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 2 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This thesis approaches the Weimar constitutional debate by focusing on its most 
significant participants, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. It reveals that this debate 
concerned the constitutional question in the context of the contradiction between the 
democratic modern state and the capitalist economy. It was in that sense a debate on the 
'riddle' that was identified by the young Marx concerning the problem of the political form 
through which modern societies are regulated, caught between the political question, 
namely that of political power, and by the social question, namely that of the socio-
economic structures of power. In effect the term “political constitutionalism” captures this 
tension through which Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt approached the constitutional 
question. 
  
The historical context of the Weimar Republic is important in order to bring into the light 
the theories of Kelsen and Schmitt (and, secondarily, of other Weimar theorists who also 
approached the constitutional question through similar problématiques). Regarding this 
context, it is, firstly, demonstrated that the Weimar Constitution was a post-traditional 
constitution that dealt both with the political question (the introduction of parliamentary 
democracy) and with the “social question” through its “economic constitution”. It is, 
secondly, demonstrated how the relationship between political and socio-economic power 
affected, in turn, the constitutional order throughout Weimar by leading ultimately to its 
structural transformation. 
  
This thesis argues, firstly, that Schmitt’s solution to Marx’s riddle dissociated the 
constitution from its democratic promise in order to protect a concept of constitutionalism 
that would maintain the 19th century liberal political-economic divide. Hence, it ended up 
as a theory of “authoritarian liberalism” that legitimized the “structural transformation” of 
the Weimar constitutional order between 1930-32; secondly, that Kelsen’s solution, while 
placing emphasis on the association of the constitution with the democratic promise, 
underplayed the power of the capitalist mode of production to affect both the State and the 
constitutional order itself. As a result, and although he defended the Republic and the 
Weimar Constitution, he could not see that the constitution itself was traversed by the 
power of capital in its entanglement with the mode of production. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
The “debate” between two of the greatest jurists of the 20th century, Hans Kelsen (1881-
1973) and Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), takes place mostly in the historical context of the 
Weimar Republic (1918-1933), the “most democratic democracy in the world” as it was 
once called1 or -as the historian Peter Gay wrote- a Republic that “was born in defeat, lived 
in turmoil and died in disaster”2. 
 
This historical context of the Weimar Republic cannot be identified merely with the 
modernist architecture of the Bauhaus movement3, Brecht’s epic theatre, Thomas Mann’s 
‘‘Magic Mountain’’ and Joseph Roth’s feuilletons regarding the outcasts and the 
underdogs4. The great political and cultural scene of 1920’s Berlin -  that was “…the 
aspiration of the composer, the journalist, the actor; with its superb orchestras, its 
hundred and twenty newspapers, its forty theaters…”5- is not the only picture of the 
Weimar Republic.  
 
                                                
1This phrase was used by Eduard David (the SPD Minister of the Interior) on July 31, 1919 as a hailing to the 
approval of the Weimar Constitution by the National Assembly on that day. David was primarily referring to 
its provisions on universal suffrage, economic-social democracy and direct democracy. 
 See David’s speech in Fowkes, Ben (2014). The German Left and the Weimar Republic. A Selection of 
Documents, The Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 36-37, 37 
 Winkler, Heinrich A. ([2000] 2006). Germany: The Long Road West: 1798-1933, vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. This is the 7th chapter of the book and is entitled ‘The Impaired Republic 1918-1933’, 339-
491, 364 
2 Gay, Peter ([1968]2001). Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider, New York, London: W.W. Norton, 2 
3Interestingly, Peter Gay argues that the “three lives of the Bauhaus- venturesome trials at the beginning, 
secure accomplishment in the middle years and frantic pessimism at the end- are expressive of the three 
periods of the Republic itself”. Ibid. 120 
4 See Roth, Joseph (2013). What I saw: Reports from Berlin 1920-33, Granta Books. 
5 Gay ([1968] 2001) 123 
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On the contrary, both this city and, even more, the newborn Republic comprised a mosaic 
of political and theoretical conceptions since its birth. This was evident even by the fact 
that the cultural advances that defined “Weimar culture” were not seen by everyone 
through a positive lens6. In terms of the political dimension, which crucially concerns us 
here, there was a ‘‘tug of war’’ between two different concepts of political representation 
of the German people, both claiming a different inscription of the revolutionary event of 
November 1918: on the one hand as rupture and a new beginning, on the other as 
continuous to the Kaiserreich. 
 
Continuity was envisaged predominantly through the categories of constitutional 
monarchy. Rupture was based on a conception of a reflexive political identity that found 
expression in the “Republik” and was also responsive to the opening of the “social 
question”, which was omnipresent as the end of the Great War was approaching. 
Alongside the “tug of war” between these two main understandings of the constitutional 
question stood a third one (of less impact) that was deployed in the name of the 
“dictatorship of the proletariat” aspiring to a “substantive” council democracy on the 
model of the newly born Bolshevik regime in Russia. 
 
In the text of the 1919 Weimar Constitution, one finds articulated clearly rupture given 
that the Constitution established parliamentary democracy for the first time in Germany. 
Moreover, for the first time and in contrast with nineteenth-century liberal 
constitutionalism the Weimar Constitution dealt also with the “social question”7.  
 
However, this Constitution included also some elements of continuity with the imperial 
constitutional order of the 1871 Constitution such as the well-known article 48, which gave 
significant powers to the President of the Weimar Republic. Moreover, despite that the 
Weimar Constitution dealt with the “social” question by addressing also the democratic 
organization of the workplace in its “economic constitution”, it did not introduce a clear 
rupture with the capitalist mode of production. 
 
                                                
6 E.g. the Bauhaus movement. Ibid. 100-101 
7 The 1848/1849 revolutionary German Constitution also ignored the “social question”. 
See the 1848/1849 Constitution in Hucko, Elmar ([1984] 1987). The Democratic Tradition: Four German 
Constitutions, New York: Berg Publishers Limited, 79-117. See also the Introduction of Hucko ([1984]1987) 
20 
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The Weimar constitutional order was transformed during the Weimar Republic and 
especially between 1930 and 1933 through these elements of continuity, namely both 
parliamentary democracy was substituted by the rise of the presidential state and the 
approach of the Weimar Constitution to the social question was subsumed under the logic 
of capitalist accumulation. So, the (originally dominant) direction of rupture in the Weimar 
Constitution was bypassed.  
 
This could be seen both at the political level and, especially regarding the “political 
question”, also among the Teachers of State Law in the “Quarrel over methods and aims” 
(Methoden-und Richtungsstreit) during the early 1930s. This structural transformation of 
the Weimar constitutional order played an important role in Weimar’s fall. 
 
My thesis will shed light on this historical process through its focus on the Weimar 
constitutional discussion and on its impact on the constitutional development of the 
Weimar Constitution. This discussion is significant given that, as Stolleis wrote, “what is 
called the ‘quarrel over methods and aims’ was thus essentially a general discussion over 
the position of the field in a politically unsettled decade. The participants …quarrelled 
over the political form under which they wanted to live and at the same time defined the 
elementary methodological preconditions of their own discipline” 8. 
 
Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt were the two most significant theorists in terms of depth in 
this methodological “quarrel” during Weimar and their debate played a crucial role in the 
direction that public law took during the Republic and, in this way, in the fate of the 
Republic itself (from the perspective of constitutional theory). Hence, I dig deeply into 
their debate, which dealt with both legal theory and state theory or- to put it in German- 
with both Staatsrechtslehre and Staatslehre. 
 
However, this dissertation will also deal secondarily with other significant theorists and 
mainly with Max Weber, Hugo Sinzheimer, Franz Neumann and to an extent with Hugo 
Preuss and Herman Heller9. These theorists are crucial in order to understand both the 
                                                
8 Stolleis, Michael (2004). A History of Public Law in Germany: 1914-1945, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 142 
9This dissertation will not deal, nevertheless, with Rudolf Smend’s spiritualist Integrationslehre theory. This 
approach is not relevant for the way in which I approach and explain the constitutional question in Weimar in 
this dissertation. That’s because, in contrast with all the other theories with which I am dealing in this 
dissertation, Smend’s theory does not delve both into the political and into the social question as I define 
them in this dissertation.  
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Weimar Constitution and Weimar constitutionalism as I approach it. The way in which I 
will delve into Weimar constitutionalism in this dissertation is by showing that all these 
theorists dealt- in the historical context of the Weimar Republic- implicitly with the riddle 
that was described by the 25-year-old Marx in his “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the 
State”. This riddle concerned the role of the constitution in the context of the modern state 
and of the capitalist economy.  
 
The solutions given to this riddle by Schmitt and Kelsen and, secondarily, by the other 
theorists had an impact on the Weimar Constitution and, in this way, on the historical 
process of the “most democratic democracy in the world” as will be seen by the end of this 
dissertation.  
 
 
Marx’s “riddle of all constitutions” 
 
 
I will start from the analysis of the modern state in order to grasp Marx’s riddle. The 
modern state was defined through its separation from civil society. As Marx argued, “the 
abstraction of the state as such was not born until the modern world because the 
abstraction of private life was not created until modern times. The abstraction of the 
political state is a modern product”10. It was Hegel, according to Marx, who “experiences 
the separation of the state [Locke’s ‘civil government’] from civil society as a 
contradiction”11.   
 
This contradiction can be already traced, nevertheless, since Rousseau’s distinction 
between homme and citoyen and it was ultimately resolved in Rousseau through the 
general will (as a “civil religion”12), which is oriented to the collective common good 
(rather than to an aggregation of interests) and is based on a conception of property that is 
just serving subsistence (as opposed to the corruptive effects of the arising capitalist 
                                                                                                                                              
 
10Marx, Karl ([1843] 1992). ‘Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State’ in Marx, Karl. Early Writings, 
Penguin Books, 57-198, 90 
11 Ibid. 141 
See also Colleti, Lucio ([1974] 1992). ‘Introduction’ in Marx, Karl, Early Writings, Penguin Books, 7-56, 31 
12 See Rousseau, Jean-Jacques ([1762] 2008). ‘The Social Contract’ in Discourse on Political 
Economy and The Social Contract, Oxford World's Classics, 43-168, particularly 158-168 
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exchange economy of accumulation)13. So, Rousseau solves this split of “dual life” without 
pactum subjectionis and through a concept of freedom in the state and not a liberal 
freedom from the state14. 
 
Hegel’s solution to this contradiction comes through the state. He presents the state as 
embodying the “ethical idea”15 by having three main internal moments16: “(a) the power to 
determine and establish the universal — the Legislature; (b) the power to subsume single 
cases and the spheres of particularity under the universal — the Executive; (c) the power 
of subjectivity, as the will with the power of ultimate decision — the Crown. In the crown, 
the different powers are bound into an individual unity which is thus at once the apex and 
basis of the whole, i.e. of constitutional monarchy”17.  
 
It should clarified here that, in the legislature “as a whole”, monarchy is the first moment 
“as that to which ultimate decisions belong;… the executive [is the second moment] as the 
advisory body since it is the moment possessed of [a] a concrete knowledge and oversight 
of the whole state in its numerous facets and the actual principles firmly established within 
it, and [b] a knowledge in particular of what the state's power needs”18. The Estates are 
the last moment in the legislature and they play a mediating role between civil society and 
the state by being the “empirical universal” of the “thoughts and opinions of the Many”19 
(the “deputation of civil society to the state” as Marx calls it20) whereas the bureaucracy is 
the universal class in the Estates (the “state formalism of civil society” that protects the 
                                                
13 See Rousseau, Jean-Jacques ([1755] 1984). A Discourse of Inequality, London: Penguin. 
14See Colleti, Lucio (1972). From Rousseau to Lenin, New York, London: Monthly Review Press, 143-194, 
especially 151 
  
See also Goldoni, Marco (May 22, 2017). ‘Rousseau's Radical Constitutionalism and Its Legacy’ in Dowdle, 
M. W.& Wilkinson, M. A. (eds.) Constitutionalism Beyond Liberalism, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. ISBN 9781107112759 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2971995 
 
15Hegel, Friedrich (1820). Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, available at: 
 https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/prstate.htm (last accessed on 02/02/2018) 
 
16 Colleti ([1974] 1992) 32 
17 Hegel (1820) 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Marx ([1843] 1992) 124 
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“imaginary universality of particular interests” as Marx writes21). The crown “is the 
abstract person that contains the state in himself” through this edifice22.  
 
Hegel’s solution is criticized by Marx both for its dialectical logic, which Marx calls 
“logical mysticism”23 , and for his ideas on the state.  Regarding these ideas, Marx does not 
focus too much on the feudal elements of Hegel’s theoretical construction, which are 
inspired by the Prussian state, but “[Hegel] is seen [by Marx], rather, as the theorist of the 
modern representative state”24.  
 
In this vein, Marx’s critique to the Hegelian solution to this contradiction is that the 
“double” life of the people (civil and political life) is not dismantled by Hegel given that 
“the only form in which… [man] can exist as a citizen is the form of pure, unadorned 
individuality. For the existence of the state is complete without him and his existence in 
civil society is complete without the state”25. Based on this, he argues that Hegel’s 
“political” state is directly dependent on private property (given also that Hegel defended 
landed property through primogeniture as essential to the state26).  
 
As Marx wrote, “if ‘independent private property’ acquires in the political state and in the 
legislature the meaning of political independence, then it is the political independence of 
the state. In that case ‘independent private property’ or ‘real private property’ is not only 
the ‘pillar of the constitution’ but also the ‘constitution itself’”27. Hence, Hegel’s theory 
turns the constitution into “the constitution of private property”28.  
 
In this direction, Marx suggested the dissolution of this split between civil and political life 
in his “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State” and in his writing “On the Jewish 
Question”29 around the same period. He argued that this could be done through the 
                                                
21 Ibid. 106-107 
22 Ibid. 100 
23 Colleti ([1974] 1992) 19 
24 See Ibid.  29 
25 Marx ([1843] 1992) 143 
26Ibid. 140. Colleti ([1974] 1992) 36. Hegel (1820) 
27 Marx ([1843] 1992) 176 
28Ibid. 177 
29The main difference between these two writings is that, whereas in his ‘Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the 
State’ Marx referred to Hegel’s landed property via primogeniture, in his writing ‘On the Jewish Question’ 
he makes reference to private property in general. 
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universal suffrage and the concentration of power in the legislature by writing that the 
“electoral reform in the abstract political state is the equivalent to a demand for its 
dissolution [Auflösung] and this in turn implies the dissolution of civil society”30. 
 
In this direction, he traced also the solution to the riddle by writing that “democracy is the 
solution to the riddle of every constitution. In it we find the constitution founded on its true 
ground: real human beings and real people… The constitution is thus posited as the 
people’s own creation”31. So, Marx suggested an approach that resolved this contradiction 
of the split life, namely of the political life in the “political” state and the civil life in the 
capitalist civil society, through a democratic constitution that starts from the “real people”, 
reversing in this way the “uncritical idealism” (that stands alongside the “equally 
uncritical positivism”) of Hegel32.  
 
There are two ways of conceiving Marx’s account. The first one is to see the problematic 
aspects of young Marx’s theory. In this direction, we can see that the young Marx has not 
referred (yet) to the social relations of production (labor) but he seems to refer to an 
exchange civil society of property owners- namely not to a picture of advanced capitalism 
(that we will see in Weimar)- that is reflected in the “political” state through the 
maintenance of the split life. This is related to the fact that, as Poulantzas wrote, the term 
of civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) that is criticized by Marx does not have the 
meaning of the developed capitalist social formation of the “mature Marx”33. His theory of 
the capitalist state is, therefore, not that developed at that time34.  
 
That’s why Marx’s solution to the contradiction between the political state and the 
capitalist economy seems to stand between a bourgeois democratic and an anarchist logic 
in the sense that it stands between a concept of the state of ‘all the people’- visible in his 
expression that “the vote expresses the real relation of real civil society to the civil society 
of the legislature…”35- and the dissolution of the state in order to get rid of the alienation36. 
                                                                                                                                              
See Colleti ([1974] 1992) 36 
30 Marx ([1843] 1992) 191 
31 Ibid. 87 
32 In Colleti ([1974] 1992) 35 
33Poulantzas, Nicos ([1965] 2006). Issues of the Marxist conception of the State [in Greek “Θέµατα της 
µαρξιστικής αντίληψης περί κράτους”], Nicos Poulantzas Institute, 7 
34 Ibid. 12 
35 Marx ([1843] 1992) 191 
36 See Poulantzas ([1965] 2006) 14-19 
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So, it is not yet the relatively autonomous class state of the mature Marx, which we can 
trace for instance in his state analysis in “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” (in 
1852).  
 
We can see, therefore, that the main problem of Marx’s account at that time (that is not that 
different from Rousseau’s account37) is that he does not analyze in depth the relationship 
between the democratic political state and the capitalist economy (possibly also because 
both the element of advanced capitalism and of the modern democratic state are still 
mostly lacking in Germany at that time). This can be seen also as a result of his quite 
idealistic logic (under the influence of Hegel38), which is visible in his real/unreal 
discourse.  
 
As a consequence of this, the “political” dimension seems underrated both in –what he 
calls- the “political” state and in his description of the future situation after the prospective 
dissolution of the state and of civil society. This is evident in the way in which he 
describes political representation in this future situation: “the legislature is representative 
only in the sense that every function is representative. For example, a cobbler is my 
representative in so far as he satisfies a social need, just as every definite form of social 
activity...he is a representative not by virtue of another thing but by virtue of what he is 
and what he does” 39. So, it seems as if there is going to be a homogeneous society without 
any form of social conflict after the introduction of universal suffrage, given also Marx’s 
conclusion that democracy is the definite solution to the riddle of all constitutions.  
 
There can be, nevertheless, a second- more productive- way of conceiving Marx’s account 
without necessarily sharing the ultimate suggestions of the young Marx.  In this direction, 
we can see that the significant element that Marx introduces is the specific contradiction 
that traverses modernity between the political state and capitalist civil society. More than 
this, he shows also how this contradiction affects- what Marx calls- the “political 
constitution”40 in this context. So, deviating from the paradigm of liberal 
                                                
37For the affinities between Rousseau and Marx see Colleti (1972) 183-193  
38Poulantzas ([1965] 2006)  12-19 
39Marx ([1843] 1992) 189-190 
40As Marx wrote, “In monarchy the whole, the people, is subsumed under one of its forms of existence, the 
political constitution; in democracy, the constitution itself appears only as one determining characteristic of 
the people, and indeed as its self-determination. In monarchy we have the people of the constitution, in 
democracy, the constitution of the people”.   
Marx ([1843] 1992) 87 
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constitutionalism41, Marx focuses on the socio-economic context and on its relationship 
with the constitution.  
 
Through his analysis, firstly, he grasps the specificity of the modern state in contrast with 
other historical forms of the state. Secondly, he raises the question about the role of the 
constitution in this socio-economic context and he shows that its role cannot be seen unless 
it is related to an account of the contradiction between the modern political state and the 
capitalist economy. Hence, he approaches the constitutional question not only with regards 
to the “political question”, namely to the organization of political power, but also to the 
“social question”, namely to socio-economic power. It is by answering to both questions 
that he resolves his riddle by tying the constitution to the democratic promise.  
 
 
Political constitutionalism in historical context: the question of methodology 
 
 
It will be seen in this dissertation that all the aforementioned Weimar theorists dealt 
implicitly and from various perspectives with Marx’s riddle of what is the role of the 
constitution between the modern state and the capitalist economy. It is also for this reason 
that their theories regarding the constitutional question involve both legal theory and 
political-state theory.  
 
I use therefore, the term political constitutionalism in the title of this dissertation in order 
to have an overview of the Weimar theorists and primarily of Kelsen and Schmitt in both 
their state and in their legal theories, namely how they theorized in their state theories the 
contradiction between the modern democratic state and the capitalist economy and how 
they conceived the effects of this relationship on the constitutional question in their legal 
theories. Hence, the term “political constitutionalism” will be used here in order to analyze 
both parts of their theories not only with regards to the stricto sensu “political” question, 
namely on the question of political power, but also with regards to the “social question”, 
namely with regards to how they conceived socio-economic power in capitalist times and 
its effect on the constitutional question.  
 
                                                
41 This is also argued by Colleti ([1974] 1992) 41 
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So, my method distances itself, firstly, from the anachronism of a deliberative perspective 
of constitutionalism that has substituted state theory in a number of influential recent 
analyses of Weimar constitutional thought42. This perspective, ‘measures’ the Weimar 
constitutional theorists with regards to the question of whether they are deploying a “non-
coercive” and “rational” concept of political power (the criterion being the model of 
deliberative democracy), based on the model of Rawls and Habermas’ project43.  
 
My approach also distances itself, from the perspective that conceives public law as “droit 
politique” (political jurisprudence). Whereas this approach does indeed introduce state 
theory analysis into constitutional thinking, this concept of a “pure” theory of public law is 
driven by the assumption of the modern state as marked by its clear differentiation from 
private power44. When read back into Weimar constitutionalism this perspective tends to 
interpret Kelsen’s, Schmitt’s and Heller’s thinking through the lens of the “political 
question” without addressing seriously their approach to the “social question”45.  
 
The difference from these two approaches of Weimar constitutionalism will be seen more 
thoroughly in the analysis of Schmitt and Kelsen in chapters 5 and 6 respectively, and 
especially in the introduction to these chapters. Moreover, in the introduction to these 
chapters my analysis distances itself, thirdly, from Kalyvas’ approach to Kelsen’s and 
Schmitt’s theory, which is much closer to Loughlin’s account (compared to deliberative 
constitutionalism) given that it also starts from the assumption of the autonomy of the 
                                                
42For two indicative examples of such an approach see Dyzenhaus, David (1997). Legality and Legitimacy: 
Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
See Scheuerman, William E. (1994). Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the 
Rule of Law, Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. 
 
43This is precisely what Dyzenhaus does by drawing a “fascinating parallel between Kelsen's Pure Theory of 
law and the recent account of public reason offered by John Rawls in Political Liberalism”. Dyzenhaus 
(1997) 158-160 
 
This deliberative approach is also evident in Scheuerman’s account of Weimar constitutionalism. 
Scheuerman’s deliberative assumption becomes evident in his argument that “…democracy provides the 
preconditions for a genuinely rational exercise of power...widespread and unrestricted popular debate and 
interchange, in which all voices can be heard and taken into consideration and in which the exercise of 
power might come to rest on a set of reasonable, broadly shared grounds and thus lose its coercive 
character”.  
 
Scheuerman (1994) 55, 113, 181 
44 Loughlin, Martin (2003). The Idea of Public Law, Oxford University Press, 76-80 
45Loughlin, Martin (2017). ‘On Constituent Power’ in Dowdle, Michael W & Wilkinson, Michael A. (eds.) 
Constitutionalism beyond Liberalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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political. This third approach focuses on the potential for a constitutionalism to embody the 
“politics of the extraordinary”, namely a constitutionalism seen in the interplay between 
institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms. However, it will be seen that, due to this 
perspective (and to the lack of historical contextualization), it too underplays Kelsen’s and 
Schmitt’s approach with regards to the “social question” in their constitutional thinking46. 
  
The droit politique approach of public law reminds us, nevertheless, correctly of the 
danger of “socio-economic reductionism” in the theorization of the constitutional 
question47. Hence, I use the term “political” in my description of Weimar constitutionalism 
to capture that dimension in the thought of Kelsen and Schmitt (but also of the other 
Staatslehre theorists that will be seen in the context of the analysis of the Weimar 
Constitution in part A, see below) that while attentive to the socio-economic power 
structures relate these to the “political question” and its ultimate prioritization. My use of 
the term “political constitutionalism” is also clearly distinguished from the concept of 
“political constitutionalism” as it is used in the current Anglo-Saxon debate in 
contradistinction with “legal constitutionalism” 48. 
 
The title of the thesis “riddle of political constitutionalism” concerns, therefore, the 
question whether primarily Schmitt and Kelsen developed a sufficiently political concept 
                                                
46 Kalyvas, Andreas (2008). Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and 
Hannah Arendt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
47 Loughlin (2003) 77 
48 Adam Tomkins, who represents an influential position within this current defined the political constitution 
as “one in which those who exercise political power (let us say the government) are held to constitutional 
account through political means and through political institutions) for example, Parliament”. In contrast 
with this, he defined the “legal constitution” as “one which imagines that the principal means, and the 
principal institution, through which the government is held to account is the law and the court-room”. 
Tomkins, Adam (2003). Public Law, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 18-19 
 
Another model is Bellamy’s model of political constitutionalism, which focuses more on the legislature’s law 
making function. He identifies political constitution with “something like the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty... a system of representative democracy, where all citizens can participate as equals in public 
processes that select and can hold accountable the prime power holders. As a result, the key decision makers 
have incentives to treat the views and concerns of those who elect them with equal concern and respect”. 
Bellamy, Richard (2011). ‘Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’, ICON  9(1), 86–111, 93-
94  
However, both currents of political constitutionalism focus mainly on the “political question”- drawing 
“upon republican theory” as Gee and Webber note- whereas my concept of political constitutionalism 
focuses both on the political question and on the social question in order to analyze Weimar constitutionalism 
with a view to Marx’s riddle.  
Gee, Graham & Webber, Grégoire C. N. (2010). ‘What is a political constitution?’ Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, 30 (2) 273-299. 283  
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of constitutionalism in the context of the Weimar Republic that would be able to answer to 
the riddle that Marx traced.  
 
This methodological lens through which we can understand their theories cannot be seen 
unless we first put these theories into a historical context. The affirmation of this 
significance for the historical contextualization is based on the assumption that the texts 
and the concepts cannot speak fully for themselves but their meaning is 
interpreted/mediated through a discourse that addresses the social reality outside the texts 
(“aussertextuelle Realität”49). This assumption is based on the fact that a text or a concept 
is not a “timeless element” that is self-standing, but it is expressed through language that 
“always-already” carries a web of social meanings in a social reality. As Michael Stolleis 
wrote, “the history of the consideration, teaching, and writing about public law cannot be 
separated from the social conditions and the general situation in which the intellectual 
processes took place”50. 
 
 
My analysis identifies three periods in the history of the Weimar Republic: the early 
“tumultuous” period (1918-1923), the era of stability (1924-1929) and the last period 
which was marked by economic crisis and governance by decrees (1930-1933). The main 
focus of this dissertation will be on the first Weimar period, in which the Weimar 
Constitution was enacted (in part A), and on the last Weimar period that shows Weimar’s 
fall through the structural transformation of the Weimar state and of the Weimar 
constitutional order (in part B and to an extent in chapter 4.2. and 4.3.). This “staggering” 
of Weimar history in the dissertation will provide the “pivot” for the whole historical 
trajectory of the Weimar Republic and of the Weimar constitutional order along with the 
analysis of Weimar constitutionalism. That’s because it is impossible to grasp the meaning 
of the Weimar Constitution unless we analyze simultaneously the theories of the 
Staatslehre scholars who introduced parts of the Weimar Constitution or were very closely 
attached to them (in part A). Conversely, it is not possible to grasp the significance of the 
Kelsen-Schmitt debate during the early 1930s unless we analyze simultaneously the 
concrete historical context of late Weimar (part B).  
 
                                                
49See Stolleis, Michael ([1997] 2002). Rechtsgeschichte als Kunstprodukt- Zur Entbehrlichkeit von ‘Begriff’ 
und ‘Tatsache’ trans. “Legal history as poetics- Towards the expendability of ‘concept’ and of the ‘fact’” (in 
Greek trans.),  Athens: Erasmos Editions 
50Stolleis, Michael (2001). Public Law in Germany: 1800-1914. New York: Berghan Books, 1 
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The perspective I adopt to analyse the historical context to the Weimar constitution is, that 
of political constitutionalism as I have already defined it. This means that, through the 
historical context, I will look at the way in which the Weimar constitution answered both 
to the political question and to the social question, namely how it dealt both with the issue 
of political power and with the issue of the socio-economic power structures. Moreover, it 
will be seen how the relationship between these two powers affected, in turn, the 
constitutional order with regards to the political and to the social question during the 
historical process of the Weimar Republic. Finally, I will explore how the Weimar 
constitutional theorists made sense of this context with regards to both questions in their 
constitutional and state thinking. 
 
 
The structure of the dissertation 
 
 
The dissertation is divided in two main parts in terms of structure. The main emphasis of 
Part A (chapters 1-4) is on the analysis of the Weimar Constitution and, more specifically, 
on its response to the political and to the social question. This analysis will be made in the 
light of the historical context mainly of the first period of the Weimar Republic (except for 
the fourth chapter, which covers part of the whole Weimar period, see below) of the 
enactment of the Weimar Constitution   
 
In part A, there is also a critical examination of the Weimar theorists that introduced parts 
of the Weimar Constitution that concerned the political question (Preuss, Weber) and the 
social question (Sinzheimer). I extend the analysis to cover  the political-theoretical 
writings of Franz Neumann and, to an extent, of Herman Heller.  
 
Part B (chapters 5 and 6) deals with Schmitt’s and Kelsen’s theories. Moreover, in this part 
there will also be a section on the historical context of the Weimar Republic, mainly of its 
last period. This historical section is necessary in order to grasp their crucial debate on the 
question of the “Guardian of the Constitution” during the early 1930s, which takes place in 
the context of late Weimar. This historical section is located in chapter 5 (the chapter on 
Schmitt) because Schmitt intervened in this historical context of late Weimar not only at a 
theoretical level (through his writings) but also at a political level as an advisor of the last 
Weimar governments. 
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More specifically, part A is divided into four chapters. The first brief chapter is devoted to 
the historical context and covers the very first period of the Weimar Republic, namely from 
the November Revolution to the Constituent Assembly. This revolutionary, ‘hot’ period is 
crucial in order to understand the way in which the November Revolution was legally 
inscribed and the basis on which the Weimar state was created. This first chapter shows 
that the element of rupture was more visible than the element of continuity in the Weimar 
state given the foundation of parliamentary democracy (elections were set for a National 
Assembly that would draft the Weimar Constitution) and the approach to the social 
question.  At the same time, I will analyze the extent to which this early Weimar Republic 
endorsed also the element of continuity by avoiding the rupture with the capitalist mode of 
production due to the “needs” of the impoverished post-war economy. In this direction, I 
will explore the relation of this continuity logic with the evolutionary thinking of the SPD, 
and whether this element of continuity could be also seen in the state apparatuses of the 
new Weimar state. 
 
In the second chapter, I deal extensively with this evolutionary thinking through the 
analysis of the evolutionary-reformist theorizations of Eduard Bernstein whose thought 
exerted a significant influence on the Social Democrats. I explore the assumptions 
regarding the concept of the state that lay behind Bernstein’s faith in the evolutionary 
transformation of society. The effects of this evolutionary-reformist thinking will be 
revealed in this chapter by Rosa Luxemburg who gave some glimpses of an anti-
evolutionary and at the same time democratic thinking during this first “hot” period.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 deal are longer (compared to the first two chapters) because they deal 
with the founding process of the Weimar Constitution stricto sensu. Chapter 3 shows how 
the Constitution dealt with the political question. It shows that the Constitution, on the one 
hand, introduced parliamentary democracy but, on the other hand extended the element of 
continuity through the power attributed to the President of the Republic. The main focus 
will be on article 48 that gave extensive powers to the President. 
 
Regarding the powers of the President, I will, firstly, analyze the historical context in 
which they were incorporated in the Weimar Constitution, at the political level, by the 
“Weimar coalition” (SPD, DDP, Zentrum). Secondly, in this chapter I will also focus on 
the theorists who introduced these presidential powers, namely Hugo Preuss and Max 
Weber. Hugo Preuss was chosen to draft the Weimar Constitution by the Council of 
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People's Commissars (mainly by the SPD) on November 15, 191851, whereas Weber 
participated also in these discussions for the drafting of the Weimar Constitution.  
 
Regarding the analysis of these theorists, I will look, firstly, at the theory of Hugo Preuss 
in order to bring into light the theoretical logic of his constitutional proposals. More 
specifically, I will show that his more moderate presidentialism (compared to Weber’s 
initial proposals) was ultimately incorporated in the Constitution and derived from his 
response both to the political question but also to the question of social justice. Moreover, 
it will be seen that this response was also related to his analysis of the German historical 
context. 
 
Secondly, I will delve more deeply into Weber’s theory in order to reveal the theoretical 
origins of his constitutional proposals given also that his (more radical compared to 
Preuss’) concept of charismatic President became hegemonic during the Weimar Republic 
both at the political level and at the level of constitutional theory (further radicalized in the 
theory of Schmitt).  
 
I will show that Weber’s constitutional suggestions for a charismatic concept of President 
derived at a theoretical level from his effort to find a “political” counterweight against the 
bureaucratic tendencies of capitalism (what he called the “instrumental” rationality) that 
endangered both the national state and individual autonomy. In this sense, it will be 
explored how Weber, while addressing both the political and the social question, found the 
solution mostly through the former (as Preuss did) and, more specifically, in the 
charismatic concept of the President. Finally, the origins of his ultimate solution to Marx’s 
riddle will be also traced in his theorization of the German political and social context. 
 
In chapter 4, I will show that the Weimar Constitution included also a response to the 
“social” question- against Weber’s insights and Preuss’ suggestions. This response can be 
seen mainly in the Second Principal Part of the Weimar Constitution (articles Articles 109-
165). This Part was the basis of the Weimar’s welfare state. The most crucial section of 
this Second Principal Part was the “economic constitution” (articles 151-165). Hence, in 
this chapter I will focus mainly on the “economic constitution”, which was introduced in 
                                                
51 Winkler ([2000]2006) 361 
See also Mommsen, Wolfgang ([1959]1990). Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1929, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 355  
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the Weimar period primarily by the Social Democrat theorist of labour law Hugo 
Sinzheimer. As Kaarlo and Klaus Tuori write “the very term ‘economic constitution’ stems 
from one particular legal culture- the German one-… general agreement prevails on the 
crucial age. This was the Weimar period.”52  
 
The main focus will be on Article 165, which regulated the role of the councils as the 
“organs of economic democracy”53, and on Sinzheimer’s theory that introduced it. I will 
present the initial assumptions that lay behind the economic constitution and article 165, 
how this constitution was partially implemented at the level of legislation during the 1920s 
and how it was “highjacked” since 1930 and it turned into an instrument of the state that 
suppressed the rights of workers.  
 
Given how the economic constitution ended up, I will also discuss this process through a 
theoretical juxtaposition. On the one side of this juxtaposition there will be two critiques of 
the Weimar economic constitution that were exerted after the fall of the Weimar Republic, 
one deriving from a Weber-inspired theoretical framework and one deriving from a 
Marxist theoretical framework. On the other side, there will be the social democratic 
Staatslehre theorists that used this constitution as part of their political-theoretical strategy 
during Weimar (mainly Neumann and Heller to an extent) in order to achieve –what 
Neumann called- the “democratic market” control.  
 
The main emphasis will be given in this chapter in Franz Neumann’s theory because his 
post-1933 theoretical critique revealed well the assumptions of the social democratic 
Staatslehre theorists during Weimar (that he held also himself during that era) both at the 
level of their state theory and at the level of their legal theory. Moreover, he revealed also 
that these assumptions were mostly shared by the SPD and the unions and that, through 
these assumptions, they could not oppose efficiently the ‘hijacking’ of the economic 
constitution and the capital’s attack both on the Sozialstaat and on political democracy 
during the last period of the Weimar Republic. 
 
Through this juxtaposition the solutions to Marx’s riddle by the aforementioned Weimar 
Staatslehre theories will become visible given that all these theorists addressed both the 
                                                
52Tuori, Kaarlo & Tuori, Klaus (2014). The Eurozone crisis: a constitutional analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 14 
53 Dukes, Ruth, (2014). The Labour Constitution: The Enduring Idea of Labour Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 18 
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social and the political question during Weimar. They delved deeply into the relationship 
between the Weimar constitution and  capitalism. 
 
 After part A, I will make the transition to part B (chapters 5 and 6), namely to the debate 
between Schmitt and Kelsen. I will analyze their theories from the perspective of political 
constitutionalism (defined earlier), in distinction with the other approaches of Schmitt and 
Kelsen (seen earlier). 
 
In chapter 5, I will analyze Schmitt’s theory throughout Weimar by presenting both his 
state-political theory and his legal theory. Regarding his political theory, I will explore his 
theorization regarding the democratic parliamentary state of 20th century in the context of 
the capitalist economy with a view to his account of the Weimar state. Through this 
perspective, I will question how he conceived the staging of the social question through the 
20th century parliament in contrast with the 19th century state and parliamentarism. 
Moreover, I will explore the extent of Weber’s influence on Schmitt’s concept of the 
political and of the social and, more than that, I will also question to what extent Schmitt 
was influenced by the liberal theorists of the 19th century and their concept of 
parliamentarism.  
 
At the level of his legal theory, I will bring into the light the relation between Schmitt’s 
state and legal theory in view also of Schmitt’s account of the Weimar state. In this vein, I 
will show how Schmitt’s Weimar methodology (that will be divided into two periods: his 
pre-1928 and post-1928 period) answers both to the social and to the political question 
through his interpretation of the Weimar Constitution and how this theorization is related 
to the different periods of the Weimar Republic. In this analysis, Schmitt’s concept of 
article 48 will be thoroughly analyzed. However, at the same time I will also explore his 
analysis with regards to the welfare state and to the economic constitution by examining its 
relation to Schmitt’s concept of the President.   
 
Finally, I will analyze the extent to which Schmitt’s theorizations played a role in the 
structural transformation of the Weimar constitutional order during the early 1930s. This 
will be explored through his writings but also through the presentation of his active role as 
an advisor of the last Weimar governments. At this point of chapter 5 (chapter 5.5.)  there 
will be also an analysis of the last period of the Weimar Republic. This historical section 
should be read in combination with chapter 4.2 and 4.3. and shows the transformation of 
the Weimar state, firstly, under the pressure of the economic elites that wanted a harsher 
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attitude against labor and were expressing their fear for a continuation of the “successful 
social-democratic reformism” that had been developed during the first “hot” period and 
between 1925 and 193054. Secondly, it explores the role of the political parties by dealing 
more extensively with the stance of Social Democracy (both at the political level and at the 
unions level) with regards to the rise of the authoritarian state and in the subsequent crisis 
of representation that led to the collapse of Weimar. Thirdly, it looks at Schmitt’s active 
role in this context.  
 
In chapter 6 I analyze Hans Kelsen’s theory. Firstly, I explore Kelsen’s conception of the 
20th century mass democratic state in the context of capitalist economy by tracing the 
origins of his state-political theorization in the way in which he grasps the Weimar and the 
Austrian context. Then I analyze the extent to which his concept of the state is also 
influenced by the multi-ethnic context of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and by the 
analyses of the German Social Democracy and of the Austro-Marxists (that are not 
unrelated to the German Social Democratic tradition as it will be seen). I will look at the 
role that these influences play in Kelsen’s relational concept of the state and how they are 
associated with the way in which he conceived the State-civil society relationship. Finally, 
I will show how his concept of the state is related to the central role that parliament plays 
in his political theory and to what extent his different approach with regards to the political 
and to the social question makes his concept of an autonomous-relational State different 
from Weber’s and Schmitt’s concept of autonomous state. 
 
At the level of Kelsen’s legal theory, I will show that his theory shares the same 
assumptions with his 1920s political theory. In this direction, I will delve into his critique 
of the dominant dualisms of traditional legal theory, namely of the State-law, subjective 
right-objective law and public-private law dualisms. I will explore how his critique to 
these dualisms and his conception of law as a “technique” are inspired by his concept of 
the state, namely (at a deeper level) by the way in which he understands the Weimar and 
the Austrian state through his social democratic assumptions.  
 
                                                
54 Abraham, David ([1981] 1986). The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis. 2nd 
ed. New York, London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, xix 
 This is argued along similar lines by Polanyi, who writes that “the peril was not Bolshevism, but disregard of 
the rules of market economy on the part of the trade unions and working-class parties, in an emergency”.   
  Polanyi, Karl ([1944] 2001). The Great Transformation: the political and economic origins of our time, 
Boston: Beacon Press, 197 
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At this point, I will discuss whether Kelsen’s theory of legal interpretation, which became 
visible in his debate with Schmitt on the “Guardian” of the Constitution, could provide a 
robust defence of the Weimar Constitution and, in this sense, of the Weimar Republic. Was 
Kelsen’s legal theory able to oppose Schmitt’s concept of the Weimar Constitution and his 
concept of the President? 
 
 Secondly, I will question whether the assumptions of Kelsen’s state theory based on which 
he conceived both the Weimar state and the Weimar constitutional order made him grasp 
the origins of rise of the authoritarian state and of the structural transformation of the 
constitutional order. At this point, I will associate Kelsen’s theoretical assumptions with 
his analysis during the early 1930s also through the comparison of his theory with other 
social democratic accounts of this period. I will bring again to the fore the theories that 
were discussed in chapter 4.3. (Franz Neumann’s pre-1933 theory, Herman Heller’s 
theory) and I will show the extent to which, through their social democratic state theory 
assumptions, they had affinities with the way in which Kelsen conceived the 1930s 
historical context (despite the differences between their theories).  
 
Based on this analysis I will conclude on whether the way in which Kelsen resolved 
Marx’s riddle in the context of late Weimar provides a better defence of the Weimar 
Constitution and the Weimar Republic than Schmitt’s solution to the riddle. 
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Part A: The founding of the Weimar Constitution 
 
 
Chapter 1: From the councils to the Constituent Assembly: the first 
conflict towards a new concept of a “we” 
 
 
 
This chapter analyses mostly the historical context of the first period of the Weimar 
Republic, namely from the Revolution of November 1918 to the elections to 
the constituent National Assembly on January 19, 1919. It aims to show the foundations on 
which the new Weimar state was built and the way in which the revolutionary event was 
legally inscribed, paving the way for its later constitutional inscription. 
 
The structure of this chapter is the following. I will present, firstly, the answer of the 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils to the political question, namely regarding the 
organization of political power, and to the social question that concerns the organization of 
socio-economic relationships. The answer to these two questions will show the hegemony 
of the Left, which is visible by the acceptance of parliamentarism even by the conservative 
bourgeoisie during this period55, but also some signs of continuity due to the evolutionary 
thinking of the SPD56.  
 
Secondly, I will focus on these signs of continuity and I will question whether this 
                                                
55Stolleis (2004) 65 
56The SPD had been founded in Gotha in May 1875 by Ferdinand Lassalle, August Bebel, Wilhelm 
Liebknecht and others with the name “Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany”. After the split of 1917 and the 
birth of USPD the official title of the Party was MSPD until September 1922. 
Braunthal, Gerard (1978). Socialist Labor and Politics in Weimar Germany.  Hamden CT: Archon Books, 20 
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revolution remained unfinished and whether this made the Weimar Republic intrinsically 
vulnerable. 
 
 
Founding Weimar 
 
 
The narration of the historical context starts from the devastating picture of late October 
1918 in Germany. By the end of the Great War, there were two and a half million deaths, 
more than three million surviving dependents and disabled veterans, and an impoverished 
German economy and society57. As a consequence of this situation (along with some other 
factors58) the revolution “from below” sparked on October 29, 1918 with the occasion of 
the mutiny of the Germany sailors in Kiel. They refused to obey the orders of the naval 
leadership to instigate a North Sea battle against the British59.  
 
This mutiny turned quickly into a series of protests in various cities demanding ‘‘bread’’ 
and ‘‘peace’’ against the will of the military leadership that wanted the continuation of the 
war. In a few days, it turned into a movement, organized in the form of soldiers’ and 
workers’ councils, that demanded the overthrow of the monarch Wilhelm II60 who was 
deemed mainly responsible both for the ‘‘catastrophic’’ outcome and length of the war and 
for the devastating material conditions. It should be also added here that, albeit this 
revolution was sparked spontaneously, the SPD members and unions dominated the 
majority of the councils. However, it was also the USDP and the revolutionary Shop 
Stewards, which played a leading role in the minority of the councils (especially in 
Berlin61) and they were gaining even more ground during this period62.  
                                                
57According to Stolleis, “the relatively contained strata of the “poor” from before the war had become a 
menacingly broad stratum, which was filled not only by victims of the war, but also by a middle class 
stripped of their assets”.  
 Stolleis, Michael (2014). History of Social Law in Germany, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 95 
See also Feldman, Gerard D. (1997). The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German 
Inflation 1914-1924, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 77 
58 There was also a feeling by large parts of the German society that the burden of the war economy was 
unfairly distributed. See Feldman (1997) 73-74 
59Winkler ([2000] 2006) 330-332. Braunthal (1978) 34    
60Winkler ([2000] 2006) 330 
61 Fowkes (2014) 44 
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After the mutiny had already turned into revolution on November 7, 1918 in various 
cities63, the leader of the SPD Friedrich Ebert met the chancellor Prince Maximilian of 
Baden on November 9, 1918, and the latter announced to him the abdication of the 
(hesitant until that time) Kaiser Wilhelm II and of himself, and the transfer of the 
“pursuance of the duties of imperial chancellor with the approval of all the ministerial 
secretaries” to Ebert64. This happened after the SPD had already sent a public ultimatum 
demanding it and had threatened with a strike.  
 
Two hours later, under the “pressure” of the November revolution, the Staatssekretär 
Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann took the initiative and proclaimed the new order of 
“democratic republic” outside the dining-room of the Reichstag at a time that the 
revolution had already reached Berlin. Scheidemann’s proclamation of the new order of 
“democratic republic” aimed at aligning with the masses that expected a “demonstrative 
break” with the previous regime and at the same time to gain control over the 
revolutionary tendencies. The latter tendencies would appear two hours later in 
Liebknecht’s proclamation of a “free socialist Republic of Germany” on the balcony of the 
Berliner Stadtschloss (royal palace)65.  
 
 So, this was the point of the first democratic rupture. This detailed description is 
important so as to see thoroughly the unstable interplay between constituent and 
constituted power during these times, namely before the revolutionary event was legally 
inscribed in the following days and months.  
 
Moving now to the institutional inscription of this revolutionary event, one day after 
Scheidemann’s proclamation 3.000 representatives of the soldiers’ and workers’ councils 
confirmed the new transitional government that was called “Council of People’s 
Commissars” (3 members from the SPD and 3 from the USPD)66. However, both the 
                                                                                                                                              
62 Braunthal (1978) 36 
63e.g. The Independent Social Democrat Kurt Eisner “seized power in Munich as the head of that city’s 
workers’ and soldiers’ councils”.  Winkler ([2000] 2006) 330 
64 This is how Ebert put it in his first proclamation to the German people.  
In Winkler ([2000] 2006) 333 
 
65Ibid. 334 
66 Ibid. 335-336 
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particular role and the duration of this government was unclear at that time. The only issue 
that could be seen was the government’s clearly leftist declaration on 12 November, 1918, 
according to which it ‘‘has itself the task of putting into effect the socialist program’’. In 
this direction, it proclaimed some measures that would ‘‘enter into immediate legal 
effect’’67. 
 
The role and the duration of this government was clarified in the first Congress of the 
Workers' and Soldiers' Councils in Berlin (16-21 December 1918). The main question both 
towards the Congress and during the Congress was whether the Weimar Republic would 
follow a pure council system like the Soviet model or there would be a Constituent 
Assembly that would decide about the “political question”. 
 
A not insignificant part affiliated with the USPD was arguing for the former line following 
the paradigm of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by Lenin in Soviet Russia, 
which is a line that was also “confirmed” in the first congress of the newly born KPD in 
the beginnings of January 1919. Based on this, the KPD (that had split from the USPD) 
decided the boycotting of the elections for the Constituent Assembly in a hugely debated 
decision objected to both by Rosa Luxemburg and by Paul Levi (among others)68.  
 
The SPD, on the contrary, argued for the latter line by suggesting parliamentary 
representation as the form of political representation. Notwithstanding its stance of 
accepting parliamentary monarchy until the first days of November 191869, the SPD 
argued clearly in favor of parliamentary democracy after 7 November 1918 (as a way also 
                                                
67Among the measures that the new government declared that it would enter into immediate legal effect were 
the following ones: 
The right of association and assembly is no longer subject to any restriction, even for officials and those who 
work for the state. 
The expression of opinion in speech and writing is free of restriction. 
The provisions to protect labor, which were suspended at the beginning of war, are hereby brought into 
effect once again...’’. 
See Fowkes (2014) 17 
68In this founding Congress of the KPD, 62 delegates voted for the non-participation in the elections, 23 
against.  
Winkler ([2000] 2006) 348 
69Hence, Heinrich Winkler writes that the SPD “though republicans in principle, had long since become 
reasoned or practical monarchists ‘Vernunftmonarchisten’”. Ibid. 330 
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to avoid a revolution) and during the post-revolutionary days70.  
 
The “moderate” part of the USPD was also not opposed to the Constituent Assembly but 
did not want to hold general elections until April or May 1919 in order to “take 
precautionary measures securing democracy and socialism” (albeit Winkler sensibly 
argues that the democratic legitimacy of a Constituent Assembly would “secure” more the 
Republic71).  
 
Ultimately, the decision for a Constituent Assembly was the one to win (344 against 98 
votes)72 and it showed a broad consensus for a deepening of democracy instead of a 
“dictatorship of the proletariat”, which they “foresaw that it would quickly become a 
dictatorship over the proletariat” especially after the route that the Russian Revolution 
started taking73. This deepening of democracy and the (overall) leftist tendency during this 
period can be also seen through the significant reforms that were proclaimed. 
 
Firstly, the Congress decided unanimously to make significant reforms in the (replete with 
monarchist officers) army, which is well-known as the “Hamburg points” (e.g. the 
elimination of the insignia of ranks, the elections of the leaders from the soldiers etc.), and 
to submit the military under the control of Council of People’s Commissars by creating 
also a volunteer people’s militia for the protection of the Republic74.  
 
Secondly, the Congress dealt with the economy and with labour law. Regarding the former, 
it voted with a large majority to call the Council of People’s Commissars to start 
immediately the nationalization process of qualified branches of industry, especially 
mining (for the first socialization commission see chapter 4.2.)75. Regarding the latter, it 
issued the decree on “Collective Agreements, Workers’ and Employees’ Committees, and 
the Settlement of Labor Disputes” (23 December 1918). 
 
                                                
70 Ibid. 331. See Fowkes (2014) 15 
71Winkler ([2000] 2006) 342, 344 
72Ibid. 348 
73 Ibid, p.346 
74 See more in Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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 This decree recognized the unions, regulated collective bargaining and the binding 
normative effect of collective agreements. As the theorist of labor law Hugo Sinzheimer 
wrote, the “fundamental ideas on which the law rests are: first, that the specifications of a 
wage agreement cannot be changed by individual contracts between employer and 
employee; second, that by special decree of the Minister of Labor they may be applied to 
such employers and employees as did not participate in the drawing up of the wage 
agreement” 76.  
 
So, this decree “boosted the legal effectiveness of collective bargaining contracts”77. In 
this direction, the Reich Labor office (established since October 1918) was given the 
authority to declare upon request as binding, collective agreements to all the relevant 
workplaces, including those in which the workers were not union members and where 
employers were not members of the employers’ associations78. Moreover, it also regulated 
the establishment of works councils in workplaces with more than twenty workers 
(including the public sector)79.  
 
This decree partially superseded the Stinnes-Legien agreement. The latter agreement (15 
November 1918), named in this way due to its most well-known signatories, will be further 
analyzed here because it plays a significant role in the discussion about Weimar’s 
‘‘economic constitution’’ both for its content but also due to the way that it was conducted. 
Starting from the latter, this agreement was signed immediately after the November 
Revolution by employers and labor leaders amidst a common climate of fear about a 
potential unfolding of the November revolution in an analogous direction with the Russian 
one.  
 
The union leaders (affiliated with the SPD) and industrialists had already held a series of 
secret meetings since October 1918 because the employers could foresee that the war 
would be lost and they “were willing to form an alliance with the strong unions as a way of 
preserving the capitalist system”80.  After the November Revolution, they were ready to 
                                                
76 Sinzheimer, Hugo (1920). ‘The Development of Labor Legislation in Germany’, (trans. Shumway, D.) The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 92, Social and Industrial Conditions in the 
Germany of Today, 35-40, 38 
77 Stolleis (2014) 123 
78Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80Braunthal (1978) 34-35 
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make bigger concessions to the unions because they conceived them ‘‘… as a bulwark 
against the threat of anarchy, bolshevism, and the socialization of industry”81. On the other 
side, labor leaders were willing to sign such an agreement not only for its important gains 
but because they feared the revolutionary situation both for their own organization and for 
a potential economic collapse “unless employers helped to shore up the economy”82.  
 
The Stinnes-Legien agreement was approved by all the federations (socialists and non-
socialists) and was also approved unanimously and publicized by the Council of the 
People’s Deputies, acquiring in this way a “semi-official character”83. Although this “did 
not grant the agreement the character of a formal law”, its consequence was also that “it 
assumed the binding character of an administrative order for the public-sector 
enterprises”84.  
 
This agreement recognized the eight-hour working day, trade unions, collective bargaining 
and pledged the prohibition of discrimination based on sex85. In addition, it also regulated 
the works committees in all workplaces with more than fifty workers (whereas the 
December Decree changed it into demanding more than twenty workers) and a Central 
Commission, which would be formed at a national level with equal representation by the 
employers’ and workers’ organisations and would be responsible for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes86. On December 4, the Central Commission was created and it was 
also charged with the role of advising the government on issues of economic and social 
legislation87.  
 
It should be added here that the effect of the Stinnes-Legien agreement and of the 
December Decree is not insignificant given that (along with article 159 of the Constitution 
                                                
81Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 35 
83Dukes, Ruth (2005). ‘Origins of the German System of Worker Representation’, Historical Studies in 
Industrial Relations, 19, 31-62, 42 
 
84 Stolleis (2014) 123 
85 For the whole content of the agreement see Fowkes (2014) 18-20 
See also Sinzheimer (1920) 35-40, 38 
86For the role of this Commission see “The Agreement for Co-Operation Made on 15 November 1918 
Between 21 Employers’ Associations and 7 Trade Unions” in Fowkes (2014) 18-20 
87 Braunthal (1978) 35 
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that established the “freedom of association”88) it led to a huge rise in the number of 
workers organized in unions from 3.9 million in 1918 to 13.3 million in 192289. Moreover, 
there was during the first years of the Weimar Republic a “triumphal march of the 
collective bargaining contract in all areas of labor law”, which was visible in that the year 
1922 saw 10,768 collective agreements that applied to 890,000 businesses with 14.3 
million employees (that is 75 % of all workers)90. 
 
However, the crucial point here is that the December Decree and the Stinnes-Legien 
agreement did not define the concrete role of the councils and their relationship with the 
unions, given also that there was a political dichotomy: the “revolutionary” left wanted a 
purely political role for the councils91 whereas the SPD did not want a substitution of the 
Reichstag92. Moreover, both the SPD and the General Commission of Trade Unions 
(precursor of the ADGB, see chapter 4) were still torn and undecided about the concrete 
role of the councils (see chapter 4 on this).  
 
It was ultimately left for the Constituent Assembly to decide, which voted for the inclusion 
of the famous article 165. This article incorporated many aspects of the aforementioned 
agreements and was included along with other provisions in the ‘‘economic constitution’’ 
(see chapter 4). This article and the overall Weimar “economic constitution” has sparked a 
theoretical discussion about whether it constituted ultimately a rupture in the direction of 
“democracy in the workplace” or a continuity with the pre-war regime of a (now) more 
leftist corporatism.  
 
I will suspend judgment on this discussion here (see chapter 4). The only issue that needs 
to be stressed here, is that the role of the councils during the “hot” period was still left 
open. In this sense, I deem problematic the argumentation of Franz Neumann, which draws 
a direct line from the Stinnes-Legien agreement to the drafting of the Weimar Constitution, 
by writing that the Weimar Constitution endorsed ab initio a class collaborationist logic 
and that it consisted mainly in the codification of prior agreements of the new actors of the 
                                                
88Weimar Constitution ([1919] 2008) in ‘Appendix’ of Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, Durham: Duke 
University Press, 409-440, 435 
89 Stolleis (2014) 96 
90Ibid. 123 
91See Winkler ([2000] 2006) 340 
92 Braunthal (1978) 37 
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political system (see also chapter 4.3.)93. The examples that he gave in this direction were 
the alleged Ebert–Groener secret pact (10 November 1918)94 and the negotiations between 
labor leaders and the employers during the war that culminated in the Stinnes-Legien 
agreement.  
  
However, I have tried to show here that both the labor legislation and the overall historical 
context of this “hot” period was more open than what is often presented by the “prior 
agreements” argumentation.  
 
 
The rise of enmity and the turning point: The “unfinished” revolution”95? 
 
This -politically dense- very first period, ended with the withdrawal of the USPD members 
from the transitional government (27 December 1918) mainly because they thought that 
the ‘‘achievements of the revolution’’ were in danger in a series of areas (regarding the 
non-implementation of reforms in the military, in the administration and the socialization 
of industries that the Council had voted for) and because of the actions of the SPD 
government members96 during the soldier mutiny in the so-called “Berlin Christmas 
                                                
93Neumann, Franz L. ([1942, 1944] 2009). Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (eds. 
Rowman &Littlefield), London: Victor Gollancz , 10-12 
94This is the alleged telephone conversation between Ebert and Groener, who was the First Quartermaster-
General. In this conversation Groener offered to Ebert the support of the army in a united fight against 
Bolshevism and the establishment of an orderly government. Although this is not certain (Groener admitted 
it), Ebert –with Winkler’s words- “supposedly accepted” this agreement. 
Winkler ([2000]2006) 337  
See also Neumann who argues that this conversation was a historical fact.  
Neumann, Franz L. ([1933] 1996). ‘The Decay of German Democracy’ in Scheuerman, W.E. (ed.) The Rule 
of Law under Siege: Selected Essays of Franz L.Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, Berkeley:  University of 
California Press, 30 
95This is argued by Bracher, Karl Dietrich (1971). The German dictatorship: the origins, structure and effects 
of National Socialism, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 71-72 
96This is the fact that the SPD members of the government (Ebert, Scheidemann, Landsberg) gave ‘‘carte 
blanche’’ to the Prussian War Minister to apply military ‘‘force’’ in order to ‘‘free’’ (the Berlin Commandant) 
Otto Wels. Wels had been taken as a ‘hostage’ by the sailors during their occupation of the royal palace due 
to a conflict “over the payment of the ‘people’s naval division’”.  
See Winkler ([2000] 2006) 347 
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Battles”97. The final step of this enmity was the “January” uprising, which broke out on the 
occasion of the dismissal of the president of the Berlin police (Emil Eichhorn) because he 
had joined the rebellious “people’s naval division” during the “Berlin Christmas Battles” 
98.  
This protest against the dismissal of Eichhorn, who was also a prominent member of the 
left-wing of the USPD, turned into a spontaneous uprising that substantively acquired the 
aim of blocking the elections for the Constituent Assembly and establishing a “dictatorship 
of the proletariat”. It was ultimately crushed by the far-right paramilitary Freikorps, which 
had been hired by (the newcomer to the transitional government) Gustav Noske99 and their 
motivation was not the protection of democracy but their “hatred of everything on the 
left”100. These paramilitary bodies acted in a very violent way in retaliation for the uprising 
by killing, among others, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg on January 15, 1919.  
 
This is a turning point for the birth of the new Republic and, therefore, for the inscription 
of the new “we”. That’s because, albeit the SPD and a large portion of the German 
population did not want a council Republic, especially in view of how things started 
unfolding in Russia at that time, it seems that the old-antidemocratic establishment had 
acquired again an almost official role from January onwards. As the historian Isaac 
Deutscher wrote, regarding Luxemburg’s assassination by the Freikorps, “in her 
assassination Hohenzollern Germany celebrated its last triumph, and Nazi Germany its 
first”101. 
 
This collaboration of the Freikorps with the SPD became visible also later in a series of 
other left-wing workers’ uprisings between 1919-1920 and most notably in the series of 
great strikes in spring 1919 and in the Ruhr uprising (1920) that, according to Winkler’s 
periodization, constituted the second and the third phase of the November Revolution 
respectively102. These minority uprisings- that indicated the dissatisfaction of workers with 
                                                
97See the whole declaration of the USPD in Fowkes (2014) 56-57 
98 Winkler ([2000] 2006) 348 
99 Ibid. 348-350 
100 Ibid. 350. See also Traverso, Enzo ([2007] 2013). A feu et à sang : De la guerre civile européenne 1914-
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101 In Dowling, Siobhán (2009). ‘Remembering Rosa Luxemburg: Still popular 90 years after assassination’, 
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102  Winkler ([2000] 2006) 354-355, 371. See also Braunthal (1978) 37  
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the SPD, regarding the lack of reforms (among others) on the issue of industrial relations 
and of socializations- acquired ultimately the target to establish council republics and were 
suppressed with the help of the Freikorps.  
 
The case of Ruhr uprising is indicative given that many members of the Freikorps that 
suppressed it were participants in the Kapp Putsch that aimed at overthrowing the 
government103, whereas the Ruhr uprising had initially started from a general strike so as to 
save the Republic from the Kapp Putsch104. Moreover, the participants in the Kapp Putsch 
were treated very leniently by the judiciary in contradistinction with the way in which the 
labor uprisings were treated by the judiciary105. As Neumann writes “it is impossible to 
escape the conclusion that political justice is the blackest page in the life of the German 
Republic”.106 
 
In this direction, I should elaborate on several issues that show this overall continuity, 
which puts limits on the further democratization of state and society, especially from 
January onwards107. More specifically, there was ultimately a lack of substantive reforms in 
the army, in the judiciary and in the public administration108. Significant parts of these 
institutions, which were staffed by people with noble origins, especially at the elite level 
(albeit less than before 1918), were very conservative and openly anti-democratic and they 
had mostly the attitude of being “above the society”109.  
 
                                                
103 This was an attempted coup d’ etat on March 13, 1920. It was orchestrated by Wolfgang Kapp, who was a 
monarchist and a founder of the wartime Fatherland party, and by Reichswehr General Walter von Lüttwitz.  
As Braunthal writes “they secretly organized 6,000 Marine Brigade troops in Prussia and marched on Berlin 
to overthrow the governments and install themselves in power”. However, the ADGB executive “after 
hearing reports from the SPD executive” proclaimed a general strike on March 13. This strike managed to 
‘save’ the Republic in the sense that it became effective and had as a consequence that Kapp “ordered his 
troops to withdraw from Berlin on March 17”. See Braunthal (1978), p. 40-46 
104Ibid, 41. 
105 Franz Neumann wrote that “every adherent” of the 1919 Munich Soviet Republic “who had the slightest 
connection with the unsuccessful coup was sentenced” whereas the participants both in the right-wing Kapp 
Putsch and in the Munich Putsch of 1923 were treated in a much more lenient way (e.g. no one was punished 
for the Kapp Putsch). 
Neumann, Franz ([1942] 1944 2009). Behemoth, pp.21-23 
106 Neumann ([1942 1944] 2009) 23 
107 Bracher (1971) 70-71 
108 Stolleis (2004) 51 
109 Blackbourn, David in Blackbourn David & Eley Geoff (1984). The Peculiarities of German History, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 243, 245 
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This continuity is due to the fact that during the first post-revolutionary period a lot of 
issues were deferred for the democratically elected Constituent Assembly, with the -not 
unwarranted- justification by the SPD of the need for greater legitimacy110. It was the triad 
“preservation of the empire’s unity, public order, restoration of the economy” that was 
prioritized also due to Germany’s bad economic condition111. However, these issues 
remained ultimately quite untouched later through a “realistic” argumentation by the SPD. 
 
To go into more detail, the SPD ultimately adopted the old imperial bureaucracy as 
“necessary” by “…claiming they did not have personnel qualified to replace the current 
officials”112. However, there was not a serious reform even at a future point. This is also 
the picture regarding the army. Despite the (earlier seen) Hamburg points and the more 
modest reform proposals by the “moderate workers’ councils” that could have created an 
army that would adhere to the new Republic113, Ebert caved in “almost immediately” to 
Groener’s and Hindenburg’s protests114. The law that passed by the National Assembly on 
March 6, 1919 and regulated a provisional army (Reichswehr), did not include “…any 
trace of the Hamburg points”115.  
 
The criticism about the lack of these reforms came from the SPD itself, with the “Prague 
Manifesto” of the SPD in exile, according to which “the grave and historic error 
committed by the German labor movement, disoriented during the war, was to have taken 
over almost unchanged the old state apparatus”116.  
 
Further than the issues related to the state apparatus, this continuity logic was also evident 
in issues of economy, such as the land issue (for the lack of socializations see chapter 4.2). 
That’s because the SPD did not carry out any significant reforms in agriculture, given also 
the food scarcity that existed after the war. As Winkler wrote “at no time in 1918-1919 was 
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the social dominance of the East Elbian manorial lords seriously threatened- an elite that 
had resisted all efforts at democratic and parliamentary reform during the imperial era, 
perhaps even more tenaciously than the heavy industrialists”117. The Land Settlement laws 
(Siedlung) of 1919 were more an attempt to enlarge “subsistence possibilities” mainly for 
the war veterans rather than a significant reform118. Any significant reform would have, 
nevertheless, weakened the power of the rural elites and could have possibly managed to 
avert the radicalization of poorer peasants in a right-wing direction, during Weimar (see 
chapter 5.5.) 
 
Finally, it should be also written here that the far-right started regaining ground on the 
occasion of the Versailles Treaty, in June 1919. This Treaty (voted for by the USPD, SPD, 
Zentrum majority and DDP minority) contained not only an important amount of 
‘‘harsh...simply impossible’’119 economic reparations, but it included also other 
prohibitions (of unification with Austria, territorial cessions such as Alsace-Lorraine, etc.) 
and the significant (in psychological terms) ‘‘war-guilt’’ clause120.  
 
The far-right deployed a hate campaign against this treaty and the policy of “fulfillment” 
that had started since the ‘‘Versailles Treaty’’121. The rising power of the far-right became 
more evident during the 1920s with the Kapp Putsch (supported openly by parts of heavy 
industry and the Bdl122) and by the several political assassinations of democratic politicians 
and ministers that took place in 1921-1922, by far-right organizations, in a climate of non-
negligible hate campaigns by the far-right press123. However, even after these 
assassinations and the reaction of the ADGB124 (that was generally more hesitant to 
                                                
117Winkler ([2000] 2006) 343 
118 Abraham ([1981] 1986) 56-58 
119 This is the phrase used by Eduard Bernstein who, nevertheless, argued for the need to accept the 
Versailles Treaty (at least in the nine-tenths of its conditions). His stance derived from his opinion about the 
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support political actions and strikes particularly with no economic dimension125) and of the 
Left, through massive demonstrations, the enacted reforms by the government were not 
seriously enforced by the ‘‘authoritarian-minded judiciary” and did not arrive at a deeper 
level126.  
 
Concluding this chapter, we have seen that there was clearly a hegemony of the Left during 
this ‘hot period’. The most important indication was the actual establishment of 
parliamentary democracy for the first time in Germany, given the decision to proceed to a 
democratically elected National Assembly. Another indication was also that there was a 
response to the “social question” despite that there was not a clean break with the capitalist 
mode of production. 
 
However, it seems that there was also a gradual compromise of the SPD with the old 
structure at the economic, bureaucratic and social level127 (see more about this also in 
chapter 3) and that the Radical Right regained some ground. This does not imply a linear-
predestined process of nazification until 1933, but it aims to show the intrinsic defects of 
the Weimar Republic that made it more “vulnerable”.  
 
                                                
125 Braunthal (1978) 38-39 
126 See Winkler ([2000] 2006) 382 
127Bracher (1971) 71-72 
On the other hand, Winkler argues that this is a controversial issue and that a “bolder” policy during the first 
‘hot’ period could have led to a civil war. 
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Chapter 2: Rosa Luxemburg: glimpses of a democratic “we” between 
Bernstein’s evolutionism and the Leninist strategy. 
 
 
 
Remaining within this first “hot” period, I will focus here on the thought of Rosa 
Luxemburg (1871-1919). That’s because, notwithstanding that she was not elected as 
representative in the Congress of Councils (December 1918) and was not allowed to speak 
therein, the dilemmas about the “we” during this turbulent period can be mirrored in her 
critique that had “the perceptivity of the eagle's eye”128 as Poulantzas wrote. Evidently, this 
approach will be antithetical to her posthumous reception as a romantic figure, which is a 
take that “co-opts” her figure while evacuating her political critique.  
 
Her critique was directed at two different positions. Firstly, to the strategy of 
‘‘evolutionary socialism’’ that conceived the political in terms of a natural evolution 
through the representative institutions. This strategy was expressed mainly by Eduard 
Bernstein and was one of the basic theoretical inspirations of the SPD's strategy on the eve 
of the November Revolution. Hence, I will start this chapter, firstly, with the analysis of 
Bernstein’s theory, which is a conception that influenced German Social Democracy129.  
 
Secondly, the presentation of Luxemburg’s critique to this conception will follow and, at 
the same time, her critique of the pure council system that Lenin (and the KPD later130) 
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adopted will also be seen. Finally, both sections will start by analyzing the theories of 
Bernstein and Luxemburg respectively and will end by associating their theories with their 
Weimar stance.  
 
Through Luxemburg’s “eagle’s eye” we will be able to see to an extent both the 
conceptions that lay behind the stance of the political parties of the Left, in Weimar, and 
the bases on which the Weimar state was built after the November Revolution. Taking this 
into consideration, I will mostly show that Luxemburg’s defeated voice could be seen as an 
early warning to the evolutionism of German Social Democracy. 
 
2.1. Eduard Bernstein: evolutionary road to socialism 
 
The origins of Bernstein’s revisionist thinking can be traced in the introduction that Engels 
wrote, just a few months before he died, for the first reprint of the “Class Struggles in 
France” (March 1895)131. Through his picture of an expansive industrial capitalism at that 
time, the political conclusion that Engels draws is that the model of “revolutions carried 
through by small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious masses, is past ”132 , 
especially in Germany. 
 
Engels provides three reasons for this. Firstly, the capitalist reorganization has brought to 
the fore a rising middle class, that would not side with the proletariat in a revolutionary 
process (this point is deployed later by Bernstein). Secondly, there are very powerful 
modern armies that make the possibility of a revolution very difficult and, thirdly, that 
there is now universal male suffrage that is a powerful “weapon” for the proletariat and its 
allies. So, the revolutionary model was to be replaced by parliamentary struggles with the 
participation of the majority, which were facilitated by universal suffrage and would end 
“tranquilly as a natural process” in socialism at the end of the century through the “slow 
                                                                                                                                              
‘‘Spartacus League’’ and by trade-union militants from the Shop Stewards movement. 
 Rosenhaft, Eve (1983). Beating the Fascists?: the German Communists and political violence 1929-1933, 
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2 
131Engels, Friederick (1895). Introduction  to the Class Struggles in France. Available at: 
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propaganda” of the Social Democratic Party133.  
 
Regarding the empirical background of this theorization, it should be reminded here, 
firstly, that universal male suffrage had existed in unified Germany since 1871 (despite the 
parliament’s subservient political role during the Kaiserreich). Secondly, Germany was, 
during this period, in the midst of a great effort to turn from an agrarian economy into an 
industrialized one, which proved to be “efficient”. There was, especially after 1895 until 
the outbreak of the Great War, a boom in German prosperity, with a significant increase in 
German trade and a growth of heavy industry134. Thirdly, there was the enlargement of the 
German Social Democratic Party, both in terms of membership and of influence (given 
also that after 1890 there had been an abolition of Bismarck’s anti-socialist law). 
 
So, Engels’ evolutionary road towards socialism was showing a “revision of tactics”. This 
path was developed further by Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932), who was seen together with 
Kautsky as the heirs of Marx and Engels (Bernstein was Engels's executor along with 
Bebel)135. Bernstein, after his 1896 revisionist shift136, argued that Engels' “tactical 
revision necessarily implied a revision of strategy, a revision of the premises of theoretical 
Marxism”137. According to Bernstein, the revision is due to the fact that the “social 
conditions have not developed to such an acute opposition of things and classes as is 
depicted in the Manifesto”138. 
 
 This is also evident from the title of his main book “The premises of socialism and the 
tasks of Social Democracy” (1899), where he distinguishes between the premises of 
theoretical Marxism and the tasks of Social Democracy, in times of the new economic 
                                                
133 As Engels wrote about the German Social Democracy “the two million voters, whom it sends to the ballot 
box, together with the young men and women, who stand behind them as non-voters, form the most 
numerous, most compact mass, the decisive "shock force" of the international proletarian army. …Its growth 
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process... If it continues in this fashion, by the end of the century we shall conquer the greater part of the 
middle section of society, petty bourgeois and small peasants, and grow into the decisive power in the 
land...”.   Engels, Ibid. 
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135 McLellan, David (2006). Marxism after Marx. 4th ed. Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 25  
136 See Gay ([1952]1970, 68. 
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138 Bernstein, Eduard (1899). Evolutionary Socialism. Available at: 
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situation139. Here, the object of Bernstein's critique is the “theory of the breakdown” 
(Zusammensbruchstheorie), which was part of German thinking140 not only during this 
period but recurring during the Weimar period for the KPD141.  
 
This latter theory prefigured, in a fatalistic way, the imminent and inevitable catastrophe of 
capitalism, as a result of the over-concentration of social wealth “in few hands”, that would 
create a huge immiseration and would, consequently, augment revolutionary tension. 
According to Bernstein, this theory was an outcome of a (Hegel-inspired) apriorism that 
conceives historical development “in terms of dialectical antithesis”142. That’s why the 
theory failed to grasp the evolutionary and harmonious situation that the capitalist re-
organization brought, which could be seen in that “the enormous increase of social wealth 
is not accompanied by a decreasing number of large capitalists but by an increasing 
number of capitalists of all degrees”143. In a similar way, Bernstein wrote, in 1902, that 
there existed a collectivization of property due to the growth of shareholders, limited 
liability companies and similar partnerships144.  
 
The political outcome that Bernstein drew from his picture was that, through the empirical 
observation of the new reality that rules out the Hegelian apriorism, there can be an 
evolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism. Hence, the title of his book “Die 
Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie” had two English 
translations: the first one “The premises of Socialism and the Tasks of Social Democracy”, 
but also translated in English as “Evolutionary Socialism”, in 1907 (a title that shows the 
                                                
139It is also indicative that this book was full of references to Engels's introduction (1895).  
See the preface to this work. Ibid. 
140 This was particularly evident in Kautsky's commentary to the Erfurt Programme of the SPD (1891).  
Kautsky argued that “we consider the breakdown of existing society as inevitable, since we know that 
economic development creates with natural necessity conditions which force the exploited to strive against 
private property, that it increases the number and power of the exploited while it reduces the number and 
power of the exploiters, whose interest is to maintain the existing order”. 
In Colleti (1972) 55 
141KPD’s policy combined “economic catastrophism” with “electoral illusions” as Poulantzas writes with 
emphasis to the last period of the Weimar Republic.  Poulantzas, Nicos ([1970] 2006). Fascism and 
Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism (in Greek), Athens: Themelio Editions, 
210-211 
142 Colleti (1972) 50 
143 Bernstein (1899) ‘Preface’ 
144 Gay ([1952] 1970] 174 
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influence of Darwin's theory)145. 
 
In this direction, Bernstein argued that there should be a gradual political struggle, through 
the representative institutions, for the further establishment and expansion of democracy, 
that would overcome the liberal night-watchman concept of the state. This is how 
socialism was going to be achieved as an inheritor of capitalism. As he wrote, “in all 
advanced countries we see the privileges of the capitalist bourgeoisie yielding step by step 
to democratic organizations. Under the influence of this, and driven by the movement of 
the working classes which is daily becoming stronger, a social reaction has set in against 
the exploiting tendencies of capital, a counteraction which…is always drawing more 
departments of economic life under its influence. Factory legislation, the democratizing of 
local government, and the extension of its area of work, the freeing of trade unions and 
systems of co-operative trading from legal restrictions, the consideration of standard 
conditions of labour in the work undertaken by public authorities – all these characterize 
this phase of the evolution”146. 
 
Taking this analysis into account, we can see that Bernstein seems to endorse a concept of 
the state not as a class state but as an autonomous (from the capitalist social relations) site 
through which socialism can be achieved in an evolutionary manner. This direction shows 
an affinity with Lassalle’s theory. This is significant to the analysis here because Lassalle is 
a common point of reference, both for Kelsen and for Heller, who oppose Lassalle’s theory 
to the (supposed) economistic determinism of Marxism (see chapter 6).  
 
Analyzing this affinity, it should be written, as an aside, that Bernstein was the editor of the 
complete works of Lassalle (1825-1864) for the Social Democratic Party. Whereas, in his 
preface for the 1891 edition of Lassalle’s works he was “highly critical” of Lassalle’s 
work, his attitude changed after his 1896 revisionist shift. In 1904 he wrote explicitly that 
he had changed his mind and that he was much closer to Lassalle’s theory147.  
 
This means practically that he was “sympathetic” to Lassalle’s primacy of political 
democracy through universal suffrage, as a way to proceed to economic reforms without, 
nevertheless, sharing Lassalle’s “lyricism” of the state and Lassalle’s idiosyncratic 
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nationalism148. On the contrary, Bernstein argued that “with respect to liberalism as a great 
historical movement [namely not as identified with capitalism], socialism is its legitimate 
heir…”149. 
 
Focusing on the common elements between Lassalle’s and Bernstein’s theoretical 
frameworks, the basic common point is the possibility of transition from the political to the 
economic (capitalist dominated) level through the “expression” of the social via the state. 
So, while neither of them was sharing the liberal conception of the state, and both of them 
understood that the working class is “always-already” on the terrain of the state, there is a 
common neglect of the “differentia specifica” of the capitalist state and of capitalist 
production, which is constitutively based on the political-economic disjunction.  
 
Regarding Lassalle, this is evident in his speech on the Constitution, which is based on this 
concept of the state. Despite the fact that he clearly evades a conception of liberal 
constitutionalism through his focus on the social, Lassalle argues that the actual relation of 
social forces is directly imprinted in what he calls the “real constitution”150. Evidently, 
Lassalle does not consider how the constitutive capitalist disjunction between the political 
and the economic affects the constitution. 
 
Going back to Bernstein, his theory of the state is not that dissimilar from Lassalle’s 
theorizations (without delving himself into constitutional theory). That’s because it is based 
on an “adulteration” of Marx’s concept of economy in the sense that economy is 
conceived as “an antecedent sphere prior to human mediation…social production is thus 
transformed into 'production techniques', the object of political economy becomes the 
object of technology”151. This means that the concept of economy that Bernstein deploys, 
rules out the political aspect of the socio-economic relations and views the political as 
autonomous152 (whereas at the same time this autonomy derives from an economic 
                                                
148 Ibid. 92-93 
149Bernstein (1899) Chapter 3-2 
150 Lassalle, Ferdinand (1862). On the Essence of Constitutions, available at: 
https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/fi/vol03/no01/lassalle.htm (last accessed 04/04/2016). 
 
151Colleti (1972) 65 
152In this effort, he was also “helped” by another famous self-criticism by Engels (1890), who argued that 
“Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on 
the economic side than is due to it” 
Engels, Friederick (1890). Engels to J. Bloch in Köningsberg, available  at: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive /marx/works/1890/letters/90_09_21.htm (last accessed on 08/03/2016). 
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analysis, as seen with his earlier point about organized capitalism).  
 
Bernstein’s overall thesis can also be seen in his Weimar stance. In one of his final texts in 
1921, Bernstein argued that the Weimar regime should be seen in continuity with the 
previous regime and not as a rupture with it153. He justified this concretely by arguing that 
the developed level of industrial capitalism (e.g. the developed level of the division of 
labor) and of democracy already existing in Germany before the November Revolution 
(e.g. the prior existence of the Reichstag and of universal male suffrage) indicated that the 
German Revolution could not stand a revolution like the Soviet or the French ones. That’s 
because- as Winkler summarized Bernstein’s thesis- “the less developed societies are, the 
better they are able to cope with measures aimed at their radical restructuring”154. So, a 
further democratization of the Kaiserreich regime, through the introduction of 
parliamentary democracy, was already a very important step towards the “evolutionary 
road” to socialism155.  
 
In line with his theorization, Bernstein had already become, again, a member of the SPD, 
in December 1918 (or in January 1919) by being, until March 1919, a member of the SPD 
and the USPD, at the same time156. He chose ultimately the SPD, given also his critique of 
the resignation of the USPD members from the government, in December 1918. He 
remained as an SPD deputy in the Reichstag from 1920 until he retired in 1928.  
 
                                                
153 In Ibid. 341 
154Ibid.  
155Bernstein argued that Germany “… had nonetheless achieved a stage of development at which simple 
democratization of the existing institutions meant a great step towards socialism. The first signs of this were 
already in evidence even before the revolution. Under the influence of the workers’ representatives, who had 
gained access to the legislative and administrative bodies of the Reich, the states and the communities, the 
measure of democracy present at those levels has proved itself an effective lever to promote laws and policies 
endorsed by the socialist movement, so that even imperial Germany could rival politically progressive 
countries in those areas”. 
However, there is also an exception in Bernstein’s evolutionism, which can be seen in a text that he co-
authored. This is the “Görlitz platform’’ of the SPD in 1921, where it was written that “the MSPD is a party 
of the working people in the city and country’ that aspired to fundamental social reforms, was open to the 
middle classes, and no longer considered socialism the result of a natural and ineluctable economic 
development, but as a question of political will”. 
Bernstein, Eduard (1921), “Die Deutsche Revolution, ihr Ursprung, irh Verlauf und ihr Werk” in Winkler 
([2000] 2006) 341, 385 
156Bernstein left the USPD and remained member of the SPD when the USPD prohibited the double 
membership. Winkler ([2000] 2006) Ibid. 
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Although he was not very influential at a personal level during this period- due to the fact 
that the party was “too busy with Realpolitik” 157- his whole theory had practically exerted 
already significant influence in the Weimar SPD. It was the “pacifist and petty bourgeois 
outlook of Eduard Bernstein” that triumphed in Weimar, according to Franz Neumann. 
Neumann justified this by writing that “it was English Fabianism that, under the Weimar 
Republic, triumphed over orthodoxy, although the orthodox formulas and slogans were 
retained”158. Moreover, Bernstein’s influence can also be seen, to an extent, in the SPD-
affiliated trade unions that “felt a deep affinity for the gradualist tactics of Revisionism” 
and that “from about 1905 on…were the key element in Social Democracy which helped to 
keep the party on its reformist path…But this marriage was strictly a mariage de 
convenance based on coincidence of interests”159. That’s because of the more economistic 
logic of the unions (see chapter 4.3.) 
 
Finally, Bernstein’s assumption was not proven right in Weimar in the sense that, firstly, 
the level of concentration of capital, especially after 1924, would debunk his observation 
about the rising number of middle-sized enterprises160 and, secondly, the fact that 
democracy was sacrificed for the sake of organized capitalism (also due to the evolutionary 
political line of the SPD) would put into question his optimism about the transition to a 
socialist economy, in a gradual manner, given the power of concentrated capital (see 
chapters 4.3. and 5.5.).  
  
2.2. Rosa Luxemburg's critique: representative democracy as a “shelter” of public 
life.  
 
Before starting with the analysis of Luxemburg’s thought, I should write as an introductory 
(methodological) remark that I will focus mainly on her works “The Mass Strike, the 
Political Party and the Trade Unions” (1906) and “The Russian Revolution” (1918) 
because it is in these works that her conception of democracy becomes more visible and it 
can be associated with her stance during the early Weimar period (that will be seen at the 
end of this section).  
 
                                                
157Gay [1952, 1970] 296 
158 Neumann, Franz ([1942 1944] 2009) 213 
159 Ibid. 138, 140, 243-244 
160 See also Gay ([1952]1970) 171-173 
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Starting the analysis of Luxemburg’s thought, the basic argument that she develops in her 
book on “The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions” is that the political 
struggle cannot be totally distinguished from the economic one. This hard distinction 
serves only the reproduction of the capitalist system, given that it naturalizes both the 
concept of economy and the conception of the political. In this sense, she disagreed 
fiercely with any form of gradualist theories that tried to orient the mass strike, either on 
strictly economic grounds, or on strictly political grounds (in the narrow sense). The 
former is entailed in an economistic-corporatist logic that expresses only economic 
demands (see chapter 4.3. about the stance of the unions). The latter was deployed by 
Bernstein, who argued that there should be a political strike only on “negative” political 
grounds, namely “as a last recourse of the working class”, when the right to vote and 
parliamentarianism is put into question and not “for romantic reasons” (for which 
Bernstein accused the group around Luxemburg)161.  
 
On the contrary, according to Luxemburg, every struggle puts into question the whole 
socio-political edifice. As she argued “the economic struggle is that which leads the 
political struggle from one nodal point to another; the political struggle is that which 
periodically fertilizes the soil for the economic struggle. Cause and effect here continually 
change places”162.  
 
This excerpt shows two issues. The first is the logic of “spontaneity” of the mass strike, as 
the extraordinary moment that cannot be grasped by any sort of evolutionary 
“calculations”, such as the discourse based on the level of the “productive forces” and on 
“slow propaganda”. However, as Laclau and Mouffe remark, her point of spontaneity is 
not only an anti-evolutionary point163 in the sense that (a certain level of) contingency can 
possibly exist even based on a given, “externally” defined concept of class identity (and 
alliances based on that) that has certain “literal” demands. 
 
What is crucial, secondly, here is the reference to the “nodal point”, even though 
Luxemburg does not develop this term further. The significance is based on the fact that 
this term, along with the overall analysis, shows that every struggle is necessarily split, in 
the sense that “aside from its specific literal demands, each mobilization represents the 
                                                
161 In Gay ([1952]1970) 243 
162Luxemburg, Rosa (1906) in McLellan (2006) 50-51 
163Laclau & Mouffe ([1985] 2000) 10 
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revolutionary process as a whole” as Laclau and Mouffe write164. So, the point of the 
struggle is not only a concrete, literal demand, with reference to a given picture of socio-
political edifice and subjectivity, but what is at stake is that a political struggle can put into 
question the whole representation of the distinction between the economic and the 
political. 
 
So, based on this analysis of Luxemburg’s work, the issue that is revealed is that 
(hegemonic) socio-political identities are questioned through political action. This is 
particularly evident when Luxemburg argues that “the mass strike has now become the 
centre of the lively interest of the German and the international working-class because it is 
a new form of struggle, and as such is the sure symptom of a thoroughgoing internal 
revolution in the relations of the classes and in the conditions of the class struggle”165. The 
unity of the class exceeds, therefore, its prior economic determination through the political 
struggle or, as Laclau and Mouffe write, “the unity of the class is therefore a symbolic 
unity”166. 
 
Although Luxemburg refers, therefore, continuously to a particular subject (the proletariat) 
using also the Marxist lexicon, she does not seem to endorse a concept of a class struggle 
and identity as a football game, in which there are two pre-constituted antagonistic camps 
(to use the famous example of Althusser's response to John Lewis167) but as a political 
concept, where subjectification takes place within the political struggle, contrary to the 
pre-given identities. In this sense, she seems to endorse a concept of political 
representation that questions the relations of inclusion and exclusion that a given 
ideological picture of the socio-political presents as “non-political” and as “political”.  
 
This is the background analysis through which we can start unpacking Luxemburg’s stance 
towards representative democracy, which was not without contradictions. She continuously 
vacillated about this and more concretely during the period of the revolutionary turmoil in 
Germany168 when she proceeded to a dubious endorsement of the concept of “civil war” as 
                                                
164Ibid. 11-13 
165Luxemburg  (1906), chapter 2 
166 Laclau &  Mouffe ([1985] 2000) 11 
167Althusser, Louis (1972). ‘Louis Althusser Replies to John Lewis’, Australian Left Review,1(38), 23-36.  
168 See her article, “Order Prevails in Berlin” (January 14, 1919) written when Gustav Noske was marching 
in Berlin along with the far-right Freikorps. 
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equivalent to the “political’’169.  
 
However, she had explicitly argued that the extraordinary mass strike should not be 
thought of as antithetical to representative democracy. That’s because of two aspects, 
which derive ultimately out of her concept of the political subjectivity that was analyzed. 
The first aspect is her insistent argument, throughout her work, that the political struggle 
should be majoritaritarian and not minoritarian. This explains her opposition to Lenin's 
“blanquism” and to his concept of minoritarian revolution driven by a centralized party.  It 
should be reminded that this is the second main target of her critique (along with her 
critique of  Bernstein’s revisionism).  
 
Without entering here into the historical context of Lenin’s theory and practice in Tsarist 
Russia, it is interesting to notice Luxemburg's argument that Lenin's concept of socialist 
organisation is “mechanistic”, in the sense that his concept of political praxis follows the 
instrumental logic of industrial capitalism. As she writes, Lenin “is convinced that all the 
conditions necessary for the formation of a powerful and centralized party already exist in 
Russia… He glorifies the educative influence of the factory, which, he says, accustoms the 
                                                                                                                                              
   As she wrote “The revolutionary struggle is the very antithesis of the parliamentary struggle. In Germany, 
for four decades we had nothing but parliamentary ‘victories’. We practically walked from victory to victory. 
And when faced with the great historical test of August 4, 1914, the result was the devastating political and 
moral defeat, an outrageous debacle and rot without parallel. To date, revolutions have given us nothing but 
defeats. Yet these unavoidable defeats pile up guarantee upon guarantee of the future final victory”. 
  Luxemburg, Rosa (1919). Order Prevails in Berlin, available at: 
 https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1919/01/14.htm (last accessed on 30/05/2016) 
169 There are some writings during this period in which Luxemburg seems influenced by the Leninist strategy. 
As an indicative example of this “attraction”, she had argued in consecutive articles during this period (20 
November 1918 and then 23 December 1918) that “the ‘civil war’ which some have anxiously tried to banish 
from the revolution cannot be dispelled. For civil war is only another name for class struggle, and the notion 
of implementing socialism without a class struggle, by means of a majority parliamentary decision, is a 
ridiculous petit-bourgeois illusion...all power to the councils – this is our participation in the National 
Assembly”.  
 See Luxemburg, Rosa (1918). ‘The National Assembly’, Die Rohte Fahne, available at: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1918/11/20.htm, (last accessed on 08/03/2016) 
 
Mc Lellan (2006) wrote that it is a “matter of dispute” to what extent Luxemburg modified her views during 
these months of the revolutionary turmoil. 57 
 
 Luxemburg, Rosa (1918). “What does the Spartacus League want”, Die Rohte Fahne., available at 
:https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1918/12/14.htm, (last accessed on 08/03/2016) 
Luxemburg, Rosa (1918). The elections to the National Assembly, available at: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1918/12/23.htm (last accessed on 08/03/2016) 
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proletariat to ‘discipline and organization’…Saying all this, Lenin seems to demonstrate 
again that his conception of socialist organization is quite mechanistic. The discipline 
Lenin has in mind is being implanted in the working class not only by the factory but also 
by the military and the existing state bureaucracy – by the entire mechanism of the 
centralized bourgeois state” 170.  
 
As an outcome of this logic, Lenin considered formal democracy as a “bourgeois” 
element171. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe write that “All the terminological 
innovations which Leninism and the Comintern introduce to Marxism belong to military 
vocabulary (tactical alliance, strategic line, so many steps forward and so many back); 
none refers to the very restructuring of the social relations, which Gramsci would later 
address with his concepts of historical bloc, integral State, and so forth…”172.  
 
This could also explain, to an extent, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the 
Bolsheviks and the gradual shrinking and prohibition of institutions and actors in public 
life (press, political parties) during the Leninist regime173. 
 
 Against this strategy, Rosa Luxemburg stresses the need for a public space that will denote 
the possibility of a continuous political-democratic contestation (as seen before). This is 
the second aspect (the first one was that political action should be majoritarian). That’s 
how we could “rescue” her defense of formal democracy (representative democracy, 
rights) albeit her ambivalences. This defense is visible in her famous critique against the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks.  
 
Her critique was that “the remedy which Trotsky and Lenin have found, the elimination of 
democracy as such, is worse than the disease it is supposed to cure: for it stops the very 
living source from which alone can come the correction of all the innate shortcomings of 
                                                
170 Luxemburg, Rosa (1904). Organization Questions of Social Democracy, available at: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1904/questions-rsd/index.htm (last accessed on 08/03/2016). 
171Lenin, Vladimir I. ([1918] 2001). ‘The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky’ in Lorimer, 
Doug (ed.) Democracy and Revolution, Resistance Marxists Library, Sidney: Resistance Books, 69. 
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See also Souvarine, Boris (1939). Stalin, a critical survey of Bolshevism, New York: Alliance Book 
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social institutions...In place of the representative bodies created by general, popular 
elections, Lenin and Trotsky have laid down the soviets as the only true representation of 
political life in the land as a whole, life in the soviets must also become more and more 
crippled. Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, 
without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere 
semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element. Public life 
gradually falls asleep, a few dozen party leaders of inexhaustible energy and boundless 
experience direct and rule. Among them, in reality only a dozen outstanding heads do the 
leading and an elite of the working class is invited from time to time to meetings where 
they are to applaud the speeches of the leaders, and to approve proposed resolutions 
unanimously – at bottom, then, a clique affair – a dictatorship, to be sure, not the 
dictatorship of the proletariat but only the dictatorship of a handful of politicians, that is a 
dictatorship in the bourgeois sense...”174. 
 
Taking this critique into consideration, Nicos Poulantzas argues that Luxemburg 
reproaches Lenin for “…exclusive reliance on council democracy and complete elimination 
of representative democracy (through, among other things, dissolution of the Constituent 
Assembly… in favour of the soviets alone)”175. In line with this, her main argument seems 
to be that the neglect of formal democracy goes hand in hand with anti-democratic 
outcomes, given that it is tied to a conception of political representation that is reduced to 
an economic-technical domain and, in this way, loses its political character. So, the space 
for a disagreement to register as political is totally missing.  
 
Luxemburg’s insight is important because democracy presupposes a public space where 
the social can be thought otherwise and the political subjectification can be reflexive. This 
approach is expressed by her not only in 1918, but also much earlier when Luxemburg 
argued that “to give a speech in parliament, essentially, is always to ‘talk through the 
window’. From the standpoint of the string-pullers in the back-rooms – whose method is 
the normal way of setting conflicts of interest on the basis of the bourgeois-feudal 
compromise – speech-making is futile, indeed it only defeats their purpose. Hence the 
bourgeois parties’ indignation at ‘too much talking’ in Reichstag...If parliamentarism has 
lost all significance for capitalist society, it is for the rising working class one of the most 
                                                
174 Luxemburg, Rosa (1918). The Russian Revolution, in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, available at: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1918/russian-revolution/index.htm (last accessed on 
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powerful and indispensable means of carrying on the class struggle. To save bourgeois 
parliamentarism from the bourgeoisie and use it against the bourgeoisie is one of Social 
Democracy’s most urgent political tasks”176.  
 
Luxemburg’s “talking through the window” argumentation, which was also the “classic 
slogan” of the pre-war SPD”177, shows that parliament can be for her the place that makes 
visible an alternative configuration of the socio-political ‘‘we’’. This is precisely the reason 
for which the bourgeois parties tried to avoid its public and political role by reducing, in 
this way, civil society to its representation by the bourgeoisie.  
 
In this vein, her defense of representative democracy is in line with Marx’s phrase that the 
parliamentary regime is the “regime of unrest”, it “lives by discussion…Every interest, 
every social institution, is here transformed into general ideas, debated as ideas...The 
struggle of the orators on the platform evokes the struggle of the scribblers of the press; 
the debating club in parliament is necessarily supplemented by debating clubs in the 
salons and the bistros; the representatives, who constantly appeal to public opinion, give 
public opinion the right to speak its real mind in petitions. The parliamentary regime 
leaves everything to the decision of majorities; how shall the great majorities outside 
parliament not want to decide? When you play the fiddle at the top of the state, what else is 
to be expected but that those down below dance?”178.  
 
So, according to this excerpt, those who dance are sustained by the parliamentary form. 
The destruction of the legal form leads to the end of the dance. It is this space that it is 
safeguarded by so-called “formal “democracy in contradistinction with a purely council 
democracy, where this public space is lost and the political is negated by turning into an 
administrative-technical discussion. 
 
Making the transition to Luxemburg’s stance in the Weimar Republic, she was on the 
antipode of two main positions (in line with her theoretical critique). She was, firstly, 
critical of the evolutionary logic of the SPD, which followed in many issues the logic of 
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“reconstruction first” and declared that the more radical policies would follow later in a 
gradual way179.  She also foresaw that this continuity logic would also be seen at the 
political level, due to the proposal for an elected president with extensive powers180. 
 
She was, secondly, against the decision to boycott the elections for the National Assembly 
in the First Congress of the KPD, in January 1919. As the historian, Arthur Rosenberg 
wrote, this decision of the KPD “…was indirectly an incitement to rioting and coups 
d'état. It had nothing in common with Rosa Luxemburg’s program”181. That’s true and, 
despite her ultimate alignment with the Spartacist uprising, Luxemburg was among the 
dissenters in this Congress that decided to boycott the elections182.  
 
Regarding what Luxemburg’s stance would be during the whole historical process of 
Weimar Republic, we can only hypothesize. Based on Luxemburg’s thinking, David 
Fernbach’s not totally unjustified hypothesis is that “it is certain, at least, that her politics 
would have taken a different course from the line that led from the March Action, through 
the ‘German October’ of 1923, to the suicidal policies of ‘class against class’. And as the 
threat of fascism intensified, Spartakists would have had less difficulty than Leninists in 
joining hands with Social Democrats and liberals in a ‘historic compromise’ that might 
well have averted the plunge into the abyss” 183.  
 
Fernbach actually refers, in this excerpt, to the KPD’s strategy during the early Weimar 
period and the late Weimar period. Although the political line of the KPD, during the early 
Weimar era and the late Weimar era are not the same (even in terms of political 
efficiency), they present a salient conceptual affinity: they both underestimate the 
distinction between a “democratic” and an “autocratic” form of the State by sharing an 
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instrumental conception of it, according to which the State serves a priori the interests of 
the ruling class184.  
 
During early Weimar, this was seen in the “ultra-leftist” minoritarian uprisings such as the 
“March Action” in Ruhr185 (the last attempt was in October 1923 after the “Cuno 
strikes”186). During late Weimar, this was seen in the “ultra-leftist” position of “social-
fascism”, which was introduced officially by the Third International at the Sixth Congress 
(July-September 1928) and was followed closely by the KPD during the last period of the 
Weimar Republic187. This line of social-fascism (supplemented with a nationalist discourse 
in 1930188) came after a period that had entailed some moments of cooperation between the 
SPD and the KPD (mainly after the end of 1923 hyperinflation). The most notable example 
was their campaign, in 1926, for a referendum for the expropriation, without 
compensation, of the former princely houses based on article 153 of the Constitution189  
(an expropriation that, as we will see in chapter 5, Carl Schmitt deemed illegal). 
 
The practical outcome of KPD’s “social-fascism” line was catastrophic for the Weimar 
Republic. That’s because, through this line, the KPD theorized the absence of a “united 
front” between the democratic powers of the Republic and with the SPD. In this way, it 
relativized the Nazi danger. As Hobsbawm summarizes the strategy of the KPD during 
Weimar, “the political left, shaped largely by revulsion against the Great War, shocked at 
the failed revolution of 1918, and hatred of the old ruling class that survived it so well, was 
no less rejectionist than the right… Large enough to block the fashioning of a lasting non-
                                                
184 This functionalist view of the State as undergirding the “social-fascism” line was stressed by Rosenhaft 
(1983) 211 
185The “March Action” was an “insurrectionary” general strike in March 1921, which was “instigated by 
Moscow’s emissaries” according to Fernbach. It did not have mass support and it led to several hundred 
workers dead and many imprisoned. 
Fernbach (1999) 3-25, 3 
186 For details see Winkler ([2000] 2006) 393-394. Pryce, Donald B. (1977). ‘The Reich Government versus 
Saxony, 1923: The Decision to Intervene’, Central European History, 10(2), 112-147. 
187As Nicos Poulantzas wrote, the KPD was very much in line with the Comintern and it was the “laboratory” 
of its strategy.   
 Poulantzas ([1970] 2006) 182 
188 See the declaration of the Central Committee of the KPD (24 August 1930) in Winkler (1990) 216  
189 See the Joint SPD-KPD proposal for the Expropriation of the Former German Princes (28 April 1926) in  
Fowkes (2014) 158 
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right Weimar regime, this left did not wish to contribute anything to its practical politics 
except disgust”190.  
 
Going back to Luxemburg, Fernbach’s hypothesis is not totally unjustified given that 
Luxemburg gave interesting insights in the direction of a modern democratic “we”, in 
opposition both to the Leninist neglect of formal democracy and to Bernstein’s 
evolutionary concept of the political, that underplayed the concrete problems that 
capitalism posed for democracy.  She does not dismiss representative democracy, on the 
one hand, but on the other hand she argues that the “fate” of the political constellation of 
powers depends as well on ideological hegemony in the social domain, which means that 
there is not an evolutionary path that leads necessarily to progress. 
This is how we can make sense of her argument that “‘we have never been idol-
worshippers of formal democracy‘. All that really means is: We have always distinguished 
the social kernel from the political form of bourgeois democracy; we have always revealed 
the hard kernel of social inequality and lack of freedom hidden under the sweet shell of 
formal equality and freedom – not in order to reject the latter but to spur the working class 
into not being satisfied with the shell, but rather, by conquering political power, to create a 
socialist democracy to replace bourgeois democracy – not to eliminate democracy 
altogether”191. 
 
 
                                                
190Hobsbawm, Eric (2008). ‘Diary’ London Review of Books, 34, available at: 
 http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n02/eric-hobsbawm/diary 
See also Poulantzas ([1970] 2006) 183, 209 
191Luxemburg (1918). The Russian Revolution, chapter 8 
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Chapter 3: The “political question’’ in the Weimar Constitution 
 
  
Whereas during the first months after the declaration of the new Republic “the dominant 
trend” seemed to be leaning toward the Left, within a few months there was a different 
regressive movement that “…restored old power relations”192. It is crucial to see how this 
affected the formation of the new Weimar Constitution. 
 
More specifically, in this chapter I will focus on the answer of the Weimar Constitution to 
the “political question”, namely to the organization of political power, along with the 
historical context of the Constituent Assembly period so as to analyze the context in which 
the Weimar Constitution was designed and enacted. This period starts from the elections of 
the members of the Constituent Assembly on January 19, 1919193 and ends with the 
approval of the Weimar Constitution on July 31, 1919194 by the “Weimar coalition” 195 - the 
SPD, the liberal DDP196 and the Catholic Zentrum197- that designed this Constitution.  
                                                
192Bracher (1971) 73 
193The results of the elections that took place on January 19, 1919 were the following: SPD-37,9%, Zentrum 
Party-19,7%, DDP-18,5%, DNVP-10,3%, USPD-7,6%, DVP-4,4%. Winkler ([2000] 2006) 352 
194The parties who voted for the Weimar Constitution (262 deputies) were the SPD, the Zentrum and the 
DDP. The USPD, the DNVP, and the DVP voted against it (75 deputies). There was also one abstention.  
 On August 11, the President of the Reich Friedrich Ebert signed the new Constitution, which came into force 
on August 14, 1919.  
195This coalition was a common governmental coalition in Weimar, namely for almost 5 years out of 14 years 
of the Weimar Republic. 
See Fowkes (2014) 13 
196The DDP was “founded, financed and controlled” by representatives of the dynamic fraction of industry, 
commerce, banking and small manufacturing. It was “staffed” by liberal intellectuals and its constituency 
comprised also of various anti-monopoly middle class elements, middle class Jews and some peasants. There 
were continuous tensions between peasants and urban commercial interests in the party.  
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 This focus both on the Weimar Constitution and on the context in which it was designed 
and enacted will help us to approach later a crucial question, which is significant not only 
at the level of history but also at the level of constitutionalism: was the Weimar 
Constitution (at the level of the political question) inherently “defective” since its birth or 
was its (later) interpretation that made it “vulnerable”? 
 
 The structure of the chapter will be the following. I will start with an introductory note 
about the “political question” in the Weimar Constitution. After this introductory note, the 
rest of this chapter will be divided in two parts. The first part will deal concretely with 
presidential powers and article 48 by presenting the authors that introduced it (Hugo 
Preuss, Max Weber), the logic under which it was proposed and the socio-political context.  
In this first part, I will show that the Weimar Constitution ultimately incorporated Preuss’ 
more moderate presidentialism, which entailed also elements of continuity with the 1871 
Constitution, rather than Weber’s Caesaristic concept of president. However, Weber’s 
concept became, nevertheless, more hegemonic during the historical process of the Weimar 
Republic.  
 
Hence, I will delve deeply into Weber’s constitutional theory along with his whole 
theoretical framework in the second part of this chapter. I will show that Weber’s 
constitutional suggestions derive from his overall theory, which delves into the 
contradiction between the modern state and the capitalist economy. I will demonstrate that 
he finds an idiosyncratic liberal solution to this contradiction in the sense that his theory 
aims at keeping the political-economic distinction and, at the same time, turns politics 
mostly into a struggle among “charismatic” elites.  
 
 
3.0. Discontinuities and Continuities in the Weimar Constitution: An Introductory 
Note on the “political question” 
 
                                                                                                                                              
However, by 1930, the DDP was very weakened given that a lot of its voters were moving mainly to the 
right. 
Abraham ([1981] 1986) 297. See also Winkler ([2000] 2006) 352 
197 It was after 1930 that the Zentrum leaned more clearly to the right. 
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The Weimar Constitution signified a moment of rupture in the sense that it introduced 
parliamentary democracy providing also with women’s right to vote for the first time 
(article 22). This element of rupture is also evident from the preamble, which indicates that 
the people is the constituent power and not the princes or the monarch (in contrast with the 
1871 Constitution)198. Moreover, it is inscribed in the very first article of the Weimar 
Constitution, according to which “the German Reich is a republic. State authority derives 
from the people”199.  
 
This element of rupture is practically seen in that the Constitution regulated the ministerial 
accountability before the Reichstag (articles 54, 56, 59) and it gave to the Reichstag 
enlarged legislative competences compared to its previous role (article 68). On the 
contrary, in the past the monarchic government did not require the confidence of the 
Reichstag. In this sense, there was in the past a duality between the State, which was 
represented by the monarchic government, and the Reichstag, which constituted merely the 
informal “…societal counterpart of the government of the state…the informal irritant to 
the formal constitutional system”200. 
 
This shift to parliamentary democracy became almost a commonplace in the political 
spectrum after the November Revolution and it was accepted even by the two right-wing 
parties, the right-wing liberal (with a monarchist tendency) DVP201 and the far-right wing 
DNVP202. As the right-wing constitutional theorist Erich Kaufmann remarked, “after the 
fall of the monarchy and in the maelstroms of the revolution, which left us with a choice 
only between a parliamentary majority rule and the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', 
                                                
198 Hucko ([1984] 1987) 149 
199Weimar Constitution ([1919] 2008) 409-440, 409 
200Möllers, Christoph (2007). ‘We are (afraid of) the people: Constituent Power in German 
Constitutionalism’, in Loughlin, M, Walker, N. (eds.) The Paradox of Constitutionalism.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 87-105, 90-92 
201 This party was representing mainly the higher sections of the middle class, the heavy industrialists and 
farmers, albeit in the elections of 1920 it was also voted by most small businessmen that had “migrated” 
from the DDP (later they moved to DNVP and, then, to NSDAP).  
See Winkler, Heinrich A. (1976). ‘From Social Protectionism to National Socialism: The German Small-
Business Movement in Comparative Perspective’, The Journal of Modern History, 48(1), 1-18, 8-10 
See also Winkler ([2000] 2006) 351 
202 This party was representing mainly the far-right wing sections of heavy industry, the Junkers (namely the 
large east Elbian landowners), monarchist academics, pastors and higher government officials, farmers, small 
merchants and nationalist white-collar and blue-collar workers. Winkler (1976), 8-10. Winkler ([2000] 2006) 
352 
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parliamentarism was the only tactical ground we could seek unless we wished to embrace, 
at least temporarily the system of soviets after the Russian model. All political parties, 
from the German National to the majority social democrats, accepted the parliamentary 
system as such a tactical foundation, as a mere political “rule of the game’’203. 
 
However, the other side of the coin of the “tactical” moves by the Right in the direction of 
“rupture” was the move made by the SPD and by the other parties of the “Weimar 
coalition” towards the continuity logic. In symbolic terms, it was shown even by the choice 
of the Weimar as the city of Constitutional Assembly. The choice to assemble in the small 
city (around 40.000 people) “of Goethe and Schiller” instead of the Reichstag in Berlin 
symbolized the distance from the influences of the insurrectionary social strata that lived in 
the metropolis of Berlin204.  
 
This symbolic dimension of continuity is more evident from three other important issues 
and one absence (apart from the issue of presidential powers that will be seen extensively 
in 3.1.). Firstly, by the way the leader of the SPD (and first President of the Weimar 
Republic from 1919 to 1925) Friedrich Ebert “represented” the transition from the 
Kaiserreich to the Weimar Republic. In his opening speech to the Constituent Assembly (6 
February 1919) he interpreted the transitional government more as “the trustees in 
bankruptcy of the old Regime”205 and less as the founders of a new, democratic regime. 
Although it is true that, as Ebert presents, there were dramatic problems in the economy 
after the lost war and a weak state in terms of administration, his speech showed signs of 
continuity by following an evolutionary thinking (e.g. first reconstruction of economy, and 
socialization when the economic development has made the time “ripe” for that206).  
                                                
203Kaufmann, Erich, (1921) “Die Regierungsbildung in Preußen und im Reiche und die Rolle der Parteien’’ 
 In Stolleis (2004) 65 
204Hadjiiosif, Christos (2012). ‘The Weimar Republic and the threat of the “extremes”. The incompatibility 
of the historical analogies” in the collective edition The Weimar Republic and its contemporary revivals (in 
Greek), Athens: Nicos Poulantzas Institute, 17-18 
 
On the contrary, according to Winkler, the choice of Weimar “would provide the parliament and government 
with… security and peace that Berlin, for the time being, was unable to guarantee”. Moreover, it would 
indicate the symbolism of another Germany “apart from the Germany of militarism”. 
See also Winkler ([2000] 2006) 354 
205See excerpt of his speech “Friedrich Ebert’s Address to the Opening Session of the Constituent Assembly, 
6 February 1919”, in Fowkes (2014) 25-28 
206Ibid. 26 
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Secondly, the left-liberal constitutional theorist and member of the DDP Hugo Preuss who 
was chosen to draft the new Constitution by the Council of People's Commissars (mainly 
by the SPD) on November 15, 1918207, declared before the constitutional committee that 
“we are only undertaking a constitutional change occasioned by special circumstances and 
unusual events”208. This “striking statement”- as Carl Schmitt characterizes it in the sense 
that it does not denote a change of the constitution-making power209- seems to be not that 
far from Ebert's statement. This is also argued by Peter Caldwell, who wrote that Preuss 
before the National Assembly “…stressed continuity: despite deep changes in the 
constitution, ‘the German Staatsvolk as such remained’ ”210. It was only some years later 
that Preuss celebrated this Constitution as “the legal expression of the Revolution”211. 
 
The continuity leanings were also revealed in Preuss’ influence by the categories of 
constitutional monarchy notwithstanding his left-liberal ideological orientation and that he 
was a defender of 1848 revolution and of a self-administered municipal socialism212. This 
influence is visible through the powers that he ultimately drafted for the President (see 3.1 
about this).  
 
It should be remarked, as an aside, that- with the exception of Hugo Preuss and of some 
other scholars (mainly Anschütz, Thoma, Stier-Somlo213)- the vast majority of public law 
scholars that had been already active in 1919 were “Vernunftrepublikaner”. These are what 
Stolleis calls as the “older scholars”, distinguishing them from the new generation of 
Kelsen, Schmitt, Heller etc.214. So, this older generation of scholars constituted basically a 
                                                
207 Schoenberger, Christoph (2000). ‘Introduction’ in Hugo Preuss section in Jacobson, A. & Schlink, 
B.(eds.) Weimar. A Jurisprudence of Crisis. Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 110-115, 110 
208In Schmitt, Carl ([1928] 2008). Constitutional Theory , Durham: Duke University Press, 141 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
211 In a 1923 pamphlet, which celebrated the Weimar Constitution, Preuss “…stated, without ambiguity, that 
‘the constitution of the German Republic of August 11, 1919, is the legal expression of the Revolution of 
November 9, 1918’ ”. 
 In Caldwell, Peter (2013). ‘Hugo Preuss’s Concept of the Volk: Critical confusion or sophisticated 
conception?’ University of Toronto Law Journal, 63(3), 347-384, 359 
212Ibid. 361 
213Stolleis (2004) 51-52, 71-72.  
See also Caldwell about Anschütz and Thoma in Caldwell, Peter (1997). Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis 
of German Constitutional Law: The Theory and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism, Durham N C: Duke 
University Press, 65  
214 Stolleis (2004) 24 
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“bridge function” between the two constitutions in the sense that they were still thinking in 
terms of the categories of constitutional monarchy215. This makes sense considering that, as 
Möllers writes, “there was virtually no discussion of a democratic constituent power as a 
contemporary issue and radical conceptions of democratic self-government did not form 
any part of the German Staatsrechtslehre before 1919…”216. 
 
After this short digression, there is, thirdly, the title of the Weimar Constitution. The 
concept of the “Reich” plays here the primary role both in the title of the Constitution that 
was chosen (“Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs”) and in its first article. In this first 
article of the Weimar Constitution, the ‘‘Republik’’ constitutes its integral part (“The 
German Reich is a Republic”). Regarding the issue of the title, there was a united front of 
all the bourgeois parties against the title “Constitution of the German Republic”, which 
was initially proposed by the USPD and the SPD217.  
 
This symbolic issue218, negligible as it may seem at a first glance, prefigures a “people” 
that is equally identified with an a-historical, homogeneous “Reich” and with a democratic 
“Republik”. That’s because it concerns the reference to a higher, a-historical value (Wert) 
of the traditional German Kultur, which is reproduced through these symbolic acts and 
especially through the reference to the new Republic as “Reich”. Moreover, this 
constitutional inclusion of the term “Reich” would be, among others, an argument of Carl 
Schmitt for the continuity of the Weimar Constitution with the 1871 one (see chapter 5).  
This conception of the “people” is imprinted further at the constitutional level through an 
absence. This is the fact that political parties were not regulated by the Constitution. On 
the contrary, political parties were mentioned only once in the Constitution and even that in 
a negative manner (article 130219) and not in the first part of the Constitution that regulated 
                                                
215 Ibid. 51-52 
216 Möllers (2007) 90 
217Winkler ([2000] 2006) 363 
218A similar compromise was also reached in the Constituent Assembly with regards to the colors of the flag 
(“Flaggenstreit”), which is visible in article 3 of the Constitution. It became visible even regarding this issue 
that “…clearly, not only the political right, but also elements within the ‘Weimar’ parties mourned the loss of 
the old Reich” as Winkler writes. Ibid. 363, 419 
See also Herrera, Carlos Miguel (1997). Theorie Juridique et Politique chez Hans Kelsen, Paris: Editions 
Kime, 189 
219According to article 130: “Public officials are servants of the collective not of a party…”. 
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the main institutional framework220. In this way, the constitutional position of political 
parties in Weimar remained the same with the Kaiserreich, namely they are considered as 
creations of civic law that play the role of informal societal influence to the state. Hence, 
they are deemed as interest groups and not as public bodies that play a role in the 
formation of the democratic general will.  
 
So, although the Weimar Constitution established for the first time both the legislative 
power of the Reichstag (article 68) and the parliamentary responsibility of the government 
(article 54), this non-regulation of political parties as public bodies along with the 
significant power attributed to the President left the space for the reproduction of a 
dualism, which was in continuity with the Kaiserreich. This is the dualism of an elected 
“Ersatzkaiser”221 who represents the homogeneous governing will of the State versus a 
pluralistic parliament, which constitutes its societal counterpart and represents fractionary 
preferences222.  
 
As a final point (before analyzing presidential powers) it should be written that the 
dimension of continuity could be also seen at the level of policies during this period. More 
specifically, there was a lack of substantive reforms in the army, in the judiciary and in the 
public administration223 (see also chapter 1, and about the economic policies see chapter 
4).  
 
3.1. The President of the Reich: The par excellence concept of continuity?  
 
 
The one of the two main issues that has sparked a huge debate about its “responsibility” for 
Weimar’s fall- from the perspective of constitutional theory- is the issue of presidential 
powers (the other main issue is the “economic constitution”, see chapter 4).  
                                                                                                                                              
 Weimar Constitution ([1919] 2008) 409-440, 430 
220 Stolleis (2004) 82-83 
221 Möllers (2007) 93-94 
222 Stolleis (2004) 83 
223 Stolleis (2004) 51 
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The crucial question regarding this issue is whether it was the initial architecture of the 
Constitution that was “responsible” or its later political and legal interpretation. 
Approaching this question, I will present here, firstly, the debates between the architects of 
presidential powers (H. Preuss, M. Weber) and secondly, the stance of the Weimar political 
parties in the Constituent Assembly. Both kinds of debates will allow us to see the concept 
of president that was adopted in the Weimar Constitution and to compare it, at a later stage 
(mainly in chapter 5), with the interpretation of president’s powers throughout the 
historical process of the Weimar Republic. 
  
 
The deliberations and the constitutional framework: the difference between Preuss 
and Weber 
 
 
To begin with the first, the deliberations about this issue took place in the department of 
the Interior (9-12 December 1918) in an unofficial debate of experts (Hugo Preuss, Max 
Weber and others) and representatives (of SPD and USPD) regarding the general outlines 
of the constitutional draft that would be submitted in the imminent Constituent 
Assembly224.  
 
Starting from Hugo Preuss (1860-1925), it should be reminded that the left-liberal 
constitutional theorist was already the state secretary of the Reich Office of the Interior- 
namely the “chief official” in this process of drafting the Weimar Constitution- given also 
that he had supported the new Volksstaat of the Weimar Republic225. Preuss proposed a 
concept of an elected President that would be a counterweight to parliamentary 
“absolutism” based mainly on a liberal balance-of-power theory. As he had declared in an 
interview in 1925, the President “…is needed as a kind of balance to the Reichstag; if he is 
                                                
224 Stolleis (2004) 56 
225Ibid. 55 
Heinrich Winkler argued that the choice of the SPD to assign to Hugo Preuss the drafting of the new 
constitution had also a symbolic dimension. On the one hand, it showed that the Social Democrats were 
uncertain about their ability in issues of public law and, on the other hand, it symbolized their will to 
cooperate with the bourgeois parties.  
 Winkler ([2000]2006) 361 
See also Mommsen ([1959]1990) 355 
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to function in this capacity he must have the strength that comes from his being the choice 
of the people…The president acts as a sort of regulator - another popular organ over 
against the Reichstag, yet always under it, in the sense that all his acts must be 
countersigned by a minister acceptable to it …”226.  
 
Preuss’ plan for a President-counterweight against “parliamentary absolutism” should be 
seen in the context of his overall theoretical framework and of the entirety of his main 
constitutional suggestions. Regarding the rest of his main suggestions, firstly, he had also 
suggested (unsuccessfully) a decentralized state that mainly aimed at breaking Prussia into 
smaller units. In this vein, Preuss was also hoping that a powerful President would 
“dampen the egotism of the Länder”227. Secondly, as it is evident from the 1925 excerpt 
(see above) he argued also for the centrality of parliament. That’s because Preuss believed 
that social justice, which he identified “not…by a deepening of class oppositions” but with 
the “integration” of classes, could be attained gradually through parliamentary 
democracy228 - as opposed to the prospect of “…councils or boards other than the 
parliament”229. Based on this, he argued for a republican form that holds together the 
“democratic” and the “social” principle and he identified the parliamentary state with the 
“cooperative structure of the state”230. This is opposed not only to the prospect of council 
democracy but also to the “anti-democratic, anti-social monopoly capitalism” that he saw 
in 1925 as becoming more and more powerful231.  
 
Through this answer both to the “political” and to the “social” question, we can understand 
also the fact that the original constitutional draft of Preuss regulated merely the “political 
question” without including a section on rights or on councils232. On this issue Preuss was 
                                                
226In Blachley, Frederick F.& Oatman, Miriam (1925). ‘Hugo Preuss talks on the Weimar Constitution’, The 
Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly, 6(3) 252-255, 253-254 
227Stolleis (2004) 59 
228 Preuss, Hugo ([1925] 2000). ‘The significance of the democratic republic for the idea of social justice’ in 
Jacobson, A. & Schlink, B. (eds.) Weimar. A Jurisprudence of Crisis, Berkeley, London: University of 
California Press, 122 
229Collin, Peter (2017). ‘The Legitimation of Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in Corporatist Concepts of 
Legal Scholars in the Weimar Republic’, Politics and Governance 5(1) 15–25, 17, available at: 
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/viewFile/784/784 (last accessed on 25/1/2018) 
230Preuss ([1925] 2000) 122 
231 Ibid. 126 
232This draft entailed 68 paragraphs in three sections: the Reich and the Free German States, the Reichstag 
and the Reich President and the Government. Tribe, Keith, (1987). ‘Introduction’ in Social Democracy and 
the Rule of Law: Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann, London: Allen and Unwin, 7 
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in agreement with Weber, albeit from different theoretical perspectives (see chapter 3.2. 
about Weber). 
 
Regarding the theoretical framework, Preuss’s constitutional suggestions derived from his 
effort to give a left-liberal spin to the organic theory of Gierke and should be seen in the 
context of renouncing the logic of sovereignty and of endorsing a cooperative-
decentralized logic233. For Preuss- as later for Kelsen but from a different theoretical 
perspective- the logic of sovereignty was “a relic of the monarchic bureaucratic-absolutist 
tradition”234. 
 
It is, therefore, important to make a short digression to Gierke’s theory (1841-1921) so as 
to grasp better Preuss’ constitutional suggestions. Gierke criticized the concept of 
sovereignty as such and was the antipode of the a-political statutory positivism of Laband 
during the Kaiserreich. On the contrary, Gierke’s theory, deviating from the Herrschaft 
(domination) tradition, reduced the state to a plurality of groups at the societal level and 
the constitution to an indistinct sphere between Staatslehre and Korporationslehre through 
the concept of “social law”, which gave emphasis on an organic concept of solidarity. 
That’s because his model was “underpinned by a Hegelian and romantic account of 
history”235 of the medieval logic of fellowships in the German towns. In this way, he 
assumed an organicistic concept of society.  
 
However, the political is, in this way, dissolved entirely into the social. Hence, Gierke’s 
theory had roughly the same outcome with Laband’s theory: the mutation of conflict and 
the underestimation of parliamentarism236. This fits with his practical political stance given 
that he was “out of sympathy” for the labor unions and the SPD during the Imperial period 
and in 1920 he became a member of the conservative German National Party237. 
 
Going back to Preuss, as it was seen in the previous paragraphs, he did not accept Gierke’s 
                                                
233See Preuss ([1925] 2000) 122 
 
234Schoenberger (2000) 112 
235 Kelly, Duncan (2003). The State of the Political. Conceptions of Politics and the State in the Thought of 
Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Franz Neumann, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 89 
236 Gierke, Otto Friedrich von ([1868] 1990). Community in historical perspective: a translation of selections 
from Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. (trans. Fischer, M., ed. Black, A.) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 156 
237Black, Antony (1990). ‘Introduction’ in Gierke, Otto von Community in historical perspective, xiv-xxx, 
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logic in its entirety in his constitutional suggestions. However, the influence is evident by 
the fact that he “conceived of democracy more as an organic unity of the people rather 
than as a system for the orderly resolution of conflict”238. This could be visibly seen in the 
excerpt regarding the “cooperative structure of the state”. Hence - to trace also the 
connection with the previous debate on political parties- he was also not that interested to 
establish constitutionally the institutional role of the parties although he affirmed them as 
means of organizing public opinion239.  Regarding this issue, albeit he had written that 
“parliamentarianism is rule by parties”, he had the fear that the parties would be 
dominated by interests (also due to their past in Imperial Germany). As Caldwell writes, 
Preuss’ suspicion was due to the fact that “the parties had a history of irresponsible 
politics in the German Empire, where they had compensated for a lack of real power by 
engaging in negative power, the power to veto budgets or get special interests represented. 
He – like Weber and other liberals – feared that the parties would continue to be 
dominated by interests; he feared that their specific history in Imperial Germany would 
hinder their ability to take on the political responsibility for the whole polity demanded by 
a democracy” 240.. 
 
So, the role that he ascribed to the President should be also seen under this light, namely 
that he is the one to express the national consciousness of the state. We should see, 
therefore, his concept of the President in the context of his overall constitutional 
suggestions that, as Schoenberger writes, “proved to be far more influenced by the legacy 
of constitutional monarchy than he himself realized”241. This is visible in his approach to 
the political question but also to the social question given that, through his cooperative 
logic, he could not see that the “cooperative” integration of classes towards the social 
justice is a contradiction in terms as long as the economy is run on a capitalist basis. In this 
vein, he could also not grasp (despite his aversion towards monopoly capitalism) how the 
power of capital could turn against political democracy- in contrast with the logic of 
“cooperation”- especially if the economy is not constitutionally regulated.  
 
Going back to the deliberations stricto sensu, Hugo Preuss invited Max Weber who had 
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“impressed”242 him with his famous articles on constitutional theory. Preuss’ invitation 
comes despite that Weber is influenced by a different theoretical tradition: whereas Preuss 
conceived the state as a cooperative structure due to his influence by Gierke and the 
Germanic tradition of Genossenschaft, Weber conceived the state as the monopoly of 
domination and, therefore, the tradition of Genossenschaft was “anathema” to him243.  
 
However, they shared two common fears during the post-revolutionary “hot” period: 
firstly, of an imminent revolutionary “authoritarianism” in case the councils acquired 
political role and, secondly, of a “parliamentary absolutism”244. The second fear was also 
related to their framing of the experience of Imperial Germany and to the weak role of the 
parties therein that, according to both, could lead in the lack of national leadership (see 
chapter 3.2 for Weber).  
 
These common fears found expression in their commonality regarding the role of the 
President. Weber agreed with Preuss’ proposal for a directly elected President for seven 
years (time needed almost for two Reichstag elections) in contrast with the French “impure 
parliamentary system” of indirect election245. However, Weber departed also from Preuss’ 
constitutional suggestions of a President-counterweight because he gave more emphasis to 
a Caesaristic- independent concept of President than Preuss (e.g. appealing directly to the 
people in the legislative process without the countersignature of ministers246).  
 
This was closer to the American model but also not identical because Weber was 
advocating for parliamentary ministers responsible to the Reichstag that would assist the 
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President’s work247. So, although Weber and Preuss agreed fully neither with the American 
nor with the French model, Weber was closer to the American model than Preuss given that 
the latter argued for a less independent (from the Reichstag) President and for a bigger role 
of the Reichstag.  
 
Eschewing here the more detailed discussions in the committee, the ultimate agreement-
compromise that was reached in the committee was following more Preuss’s line and 
decided that the President’s role ought to be “designed in a form similar to that of a 
monarch in a parliamentarily governed state”248. Weber recognized this formulation “as a 
compromise” but he also “counted on the fact that the impact of a presidential authority 
would make itself felt even without explicit institutional authorization”249. 
 
 The concrete content of this agreement, which was ultimately decided by the Constituent 
Assembly, provided the President with the power of dissolution of the Reichstag in case of 
conflict so as to “lodge an appeal against the people’s representative with the people 
themselves”250 (article 25251), the recourse to referendum in case of disagreement about a 
law (article 73, paragraph 1), and the discretion in the selection of chancellor even without 
the necessity of a formal proposal by the Reichstag (article 53)252. However, “the 
chancellor and the ministers require the confidence of the Reichstag for the execution of 
their office. Each of them must resign if the Reichstag withdraws its confidence through an 
explicit decision” (article 54)253. 
 
The most crucial provision, nevertheless, is article 48, which concerned the president’s 
emergency powers. It reads as follows: 
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[paragraph 1] “If a Land does not fulfill its duties according to the Reich Constitution or 
Reich statutes, the President can compel it to do so with the aid of armed forces. 
 
[paragraph 2] If in the German Reich the public security and order are significantly 
disturbed or endangered, the President can utilize the necessary measures to restore 
public security and order, if necessary with the aid of armed force. For this purpose, he 
may provisionally suspend, in whole or in part, the basic rights established in Articles 114, 
115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153. 
 
[paragraph 3] The President must inform the Reichstag without delay of all measures 
instituted according to paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of this article. The measures must be 
set aside at the request of the Reichstag. 
 
[paragraph 4] In the case of immediate danger, the Land government can institute for its 
territory the type of measures designated in paragraph 2 on an interim basis. These 
measures are to be set aside at the demand of the President or of the Reichstag. 
 
[paragraph 5] A Reich statute determines the details of these provisions [this was never 
implemented]”254.   
 
This overall constitutional framework and especially the triad “dissolution of the 
Reichstag-discretion in the selection of the chancellor- article 48” along with the 
unmediated election of the President made the President a powerful political actor. 
However, there were also some safety valves against the power of the President that were 
mainly three.  
 
Firstly, there was the necessity of ministerial countersignatures in the emergency actions 
and generally in all the presidential actions (including the dissolution of the Reichstag) 
according to article 50255. Secondly, there was the possibility of removal of the President 
with a referendum after the Reichstag instigated such a procedure with a two-thirds 
majority (article 43 paragraph 2256). This was never actually used in Weimar given that in 
case the President remained in power after the referendum, this would mean the direct 
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dissolution of the Reichstag and the renewal of President’s time for seven years. Thirdly, 
there was also the third paragraph of article 48, according to which the Reichstag could 
revoke the emergency measures of the President. 
 
So, on the one hand, the powers given to the President revealed the dimension of 
Caesarism. This showed a level of continuity with the Kaiserreich given that the President 
was directly elected and could play the “card” of dissolving the Reichstag. However, on 
the other hand, this is not exactly the case in terms of actual powers given by the whole 
constitutional framework. That’s because the Reichstag kept more safety valves than 
Weber wanted (e.g. the President needs a countersignature of the chancellor, who is 
dependent on the confidence of the Reichstag based on article 54).  
 
As Mommsen wrote “Weber’s ideal of a genuine leadership of the Reich fell through, at 
least in the formal constitutional sense”257. So, the whole constitutional framework that 
regulated the president’s powers was closer to Preuss’ model and theoretical framework258. 
 
 
The Constituent Assembly and the shift 
 
 
Regarding the stance of the Weimar political parties in the Constituent Assembly, the SPD 
was opposing this conception of the President at the beginning, the USPD was against the 
institution altogether259 and all the other parties supported a “strong” President (DDP, 
conservative parties) following mainly Weber’s concept of the President (especially those 
from the DDP)260. 
 
 Regarding particularly the Majority Social Democrats, there was initially a strong 
opposition to Preuss’ concept of the president except for the proposal regarding its direct 
election because it seemed to them as democratic and they also believed that the first 
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President would come from the SPD261. The reservations by the SPD against the strong 
presidency lasted, nevertheless, until the third reading of the Constitution (30 July 1919) 
and it seems that they proposed in this last moment a joint election of the president by the 
Reichstag and the Reichsrat. However, they ultimately withdrew this proposal and 
conceded to the concept of President that we have already seen262. This happened because 
(among other reasons) the civil-war conflicts during 1919 (e.g. Munich) convinced more 
people in the SPD to ally with the demand of bourgeois parties for a strong president263. 
 
So, the issue of presidential powers in the Weimar Republic ratified the convergence 
between the conservative, the so-called “moderate” parties and of the SPD to the 
continuity conception of the Republic.  
 
Finally, this is connected with another issue that is important, which is the interpretation of 
the concept of president during the Weimar Republic. Although this issue will be 
developed in the fifth chapter through the analysis of Schmitt’s theory, it suffices to write 
here that Weber’s concept of president gained more in influence already during the early 
1920s both at a political level through the expansive interpretation of article 48 by the 
Social Democrat Ebert (see chapter 5.2.) and in the field of constitutional theory primarily 
through Carl Schmitt’s theory (see chapter 5.2). 
 
 However, it will be seen that the big shift took place during the early 1930s. This is the 
time that Schmitt’s conceptualization (that radicalized Weber’s concept of president264), 
became hegemonic both politically and in the “Staatsrechtslehre” community (see chapter 
5.5 and 6.5). So, given that this “genuine and thus daring gamble”265 of the president’s 
power was ‘resolved’ ultimately in the direction of a radical version of Weber’s concept of 
president, it is important to focus deeper on Max Weber’s constitutional theory, which we 
have already touched upon at the level of his concrete proposal regarding the concept of 
president. This will be important also in order to understand Schmitt’s theory and his 
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interpretation of article 48 (see chapter 5). 
 
 
3.2. Max Weber’s constitutional theory 
 
 
Max Weber (1864-1920) is one of the most famous sociologists of modernity. However, 
the writings of this “deeply committed political personality”266 on constitutional theory are 
often downplayed. This will be the topic of this section so as to shed light on the 
constitutional thinking that undergirds his concept of president. I will focus more on his 
later writings that delve deeper into constitutional theory through the association with his 
overall theory. 
 
Starting from some biographical details, Weber was coming from a legal background as a 
student but he was mostly teaching Nationalökonomie during his short career at the level 
of academic teaching267. At the same time, he argued in his inaugural lecture in Freiburg in 
May 1895- after he had accepted the chair of Nationalökonomie at this university268- that 
“the science of political economy is a political science. It is a servant of politics, not the 
day-to-day politics of the persons and the classes who happen to be ruling at any given 
time, but the enduring power-political interests of the nation”269. Moreover, the course that 
Weber would have delivered at the University of Vienna in the summer semester of 1920, 
had he lived, would be Allgemeine Staatslehre270. 
 
The fact that Weber dealt with law, political economy and state theory can be also 
explained by the “direct connection between German Staatswissenschaft- which included 
public law, public state economics, public administration and various sub-fields of 
political science- and political economy”271. Taking this into account, I will show that 
Weber’s theory dealt with the modern national state under conditions of capitalist 
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modernity. Through this lens I will analyze Weber’s constitutional suggestions and, 
therefore, his concept of president.  
 
My approach of Weber distances itself, firstly, from Dyzenhaus’ approach. Although he 
argues that the radicalization of Weber’s thinking came from Schmitt (in the sense that 
Weber’s thinking entailed also the “ethics of responsibility”), he wrote that “…for Weber, 
there are no criteria for success beyond success itself…because Weber denied that there is 
a morality beyond the law by which it can be judged, he holds that a de facto legal order is 
also legitimate”272.  
 
 In a not dissimilar way, Scheuerman -albeit arguing cautiously that Weber had a 
“moderate decisionism”273 - writes that for the “late liberal [Weber] ‘politics means 
conflict’ he dramatically announces...doomed to suffer and enjoy the ambivalent freedoms 
of modernity, we are necessarily left without verifiable universal certainties about our most 
basic values”274.  
 
This picture of Weber, which depicts him as the proponent of sheer power politics 
(Machtstaat), underplays the overall theoretical framework in which Weber’s thinking and 
his constitutional suggestions are developed. I will demonstrate that the issue of rationality 
and legitimacy, which are central to Weber’s thought, should be viewed in the context of 
his theorization about the contradiction between the modern state and capitalist modernity. 
Regarding this contradiction, I will argue in this section that his theory illuminated a 
bourgeois solution to the Marxist framing of the contradiction of modernity. As he himself 
had argued, “…I am a member of the bourgeois (bürgerlich) classes. I feel myself to be a 
bourgeois…”275.. This will be evident primarily from his response to the political question 
but it will be also revealed from the way in which he responds to the social question. In 
order to see these responses I will associate his constitutional suggestions with his overall 
theory. 
 
  
The origins of Weber’s constitutional proposals 
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Max Weber had endorsed a “genuine parliamentary system” since the first decade of 20th 
century276. This should be seen also in the context of his left-liberal position since the 
1900s and more clearly since 1905, which was evident by the fact that he acted 
‘‘indirectly’’ as a political adviser from 1906-07 onwards for the “Freisinnige Vereinnige” 
(Liberal Union- later turned into the FVP)277. Moreover, his left-liberal position became 
more visible with his participation in the foundation of the left-liberal DDP in December 
1918278. He was at that time close to those liberals that wanted coalition with the SPD as it 
is evident from his statement that “all honest, unreservedly pacifist and radical bourgeois 
democrats and Social Democrats could work side by side for decades to come until their 
ways eventually might have to part again”279. 
 
 Unraveling this orientation of Weber at the level of his theory, his defense of 
parliamentarism is related to his critique of Bismarck’s heritage. Weber argued in 1917 that 
“for the last forty years all parties have worked on the assumption that the task of the 
Reichstag is merely to practice ‘negative politics’. It became frighteningly obvious that the 
effect of Bismarck’s legacy was the ‘will to powerlessness’ to which the parties had been 
condemned by his actions”280.   
 
With the term “negative politics”, Weber mentioned the fact that, according to the 1871 
Constitution, the Reichstag had merely the right of veto to the budget281. In view of this 
situation, he wrote, the impotent parliament worked merely as a “petty-bourgeois guild” 
organization in the sense that there were not politicians to accept “full personal 
responsibility”282. That’s because the political parties were only aiming at creating 
coalitions so as to act in a “negative” way in the Reichstag and they lacked broader 
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“integrative function” by being still rooted in private associations. This is important, 
according to Weber, because the responsible political leaders of the future that would make 
the German nation more powerful could not be born283.  
 
So, due to the fact that parliamentarism did not work, the heritage of Bismarck’s policy 
created only -what Weber calls- “officials”, namely politicians that did not take 
responsibility for the nation but were working only behind the scenes “in the form of the 
patronage for minor prebends”284. Hence, Weber argues here that the lack of 
parliamentarism reproduces the lack of national leadership and the fusion between public 
and private interests. On the contrary, it is only through the parliamentary procedures that 
there could be leaders. 
 
He associated, therefore, his demand for parliamentary democracy with the necessity of 
leadership so as to achieve national integration. It is from this perspective that he opposes 
all those who conceived parliament merely as a “talking shop”285 and that he drew a 
connection between “parliamentarization and “national integration” (against Bismarck’s 
heritage).  
 
However, his concept of leadership through the lens of national integration was also related 
to his defense of imperialism. Hence (along with Friedrich Naumann286) they did not 
oppose the “necessity” of an “overseas expansion”287 and of an “aggressive” foreign 
policy288. This changed only during the Great War, where he publicly opposed any 
annexation plans289.  
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This stance is the reason for which Abraham writes that Max Weber and Friedrich 
Naumann were seen as “exponents” of the export-oriented industry “…when they hoped 
…to link imperialism to political and social democratization”290. That’s also because this 
capital fraction was even more imperialist than the hegemonic, anti-labor “Sammlung” 
social coalition of heavy industry and agriculture291. 
 
Although we cannot analyze Weber’s whole oeuvre through this lens (namely that Weber 
was a spokesman for this fraction) because it would be quite reductive, we can already see 
that his theory is permeated by the key aspect in the ideological orientation of late-
nineteenth century German liberalism, which “can be most accurately assessed as a 
problem of integration”292. In line with this, the orientation of Weber's political theory is 
explicitly the national integration and the way in which such a democratic concept of the 
political could enhance the international standing of Germany. This is evident in the 
excerpt that Mommsen quotes from Weber's collected lectures and essays dating from the 
period 1914-1918: “for me democracy has never been an end in itself. My only interest has 
been and remains the possibility of implementing a realistic national policy of a strong, 
externally oriented Germany”293.  
  
Making a short digression here, this overall orientation of liberalism became particularly 
visible in the outbreak of the Great War not only through the fact that many liberals were 
enthusiastic nationalists (nevertheless not only in Germany294), but mainly from the 
theoretical “justification” of this enthusiasm that consists in the defense of “Kultur” against 
“Zivilization”. The latter was a distinction initially deployed by “völkisch” conservative 
thinkers, which counterposed a romantic homogeneous identity of the German Reich based 
on rural life (Kultur) to the “soulless” life of the big cities and the instrumental logic of the 
industrial capitalism (Zivilization).  
 
The adoption of this distinction by many liberals is visible from the manifesto that the 
                                                
290 Abraham ([1981] 1986) 114 
291Ibid. 
292 Thornhill (2000) 21. Kelly (2003) 129 
293In Mommsen (1989) 25 from Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe, vol 1/15: Zur Politik im Weltkrieg: Schriften 
und Reden 1914-1918, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen in collaboration with Gangolf Hübinger (Tübingen 1984) 
234  
294 See Traverso ([2007] 2013), 214-220 
 79 
liberal newspaper “Berliner Tageblat” published in October 1914, in which 93 worldwide 
known scientists- some of them Nobel Laureates and Friedrich Naumann- defended the 
German case as a case of “Kultur”295. Max Weber had also a feeling of enthusiasm, writing 
on August 28, 1914 that “whatever this outcome, this war is great and wonderful”296.  
 
After the Great War and the “Fronterlebnis” (front experience) this distinction between 
Kultur and Zivilization changed meaning for many conservative thinkers and they 
proceeded in a synthesis of Kultur's anti-modern ideas of political representation (namely 
they were opposed to the principles of 1789) with the technical powers of Zivilization. 
Hence the term “reactionary modernists” coined by Jeffrey Herf297. The political outcome 
of this combination was a prevalence of anti-modern political ideas along with the power 
of the ‘‘dark side” of modernity298 .  
However, it should be clear that this term of “reactionary modernism” is different from the 
kind of national integration that Weber espoused (despite that he was not totally 
impervious to this direction as seen above with colonialism), which was associated with 
his defense of parliament. This was revealed clearly in his 1917 articles (seen earlier)299 
that conceived parliament as the platform for the revelation of leaders (against Bismarck’s 
legacy). Moreover, it was also seen in his famous address “Politics as a Vocation” to the 
student body at the University of Munich on January 28, 1919 (also attended by Carl 
Schmitt300). In this speech Weber continued the line that he had formulated in his articles 
during 1917. 
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However, there was now a difference. The important difference is that he argued clearly 
also for a charismatic presidential authority that was “the only remaining outlet for the 
desire for leadership…if the President were to be elected in plebiscitary rather than 
parliamentary means”301. This is where we can see his defence of a strong President that 
would stand above the “leaderless” proportionally elected parliament.  
This is an important difference from his 1917 writings despite that he had not excluded the 
possibility of a co-habitation between a directly elected president and a parliament in his 
1917 writings302. Weber’s shift can be explained by taking into account the Weimar system 
of proportional representation that, as he argued, could lead to the defeat of leadership and 
to the capturing of parties by interests303. Moreover, his concept of President is also a 
solution against the Weimar role of the Bundesrat that will “necessarily limit the power of 
the Reichstag and hence the importance of the Reichstag as the place where leaders are 
selected”304.  
 
However, his constitutional suggestion for a “charismatic” President does not change his 
overall theoretical perspective of the political, which is related to the logic of leadership 
and to national integration. This continuity with his 1917 writings derives from this overall 
theoretical construction of what does political and “leadership” mean for him in the context 
of capitalist modernity.  
 
In order to see this, we need to dig deeper into Weber’s analysis of capitalist modernity. 
Weber starts from the assumption that the modern “disenchanted” world is contradictory in 
the sense that, on the one hand, capitalist modernity relieves the individual from “recourse 
to magical means”, and, on the other hand, it introduces a concept of technical-
instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität) that permeates the social actions. As Weber 
had put it in his lecture “Science as a vocation” (also attended by Schmitt305), “…the world 
is disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or 
implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical 
means and calculations perform the service. This above all is what intellectualization 
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means”306. 
 
The excerpt above reveals this Janus-face dimension of modernity, where, on the one 
hand, it is liberating through the “demystification” of the world and, on the other hand, it 
determines the social actions given that “technical means and calculations perform the 
service”. The origins of this rationality can be traced in the capitalist economy, which has 
now pervaded the whole social sphere (law, politics, culture).  
 
This demystified “capitalist rationality”, which endangers both the individual autonomy 
and the national integration, is analyzed further in his sociological work “The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” (1905). In this work, he argued that “.... this order is 
now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which today 
determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those 
directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so 
determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In Baxter’s view the care for 
external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the 'saint like a light cloak, which can be 
thrown aside at any moment'. But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron 
cage”307. 
 
In this excerpt, the metaphor of the “iron cage” (stahlhartes Gehäuse) and the reference to 
the machine production makes clear that Weber alludes to the taylorist mode of work of 
industrial capitalism when he analyzes the capitalist rationality. Moreover, his phrase 
“...determines the life of all individuals…with irresistible force” shows that capitalist 
rationality is not limited to the factory, but that, crucially, society turns into a big factory in 
which human subjectivity is guided and (possibly even) constituted by this rationality. This 
process of the expansion of capitalist rationality on human subjectivity is also seen 
emphatically in Weber's lament for the loss of the “Faustian multi-dimensionality of the 
human species”, which is lost since there is a shift into “specialists without spirit, 
sensualists without heart”308.  
 
At this point, Weber’s critique to capitalist rationality and on its impact on subjectivity is 
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clear.  In this framework, he had written in the editorial - co-written with Werner Sombart 
and Edgar Jaffé in 1904- of the journal Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 
that the journal was to explore “the cultural significance of capitalist development”309. The 
question that interests us here is how this capitalist rationality penetrates politics and why 
does Weber identify the political with the figure of a strong President as opposed to this 
rationality (which is also the point that I will go back to his constitutional suggestions). 
 
Regarding the former question, the German thinker presented the political dimension in 
modernity as a “process... parallel to the development of the capitalist enterprise (Betrieb) 
through the gradual expropriation of independent producers...in today’s ‘state’…the 
'separation' of the material means of administration from the administrative staff, the 
officials and the employees of the administration, has been rigorously implemented”310.  
 
Through this explicit analogy of modern politics with the instrumental rationality of the 
capitalist firm, he reveals the ossified, formal side of politics that functions based on a 
mechanic and depersonalized manner. However, as Weber argues, the logic of 
“calculability” -that is the basis of this rationality- cannot be conceived as analogous to “a 
way to God” and cannot provide us with the ultimate meaning of the social universe. That's 
because such a meaning does not exist in modern “polytheistic” societies and, therefore, “it 
is necessary to make a decisive choice” 311. So, the only way to make sense of the social 
actions is through a decision that bypasses the instrumental-calculated rationality. 
 
 Hence, the concept of the political is, crucially, identified with a ‘‘non-technical praxis’’. 
This identification does not exclude, nevertheless, the bureaucratic side of capitalist 
modernity and of politics as well. Weber argues that this bureaucratic element is 
inescapable but he is critical of the over-expansion of the technical rationality in all the 
spheres of social life because it endangers both the individual autonomy (by enclosing it in 
the “iron cage”) and the national integration in the sense that it is impossible to sustain a 
collective “we”. 
 
This combination of bureaucratic and political action and his ultimate solution (that shows 
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also his Weimar constitutional suggestions) can be seen through his distinction between 
three inner justifications that provide legitimacy to the political domination in societies. 
The first justification “was the authority of the 'eternal yesterday,' i.e. of the mores 
sanctified through the unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to 
conform. This is 'traditional' domination exercised by the patriarch and the patrimonial 
prince of yore. There is the authority of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace 
(charisma), the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, 
heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership. This is 'charismatic' domination, as 
exercised by the prophet or in the field of politics by the elected war lord, the plebiscitarian 
ruler, the great demagogue, or the political party leader. Finally, there is domination by 
virtue of 'legality,' by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional 
'competence' based on rationally created rules. In this case, obedience is expected in 
discharging statutory obligations. This is domination as exercised by the modern 'servant 
of the state' and by all those bearers of power who in this respect resemble him”312. 
 
In this excerpt, the “patriarchal legitimacy” signifies the pre-modern and pre-capitalist 
concept of political power that Weber renounces already through his depiction of the social 
as “polytheistic”. The “formal legality” is the adherence of politics to the competent legal 
norm that has a general-impersonal applicability313. To put it in a nutshell, this is the main 
side of bureaucracy with regards to the state. However, the “legal legitimacy” is not 
adequate, according to Weber, to sustain a legitimate system by itself because this would 
lead to its ossification.   
 
It should be noted, as an aside, that this ossified-mechanic picture of constitutionalism 
(depicted as “formal” legality) is the object of Schmitt's critique in “Political Theology” 
(that was initially planned as a commemorative publication of Max Weber)314. Schmitt 
explicitly mentioned Weber against the danger of the transformation of politics in a ‘‘huge 
industrial plant’’ that ‘‘runs by itself’’ through its cooption by the instrumental rationality. 
The danger, for Schmitt, is that ‘‘the decisionist and personalist element in the concept of 
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sovereignty is lost’’315 and that’s why he developed his concept of exception as “the power 
of real life [that] breaks through the crust of a mechanics paralyzed by repetition…”316.  
 
However, one of the main differences of Weber’s account with Schmitt’s is that, for Weber, 
the formal legal element is also necessary because a system based merely on the 
“charismatic” rationality would not be sustainable- even though the instantiation of politics 
is clearly the “charismatic” rationality because it embodies the non-reduction of the 
political to the technical approach.  
 
Analyzing now this “charismatic” rationality, which expresses the “essence” of the 
political for Weber, it is taking a clearly elitist direction in Weber’s analysis. That’s 
because, whereas he tried to disentangle the political from the economic and technical 
considerations that a crude materialism proposed, he finally ascribed this political quality 
only to people that have “the inner charismatic qualities that make a leader”317. These are 
the elites that live “for politics” and not “of politics”, in the sense that they don't think 
about their personal gains and about party machinations (here he has also in mind the paid 
officials of the bureaucracy of the parties)318. This is a point that Weber had repeated in his 
1917 writings319 .  
 
Now we can see better that the knot between his 1917 and his 1919 writings is, 
significantly, that politics is not the place of conflict and deliberation but only a place for 
the “preparation” of charismatic leaders that live “for politics”320. This is the key common 
point that shows Weber's effort to avoid the economic-instrumental logic of “interest” 
through an elitist conception of democracy.  
 
This way out is, firstly, due to Weber's “anthropological pessimism”, according to which 
the vast majority of people are depicted as not able to think in a deeper political way 
because they think about their own, personal gains or they think emotionally and, 
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therefore, “only as far as the day after tomorrow…”321. So, his conception of human 
subjectivity denotes an identity that cannot be changed by means of the political process. 
In this context, Weber is clear: the political conflict, if it remains, is (at best) between 
“heroic” elites. As he argued, every democracy has inescapably a Caesaristic tendency322. 
 
So, the solitary figure of President that takes decisions through his “inner ability” comes as 
a consequence of Weber’s elitism. This is Weber’s solution also to the emergent 
phenomenon of the bureaucratic dimension within mass political parties (e.g. party 
functionaries etc.)323. As Weber writes, “…the only choice lies between a leadership 
democracy with a 'machine' and democracy without leader, which means rule by the 
professional politician who has no vocation, the type of man who lacks precisely those 
inner, charismatic qualities which make a leader. Usually this means what the rebels within 
any given party call 'rule by the clique”324.  
 
This except shows that Weber ends up in an elitist concept of the political that regulates in 
detail the “parts” that have a say in politics and the parts that have the “depersonalized” 
role of the “machine”. So, this Weberian system of the modern state, which derives from 
his assumptions of a “disenchanted”-“polytheistic” world that does not offer any historical 
teleology, is ultimately sustained only with the emergence of leaders that are those to 
embody the “purely” political.  
 
This ultimately drives Weber’s suggestion for a powerful-Caesaristic President that will 
maintain both a collective “we” and the individual autonomy as opposed to the 
bureaucratic logic that permeates also the political parties. In this vein, he suggested that 
“a popularly elected President, as the head of the executive, of official patronage, and as 
the possessor of a delaying veto and the power to dissolve parliament and to consult the 
people, is the palladium of genuine democracy, which does not mean impotent self-
abandonment to cliques but subordination to leaders one has chosen for oneself”325.  
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Weber’s elitist conception of democracy is related not only to his anthropological 
pessimism (seen above). It is also related, secondly, to the way in which Weber conceives 
the social question. That’s because Weber’s elitist conception of the political goes along 
with a naturalization of the capitalist division of labor whose “bureaucratic” element is 
deemed as essential and, therefore, as non-political. This is evident in his Vienna lecture on 
“socialism” in which he argued that “everywhere we find the same thing: the means of 
operation within the factory, the state administration, the army and university departments 
are concentrated by means of a bureaucratically structured human apparatus in the hands 
of person who has command (beherrscht) over this human apparatus…it is a serious 
mistake to think that this separation of the worker from the means of operation is 
something peculiar to industry and, moreover, to private industry”326.  
 
It can be seen in this excerpt that the capitalist division of labor is deemed as an 
inescapable bureaucratic (and, therefore, non-political) element of modernity. On the 
contrary, Weber’s concept of the political-non-technical action should be seen as expressed 
by an elite that keeps the ability of purely political action as opposed to the instrumental 
logic that pervades civil society- namely the “people” (as seen also in the analysis above). 
  
From this perspective, Weber answered also to the “social question” by opposing both the 
socializations and socialism. Regarding the former, he argued that this would necessarily 
lead to further bureaucratization (even though he seemed to concede to some socializations 
in view of the prospect of the SPD-DDP coalition327). So, when the DDP asked Weber to 
represent them on the second Commission on socializations (in 1920) he argued that “at all 
meetings, everywhere, both private and public, I have declared ‘socialization’, in the sense 
now understood to be nonsense. We are in need of entrepreneurs…”328. Regarding the 
former, Weber had written in 1917 (in the context of a discussion about the future of 
German economy and the possibility of a socialist transformation of the economy) that “a 
progressive elimination of private property is theoretically conceivable…What would be 
the practical result? The destruction of the iron cage of modern industrial labour? No! The 
abolition of private capitalism would simply mean that the top management of nationalized 
or socialized enterprises would become bureaucratic as well”329. 
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We can see from the excerpt above that the rationality of the capitalist system is the only 
horizon that we have at our disposal since anything else is doomed to bring even more 
bureaucracy. So, despite that he was in favor of some measures of progressive social 
legislation330, it is clear that Weber opposed the welfare state to the extent that it intervened 
with formal rationality. This formal rationality, as is visible in the excerpts above, is 
identified with the capitalist division of labor. 
 
Taking this into our account, the crucial point is the one pinpointed by Mommsen when he 
argued that “Weber was convinced that neither private appropriation nor the uneven 
distribution of property can be regarded as the essential causes of the alienation and 
deprivation of the working classes…Weber saw the roots of alienation, not in property 
relations [namely in the capitalist division of labor] but in omnipotent structures of 
bureaucratic domination, which modern industrial capitalism produced in ever-increasing 
numbers”.331 So, alienation comes from bureaucratic domination. 
 
Opposed to this bureaucratic domination was solely the “leader” as opposed to the 
“official”. The “leader” can be seen, according to Weber, not only at the political but also 
at the economic level. This derives from the analogy that he drew between the state and the 
enterprise in the sense that both contain both an inescapable bureaucratic component and a 
non-technical (leadership) component332. At the economic level the figure of the leader is 
identified with the dynamic entrepreneur as opposed to the static capitalist model -such as 
the “parasitic ideals of a stratum of prebendaries and rentiers”333. So, his ideal, at the 
level of the “social question”, is a reinforcement of the capitalist economy with measures 
that strengthen social mobility and “productive capital” instead of socialist, interventionary 
measures that create further bureaucracy. From this perspective, he had argued in 1917 that 
a concept of a “communal economy” would be unable to produce dynamic entrepreneurs 
and would create further bureaucratic monopolization334.  
 
Through this lens we can also see Weber’s argument that the continuous demands for 
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equality by the “excitable majority” would “further the influence of informal law”335. So, 
modern law- namely the main bureaucratic element in politics- is deemed to go hand in 
hand only with the capitalist rationality or it runs the danger of being disintegrated336. 
That’s why deviating from the capitalist rationality means- what Weber calls- a “cadi 
justice”, namely a premodern logic337. 
 
In a similar vein, Weber “pleaded strongly for a liberal system of industrial relations in 
which the trade unions would be free to fight for the economic and social interests of the 
workers...”338. So, as Mommsen argues, Weber’s theory is not a “throwback to Manchester 
liberalism” but “in a way it anticipated the neo-liberalism of the 1950s… he influenced its 
leading exponents (e.g. Friedrich Hayek, Hannah Arendt, Alfred Müller-Armack) to a 
considerable extent”339.  
 
Weber’s insights have been the lens through which the Weimar economic constitution was 
criticized in similar terms by other liberal approaches (see chapter 4). This makes sense 
given that the deeper assumption of Weber’s logic is a liberal concept of an autonomous 
state through its distinction with the economic (that is deemed to be non-political as seen), 
which makes it incompatible with a constitution that puts into question the political-
economic divide (as the Weimar economic constitution did, albeit it did not make a rupture 
with the capitalist mode of production). 
 
Concluding, it is evident through this analysis of Weber, that his answer to the political and 
to the social question is close to liberal thought despite his aversion to the usual liberal 
conception of politics as a utopia of “perpetual peace”340. That’s because, notwithstanding 
Weber’s Kulturkritik regarding the effects of capitalist rationality on subjectivity, his 
critique is not against the capitalist social relations but against the confounding between 
the political and the economic and the capturing of the leaders-elites by the bureaucratic 
logic. Hence, his theory and his constitutional suggestions endorsed a framework of 
democracy as “competitive leadership antagonism”341.  
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This architecture shows also his main, not negligible, difference with Marxism342. Whereas 
Marxism takes the promises of modernity seriously as inscriptions for a generalized non-
technical praxis that could transform the social relations, Weber's concept of a non-
technical praxis goes in the direction of maintaining the political-economic divide.  
 
As a very last point, it should be also noted that Weber’s theory was influential not only 
regarding the political and the social question but also with his remarks about the 
bureaucratization of political parties. As we will see in chapter 5, Schmitt took this critique 
into account but in a more radical anti-parliamentary tone, whereas Weber was not against 
political parties as such but against “parliamentary absolutism”. Kelsen also took Weber’s 
critique into account by suggesting the constitutional recognition of political parties as 
public bodies in order to enhance their democratic accountability (also in terms of their 
internal organization), giving in this way a democratic twist to Weber’s insights without 
resorting either to charismatic leaders or to a political-economic distinction (see chapter 6). 
Finally, Franz Neumann was also influenced by Weber’s theorizations by showing clearly 
the bureaucratization not only of political parties (SPD) but also of the social organizations 
(unions). However, his critique is not exerted in a Weberian liberal direction but he 
conceived this bureaucratization as related to the advanced capitalist state343 and as a result 
of the problematic trade unions’ strategy (see chapter 4.3 and chapter 6.5). 
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Chapter 4. The “social question” in the Weimar Constitution 
 
 
 
The Weimar Constitution was not a typical liberal constitution but a “post-traditional” 
constitution344. Hence it dealt also with the “social question” in contrast with Preuss’ 
original draft (see chapter 3.1) and with nineteenth-century constitutions. 
 
Social policy was very important for the Weimar Republic. Its necessity for the Weimar 
state lies, firstly, on the specific post-war German conditions. Under these conditions, 
social policy was necessary for the relief and the integration of war veterans (and of their 
families) and for the impoverished post-war German society345. Secondly, Weimar social 
policy “…also reflected the long-term trend in the development of the western and central 
European states since the nineteenth century. The industrial revolution had gotten under 
way in these states through the unleashing of capitalism and with the enormous human 
sacrifices that constituted the ‘social question’. But the political pressure emanating from 
the ‘social question’ and the rising productivity of industrialization also allowed for the 
creation of large collective system of security, the expansion of worker protections, and the 
legal regulation of the clash of interests in collective labor law. In all areas, the state 
abandoned its paltry role as merely a ‘night watchman’…. It became a ‘welfare state’, 
initially still in the sense of fighting off threats that could arise for the body politic from 
mass poverty and class warfare, but then increasingly as an agency for the distribution of 
the national income that was intertwined in multifarious ways with the societal forces. 
Those forces were now organized into associations, and in cooperation and competition 
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with the other parties and the ministerial bureaucracies, they were especially intent on 
getting their hands on the rudder of legislative activity. Everything now depended on the 
viability of this changed state: the ability for political action, on the one hand, and the 
productivity of the economy, on the other”346.  
 
The significant point here is that social policy is associated with this “changed state” as 
Stolleis named it. It is a state of democratic capitalism, which is a centralized state but also 
a state where the social forces and the associations play a significant role. Given the 
centrality of labor especially in Weimar (as seen already from the central role of the 
Stinnes-Legien agreement), the most powerful Weimar social associations were those 
related with the issue of labor.  
 
The main labor organization during the Weimar Republic was the ADGB347. The ADGB 
was established in 1919 and was an evolution of the General Commission, which had been 
established in early 1890348. It was the most significant blue-collar workers’ federation and 
from 1924 on it had between 4 and 5 million members349. Moreover, the ADGB along with 
the other two socialist federations (Afa and ADB), which represented salaried employees 
and civil servants respectively, had a combined membership of 8 million in 1920 (less 
later)350. This gave them the possibility of significant influence in national politics when 
they acted together351. Moreover, the ADGB continued the line of official independence 
from the SPD, which was held by the unions since the 1906 Mannheim agreement352- 
notwithstanding that it was affiliated with the party at many levels. The orientation was 
clearly close to the reformist side of the SPD at the level of the top ADGB decision makers 
(see section 3 of this chapter and chapter 2)353. 
  
On the opposite side of the spectrum, there was the League of German Industry (RDI) 
whose intensity of opposition to the unions was contingent on the struggle between 
fractions of capital and on the economic conditions. The RDI was created in February 1919 
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with “one thousand trades organization subdivided into twenty-seven trades groups”354. 
 
In this mosaic of interests and associations we could also add the differences between 
various fractions of capital (e.g. export-oriented and heavy industry, see chapter chapter 
5.5.) and of labor (e.g. between white-collars and blue-collars workers) along with the 
domain of agriculture (see chapter 1 and chapter 5.5.). Social policy plays, therefore, a 
crucial role in-between these contradictions of the democratic advanced capitalist state by 
ensuring both the “loyalty” of the citizens and the economic “efficiency” of the capitalist 
state. 
 
The Weimar Constitution provided the basis for social policy on the Second Principal Part 
of the Constitution (Articles 109-165) given that the majority of representatives in the 
National Assembly decided the addition of a section on the Sozialer Rechtsstaat355. In this 
first section I will analyze the Weimar welfare state, which is based on the Second 
Principal Part of the Weimar Constitution. I will show that it is not divested from the 
capitalist logic.  In the second section, I will focus on the Weimar “economic constitution”, 
which is a crucial section of this second part of the Weimar Constitution, and on Hugo 
Sinzheimer who introduced it. Moreover, I will analyze the economic constitution in 
parallel with the political and the social traction in the historical context of the Weimar 
Republic and I will show how it remained to a large extent a “dead letter” during the 1920s 
and how it was “highjacked” mainly during the last period of the Weimar Republic (with 
the rise of the authoritarian state) and turned into a tool for the suppression of the workers’ 
rights. In the third section, I will analyze this process by juxtaposing the theories of the 
scholars that argued for the economic constitution during the Weimar period (mainly 
Neumann, Sinzheimer and Heller to an extent) with the post-1933 critiques of this 
constitution. This juxtaposition will allow us to see, firstly, how the economic constitution 
was deployed by the aforementioned Weimar theorists of Staatslehre as part of their social 
democratic political strategy. I will show that this strategy is, in a way, the Marxian-social 
democratic answer to the Weberian solution to Marx’s riddle. Secondly, it will allow us to 
see two entirely different ways of conceiving both this strategy and the “economic 
constitution” through the post-1933 Marxist critique of Franz Neumann and the 
contemporary liberal critique (that has Weberian overtones) of the Weimar economic 
constitution. Finally, it will be asked in this third section what lessons can we draw from 
the way in which this “economic constitution” ended up and to what extent these latter 
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critiques are valuable.  
 
As a final methodological note, it should be noted that the reason for the inclusion of this 
chapter in this dissertation is to show, firstly, the strong relation of the Weimar Republic to 
social policy. As Stolleis wrote, the capacity of the social policy “…to defuse social 
conflicts would decide the fate of the state”356. In this sense, it is also not accidental that 
there was a structural transformation of the constitutional order during the early 1930s in 
Weimar regarding both the constitutional provisions that regulated the political question 
and the social question, as it will be seen.  
 
Secondly, it wants to show the depth of the Weimar constitutional debate that delved 
deeply not only into the political but also into the social question. The debate in this 
chapter will also prepare the ground for the Kelsen-Schmitt debate to come in part B.  
 
In this sense, the inclusion of this chapter in the dissertation will reveal also the 
differentiation of this dissertation from other methods of analyzing the Weimar Republic 
and Weimar constitutionalism, which focused mainly on the “political question” 357. 
 
4.1. The Weimar welfare state  
 
The Weimar welfare state was different from the Kaiserreich welfare state. This change is 
described well by Stolleis. He writes that, whereas the welfare state during the Empire 
“aimed primarily at industrial workers and had simultaneously sought to pacify them 
politically by providing material security, the consistent expansion of social insurance was 
already pointing in the direction of a slowly emerging national insurance. However, that 
trend asserted itself fully only when entirely new segments of the population became 
involuntarily dependent upon the state in the in the postwar period”358.  
As seen before, this was both due to the specific post-war German conditions but also due 
to the ‘risks’ of the industrial society in which “those who had jobs gained a relatively 
secure place, thanks to guarantees and protections from associations, while the 
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unemployed and many other groups gradually turned into the ‘poor’, without being able to 
fight against it in any organized form. These groups, which were now also voters, could 
not be pacified by pointing to traditional welfare”359.  
So, there was the necessity of inclusion of all these groups that were exposed to insecurity. 
It is indicative that the number of those who were in need of welfare aid between 1913 and 
1924 was much larger (quadrupled) and the need for state support per capital grew 
eightfold360.  
 
These social policies were based on the constitutional provisions of the Second Principal 
Part of the Constitution (Articles 109-165). This Part of the Constitution was the 
constitutional basis of the legislative regulation of various dimensions of the social life 
(e.g. youth welfare in art. 122, housing policy in art. 155, social insurance in art. 161) at a 
Reich level (article 9).  
 
The Weimar welfare system both at the level of this Second Part of the Constitution and at 
the level of the legislation that followed was marked by the centrality of labor. That’s 
because this “social state” originated from and was driven by a strong workers’ movement 
that “…was largely moderate, and it was eventually undone by rampant unemployment”361.  
 
This centrality of labor, which is visible since the Stinnes-Legien agreement, explains why 
the domain of welfare issues was transferred from the Reich Ministry of the Interior to the 
newly founded Reich Labor Ministry in October 1918362 (except for the part of the welfare 
that remained in the competence of the Länder with guidelines provided by the Reich363, 
see below).  
 
However, on the other side of this centrality of labor is the consideration that the concept 
of labor and the concept of welfare state that was adopted by the Weimar Constitution is 
also part of a compromise between the various parties of the coalition government (SPD, 
Zentrum, DDP). So, on the one hand, the Weimar welfare state was driven by a strong 
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workers’ movement but, on the other hand, the Second Principal Part of the Constitution 
was also a compromise at a more concrete level. This is a contradiction only if we forget, 
firstly, the reformist character of the ADGB and of the SPD leadership and, secondly, the 
overall societal pressure after the November Revolution for a welfare state.  
This compromise is evident by the fact that this Part was drafted primarily by Friedrich 
Naumann (DDP) along with Hugo Sinzheimer (SPD) and with the involvement also of 
Konrad Beyerle who was the constitutional expert of the Zentrum party364. The knot of this 
compromise can be traced in the category of the “social” that was adopted by the 
Constitution365. This was a concept of the social that, whereas it entailed the element of 
solidarity (that was shared also by Catholicism as seen in article 151 and the articles 
regarding private property, see below), was still identified with capitalist logic. This is 
primarily seen in that, whereas “labor power” is constitutionally protected (art. 157, 161), 
labor is not clearly disentangled from its subjection to the capitalist logic of productivity 
and profitability and, more than this, it is also conceived as a “moral duty” (article 163)366. 
Regarding the legislation, it followed the same logic by turning, on the one hand, the 
welfare system into a more national and centralized form but, on the other hand, this 
system was based on the availability of the people to follow the logic of work as identified 
by the capitalist system. Moreover, this welfare system was based on the principle of 
individualization367 (see below about the “public welfare assistance” and the three-tiered 
structure of the national insurance). 
 This overall logic is also evident in Stolleis’ summary of the principles of social assistance 
as imprinted in the legislation. As he writes, “what is presupposed is an image of the 
person that is focused on earning a living through work. …In case of ‘uneconomical 
conduct’, social assistance should ‘test in the strictest way and restrict the kind and 
measure of social assistance to what is indispensable for getting by.’ Persons ‘who 
stubbornly act against the legitimate directives from the relevant authorities’ were 
                                                
364Thornhill (2000) 105 
365Stolleis (2014) 112 
366According to article 163 “without detriment to his personal freedom, every German has the moral duty to 
activate his spiritual and bodily forces such that it advances the well-being of the whole society. Every 
German should be granted the opportunity to earn his living through productive labor. To the extent that an 
appropriate opportunity for work cannot be found for him, his necessary living needs will be provided 
for…”.  
  Weimar Constitution ([1919] 2008) 409-440, 436 
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disciplined in this way and stood under the threat of being committed to a ‘work 
house’…Thus, the work ethic and repression thus lay closely side by side— as they already 
had throughout the entire modern period and continue to do so to this day”368.  
Unravelling Stolleis’ remark  through the analysis of the Weimar welfare legislation, this 
logic can be seen, firstly, by the “public welfare assistance”. Analyzing gradually this form 
of assistance, the “public welfare assistance” was “the catch-all for those who dropped out 
of their special systems of social protection and now found themselves in the company of 
those who became welfare recipients solely because of their poverty”369. After the 
1923/1924 legislation, various areas of social care were transferred from the Reich to the 
regional states and the “Reich reserved for itself the right to issue ‘fundamental principles’, 
which then came into force in 1924/1925”370. These fundamental principles issued by the 
Reich (1924/1925) indicate clearly the compromise between the aforementioned political 
conceptions, by suggesting the individualized form of “public welfare assistance”371 and 
that it “must not paralyze the self-responsible work”372. 
This logic is also evident, secondly, from the “Law on Job Placement and Unemployment 
Insurance” (July 7, 1927) that “now assigned protection against the risk of unemployment 
to the state’s sphere of responsibility”373. This was the most significant indication of the 
closeness of the Weimar Republic to the category of the “social” and to the aforementioned 
specific conception of the social.  
This can be seen through the focus on the structure of this system. Regarding the financing 
                                                
368Ibid. 
369As Stolleis concretizes this second category of welfare, “public welfare assistance now comprised the 
following: social assistance for disabled veterans and surviving dependents, assistance for the disabled and 
for salaried employees who had no insurance protection, assistance for recipients of small pensions, 
assistance for the severely disabled and those seriously impaired in their ability to work through job 
procurement, assistance for needy minors, maternity benefits, and—listed only at the very end—assistance 
for the poor”. Ibid. 100-101 
370 Ibid. 101 
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372These fundamental principles were the following: “Welfare should create values instead of merely 
preserving them. Its noblest goal must be to strengthen the will and power of the need person such that he 
can hold his own through his own skill, effort, and productivity. It must not paralyze the self-responsible 
work, especially not the fulfillment of one’s obligations towards one’s own family. It must take effect in time 
and adequately, and, where the need exists, also intervene preemptively. Formally it must respect human 
dignity. It must not help in a uniform manner, but must probe into the peculiarity of the emergencies and on 
that basis select the means to remedy them. It should no longer put the giving of cash in the center, but help 
from one human being to another”. 
In ibid. 
373 Ibid. 119-120 
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of this system, the employers and employees each paid half of the contributions374. In 
terms of benefits, the structure of the insurance system was three-tiered and was the 
following one. The first category could claim assistance from the state unemployment 
insurance scheme (Arbeitslosenunterstützung) for 6 months provided that the worker was 
working full time for a certain amount of years. The second category provided a lower 
“emergency assistance” for another 6 months (Krisenunterstützung) to those that had 
exhausted the first category and to those that were ineligible (at a first place) because they 
had not completed the essential contributions to the insurance system or they were working 
in a more precarious situation (fluctuation between employment and unemployment). The 
third category (Wohlfahrtsunterstützung) corresponded to those that had exhausted or did 
not fit into the other two forms of assistance and it was provided as an assistance to the 
poor by the municipalities “according to their ability and discretion”375. Moreover, this 
third form of assistance took the form of a loan, which means that it had also to be repaid. 
The crucial assumption that lay behind this system is that “only jobs brought contributions 
to the insurance funds, which could in turn benefit others. Conversely, unemployment 
meant a financial burden and political extremism”376. So, the rise of unemployment after 
the outbreak of the Great Depression in the fall of 1929 (around 6,2 million in 1932377), 
had a twofold consequence.  
Firstly, the insurance system was less efficient in the maintenance of social cohesion. 
That’s because the first insurance scheme was given only to a minority of the unemployed 
and the vast majority of the unemployed belonged to the third category (apart from the 
“invisible” unemployment378). Especially regarding the third category, given the 
individualized character of this assistance, the unemployed people were dependent on the 
“mercy” of the local authorities. As Bologna writes, “the result of driving the unemployed 
onto the system of municipal welfare was to create an army of people obliged to go asking 
for charity from a bureaucrat, who very often judged their needs solely on the basis of 
subjective impressions. The unemployed could receive social security only if they 
succeeded in convincing the benefits officer in a face-to-face interview. This led to the 
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creation of a mass of millions of people who were open to blackmail” 379. 
Secondly, the state resources were depleted due to the lack of contributions and, therefore, 
“the Reich office was presiding over an enormous deficit” 380. Moreover, the expenditures 
for public assistance also “weighed heavily on local budgets [as was also the third form of 
assistance in the national insurance] and thus closed the fateful circle of political 
hopelessness”381. That makes sense considering that the vast majority of the unemployed 
people “belonged” to the third category of assistance. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Weimar welfare system was intrinsically 
connected with labor but without disconnecting labor from the capitalist logic of “work”. 
Hence the sustainability of the Weimar welfare system was directly associated with the 
“success” of the capitalist system, i.e. the workers’ contributions to the system were 
dependent on the employment rate, which was related mostly to the profitability of 
enterprises. 
 
4.2. The “economic constitution”: its architecture and its “hijacking” 
 
The biggest indication of the centrality of labor in the Weimar Constitution is the 
“economic constitution” (articles 151-165). The economic constitution shows that the 
power of labor during the early Weimar period- that was evident in that even the RDI 
recognized the unions, their bargaining rights, the 8-hour day, the factory councils and the 
joint working committees382- was imprinted in the constitutional document. 
 
The “economic constitution” consisted of a series of guarantees of labour protection but in 
the spirit of the aforementioned ‘accommodation’ within the logic of capitalism. This 
                                                
379Moreover, Bologna writes that this welfare mechanism was administered by the last governments of 
Weimar as an “information” mechanism so as to fragment/atomize and, therefore, “discipline” the 
unemployed people efficiently. Finally, this personal information was used later by the Nazi regime in the 
context of its “physical extermination” policy.  
 
Ibid. 83. The English translation here is from Ed Emery. Available at https://libcom.org/library/nazism-and-
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380Stolleis (2014) 121 
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direction is visible from the very first article of this constitutional section (article 151 
paragraph 1), according to which “the regulation of economic life must correspond to the 
principles of justice, with the aim of guaranteeing to all a humane existence. Individual 
economic freedom is secured under these limitations”383. Moreover, it is also visible from 
article 153 paragraph 3, according to which “property creates obligations. Its use should at 
the same time serve the general good”384. So, individual economic freedom and property 
are enshrined but with restrictions (see also articles 152 and 153385).  
 
Apart from the aforementioned general limitations, these restrictions are concretized in a 
number of other provisions: the established protection of workers (articles 157, 160-161), 
the recognition of the unions (article 159, 165), the rights of co-determination at work 
through article 165, and the “optional’’ socialization of key industries (article 153 
paragraph 2, article 156).  
 
Regarding the issue of socializations, a “socialization law” had already been approved by 
the National Assembly (23 March 1919) under the pressure of wildcat strikes that broke 
out in spring 1919 (without the participation of the General Commission). This law did not 
socialize anything particular but it established a framework for future socializations386. 
Moreover, two short-lived “socialization” commissions had been set up by the 
government. The first commission was created after the November Revolution (between 
November 1918 and April 1919) and a second one was set up after the Kapp Putsch 
(between March 1920 and February 1921) at the urging of the ADGB, which was trying to 
“dampen the strong Left forces”387. 
 
 However, both commissions ultimately failed to achieve anything and the aforementioned 
constitutional articles remained a dead letter. This was partly due to the fear that, in case of 
socializations, something akin to state property would be created that could be demanded 
as reparation by the Allies388. Moreover, it was partly because of the fear of the SPD and of 
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384 Ibid. 
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386See the “Socialization law” in Fowkes (2014), 30-32 
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387 Braunthal (1978) 165. See also Fowkes (2014) 32 
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the union leaders that there would be a further deterioration of the impoverished post-war 
economy and a Left-minority take over of the country389, and “partly because of the fierce 
resistance of the mine owners”390 (given the focus of the commissions on the mining 
industry). 
 
The stance of the SPD and of the unions could be seen in their response to the first 
socialization commission. This commission under Kautsky had proposed in February 1919 
a “German Coal Community’’ for the socialization of mines with equal representation 
from various social actors391. The SPD and the Free Trade Unions followed, on the 
contrary, the evolutionary slogan “reconstruction, and, where it makes sense, 
nationalization”392. Hence, the coal mines “remained an antidemocratic bulwark after 
1918”, as Winkler writes393. Kautsky had, nevertheless, warned in April 1919 that “the 
most dangerous experiment of all, however, would be a return to the old capitalism”394.  
 
Going back to other parts of the “economic constitution”, the constitutional article that 
shows more clearly the centrality of labor and its proximity to the “social” is article 165. 
Article 165 was established after the Stinnes-Legien agreement and the Collective 
Agreements Decree had already given an impetus to the unions and to the collective 
bargaining (see chapter 1).  
 
This article was introduced with the insistence of the SPD parliamentary representative and 
theorist of labor law Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945). Sinzheimer was the central figure of 
the special committee of National Assembly for the drafting of labor law395. He was 
influenced from a “humanist” interpretation of Marx and from Gierke’s theory396, based on 
which he adopted a concept of “labor law” close or even indistinguishable from “social 
law” (soziales Recht). This concept of law would redress the hard distinction between 
private and public law and would substantively orient itself towards a concept of labor as a 
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“human activity” against its identification merely with property and capital397. On the 
contrary, this concept of labor would fulfill a social role398 through which it could also 
fulfill an individual role of autonomy and dignity399.  
 
The role of councils would be crucial in this process. Whereas the SPD was initially torn400 
and the leadership of the General Commission of Trade Unions conceived the councils 
initially as antagonistic to the unions401, Hugo Sinzheimer convinced the SPD conference 
in March 1919 to adopt a constitutional provision that would incorporate the councils. His 
proposal suggested the establishment of workplace councils, which would “participate on 
an equal footing with the employers in the regulation of labour conditions as a whole”, of 
district labour councils and of a Reich labour council “with a political role, advising on all 
new laws on economic or social questions”402.  
 
This constitutional provision was article 165. It reads as follows: 
 
[paragraph 1] “Workers and employees are entitled to determine in common with 
entrepreneurs and as their equals in the regulation of wages and working conditions as 
well as in the entire economic development of productive forces. The reciprocal 
                                                
397Dukes (2014) 15 
 
398Ruth Dukes stresses that Sinzheimer uses the words “social law” and “labor law” interchangeably in his 
writings. Ibid. 15 
399As Sinzheimer had argued “Les personnes sont egales. Les etres humaines sont inegaux dans les situations 
concretes”. 
  In Zachert (2002) 49-67, 54 
400 This can be seen in chancellor Scheidemann’s statement in February 1919 that “no member of the Cabinet 
contemplates the incorporation, in any form, of the council system into the constitution”. In Dukes (2005) 44 
401The leader of the General Commission Carl Legien described at the SPD conference in March 1919 as “ 
‘an unhappy notion’ the idea that workers’ councils should be given a role in industry: ‘if the workers’ 
councils are given governmental consent to regulate pay and working conditions, the unions will no longer 
have any raison d’être’ ”.  
 
However, as Dukes writes, the majority of the union leaders accepted the following strategy: “it was agreed 
that the unions would advocate the permanent re-establishment of works councils with purely economic 
functions, on the understanding that the unions would be able to dominate the councils”.  
Dukes (2005) 43-44 
See also Fowkes (2014) 43 
402Dukes (2005) 45 
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organizations and their agreements are recognized. 
 
[paragraph 2] Workers and employees must be legally represented in the enterprises’ labor 
councils as well as in district labor councils and in a Reich workers’ council in order to 
protect their economic and social interests. 
[paragraph 3] In conjunction with representative employers’ organizations and other 
related popular participant associations, the district and Reich councils cooperate in the 
fulfillment of comprehensive economic tasks and in the joint execution of socialization 
statutes. The Reich and district councils are composed such that all significant 
occupational groups are represented commensurate with their economic and social 
importance.  
[paragraph 4] The Reich government should submit fundamentally significant draft statutes 
on social and economic policy to the Reich Economic Council for its advice before their 
introduction to the Reichstag. The Reich Economic Council itself has the right to submit 
such draft statutes. If the Reich government is not in agreement with such submissions, it 
must nevertheless present them to the Reichstag together with an account of its view of the 
issue. The Reich Economic Council has the authority to appoint one of its members to 
represent its submission to the Reichstag…”403. 
 
So, this article went further than the aforementioned agreements (e.g. Stinnes-Legien) by 
opening the way to a more decisive role of the councils. However, it is crucial that, 
according to article 165, the councils are neither conceived as an alternative to the 
Reichstag nor do they have a legislative function with respect to economic affairs as it was 
demanded by the Second Congress of the Workers’, Farmers’, and Soldiers’ Councils of 
Germany in Berlin in April 1919 and (from a right-wing perspective) by the German 
nationalists404.  
In this direction, Franz Neumann -who was close to Sinzheimer during the Weimar 
Republic given that he was also his Assistent between 1923 and 1927405- argued that 
Sinzheimer’s theory opposed the suggestions for the establishment of a corporate 
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economic parliament that would be “equal to the political parliament” and did not  aim at 
the “complete freedom of the economic constitution from the state constitution”406.  
As Brunkhorst wrote “Sinzheimer and Neumann followed the Kantian presupposition that 
the parliamentary legislator should maintain absolute supremacy over the economic 
constitution. The economic constitution should have a mere service function: it should 
improve the possibilities of the democratic legislator, to get the markets, and in particular 
the private sphere of domination within the capitalist firm under democratic control’’407. 
So, the political is not dissolved into the social as in Gierke’s logic despite his influence on 
Sinzheimer. 
In this sense, article 165 constitutionalized the extension of democracy to the workplace 
and included labor to a general social/national strategy that would concern the whole 
production through the district and the national bodies. To put it in a different way, the 
economy would be transformed, according to Sinzheimer’s vision, from an affair that is 
run through the “anarchy of so-called economic freedom” into a public affair that would 
give workers a voice and would “ensure that the economy was run so as to fulfill social 
ends”408. As Sinzheimer wrote, “… the private economy more and more according to 
social economic points of view has been propitiously begun in special legal forms upon the 
soil of the new political democracy”409.  
However, article 165 required further legislative implementation. The most important Act 
concerning this implementation was the Works Councils Act (February 4, 1920). This Act 
was voted amidst the fierce opposition from the radical Left and the National Association 
of German Industry. As far as the latter is concerned, it argued that this Act would give too 
many management prerogatives to the council members and it would lead to a fall of the 
national industrial activity410. Regarding the former, it was both the KPD and the USPD 
that opposed this Act through a joint appeal. They argued that this Act “...completely 
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excludes the workers and office employees from exerting any supervision over the 
management and running of the enterprise. It makes the Factory Councils mere foremen in 
the service of the capitalist entrepreneurs. The confusion in the economy is now worse… 
Only a transformation of the mode of production from the ground up can prevent a further 
collapse and make possible a reconstruction of the economy”411. 
Analyzing more thoroughly this 1920 Act before we can conclude whether the latter 
critique was valid, this Act regulated the works councils “in all factories which employ at 
least 20 employees”412. The role of the councils would be twofold. There is, firstly, the 
representation of workers by the works councils on the issues that “have to do with labor 
conditions”- what Sinzheimer calls “the socio-political duties”413As Sinzheimer writes, “in 
all these questions the industrial representatives have a deciding vote”414.  
 
At this point, the relationship between the unions and the works councils should be further 
clarified because they had different functions. The works councils, according to the 1920 
Act, had a dual role. They were representing the demands of workers but they had also “to 
co-operate with and support the employer in the fulfilment of the ‘works objective’ and the 
attainment of the highest possible productivity levels. The works councils were under a 
duty ‘to protect the workplace from disturbances’ and so were prohibited from organizing 
strikes or calling workers out on strike”415. On the contrary, the trade unions “…functioned 
on the basis of a conflictual model", which meant that they could strike or use the threat of 
strike416.  
 
Regarding this relationship between the unions and the councils, this issue was decided by 
the Works Councils Act. As stipulated in the Works Councils Act, there was “the overall 
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priority, in law, of trade-union policy and organization over the decisions and activities of 
the works councils.…that one very important role of the works council would be the 
execution of collective agreements reached by the employers’ association and the unions; 
and that only in the absence of a collective agreement would the works council have rights 
to negotiate – in consultation with the relevant unions – in respect of pay and working 
conditions”
417
.  
 
The councils had also the right “to participate in a preliminary capacity in the appeal 
procedure in cases where workers were dismissed”418. In case an agreement with the 
employer could not be reached the Works Council and the dismissed worker “could take 
the case to court, initially to the Commercial Court…after 1927 the Labor Court”419. It 
was the Labor Court that could make the Works Council rights enforceable420. 
 
Regarding, secondly, what Hugo Sinzheimer calls as the ‘‘economic-political duties”421 of 
the councils, this was planned to be the par excellence role of the councils in Sinzheimer’s 
theory through the cooperation between the workplace and the objectives posed by the 
district and national industrial councils (after a dialogue with the government) with the 
orientation ‘to limit the freedom of the employer to control the use of the means of 
production”422. In this direction, there was also the creation of a temporary Reich 
Economic Council (Reichswirtschaftsrat) with a decree in May 1920423. However, “in 
practice…[it] never developed into a body of significant power or influence, and no 
permanent council was set up”424. 
Regarding this second kind of duties the Works Councils Act gave the power of co-
determination to the works councils at company level in paragraph 70425. Under this 
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legislation, “one or two members of the works council have the right to represent in the 
board the interests and demands of the workers and also present their views with respect 
to the organization of the plant”426 and that these representatives had also “… equal voting 
and other rights with the existing members”427. However, in practice the employers 
allocated the significant decisions “…from the supervisory boards to committees to which 
no works councilors were admitted”428.  
In effect, the original plan behind article 165 was ultimately implemented in a limited way 
regarding the councils, taking also into account that the district economic councils and the 
workers’ representative councils at district and national levels were never legislated. As 
Dukes writes, “the only part of Article 165 to be effectively implemented – in the Works 
Councils Act of 1920 – was that which referred to the formation of worker representative 
councils at works level”429. The reasons for this are multidimensional: the violent crushing 
of the councils during 1919-1920 that led to their fragmentation and weakening430, the 
“strengthening position of employers”431, the defeat of the “Weimar coalition” in the 1920 
general election432.  
This architecture started, therefore, resembling the pre-revolutionary era, in which works 
councils were established and were ‘offered’ to the working class as positive rewards in 
order to mobilize them for the war433. This continuity can be seen not only in the lack of 
further legislative acts in Weimar but also in the gradual interpretative hollowing of the 
councils’ role throughout the Weimar Republic. In this vein, the Reichsgericht (Reich 
Court) wrote in a 1926 decision that Article 165 was ruled to have only “programmatic 
effect”434, which actually meant that it was not legally binding and that the main legislative 
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framework that remained, therefore, was the Works Council Act of 1920. 
 
The ‘highjacking’ of the economic constitution 
 
The most significant issue is that article 165 became gradually (and more clearly since the 
Depression) one of the “Trojan horses” of the suppression of workers’ rights through its 
interpretation.  
This was, firstly, done, through the labor courts. Analyzing this gradually, a separate 
system of labor courts was created through the Labor Court Act (it took effect on July 1, 
1927435)  due to the demand of the unions because they were “wary of the conservative 
judges and the ordinary courts lacking a uniformity of law”436. The structure of the labor 
courts was the following: a judge, who was appointed by the government to be 
independent, and two assessors (one was nominated by the unions and the other by the 
employers’ associations)437. The ADGB had “delegated” 10.000 personnel to the courts438.  
The interesting is that, whereas the employers before the Depression argued that the labor 
courts were “too social minded to apply justice”, it was the unions that fiercely criticized 
them during the Depression by arguing that their decisions were made by “conservative 
judges”439. That’s because, as Otto Kahn-Freund writes in 1931, the labor courts were 
interpreting the objective of the works councils as “…co-extensive with the employer’s aim 
of maximizing production and profit” 440. 
In this direction of “etatization” of the unions, it was, secondly, the mechanism of 
compulsory state arbitration that significantly “contributed”. Putting state arbitration into 
context, it was already regulated under the Collective Agreements Decree (in part 3) and 
was used in the cases of industrial disputes441. However, the problem with this system 
under the Collective Agreements Decree was that “the boards’ decisions could not be 
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legally enforced unless recognized by both parties”442.  
This changed with the emergency decree of 30 October 1923, which passed during the 
hyperinflation period and was based on article 48 of the Weimar Constitution443. This 
decree (along with the Second Mediation Decree of December 29, 1923) “reorganized the 
state’s mediation system that had been regulated until then by the collective bargaining 
code”444. The main point of the new arbitration system is that when the parties could not 
reach an agreement, the government-appointed arbitrator would intervene, at first, “as a 
voluntary mediator”445 and, when this failed, the arbitrator could “declare the board’s 
award binding upon an entire trade or industry” even against the will of one of the 
parties446. The range of the jurisdiction concerned disputes “from individual shop to 
national collective agreements”447. 
The significant point is that the government could intervene decisively through the right of 
the Ministry of Labor to “formulate general principles for arbitration officials to follow”448 
and directly given that the Reich Labor Minister was at the highest level of this state 
arbitration (depending on the nature of the dispute in collective bargaining)449. So, the state 
became the “final arbiter of industrial actions”450.  
This system was hailed by Rudolf Hilferding in 1927 as a step towards “higher ‘organized 
capitalism’, indeed as a step towards socialism: the veritable abolition of wage autonomy 
and market forces”451. Moreover, the labor leaders also favored a system of compulsory 
arbitration by 1920. They conceived it as “a way of politicizing wages…of avowing strikes, 
and as a useful tool of a socially-oriented state”452. On the contrary, the employers 
particularly of heavy industry were very hostile to compulsory arbitration given its very 
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positive for labor outcomes and its role of undermining “free” negotiations. This hostility 
is one of the two reasons that the Ruhr steel and iron industrialists resorted to a lockout for 
two months in October 1928 so as to attack the state arbitration “and the accelerated wage 
demands”453.  
State mediation became the norm after 1928454 (since the beginning of the economic crisis) 
and this was done “at the urging of the unions, who would have been at a disadvantage in 
their dealings with employers without the support of government mediation”455. The 
transformation of the state in 1930 brought, nevertheless, the hijacking of this mechanism, 
which became practically visible when there was a political shift by the Ministers of Labor 
(who were more favorably inclined to labor until 1930)456. 
 The authoritarian governments during the early 1930s used this mechanism in order to 
“undermine the system of collective bargaining more directly”, to order wage cuts and 
longer working hours457 (despite the fact that wage cuts were ordered during this period 
also through emergency decrees, see chapter 5.5.). This took place through the freedom of 
the state organs “to impose their own view of what was ‘equitable on a fair balancing of 
interests’. Instead of a true compromise reached in the furtherance by the collective parties 
of their interests, collective agreements increasingly gave legally binding effect to the 
‘aims of state social policy’ ”458. 
This shift can be seen in the Oyenhausen arbitration ruling in May 1930, which is a ruling 
that “mandated a wage (and price) reduction for nearly 800.000 iron-and steelworkers 
(and producers) and signaled Brüning’s deep commitment to deflationary politics”459. After 
this, a series of more positive (for capital) decisions followed during the Depression460. 
Hence, some employers now wanted the binding awards in contrast with the 
                                                
453Abraham ([1981] 1986) 246 
454As Dukes notes, “in the period to 1927, the wages of around 50 per cent of workers were set by arbitration 
orders”. However, she writes that there is no official record if it was with the agreement of the parties or not.  
Dukes (2014) 40 
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past461whereas the unions by 1930 “in a volte-face, opted for nonbinding awards in the 
hope of stemming dangerous wage cuts”462. However, it should also be written that 
industrialists from heavy industry (that started becoming again hegemonic around 1931 in 
the RDI) were mostly until the end of the Weimar Republic arguing for its abolition and 
were blaming chancellor Brüning for not doing so463. 
 
 So, the overall picture showed a suppression of the class conflict after 1929 through the 
counter-intentional “etatization” of the unions (they had already taken over the councils 
practically throughout the 1920s)464. This “etatization” was due to the fact that the 
achievement of “national economy” became a common “neutral” target (under the auspices 
of the neutral state organs) for all the parts. In a capitalist economy under crisis and with a 
simultaneous transformation of the state, this meant that the interests of workers became 
identified with the “aims of state social policy” and those with the interests of the capitalist 
economy.  
Finally, it should be added, that the government and the courts often proscribed industrial 
action given the “peace obligation”, which was written into every collective agreement. 
This was also based on an important absence in the Weimar Constitution. Whereas it 
regulated the freedom of association (article 159), it did not regulate the right to strike. 
This had as a consequence that this right was difficult to be exercised both at the level of 
individuals (e.g. participation could bring breach of contract, which could mean dismissal 
and suit in tort for losses465) and at the level of unions (e.g. it could involve a breach of 
contract) given the “‘peace obligation’ implied into all collective agreement, including 
arbitration orders”466. Effectively, then, the right to strike could be lawfully exercised only 
during the negotiation of the terms of a new collective agreement or about something that 
                                                
461Ibid. 
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463 About these demands see Abraham ([1981] 1986) 160-161, 255, 262, 282 
464As Dukes writes “the majority of free unions secured direct control over the new works councils: by 1922, 
75–80% of works councillors were members of socialist unions.”. 
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466However, there was the highest level of industrial action (throughout German history) during Weimar.  
Ibid. 
 111 
had not been part of a collective agreement467. However, Dukes shows that even if the 
strike was compatible with the “peace obligation”, it could be “declared unlawful if the 
courts regarded it as sittenwidrig or ‘immoral’—a term defined remarkably widely by the 
Weimar judiciary”, based on the Civil Code468. 
Concluding this section, the overall picture that emerges is that labor law had been 
transformed from a powerful tool of the popular classes into an instrument of the state that 
suppressed them. The main question that remains to be answered is to what extent the 
architecture of the “economic constitution” was “responsible’ for this. 
 
4.3. The economic constitution as a question of strategy: advocates and critics 
 
There has an explicit critique of the initial architecture of the Weimar constitution given 
how the economic constitution ended up and due to the fall of the Weimar Republic. Such 
a critique came, firstly, from a Marxist perspective by Franz Neumann (1900-1954) in his 
post-Weimar period (mainly in his writings between 1933-1945), namely after his shift 
from the “lawyers socialism”469 stance in Weimar. The second main critique is a 
contemporary critique from a liberal perspective, which follows in the footsteps of Weber’s 
insights. 
The method that I will follow in the section is that I will analyze these post-1933 critiques 
after I present the theories of the Weimar scholars who used the economic constitution in 
the framework of their political strategy during the historical process of Weimar. So, I will 
analyze firstly, the latter Weimar approaches (pre-1933 Neumann, Sinzheimer, Heller) 
and, then, I will contrast them with these post-1933 critiques in view also of the Weimar 
                                                
467Ibid. footnote 52 
468As she writes, “ ‘Immoral’ industrial action was unlawful by reason of para 826 of the Civil Code: 
Grundzüge, 294–8. In respect of industrial action, the paragraph was interpreted so widely that any instance 
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historical context. This will allow me to see better the extent to which each of these post-
1933 critiques is valuable.  The main figure in this section will be Franz Neumann because 
his complete theoretical shift after 1933 will allow us to see both sides (except for the 
liberal critique that will be seen by itself). 
 
Neumann’s pre-1933 thought 
 
In his pre-1933 writings Neumann was very positive about Sinzheimer’s theory (see also 
section 2) and argued that the Weimar constitution “is the creation of the working class”. 
For Neumann, the economic constitution “contain[ed] the fundamentals necessary for the 
construction of a social Rechtsstaat whose objective is the realization of social 
freedom…Social freedom means that workers will determine their own working life; the 
alien power of the owners to command labour through their control of the means of 
production must give way to self-determination”470 . 
In his effort of identifying “social freedom” he invoked Rousseau and especially the 
emphasis of Rousseau’s concept of freedom upon the “compulsion on the part of the state” 
as opposed to a liberal, pre-political and individualistic concept of freedom471. In this 
direction, he argued that the Weimar Constitution is “positively endorsing the basic idea of 
the social Rechtsstaat, which, while recognizing private property, removes from the private 
owner the administration of his property”472.  
However, Neumann recognized that state theory and jurisprudence (“particularly in 
the...Reichsgericht”) have “turned on their head” the constitutional principles of the 
economic constitution during the post-revolutionary period in Weimar473. As he argued 
“…in particular the protection of property secured by article 153 has expanded 
immensely”474 . Hence, his injunction that “it is the main task of socialist state theory to 
develop and concretely present the positive social content of the second part of the Weimar 
Constitution. Apart from the lesser writings of Herman Heller, socialist theory of the state 
                                                
470 Neumann, Franz L. ([1930] 1987). ‘The Social Significance of the Basic Laws in the Weimar 
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has, up until now, done nothing to substantiate the concrete legal content of the second 
part of the Weimar Constitution”475.  
Keeping this analysis in mind, Neumann justified further his support for the economic 
constitution through the analysis of the state of monopoly capitalism. He argued that the 
preconditions for free competition are suspended in this state and that “non-intervention 
has the same meaning as intervention” because if the state guarantees economic liberty 
“...it actually endows them with the liberty to limit the liberty of others”476. This is visible, 
according to Neumann, in the difficulty to set up a competitive enterprise in a monopolist 
economy but also in that the freedom of contract actually “disguises the fact that the 
monopolist dictates the conditions for the non monopolist”.477 At this point, “liberty 
becomes a privilege”478. Hence, “given that non-intervention means the same as 
intervention” in this state, the necessity of a “systematic order of state intervention arises, 
that is, of an economic constitution”479.  
The necessity of the economic constitution arises, therefore, from the “discrepancy 
between legal norm and substratum in the field of economic law [namely how the 
economic liberty turns into privilege]”480. However, this necessity follows also “from an 
equal contradiction between the norms of constitutional law and the concrete 
contemporary situation of the constitution”481. Elaborating on this last point, Neumann 
draws out the contradiction between the wording of the Weimar Constitution, which 
established parliamentary democracy, and the constitutional reality in which “free social 
associations (parties, trade unions, employer’s and industrial associations, Land 
federations and church unions, in short social power groups) have appropriated 
themselves control of the decision-making process. Referring to English constitutional 
theory, Carl Schmitt calls this ‘pluralism’ ”482. 
Neumann complements this descriptive account with other factors that for him contributed 
to this “infringement of the parliamentary-democratic system”: the upgraded role of 
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ministerial bureaucracy483, the assumption of a right of review by the judiciary, federalism 
and Polykratie484.  
Regarding this descriptive account of Neumann, it is clearly influenced by Schmitt’s 
analysis of the Weimar state. The dangers of pluralism, polycracy485 and federalism were 
used by Schmitt extensively in his “Guardian of the Constitution” (see chapter 5). This 
description is deployed by Schmitt in order to show that the state and society become 
indistinguishable as opposed to the 19th century state, and that this was mostly due to the 
intervention of the state in the economy through the political parties. Hence, his main 
emphasis is on –what he calls- “pluralism”486 that is defined as “a majority of strictly 
organized power complexes penetrating the state…which take hold of state decision-
making without ceasing to be solely social (non-public) entities”487. As Kelsen writes, “in 
talking about ‘social complexes of power’, [Schmitt] ...refers, first and foremost, to the 
political parties”488. 
Whereas Neumann’s analysis takes Schmitt’s descriptive account he turns it against 
Schmitt’s assumptions in the sense that he does not follow Schmitt’s direction of an 
“authoritarian liberal” resolution (as we will see in chapter 5). A substantial similarity with 
                                                
483That was “because parliament conceded to government far-reaching authority, because the position of 
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Schmitt cannot, therefore, be traced489. On the contrary, Neumann finds the solution to 
Marx’s riddle in the economic constitution that, despite being “…no longer purely 
capitalist or socialist”490, it can be the basis for “the democratic market control” that “is 
exercised together with the state by the market parties and the trade unions. The latter 
have to send representatives into the management of the market parties, that is the cartels, 
the monopolistic concerns and the monopolistic retail companies, that is into those 
economic agencies which control and manage these economic subjects”491. So, Neumann 
actually refers to a cooperation of the “cartels, companies, employer’s associations, and 
labor unions” with the state as Offe writes492.  
The basic principles of the economic constitution are identified, according to Neumann, in 
articles 159 (freedom of association) and 165 par. 2, which do not abolish the function of 
the trade unions as “private associations”493. Here there is also a disagreement with 
Sinzheimer given Neumann’s argument that the works councils represent only the “socio-
political interests of the workers against the employer” and “accordingly they provide only 
representation in private law”- as opposed to Sinzheimer who treated councils as public 
entities494. Neumann justified this by arguing that they are not “production councils” but 
only “enterprise councils”. So “the transfer of economic control and administrative tasks 
would therefore require the transformation and promotion of councils from the level of the 
enterprise to that of the company or even to the group, since economic decision are often 
made within the concern or the cartel”495. To put it simply, Neumann puts more emphasis 
on the councils’ role of “representation in private law” and on the overall “relative 
autonomy” of the unions from the state496.  
However, despite this (not insignificant) disagreement, there is a common strategy that is 
shared by Sinzheimer and Neumann: they both endorse state intervention aiming at social 
freedom through the economic constitution (without undermining the ‘political’ legislator). 
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As Neumann put it, “the economic constitution is intended to provide the possibility of 
some form of state and social intervention into the natural course of economic activity”497.  
 
The family of social democratic theories 
 
Neumann’s analysis has affinities not only with Sinzheimer but also with other theorists 
and primarily with Herman Heller (1891-1933)498. They are both self-described as “social 
Rechtsstaat” theorists499and they both substantively argue that a concept of social freedom 
can be reached through this Weimar state in the context of the Weimar economic 
constitution (without undermining the Weimar ‘political’ constitution) so as to subordinate 
“the means of life to the purposes of life”500 (Heller) and to open a new concept of 
“economic freedom”501. This is opposed to the liberal concept of freedom that leads to 
“privilege” in Neumann’s terminology or to “economic compulsion” in Heller’s 
terminology502 (albeit Heller deviated from the Marxist discourse and stressed also that the 
element of power and domination cannot be eliminated in any society503).  
Moreover, Neumann’s theory is close to the Austro-Marxist Karl Renner who is also 
explicitly invoked by him504. As Karl Renner argued “fundamental changes in society are 
possible without accompanying alterations in the legal system...development by leaps and 
bounds is unknown in the social substratum, which knows only evolution, not 
revolution”505 (see more in chapter 6 about the Austro-Marxists). This does not differ 
much from Neumann’s earliest injunction that the socialist state theory can play a decisive 
role in “capturing” the economic constitution in its direction. Through this logic, Neumann 
believes that, albeit the Weimar “economic constitution” imprinted a compromise between 
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socialism and capitalism (between workers and capitalists)506, socialism can be reached 
through the Weimar state and its intervention in the economy.  
 
This strategy of Neumann is based on the state and on a concept of the state as instrument 
through which the socialist transformation can take place, which is an assumption that he 
would reject few years later with his theory about the relative autonomy of the state in 
capitalism (see below) . This analysis of Neumann draws on the state theories of other 
social democrat theorists.  
He refers to the analysis of the Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer507 and to his concept of the state 
as an “equilibrium of class strengths”508. This actually means that the modern democratic 
state could be used in the direction of proletarian interests and that it was not a class state 
(see chapter 6.2.). Whereas Bauer’s analysis concerned the new Austrian state (mostly for 
the period between 1919-1923 but not exclusively, see chapter 6.2.), it became also “the 
seminal ideological position of the Weimar SPD” as Thornhill writes509. This assumption 
of the Weimar state as being a “class equilibrium” state is evident in Neumann’s argument 
against corporatism with the justification that it “requires…. domination by one class”510- 
the assumption being that the current Weimar state did not embody class domination.  
 
This concept of the state is also evident in Herman Heller, whose theory was also invoked 
by Neumann (as seen earlier). Heller argued that “in an age of developed and organized 
capitalism...a continuously increasing proletariat awakened to consciousness and made 
the demands of bourgeois democracy into its own in the form of social democracy” will be 
successful511.  
 
Heller’s argumentation was similar to Rudolf Hilferding’s- the SPD economist and finance 
minister (in 1923 and from 1928-late 1929s) and one of the most influential figures in the 
German Social Democracy- who is also invoked by Neumann in his analysis of advanced 
capitalism512. Hilferding dealt persistently with the issue of organized capitalism513 and 
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argued optimistically in 1927 that “this form of economy, planned and directed 
deliberately, is much more open to the possibility of conscious intervention by society, 
which is nothing other than the intervention of the sole conscious organization of the 
society with the power to compel, namely intervention by the state”514. 
Finally, Sinzheimer  advanced the not altogether different assumption of the existence of a 
social democratic state that would function “in furtherance of the common good”515. 
Hence, this could possibly that “when the state acted contrary to his expectations, 
throughout the 1920s, he was slow to admit it, slow to acknowledge the failure of the 
social democratic project”516.  
 
We can have now a better picture of the assumptions that lay behind the use of the Weimar 
economic constitution as part of a political strategy by the Weimar Staatslehre theorists. 
Opposed to this strategy was young Kirchheimer, who was criticized by Neumann for his 
objections517. 
 
A short excursus: The unions call for ‘economic democracy’ and its fate 
 
Before I proceed to the post-1933 critiques, it is interesting to focus on how the ADGB 
made use of the similar concept of economic democracy in its political strategy.  
                                                                                                                                              
513Hilferding first used the term organisierter Kapitalismus in his 1915 article “Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
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Constitution needs to take a clear value decision in favor of a socialist property order”. 
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This can be seen in the ADGB’s call for “economic democracy”. Putting this into context, 
this was the time after the hyperinflation period where capital was more powerful518(some 
of the industrialists would even support the Kapp Putsch519), there had been a collapse of 
the labor-management councils, there remained only the work councils at a local level520, 
and the rank and file had been totally defeated. Moreover, in mid-1923, with the SPD no 
longer in government, the real wages were down almost to half their prewar and 1921 
levels and there was an extension of the eight working hours521.  
The union’s response aiming to reclaim their gains would come in 1924 with their call for 
economic democracy, which was a sign that the unions remained in a “militant reformist 
path” (as it was the case throughout Weimar). This call started mainly as a defensive 
slogan in 1924 in the coal fields where the workers were treated badly though the re-
establishment of the authority of the employers (lower wages, working hours etc.)522. It 
was further discussed during the 1925 congress of the ADGB at Breslau in which the 
Congress majority rejected the concept of planned socialist economy for the near future 
and favored a “pragmatic” approach of economic democracy that was achievable under 
capitalism through a “greater or equal share in the leadership of the national industrial 
sector”523. However, the economist Fritz Naphtali was also commissioned by the labor 
leaders in 1925 to draft the program of economic democracy more clearly524. 
 
His analysis was expressed at the 1928 ADGB Congress. He argued that “economic 
democracy” could severely bend the capitalist system525. This would take place, firstly, 
through the democratization of economy based on “the expansion of the works councils, 
governmental self-governing bodies, trade-union sponsored enterprises, cooperatives and 
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public firms, which would give the workers more power at the expense of management”526. 
Secondly, there was also a longer-term plan for a “planned economy” that would go hand 
in hand with the breaking of economic monopolies and socializations527. 
  
However, the 1928 ADGB Congress embodied Naphtali’s short term program but it gave 
much less emphasis to his long term one528. So, it held a “militant reformism” strategy - 
more confident due to the gains of labor during 1925-1928 after the economy had 
recovered with the American loans- but was unable to understand and respond politically 
to the new situation.  
 
This new situation was evident since the 1928 lock-outs (supported by heavy industry) that 
forced the state to take a middle approach529. However, this started taking a dramatic route 
after the repatriation of American capital. The various fractions of capital started 
demanding forcefully the dismantling of the welfare state530 in contrast with the prior 
consensus with labor (under the hegemony of export-oriented industry and of middle 
capital) that could be seen even when the SPD was not in government531. Further than this, 
the unions were weakened during the 1930s mainly due to the huge unemployment but 
also to the fact that their main way of acting was through the state and that they had 
adopted an economistic strategy (struggling for the “everyday” working conditions) that 
was not efficient anymore (see also chapter 5.5).   
 
As Abraham writes, “a crucial weakness of this design for economic democracy was 
precisely its economism; economism just when the dominant classes were politicizing even 
the economic aspects of their struggle against organized labor, as heavy industry had in 
the Ruhr lockouts”532. 
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Neumann’s post-1933 critique and the liberal critique  
 
Both the analysis regarding the Weimar theorists and the overview of the fate of the 
concept of “economic democracy” in late Weimar through a partial overview of the 
historical context (given that the full picture can be seen only after chapter 5.5), allows us 
to proceed now with the critique of the Weimar economic constitution and of the overall 
strategy of “economic democracy”. 
In Neumann’s post-1933 critique, we find a much more critical analysis of Weimar. He 
argued that the “so-called revolution of November 1918 was no real revolution but only the 
collapse of the monarchy…”533. Moreover, he describes his pre-1933 position of “social 
Rechtsstaat” as a failure but “he refers to it in the third-not first person” as Offe incisively 
notices534. 
His critical analysis of Weimar was mainly related to the structural problem that he 
identified. The structural problem was capitalism and more particularly monopoly 
capitalism- especially after the 1924 “rationalization period”535 - that was providing the 
opportunity for the reactionary parties to orchestrate the destruction of “parliamentary 
democracy [which was] the constitutional platform for the emancipation of labor”536. The 
fact that the efforts of the reactionary parties were “successful” was attributed to the “…the 
framework and the practice of the Constitution [that] facilitated it and because the Social 
Democratic Party and the Trade Unions, the sole defenders of the Weimar system, were 
weakened”537.  
Starting from the latter, he wrote that both the SPD and the trade unions did not take into 
account the danger of monopoly capitalism for democracy given that “labor was not at all 
hostile to this process of trustification”. He deems responsible for this underplaying- at a 
theoretical level- “…their leading theorist, Rudolf Hilferding…” and his thesis about 
organized capitalism (seen above)538. In this vein, he also criticized the “ambiguous 
position” of the SPD that, by not deciding between Marxist rhetoric and gradualist strategy, 
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“could not create a democratic consciousness”539 (see chapter 5.5. about the SPD’s 
toleration strategy to the presidential regime). By 1932, Neumann argued, the SPD “was 
socialist only in name”540. Moreover, he pinpointed the “disastrous role” of the KPD, 
which held the social-fascist line while looking forward to the dictatorship of the 
proletariat541.  
 
Regarding the ADGB, its major strategic mistake -apart from the underplaying of the 
danger of monopoly capitalism- was “to believe that economic democracy was possible 
without political democracy”542. Moreover, Neumann argued that the unions were 
dissipated both due to the very high unemployment and because the “accompanying 
political tensions tended to make every strike a political strike, which the trade unions 
flatly opposed because of their theories of revisionism and ‘economic democracy’”543. 
Further, he criticized the fact that free collective agreements disappeared with the state 
fixing the wage levels544. Finally, he showed the significant bureaucratization of the unions 
by arguing that “the trade union bureaucracy was much more powerful than the 
corresponding party bureaucracy. Not only were there many jobs within the unions but 
there were jobs with the Labor Bank, the building corporations…and there were 
innumerable state jobs: in the labor courts…”545. Hence, he concluded that “bound so 
closely to the existing regime and having become so bureaucratic, the unions and the party 
lost their freedom of action”546. 
 
In all this Neumann appears to have totally changed his mind from his pre-1933 positions. 
The difference is also seen in his argument regarding the Weimar Constitution. He writes 
that the problem with the Weimar Constitution was that it embodied the compromise 
between socialism and capitalism, which could work only as long as no economic crisis 
intervened (during the 1924-1928 “boom years”) given that capitalism is “the real owner 
of power in every non socialist state”547.   
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Moreover, at the level of legal theory, he argued now that this advanced capitalism led to a 
deformalization of the “rational” concept of law. That’s because, the “rational” concept of 
law was based on the assumption of a competitive economy of “equality within the 
capitalist class”, which was regulated by the political power of the sovereign through 
general legal norms. However,  monopoly capitalism reverses the principle of free 
economy and makes “pointless” and “absurd” the regulation by general legal norms548.  
This problem, according to Neumann, was missed by Sinzheimer who “transposed” 
Gierke’s “institutionalist” theory into the “German labor law”549. Neumann shows that, 
through this theory, business enterprise is transformed into a “social organism”550, property 
is not conceived as a “subjective right” of the possessor but as an “institution”, and the 
plant is transformed into a “social work and factory community” in which the worker is “a 
living member of the community of entrepreneurs and workers”551. To put it in a nutshell, 
he shows that the socio-economic relationships are reified with this legal theory. Moreover, 
he argues that this theory was combined with decisionism (as seen in Schmitt’s writings) 
and they both helped monopoly capitalism in the sense that private property was preserved 
(through institutionalism) and general law disappeared and was replaced by “individual 
measures on the part of the sovereign” 552. All this is a direct critique of Sinzheimer, as 
opposed to his Weimar writings.  
Regarding the overall argumentation of the post-1933 period, Neumann, I would argue, 
tends at times to see Weimar in an ex-post manner (as in the first excerpt in this subsection) 
by underplaying the fact that the fate of the economic constitution was strongly related to 
the political and social process during the 1920s and particularly after 1929. Because it is 
this context that determined both the legislation, which implemented Weimar’s economic 
constitution, and informed its application.  
 
In effect his argument that the constitutional text is to be blamed is problematic to the 
extent that the main parts of the Weimar economic constitution either remained 
inapplicable or were interpretatively “perverted” after 1928 (to the extent that they 
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remained) as we saw in the second section. This argumentation of Neumann can be seen 
when he writes that “class struggle turned into class collaboration- that was the aim of the 
constitution… the ideology of the Catholic Center Party was to become the ideology of 
Weimar”553. I think that, although Neumann rightly captures the initial compromise of the 
Weimar Constitution, he underplays that the picture of post-1919 Weimar was not the same 
with the more “open” and more left-leaning picture of 1919 (see also chapter 1). 
On the other hand, Neumann’s post-1933 account grasps better than his pre-1933 
argumentation some significant issues. Firstly, he grasps the problem that organized 
capitalism poses for formal legality (as seen before). In this vein, he argues that “if the 
state is confronted only by a monopoly...it is pointless to regulate the monopoly by general 
law...the individual measure is the only appropriate expression of the sovereign power”554. 
He also traces here the essential difference with Rousseau’s concept of volonté générale, 
which was based on the presupposition of general laws. The difference is that “the volonté 
générale could be expressed in general laws only in societies with equally distributed 
small property holding or with socialized property”555. Neumann is right on this given that 
Rousseau’s general will was based on a model of political economy that rested on the 
subsistence economy556.  
 
In this direction, he also criticizes Schmitt’s tactical revival of the general law necessity in 
the expropriation cases (see chapter 5) by arguing that it was used “as a device to restrict 
the power of the Parliament which no longer represented exclusively the interests of the 
big landowners, of the capitalists, of the army, and of the bureaucracy”557.  
 
Neumann’s thinking is associated, secondly, with a different concept of the state that he 
adopts compared to his pre-1933 writings. Although it seems at times too instrumentalist 
(when it is implied that monopoly capitalism would lead necessarily to Weimar’s fall given 
Weimar’s constitutional architecture), he now turns away from his more autonomous 
concept of the state and recognizes the specificity of the capitalist state. This is evident in 
his argument about the “relative independence” of this state, which exists “as long as 
capitalism is able to make certain concessions to the working class…if it cannot do so, the 
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relative independence of the state ceases to exist and the state becomes again exclusively 
an instrument of domination on the part of the ruling class”558. Moreover, he now criticizes 
Heller for not seeing the “class nature of the actual state” and for his concept of the state 
“which…sees in the state a structure independent of the class structure”559. 
 
What we can keep from this critique is that Neumann puts the issue of the relative (only) 
autonomy of the state in a capitalist social formation. To put it in a different way, when it is 
recognized that the capitalist state is relatively autonomous, it is also recognized that it is 
always-already relatively privatized in an analogous way. And this relative privatization 
has to do with the fact that- and I repeat Neumann’s words here- “the real owner of power 
in every non-socialist state” is capitalism560. 
 
The extent, nevertheless, of this “privatization” both of the state and of law (that are 
inextricably linked in Neumann’s account) has to do also, crucially, with the ability and the 
will of the political powers and the unions to resist this process of privatization. On the 
contrary, the parliamentary state did not resist it given the toleration policy of the SPD and 
of the ADGB to the presidential regime and to the austerity program that was implemented 
(see chapter 5.5.).  
 
The crucial point in this picture is that this austerity program was altogether based on the 
assumption that the capitalist economy under crisis must be “saved” and this assumption 
was not put into serious doubt even by the SPD and the unions (see also chapter 5.5). This 
is also evident by the fact that once the Depression kicked in and the unions faced the 
dilemma of either attempting to transform the capitalist economy or to save and enlarge 
their hard-earned benefits, the ADGB leaders and officers pointed towards the latter by 
influencing also the party in this direction (in the 1931 SPD convention) whereas at the 
same time they were still asserting the longer “aim” of socialism561. This is not a surprise 
given that, as Braunthal writes, in the critical formative years of Weimar the labor leaders 
“...rejected any plan to alter a system which left powerful archconservative industrial, 
army, police, judicial and bureaucratic forces intact. In effect, by not supporting political 
strikes or pressing for socialization, they helped entrench the increasingly bourgeois 
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order”562 (see chapter 1). At the same time, the “narrow pressure-group mentality” of the 
unions did not “allow” them to make further coalitions with other strata563. 
 
 So, the main problem with the strategy of the unions and of the SPD was their combined 
reformism-economism that did not allow them to see the significant public power that 
capital has in this form of state. In this way, they could not foresee how this power would 
transform the state and how this transformation would create (also due to the toleration 
stance of the SPD during the early 1930s) a huge crisis of representation.  
 
While the historical context described in the precedent paragraphs is not ignored, it seems 
at times underplayed in Neumann’s argumentation about Weimar. However, it is true that, 
as seen before, he exerts a powerful and insightful critique both on the strategy of the 
political parties of the Left (KPD included) and on the political inability of the unions to 
respond to the strategy of capital due to their reformist-economistic logic and to their 
dependence on the State.  
 
In concluding the chapter it is time to confront directly the question about the role played 
by the economic constitution in the fall of Weimar. It has been my argument  that the 
economic constitution cannot be blamed directly for that. That’s because the more direct 
contact of the State with the direct interests of capital fractions was, crucially, not based on 
the economic constitution albeit this inhibited the power of labor through its “perversion”. 
The crucial cause of this contact lies in the structural contradictions of political democracy 
with capitalism along with the inability of the Weimar political parties and of the unions to 
respond efficiently to the political attack by capitalist fractions, also due to their 
assumption of the need to “save” capitalism from its own crisis (as seen before).  
 
This is an answer both to “prior agreements” part of Neumann’s argumentation but also to 
the liberal (Weber-inspired) critique, which argues for the responsibility of the Weimar 
economic constitution in Weimar’s fall. It argued that the Weimar Constitution continued 
the corporatist tradition of “weak statehood” because of its pluralistic expansion of rights 
that attempted to “…establish material/volitional identity between state and society after 
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1914” and, therefore, “…destroyed the basic normative fabric of exclusionary abstraction 
and autonomy in political…”564.  
 
Thornhill continues: “…the increasingly pluralistic inner structure of the state led to a 
depletion in society’s capacities for pluralism outside the state”565. To put it in other 
words, the loss of autonomous statehood came through the introduction of the hyper-
political and pluralistic “economic constitution”, which involved the corporatist 
organizations in the policy-making process (labor, capital), and was ultimately deployed 
after 1930 by private economic actors that “…were able to utilize their position close to the 
executive to renege on their bilateral corporate commitments”566. This loss of autonomous 
statehood, according to this argumentation, led finally through this process to the collapse 
of Weimar. In an important recent work Poul Kjaer adds this: “the root cause of the crisis 
was therefore profoundly linked to the absence of a condensed and institutionally 
stabilized functionally delineated sphere of public power due to the continued resistance of 
societal countermovements. To the extent that modernity is defined as the primacy of 
functional differentiation vis-à-vis segmentary, territorial, and stratificatory differentiation, 
Germany at that time, might therefore be considered to be a country which had only 
partially arrived in modernity”567.  
 
However, as has been argued, this “problem” of the privatization of the capitalist state 
cannot be “resolved” with a liberal strict distinction between a “purely” political and a 
distinct economic issue. On the contrary, this privatization is associated with the 
interdependence of the political state with the capitalist economy. So, the “abstracted 
structure of the state” was not eroded by the economic constitution (as this liberal critique 
argues568) but it is always-already eroded due to the “relative” autonomy of this state 
(without excluding the political factors in this process as well). This is demonstrated well 
by Neumann’s post-1933 argumentation, which shows that both the relative autonomy of 
the state due to the power of capital and the erosion of the general form of law do not come 
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from the expansion of social policy but, against Weberian assumptions, are related to the 
public power that capital acquires in times of advanced democratic capitalism.  
 
However, although the “economic constitution” could not be blamed directly for Weimar’s 
fall, both this constitution (due to its initial logic of compromise and to the SPD’ 
evolutionary strategy) and even more visibly its implementing legislation during the 1920s 
did not focus on the issue of compatibility of the democratizing process at the level of 
economy with the capitalist mode of production. Moreover, the theories that endorsed the 
concept of the economic constitution as a political strategy (Sinzheimer, pre-1933 
Neumann, Heller) could be blamed for their optimism towards the evolutionary transition 
to socialism through the state under conditions of a capitalist social formation without 
focusing on the tension between capitalism on the one hand and political democracy and 
the democratic state on he other. (see also chapter 6.5. about the stance of Neumann and 
Heller during late Weimar).  
 
The insightful critique of the KPD and the USPD on this issue regarding the Works 
Councils Act of 1920 (see above), was not seriously taken into account both by the SPD 
and the unions and by the Weimar theorists (e.g. Sinzheimer dismisses it569). However, it is 
valuable in the sense that the room for state and unions intervention (via “democratic 
market control”) becomes more limited in a capitalist regime since it is constrained by the 
logic of accumulation. In this form of the advanced capitalist state, capital still has the 
public power to decide when and where to invest, the allocation of prices to an extent 
(especially in monopoly, cartels etc.), it employs people and it determines also to an extent 
the fiscal condition of the state (the example of the unemployment insurance is indicative, 
see section 1 of this chapter). In this sense, Abraham is right to argue that “…Weimar labor 
movement’s search for economic rationality, social justice and political participation was 
inevitably constrained by the privileged status systematically accorded the logic of 
accumulation. It seems that the best can be accomplished is the worst that can be done: 
paralyzing capitalism without being able to transform it. The Weimar SPD and ADGB 
were highly effective but also terribly vulnerable”570. 
 
 
In the end, the contradiction between political democracy and the capitalist economy was 
resolved not in the direction of the extension of democracy- as it was aimed by the SPD, 
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the ADGB and the abovementioned theorists of social democracy - but to the benefit of 
capital through the authoritarian transformation of the Weimar state. 
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Part B: Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen: Between state and legal 
theory 
 
 
 
Chapter 5.  Carl Schmitt in Weimar: An authoritarian liberal? 
 
 
 
Carl Schmitt was born in Plettenberg on July 11, 1888 into a Catholic, petty-bourgeois and 
provincial background that was affiliated with the Zentrum party571. Because of his 
‘‘modest’’ Catholic origin, he felt an ‘‘outsider’’ among Berlin’s elites572 when he joined 
Berlin University in 1907 as a student573. However, on his return to Berlin in 1928 he 
would be close to the elites and the most visible jurist of the Presidential regime during the 
last period of the Weimar Republic.  
 
The work of the German jurist became very influential and exerted a “fascination” in a 
wide array of law students both on the right and the left of the political spectrum574 albeit 
he was not considered “…a moral authority figure like Triepel, Anschütz or Thoma”575. 
That’s also because he had an impressive array of influences (philosophy, literature, 
theology) and his writing was, according to Stolleis, “brilliant…clearly superior to the 
average legal scholarship”576. Hence, he was read by philosophers, theologians, historians, 
sociologists and political scientists577. 
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However, the fact that he was the ‘‘Crown Jurist’’ of the Nazi regime (between 1933-
1936)578, for which he never explicitly apologized579, is the main reason for which the 
reception of Schmitt’s Weimar thought was so “polarizing”580. It is well-known that Carl 
Schmitt joined the Nazi party (on April 27, 1933). During this period, he received a chair 
of law at the University of Berlin (taking the vacant position of the exiled Herman Heller), 
he became the chairman of the Nazi league of German Jurists, editor of the leading law 
journal Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung and he was appointed as a Prussian State Councillor. His 
active political involvement ended in 1936, when he was publicly defamed by the SS organ 
Das Schwarze Korps and he was removed from party offices denounced “…as a 
representative of a political Catholicism that was positively inclined toward the Jews” as 
Mehring writes581. Nevertheless, he retained his position as a professor of “Staatslehre” in 
Berlin582. 
 
So- apart from the often ambiguous way of writing- it was his political stance mainly 
during the Nazi regime but also during the end of the Weimar Republic that “aroused 
suspicion”583. Because of this, there was a frequent association of Schmitt’s works with the 
“demonic”584. 
 
Carl Schmitt struggled in his post-war writings (even in his interrogation by Robert 
                                                
578 This is a title accredited to Carl Schmitt (firstly) by a local Nazi newspaper on 11 May 1933.  
See Mehring ([2009]2014) 281, 291-348, 347 
See also Balakrishnan (2000) 181-182 
579During his 1947 interrogation in Nuremberg, Schmitt’s main line of defense (among others) was that he 
was just an “intellectual adventurer” and that he had no responsibility for how his concepts ended up by the 
Nazis.  
 See Kempner, Robert (1987). ‘Interrogation of Carl Schmitt’, Telos, 72, 97-129. 
Schmitt, Carl ([1947] 2007). ‘The “Fourth” (Second) Interrogation of Carl Schmitt at Nuremberg’, Telos, 
139, 35-43, 37 
580Stolleis (2004) 171 
581Mehring ([2009]2014) 347 
582 Ibid.  pp. 281, 291-348 
583 The phrase “aroused suspicion” was expressed in 1932 by Ernst Niekisch, who was a former leader of the 
short-lived Bavarian Council Democracy in 1919 and later converted to nationalism but not to the NSDAP.  
According to Stolleis, Niekisch’s phrase expressed a “widely shared sentiment” at that time. In Stolleis 
(2004) 171 
584See Werner-Mueller, Jan (2010). A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-war European Thought (in 
Greek trans.), Athens: Polis Editions, 170-179, 17 
 132 
Kempner on April 11, 1947585) to distance himself from his Nazi past and to present his 
Weimar work as an effort to save the Republic. In this direction, he wrote that his concept 
of the constitution aimed at protecting the constitution against a “functionalist” formal 
concept given that the latter fell prey to a “broken down” pluralistic parliamentarism that 
opened the way to the NSDAP and to the KPD, namely to the “enemies” of the 
Constitution. In this vein, he wrote that the finest argument of how not “to allow 
democracy to be attacked with the apparent means of democracy” originated with him and, 
more particularly, with his writings during the last phase of the Weimar Republic that 
posed the ‘‘friend-enemy’’ issue in constitutional thinking586. 
 
However, in the ‘‘Westdeutscher Beobachter’’ (23 July 1933) he gave an entirely different 
interpretation when he wrote a retrospective of the coup in Prussia, which was decisive in 
Weimar’s fall in the sense that Prussia was the last “bastion” of democracy. He argued that 
the German military and administrative state “had put an end to the Berlin corruption of a 
liberal-democratic party state…But without the background of the powerful National 
Socialist movement, this coup would not have succeeded, and without, let alone against, 
this movement, the German state could no longer be held”587. 
 
In this chapter, I will show that both these interpretations include fragments of truth. 
Hence, we could conceive Schmitt’s Weimar theory both as a critique of a “functionalist’’ 
conception of the constitution, which was unable to respond to Weimar’s “enemies”, and as 
a theory that was a precursor to fascism due to his enmity towards parliamentarism.  
 
However, none of these interpretations captures the entire historical picture of Schmitt’s 
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Weimar theory. Regarding his political theory, I will demonstrate in this chapter that it is 
hostile both to parliamentary democracy and to the NSDAP without being immune to 
fascism. In this direction, I will argue that Schmitt developed persistently a concept of a 
Presidential authoritarian regime that laments for the loss of 19th century liberalism, which 
maintained the political-economic divide, in contrast with 20th century mass democracy 
that enabled the politicization of economy. This is, significantly, the main knot that 
connects his whole Weimar oeuvre in political theory- at least since it gets clearly visible in 
1923 with his book “The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy”.  
 
I will demonstrate that this political theory is reflected in his legal theory in which he 
develops a foundational distinction throughout his Weimar work between the “political” 
Constitution (represented by the President) and the “formal constitutional laws”. This 
distinction is associated with a concept of collective identity-normality that is situated in 
the gap between- what Schmitt calls- “law” and its “realization”. This gap, which is traced 
since 1914 as it will be seen in section 1 of this chapter, denotes in Schmitt’s Weimar 
works the political moment within law, which is tied to a concept of collective identity as 
an “existential status”.  
 
Based on this identity, Schmitt follows an ‘‘originalist’’ concept of representation within 
law: “the reifying assumption that a legal order should merely replicate a pre-given 
political unity which is independent of its legal representation”588. However, I will show 
that, in line with his political theory, this pre-given political unity is mostly not a pre-
modern one. It corresponds to a 19th century concept of liberal constitutionalism but with 
the crucial difference that Weimar is a mass democratic regime of parliamentary 
democracy. This contradiction produces continuous shifts in Schmitt’s legal theory, which 
are also affected by Weimar’s political conjuncture.  
 
Regarding the shifts in his legal theory throughout Weimar, the significant shift that I will 
develop in this chapter is between his pre-1928 works and his post-1928 works. During his 
earlier Weimar works up to 1928, which will be developed in sections 2 and 3 of this 
chapter, his legal theory is based on a “purely political” identity. Based on this identity, 
which is expressed also in Schmitt’s political theory (mainly in the “Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy”), he adopts a political-substantive concept of  constitution that 
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is tied to an expansive interpretation of article 48. I will demonstrate that this concept of 
constitution is opposing a formal concept of constitution, which enabled the staging of the 
social question through the parliament. However, I will also argue that, except for 
“Political Theology” (in 1922), his pre-1928 theory can be seen more as an effort of re-
interpretation of Weimar legality in the direction of continuity with the 1871 Constitution 
rather than as a total rupture with that.  
 
In the fourth section of this chapter, I will introduce Schmitt’s “Constitutional Theory” 
(1928), where his decisionism-exceptionalism is still visible but he also introduces 
hesitantly his own concept of institutionalism (Croce and Salvatore name it 
‘‘institutionalist decisionism’’589) through the discourse of “institutional guarantees”.  This 
becomes very clearly introduced by 1932.  
 
The development of his post-1928 legal theory will be seen in the fifth section of this 
chapter. I will show that this theory over-determines Schmitt’s distinction between the 
political constitution and the formal constitution laws by giving the power to the President 
to represent the Weimar Constitution as a meta-political “pouvoir neutre” (the element of 
decisionism) and to trace-what Schmitt calls- “spaces of depoliticization” against the 
functionalist use of the Weimar Constitution through the discourse of “institutional 
guarantees” (the element of institutionalism). I will show that, with this discourse, Schmitt 
juxtaposes (a liberal interpretation of) the Second Principal Part of the Constitution against 
the First Part that introduced parliamentary democracy, which is deemed to represent a 
functionalist use of legality that weakens the State.  
 
This post-1928 legal theory of Schmitt cannot be understood unless associated with 
Schmitt’s account of the Weimar Republic. I will analyze, therefore, in the fifth section, his 
legal theory along with the historical context of late Weimar and Schmitt’s account of the 
Weimar context.  
 
Regarding his account of Weimar, I will demonstrate Schmitt’ argument that the state was 
endangered by the political parties, which he relates with the parliament’s intervention in 
the economy- as opposed to 19th century parliamentarism. His answer is, therefore, for a 
strong Presidential State that will be able to depoliticize and to act also counter to the 
principle of “economic democracy”. I will argue that this analysis of Schmitt is visible also 
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in his role as a legal advisor of the last Weimar governments. Schmitt’s role as an advisor 
will be also seen extensively in section 5 of this chapter. 
 
Given this analysis, I will argue that Schmitt’s Weimar theory radicalized the Weberian 
insights with regards both to the political and to the social question, namely he theorized a 
very powerful President (by being more radical than Weber in his critique of 
parliamentarism) and a liberal political-economic distinction (by being even more assertive 
than Weber in favor of a “free economy”). 
 
 As a consequence of this, I will use the term “authoritarian liberalism” in the description 
of Schmitt’s theory. This is a term that was used firstly by Heller in 1933 regarding a 
speech of Schmitt in 1932. Heller defined this term as the “retreat of the ‘authoritarian’ 
state from social policy, liberalisation (Entstaatlichung) of the economy and dictatorial 
control by the state of politico-intellectual functions”590. My use of this notion in the title 
of this chapter describes, nevertheless, Schmitt’s theory during the whole Weimar period 
(at least since his 1923 “Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy”)591. Moreover, it denotes- in a 
similar way with Heller’s- a strong state that protects the 19th century political-economic 
distinction, which is endangered by the 20th century parliamentary state, by detaching 
economic liberalism from democracy (prioritizing the former) due to this endangerment. 
 
In this vein, I also argue that, despite Schmitt’s methodological changes in his legal theory, 
there is a clear continuity throughout Schmitt’s Weimar period. This is an interpretation of 
the Weimar Constitution that dissociates it from the legislative supremacy through which 
the ‘‘social question’’ is addressed and associates it with a 19th century reified modality of 
the State-civil society relationship through a strong President.  
 
In this sense, my analysis of Schmitt distances itself, firstly, from those approaches that 
conceive Schmitt’s Weimar theory as a “‘nihilistic, irrational and normless’ decisionism” 
from the perspective of deliberative constitutionalism592. Indicatively, Dyzenhaus approach 
argues that Schmitt’s Weimar theory follows Weber’s “…ethic of pure conviction and 
                                                
590Heller, Herman ([1933] 2015). ‘Authoritarian Liberalism?’, European Law Journal, 21(3), 295-301, 300 
591In a similar way, this term is used by Renato Cristi to describe Schmitt’s theory throughout the Weimar 
period. Cristi, Renato (1998). Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 
6 
592 This is an apt characterization by Kalyvas for these theories. Kalyvas (2008) 101. 
 These theories, which are also analyzed in the Introduction, are the following: Dyzenhaus (1997) 38-122. 
Scheuerman, William (1999). Carl Schmitt: The End Of Law, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 74-82 
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executive will unconstrained by any rules”593 and Scheuerman argues that Schmitt is 
blamed for “having eliminated the most minimal ties between politics and morality”594. 
These approaches, whereas they capture Schmitt’s anti-parliamentarism and decisionism, 
they cannot grasp what sort of anti-parliamentarism is this. On the contrary, I will show in 
this chapter, by focusing also on Schmitt’s answer to the social question and on his concept 
of civil society, that Schmitt’s anti-parliamentarism during Weimar is tied to an embrace of 
a 19th century parliamentarism. Moreover, it also escapes from their view that Schmitt’s 
decisionism is tied to concept of constitutionalism that detached liberalism from 
democracy by prioritizing the former595. I should also add, nevertheless, here that this 
approach captures well Schmitt’s conception of homogeneity as not unrelated to the ethnic 
element596.  
 
My analysis of Schmitt’s Weimar theory distances itself, secondly, from those approaches 
that reconstruct through a positive lens Schmitt’s theory by tracing its potential for 
“agonistic pluralism”597 or for the “politics of the extraordinary”598 (the latter theory gives 
more emphasis to the non-institutionalized form of politics compared with the “agonistic 
pluralism” theory.) Despite that these theories do not succumb to the denunciation of 
Schmitt that comes from the perspective of deliberative democracy, they underplay that 
Schmitt’s approach to democracy is strongly related to his approach to the social question.  
 
Indicatively, Mouffe writes that the problem of Schmitt is that he “is no democrat in the 
liberal understanding of the term, and [that] he had nothing but contempt for the 
constraints imposed by liberal institutions on the democratic will of the people”599. On the 
contrary, I will argue that the problem is that Schmitt was mostly an authoritarian liberal 
who could not accept mass parliamentary democracy due to the insertion of the “social 
question”. However, in order to have a view of this, it is crucial that Schmitt’s concept of 
                                                
593Dyzenhaus (1997) 14  
 
594 Scheuerman (1994) 20 
595 This is visible in Scheuerman’s argument that ‘‘Schmitt’s marriage to Nazism stems immanently from core 
elements of his jurisprudence…’’.  
Scheuerman (1999) 115 
596 Dyzenhaus (1997) 98-101. 
597 Mouffe Chantal (2000). The Democratic Paradox, New York, NY: Verso, 36-59 
598 Kalyvas (2008) 79-162 
599This is traced by Chantal Mouffe as Schmitt’s problem. She tries to resolve it by turning Schmitt’s concept 
of “homogeneity” into “commonality” so that it can accommodate pluralism. However, she does not delve 
into Schmitt’s concept of civil society and how is it related to his overall theory. 
 Mouffe, Chantal (2000) 36-59, especially,43 
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civil society is seen, which is related to his concept of the political and of 
constitutionalism. This is how we can grasp the reason for which his writings attacked 
parliament, which was due to its mass democratic origins and to the latter’s intervention in 
the economy- an issue that is underplayed in this analysis. 
 
 Hence, this theory underplays the liberal elements of Schmitt’s theory and the role that 
these elements play in Schmitt’s answer to the “political question”600. Moreover, it 
disregards the historical context in which Schmitt’s analysis takes place and Schmitt’s 
writings in this context.   
 
My analysis distances itself, thirdly, from the approach of Schmitt’s work by the theory of 
political constitutionalism as droit politique601 (which is much closer to the latter category 
rather than the first). This approach argues that there is a political potential in Schmitt’s 
shift to the “concrete-order” methodology, which makes it close to Heller’s relational 
approach (namely the dialectical relationship of power with law)602.  
 
I think that, through this parallelism of Schmitt’s theory with Heller, the liberal dimension 
of Schmitt’s political theory and legal theory is underplayed. Given this, whereas this 
theory of droit politique captures well Schmitt’s not anti-juristic logic, it overestimates the 
political potential that Schmitt’s theory can deliver by underestimating the level of 
exclusion that is played out in both periods of Schmitt’s legal theory (Loughlin insightfully 
captures this periodization). On the contrary, it will be evident in this chapter that this 
exclusion is not only due to the ethnic element (due to Schmitt’s concept of 
“homogeneity”) but also due to the deeper liberal element that is evident throughout 
Schmitt’s Weimar writings and follows on the footsteps of Weber’s thought (by 
radicalizing it). Hence, this reconstruction of Schmitt’s theory underplays also Schmitt’s 
approach to the social question in the context of the Weimar Republic.  
 
The common element between all the aforementioned analyses is that, despite their clearly 
different orientation, they underplay mostly how Schmitt’s analysis of the constitutional 
question is associated with his focus on the Weimar democratic welfare state in the context 
of the capitalist economy. So, they underplay how his constitutional thinking is related to 
                                                
600Indicatively, Kalyvas argues that Schmitt’s theory can be appropriated in the direction of a substantive 
model of radical democracy and for a theory of a democratic constitutionalism “without, however, commiting 
to his entire project”. Kalyvas  (2008) 81 
601 Loughlin (2017) 
602 Ibid. 34 
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his answer both to political and to the social question in the context of this Weimar state. 
 
Hence, I focused on Schmitt’s approach on both questions so as to grasp how his theory 
solved Marx’s riddle in the context of the Weimar Republic. That’s why I deploy a concept 
of political constitutionalism that tries to encompass the whole range of this riddle- as 
indicated in the Introduction- in order to have a view on this.  
 
Finally, given that I argued for the continuity of Schmitt’s Weimar works, it is important in 
terms of method to deal with Schmitt’s whole oeuvre during Weimar. So, I will introduce 
Schmitt’s concepts gradually through a chronological trajectory, which goes also along 
with the Weimar historical context. 
 
 
5.1. Young Schmitt’s pre-Weimar influences: law and its realization 
 
 
Before analyzing Schmitt’s Weimar works, it is useful to see briefly a significant work of 
the young Carl Schmitt given that he introduces for the first time in this work both the 
distinction between law and its realization and the significant power of the State in 
realizing law.  
 
This is his habilitation text ‘‘The value of the State and the significance of the Individual’’ 
(1914), which is his first foundational text in constitutional theory given that his doctorate 
was in criminal law603 (1910) and his second study was about the legal practice and its 
‘‘inherent standards’’ as a matter also of his legal practice as a legal trainee604.  
 
Unpacking this work gradually, Schmitt argues that the validity of law is not reduced to 
                                                
603See more at Mehring ([2009] 2014) 17-21 
604 In this book, which is called ‘‘Law and Judgment’’, Schmitt argued against the logic of the legal decision 
as a juridical automaton. However, he ‘‘resolved’’ the issue of legal indeterminacy by arguing that the 
correctness of a legal decision could be ‘‘measured’’ through the appeal to the opinion of the community of 
judges, who can even decide “contra legem” without violating the law. As he wrote, ‘‘a judicial decision is 
correct today, where we can assume that another judge would have decided in a like manner’’.  
In Fischer-Lescano, Andreas & Cristensen, Ralph (2012). ‘Auctoritatis Interpositio: How Systems Theory 
Deconstructs Decisionism’, Social Legal Studies, 21(1) 93-119, 94,104 
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factual power but it has primacy over power and is based on the reason of the “autonomous 
subject”605. So, at that time, he opposes the hegemonic statutory legal positivism, 
according to which law is equated with factual power. Given this, he argues that the power-
based theory of law constitutes a positive evaluation of power and that, in this sense, if law 
is derived out of facts it does not exist any more606. 
 
 So, under the Kantian influence during that time607, he suggests that Sein remains distinct 
from Sollen or -as he put it- “the two universes oppose each other”608. In this sense, 
Schmitt is closer to Kelsen as he admits609. However, he recognizes that there is a problem 
here in the transition from one sphere to the other, which is constituted by the 
“heterogeneity of the two objects”610. So, the problem is that of “bringing the two spheres 
together”611 so as to make the legal imputation of acts possible. 
 
Given, therefore, that the norm is “never in a relation with reality”, a solution should be 
found. Schmitt finds the solution in the State whose role is to “mediate” and “realize” the 
law612 in an analogous way that the Pope is “servus servorum Dei”613 but now into the 
secular realm (as the Protestant Reformation had declared). So, the unity of the Catholic 
Church serves since 1914 as Schmitt’s paradigm of a State that “gives effect to the link 
between this world of thought and the world of real empirical phenomena”614. Moreover, it 
is the State that does the work of realizing the law615, which is a point to survive into his 
                                                
605Schmitt, Carl ([1914] 2003). La valeur de l'État et la signification de l'individu, Geneve: Librairie Droz 
S.A, 73 
606 Ibid. 85 
607 Ibid. 128 
608 My own translation from Ibid. 85 
609 Ibid. 118 
610 My own translation from Ibid. 91 
611 From Paulson’s translation in Paulson, Stanley (2014 online). ‘Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt: Growing 
Discord, Culminating in the “Guardian” Controversy of 1931’ in Meierhenrich, J.& Simons, O.(eds.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 6 
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199916931.013.34 
612 My own translation from Schmitt ([1914] 2003) 112 
613 Ibid. 95, 122-123, 133 
614 The translation is by Paulson (2014) 7. It corresponds to Schmitt ( [1914] 2003) 62 
615 However, he argued that there are also the “apocalyptic times” of immediacy, in which there is no need of 
the state and “the preeminence of the idea imposes itself on the individual”. This is where the individual is 
connected with the idea of legality immediately outside the State and the Church. 
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Weimar works. 
 
There is here also a prevalent methodological anti-individualism that will remain in his 
Weimar oeuvre to an extent. That’s because the individual does not have a prior legal 
existence outside the state but acquires value mainly within a system of legal norms that 
are “mediated” by the State. This is visible already from Schmitt’s opening citation taken 
from his expressionist friend Theodor Däubler (“la norme d’abord, les hommes 
ensuite”)616.  
 
Simultaneously, there is a difference with his Weimar works in the sense that he based the 
presuppositions of a legitimate State in the rule of law that is not “...a contingent 
conjunction of factual relations of an empirical state with a complex of juridical norms but 
it signifies the reunion of State and law, with the former being totally grasped and 
determined by the latter”617. In this sense, he is against an “ethical” conception of law but 
it is clear that his concept of law as embedding value (in the sense of reason) is not totally 
morally indifferent618. 
 
So, taking all these into consideration, Schmitt rejects the foundation of law in 
contractualism as well as in anthropocentric theories and in German idealism619. These 
issues, which remained as leitmotivs throughout his work, formulated what Joseph 
Bendersky called ‘‘Catholic neo-idealism’’ and they went hand in hand with his anti-war 
sentiments (infrequent at that time620). Strangely enough regarding his future route, 
Schmitt’s Catholic influences are “mingled” with Kantian influences, which are lost in 
Weimar.  
                                                                                                                                              
Schmitt ([1914] 2003) 47, 143-144 
 Mehring ([2009] 2014) 47 
616Schmitt ([1914] 2003) 61 
617My own translation from Ibid. 99 
618On the contrary, according to Balakrishnan, despite Schmitt’s sympathy towards ‘‘Neo-Thomist natural-
law’’ theories, many conclusions of this book (such as the primacy of law over power) are ‘‘stringently 
positivist’’. 
 Balakrishnan (2000) 13  
619Mehring  ([2009] 2014) 48 
620 Bendersky, Joseph (2009). ‘Love, Law and War: Carl Schmitt’s Angst’, Telos 147, 171-191,181-191,184 
See also Mehring ([2009] 2014) 61-62 
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However, what clearly remains is the power of the state in this space in-between law and 
its realization. This would drive his theory in Weimar and would be associated with the 
exception, especially from “On Dictatorship” onwards.  
 
 
5.2. Schmitt in early Weimar: The conservative shift, decisionism and the exception 
 
 
Although some of these foundational elements of Schmitt’s thinking remained, he took a 
different political direction after the experience of the ‘‘Great War’’ and after the 
revolutionary situation in Germany and in Munich (the two council Republics in 1919621). 
This took place while Schmitt served his military duties and had, among other duties, the 
observance of the peace movement of the USPD and of the pan-German movement622. It 
should be noted here that the Bavarian capital had turned into a “bulwark of the extreme 
right” after the defeat of the Second Councils movement (Spring of 1919)623. This 
environment has probably influenced Carl Schmitt624 although it should be stressed that his 
conservative shift had already begun625.  
 
This stance of Schmitt lasted for the whole period of the Weimar Republic and was not 
antithetical to his political affiliation with the Catholic Zentrum party (that can be seen 
until the beginning of the 1930s)626. This conservative stance was clearly revealed in his 
first two books, which were written immediately after the establishment of the Weimar 
                                                
621 See Winkler ([2000] 2006) 355-356 
622Mehring ([2009] 2014), 77 
623Winkler ([2000] 2006) 356 
624When Schmitt was a civil servant in Munich, revolutionaries intruded into his office and shot an officer 
beside his desk.  
Wiegandt, Manfred H. (1994-1995). ‘The Alleged Unaccountability of the academic: A biographical sketch 
of Carl Schmitt’, Cardozo Law Review, 16, 1569-1598, 1576  
625It is controversial when exactly this shift started. Paulson argued that it started in 1916 with Schmitt’s 
paper “Dictatorship and the State of Siege”. Paulson (2014) 25 
However, Mehring writes that his position is not very clear in this paper.  Mehring ([2009]2014) 74-76 
626See Mehring ([2009] 2014) 162 
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Republic. In these books, he did not comment, nevertheless, in a direct way on the political 
issues of that era.  
 
The overall question in these books is how/whether the liberal element and the rule of law 
can be maintained in the constitution without the self-destruction of the constitutional 
order itself, which is a question that will remain in Schmitt’s thought throughout Weimar. 
In terms of structure of this section, I will refer briefly in the first book of this era 
(“Political Romanticism”) in order to show the beginning of this problematization. The 
main focus of this section will be on Schmitt’s book “On Dictatorship”, which is Schmitt’s 
main treatise on legal theory until “Constitutional Theory” (1928). I will show, then, how 
Schmitt’s problematization on this issue of dictatorship was developed even more 
concretely in his speech in Jena (1924), which took place at a time that the early Weimar 
period would come to an end.  
 
 
5.2.1. “Political Romanticism” 
 
Schmitt started writing “Political Romanticism” in 1917 but it was published in early 1919 
(that was probably before what happened in Munich after February 1919627). 
 
In this book, Schmitt sympathized more with the Catholic counter-revolutionary thought 
(Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre, Louis Bonald) against -what he called- “political 
romanticism” that concerned mainly the liberals628. Moreover, he introduced clearly his 
metaphysical decisionism and problematized about whether the liberals have a conception 
of the legal order given that they cannot make sense of the “concrete reality” (a term that 
he also introduces here for the first time). 
 
To unpack this more, according to Schmitt, political romanticism was embraced politically 
by the 19th century bourgeoisie and signified the depoliticization of the social order due to 
the fact that it had led to a romantic privatization of the experience629. Hence, he called 
                                                
627 Ibid. 84-85 
628Oakes, Guy (1986). Translator’s ‘ Introduction’  in Carl Schmitt Political Romanticism, Cambridge MA: 
MIT press, ix-xxxv, xiii 
629 Schmitt, Carl ([1919] 1986). Political Romanticism, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 17 
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political romanticism a ‘‘subjectified occasionalism’’ in the sense that the romantic subject 
has taken the position of God and “…treats the world as an occasion and an opportunity 
for his romantic productivity”630. 
 
Because of this, Schmitt traces an affinity between romanticism and 18th century 
rationalism (Descartes’ ‘‘cogito ergo sum’’) in the sense that they both depend ultimately 
on an individualized liberalism and “poeticized” aestheticism. This can take place only in a 
bourgeois world that “…isolates the individual in the domain of the intellectual, makes the 
individual its own point of reference, and imposes upon it the entire burden that otherwise 
was hierarchically distributed among different functions in a social order”631.  
 
Against this, Schmitt describes a supra-personal Hegelian causality, which has replaced 
God with a reference either to the ‘‘revolutionary demiurge’’ of the people or to the 
‘‘conservative’’ one of history. So, Schmitt recognizes in a positive way Hegel’s 
philosophy of history by writing that ‘‘Hegel, with an unerring sense of genius, had 
already recognized that the connection with the rationalism of the previous century, and 
thus the historical inadequacy of the system, lay in the causal reference between the ego 
and the non-ego. The romantics were incapable of this sort of philosophical insight…if 
anything provides a complete definition of romanticism, it is the lack of any relationship to 
a causa’’632. 
 
He ultimately uses Hegel on the plane of the counterrevolutionary Catholics633 by writing 
that this Catholic-concrete way of thinking can lead into a normative political decision 
whereas the romantics are unable for any sort of “ethical and legal valuation”634 since they 
“float from one reality to another”635. So, romanticism abjures “concrete reality” and 
culminates in a “fanciful” privatized construction of the experience that turns into a “state 
of eternal becoming and possibilities that are never consummated to the confines of 
                                                
630Ibid. 
631 Ibid. 20 
632 Ibid. 82 
633 See also Mehring ([2009] 2014) 86-87 
634 Schmitt ([1919] 1986) 124-125 
635 Ibid. 92-93 
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concrete reality”636. In this way “forms without substance can be related to any content”637, 
which is precisely the critique that Schmitt would later exert against Kelsen’s theory in 
‘‘Constitutional Theory’’ arguing that this formalism ultimately legitimizes any power638.  
 
So, for the first time, Schmitt gives emphasis here to the “concrete reality” as a 
presupposition of a legal order. Moreover, he identifies it with the Hegelian-Catholic 
thinking and with a world that should be based on a certain substance, functional cohesion 
and a fixed direction639. Hence, this is the concept that undergirds his idea of the legal 
order albeit Schmitt does not develop it further here640.  
 
Concluding, “Political Romanticism” should be seen as an indirect attack both to the 
romantics of the “turning point 1918-1919”641 and to the bourgeois-liberal state as it is 
expressed through romanticism in Germany (by Protestants)642. So, it remains that his 
concept of the State is based on the unicity model of the Catholic Church, which he finds 
as essentially interrelated with the decision. In this way, Schmitt engages here for the first 
time with the “concrete” and with the metaphysical decision as a presupposition of the 
legal order.  
 
 
5.2.2. Between “sovereign” and “commissary” dictatorship 
 
                                                
636 Ibid. 66 
637 Ibid. 76 
638 Schmitt ([1928] 2008) 63-64 
639 Schmitt ([1919] 1986) 19 
640 The consequences that Schmitt stresses of political romanticism is that ‘‘any relationship to a legal or 
moral judgment would be incongruous here, and every norm would seem to be an anti-romantic tyranny. A 
legal or a moral decision would be senseless and it would inevitably destroy romanticism. This is why the 
romantic is not in a position to deliberately take sides and make a decision. On romantic grounds, he cannot 
even decisively reject the theory of the state that proceeds from the view that man is "evil by nature."  
Ibid. 124-125  
641 Mehring adds also that Schmitt “…distanced himself from the older conservatism following 1789”. 
Mehring ([2009] 2014) 87 
642This becomes visible in his reproach of Adam Müller, the par excellence figure of political romanticism. 
   Schmitt ([1919] 1986) 49 
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This element of decisionism and a clearer conservative political orientation emerges in 
Schmitt’s foundational work “On Dictatorship” (1921) that was written during the civil 
war in Munich and the Kapp Putsch643. Although the normative orientation of this book 
remains contradictory, it should be seen in some continuity with his thoughts in “Political 
Romanticism” in the sense that his question concerns how/whether the liberal element and 
the rule of law can be maintained in the constitution without the self-destruction of the 
constitutional order itself, particularly in the face of modern revolutions and of the 
“organized proletariat” that constitutes a form of threat to the unicity of the State. His 
solution is traced through a historical analysis about the different meanings of the concept 
of “dictatorship” and demonstrates the transition from the ancient Roman “commissary” 
dictatorship to the modern “sovereign” dictatorship, namely from the older “dictatorship of 
reformations” to the “dictatorship of revolutions”644.  
 
Schmitt shows how this transition goes hand in hand with the rise of the modern 
“sovereign” state and particularly of the “enlightened” rationalist philosophy and of the 
pouvoir constituant, which endangers the distinction between “law” and “measures” and 
makes more difficult (and even dangerous) the application of the rule of law for the 
survival of the legal order as a whole. This theoretical problematization is practically 
related to the question of how article 48 can be interpreted in view of the aforementioned 
transition.  
 
In terms of structure, I will start in this subsection, firstly, from the “dictatorship of 
reformations”, in its second part I will approach the transition to the “dictatorship of 
revolutions” and, thirdly, I will associate this analysis with Weimar and with Schmitt’s 
interpretation of article 48. 
 
Starting from the first, Schmitt describes the “dictatorship of reformations” in the context 
of the gradual transition from the medieval system of estates to the early modern state. He 
writes that the start of the discussion about the concept of dictatorship therein was 
Machiavelli’s ‘‘Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Titto Livio’’645. Machiavelli argues there 
for a Roman concept of dictatorship that could implement legal sanctions (but that is 
                                                
643 Mehring ([2009] 2014) 93, 102 
644Schmitt, Carl ([1921] 2014). On Dictatorship, Cambridge: Polity Press, xliv 
645 Ibid. 3 
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distinctive from the legislative activity of government) without consultation and for a 
concept of dictator as “always-admittedly, by extraordinary appointment, yet 
constitutionally- a republican organ of the state”646. This dictator is “entitled to do 
everything that is appropriate in the actual circumstances (nach Lage der Sache) 
…Therefore, especially in a dictatorship, only the goal governs, which is freed from 
restrictions imposed by the law and is only determined by the need to create a concrete 
situation” 647. 
 
This is the concept of commissary dictatorship, which signifies that the dictator is 
appointed by the consul at the Senate’s request for a specific mandate and time by ignoring 
the existing law in order to save the Republic. From a legal perspective “this means to 
permit a concrete exception whose content, by comparison with another instance of a 
concrete exception-amnesty-is outrageous”648. So, there was a concrete mandate649.  
 
 
However, Machiavelli’s thinking entails contradictions and- through his preoccupation 
with the “technical” problems of politics and with the advising of the absolutist monarch in 
the ‘‘Prince’’650- he seems even to justify an indifferent in substantive terms “raison 
d’etat”. As Schmitt argues ‘‘any political task- be it the absolute government of one single 
person or a democratic republic, the political power of a prince or the political freedom of 
the people- is just a task’’651. So, while Machiavelli understands (according to Schmitt) a 
concept of dictatorship based on the need to act without deliberare and consultare in order 
to achieve the “concrete goal”, he does not engage seriously with the juridical thinking but 
only with the “...rational technique of political absolutism” that lies in the hands of the 
executive652. 
 
Against Machiavelli’s preoccupation with technicity stand the Protestant monarchomachs. 
Their views can be seen primarily in the “Vindiciae contra tyrannos”- the “exemplary 
                                                
646 Ibid. 3-4 
647 Ibid. 7-8 
648 Ibid. 1 
649 Ibid. 
650 Ibid. 5 
651 Ibid. 6 
652 Ibid. 6, 8 
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piece of evidence of the literature of the monarchomachs”653. They were defenders of the 
rightful exercise of the office that “consists in the fact that prince only obeys law 
sanctioned by the people- that is the estates”654. The monarchomachs supported, therefore, 
a right of resistance against both the tyrannus absque titulo (tyrant by force or by 
machinations) and the tyrannus ab exercitio (tyrant by abuse of the “…legally transferred 
dominion by violating the law and his own promises, made under oath”)655.  
 
Between the “Machiavellian technicity” and the “monarchomachic lawful state” it is the 
“moderate figure”- with Schmitt’s words- of Jean Bodin with whom Schmitt seems to side 
more656. This can be seen in his argumentation that ‘‘the difficult problem for public law, 
which can be summarized as the problem of the concept of sovereignty and of its 
relationship to supreme right and supreme power, could not be resolved by means of a 
politico-legal theory. Nor can it be resolved by ignoring it, as the monarchomachs did’’657.  
 
So, Bodin (to whom Schmitt returns in various books) while arguing for a modern concept 
of an “absolute” and indivisible sovereignty, he conceived the concept of the commissarial 
dictator in the framework of a constitutional order658. Schmitt argues that Bodin ‘‘provided 
an extraordinary clear and detailed juridical foundation”, which is associated with the 
overall fact that his notion of the state is “…that of a lawful state (Rechtsstaat), whose laws 
are not just expressions of power that can be issued arbitrarily and cancelled arbitrarily, 
like other regulations (règlements)’’659. Although he was against the monarchomachs, 
Bodin conceived simultaneously “…the technologisation of law undertaken by Machiavelli 
as something despicable- a ruthless and unworthy atheism from which he distances 
himself. Accordingly, he would never be able to admit that the will of the sovereign can 
turn any sentence into law. That, for him, would no longer characterize a state but a 
tyranny”660.  
 
                                                
653 Ibid. 14 
654 Ibid. 12 
655 Ibid. 14 
656 Ibid. 19, 20, 30-32  
657 Ibid. 20 
658 Ibid. 24 
659 Ibid. 27 
660 Ibid. 
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This distinction that Schmitt draws here between tyranny and dictatorship is crucial and 
corresponds to the fact that his concept of “dictatorship” is still norm-bound. Keeping this 
distinction in mind, Schmitt traces two more references. Firstly, Montesquieu’s theory in 
the sense that Montesquieu argued for a balance between royal absolutism and state-
destroying legalism or -to put it in different words- for a monarchic government that will 
respect the “basic principles of law”661. The crucial for Schmitt is that Montesquieu’s 
theory is far from “legal despotism” such as the one demanded by the French rationalism 
of the 18th century662 (see below).  
 
Secondly, Schmitt also draws an analogy with the “Papal Revolution” by writing that the 
plenitudo potestatis “became the base of a great reformation [reformatio], which 
restructured the entire organisation of the Church”663 without a revolution since it was 
executed by an organ formed according to the law (Pope), and revealed modern concepts 
of sovereignty. Moreover, there was also the personal representation by the Pope, who is 
the “Christ’s commissar”664, and the whole lineage of personal commissars leading by 
proxy to the Pope. 
 
Taking all these into account, the significant point for Schmitt is that in all these cases, 
namely in Bodin’s concept of dictator, in the canon law discussion and in this historical 
process that he describes, he traces the same concept of dictatorship: it is the achievement 
of the concrete situation (Lage der Sache) through the dictator. However, crucially, the 
dictator (who is a constituted organ) not only exercises the law but also creates it but 
without abandoning law at the same time. That’s because ‘‘executio goes beyond the 
weighing of factual evidence’’665.  
 
Hence, this is not tyranny but it is associated with the “gap” between “law” and “law’s 
realization”, which Schmitt had already traced in “The value of the State and the 
significance of the Individual” (1914). As he wrote, “In terms of the philosophy of law, the 
essence of dictatorship consists in the general possibility of a separation of the norms of 
                                                
661 Ibid. 83 
662 Ibid. 83, 89 
663Ibid. 34  
664 In this vein, Schmitt wrote that “the idea of Christ’s personhood is therefore the ultimate pinnacle of this 
conception of the law”.   Ibid. 39 
665 Ibid. 37-38 
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law from the norms of the realization of law (Rechtsverwirklichung). A dictatorship which 
does not make itself dependent on the concrete realization of an outcome that corresponds 
to a normative idea- which, in other words, does not aim at making itself redundant- is an 
arbitrary despotism”666.  
 
So, he traces here more clearly the distinction between arbitrary despotism (seen earlier as 
tyranny) and dictatorship. This analysis of Schmitt is not antithetical to the decisionist spin 
that his theory takes mainly in “Political Theology”667 but also in “Constitutional Theory” 
(albeit to a lesser extent)668. This is based on Schmitt’s reading of Bodin’s concept of 
sovereignty, according to which the sovereign can “change and violate statutes” in an 
emergency so as to advance the “public good” without abandoning law but only a 
normative concept of law669. 
 
So, crucially, the way in which we can understand Schmitt’s concept of “commissary 
dictatorship” is that, whereas there are “measures” beyond (a normative conception of) law 
in an emergency, there is not a blurring between “laws” and “measures” given that these 
“measures” are taken in order to constitute the “normal” situation where the “law” can 
apply. 
 
The big break that signified, nevertheless, the transition from the commissary dictatorship 
of reformation, which was initiated by a constituted organ, to the limitless “sovereign 
dictatorship” of revolution came with the establishment of the centralized modern state 
along with the revolutionary pouvoir constituant. Philosophically, this was seen mainly in 
Rousseau’s concept of “volonté générale” that is driven by the logic of the “enlightened 
rationalist” domination of “legal despotism”, which “levels” any association within the 
state, every party and every estate670 (against Montesquieu’s theory of balance). 
 
As Schmitt writes “when a relationship emerges that makes it possible to give the 
                                                
666 This is from Schmitt’s introduction in the 1921 edition of “On Dictatorship”. 
In the translation of Ananiadis, Grigoris (1999). ‘Carl Schmitt and Max Adler: The irreconcilability of 
Politics and Democracy’,  in Mouffe, Chantal (ed.) The Challenge of Carl Schmitt. London: Verso, 118-137, 
122-123 
667Schmitt ([1922 1934] 1985) 7-10 
668 Schmitt ([1928] 2008) 101 
669 Ibid. 
670 Schmitt [1921] 2014) 89, 100, 107 
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legislator the power of a dictator, to create a dictatorial legislator and constitutional 
dictator, then the commissary dictatorship has become a sovereign dictatorship. This 
relationship will come about through an idea that is, in its substance, a consequence of 
Rousseau’s Contral Social, although he does not name as a separate power: le pouvoir 
constituant”671.  
 
So, what interests Schmitt is that Rousseau’s “legislator” becomes practically 
indistinguishable from the “dictator” if we put into the picture the factor of the constituent 
power given that there is no more the earlier stable reference point of the commissar’s 
dependence (that was the prince)672. Crucially, this brings the shift from the “commissary” 
to “sovereign dictatorship”, namely to the unlimited commission that “exists only quoad 
exercitium” (in relation to what it does) through the shift from the executive to the 
legislative673. This was located by Schmitt historically in the French Revolution and 
particularly in the Jacobins. Therein we could see a suspension of the separation of powers 
by the National Convention674 and a handing of power to the revolutionary people’s 
commissars and to the revolutionary tribunal.  
 
At this point, there was, therefore, a transition to the new concept of dictatorship, which is 
against any logic of the constitution in the sense that any constituted organ is abolished (as 
the Convention did on October 10, 1793)675. This is something that Schmitt repeated also 
in his speech in Jena (1924) by arguing that “a sovereign dictatorship is irreconcilable 
with a constitutional form of government… Either sovereign dictatorship or constitution; 
the one excludes the other” 676. 
 
To sum up the argumentation until now, the overall point of this genealogy is that Schmitt 
seems to endorse the unitary modern state against the estates (as Bodin) but he is against 
Jacobinism in the sense that it leaves undistinguished the law and the command, the 
                                                
671 Ibid. 110 
672 Ibid. 120 
673 Ibid. 126 
 See also Mehring ([2009] 2014) 104 
674Schmitt ([1921] 2014) 95 
675 Ibid.127 
676Schmitt, Carl ([1924] 2014). ‘The Dictatorship of the President of the Reich according to Article 48 of the 
Weimar Constitution’ in On Dictatorship, Cambridge: Polity press, appendix, 180-225, 204 
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“commissary” and “sovereign” dictatorship- as opposed to the previous era. Hence, his 
ambivalence regarding Rousseau’s theory and his siding more with Bodin and, to an 
extent, with Montesquieu.  
 
Schmitt’s theory is inextricably associated with the Weimar context. Proceeding in the last 
chapter of this book to Weimar, the problem that Schmitt traces is the protection of the 
modern state against the heirs of Jacobinism, namely the organized proletariat that aspires 
to a continuous sovereign dictatorship. He argues that, whereas there was the illusion that 
there is a “uniform collectivity” in the modern State and that the “powerful groups and 
classes within the state have disappeared”, the political organization of the proletariat has 
changed this situation and, therefore, the concept of dictatorship has changed677. 
 
Analyzing this, Schmitt argues that, after the “sovereign dictatorship” of the Weimar 
Constituent Assembly was over with the voting of the Constitution by the pouvoir 
constituant, the only concept that could be seen was a commissary dictatorship based on 
article 48. That’s because the Reichstag is a pouvoir constitué and it cannot give a different 
mandate. So, the question for Schmitt is what should be the response of the legal order 
against the Weimar communist uprisings that, through the concept of the “dictatorship of 
the proletariat”678, worked in practice as heirs of the 1793 Jacobinism aiming at 
establishing a continuous sovereign dictatorship.  
 
He answered that the “dictatorship of the proletariat” does not leave much room for a 
“fictional” state of siege that will establish guarantees of civil liberty679. In this direction, 
he argued that liberalism and, therefore, the maintenance of a restrictive interpretation of 
article 48 presupposes just the isolated individual and the state without any social 
groupings. If this condition cannot be held (due to the proletarian organization), a liberal 
approach that views article 48 restrictively can endanger the legal order as a whole and 
lead to the collapse of the state680.  
 
Explaining the latter point from a practical perspective, the major issue concerns the extent 
                                                
677Ibid. 
678 Ibid. 179 
679 Ibid. 178-179 
680 Ibid. 
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of the power of the President. Schmitt argues that this commissary dictatorship of article 
48 entails contradictions and these contradictions are between the first (general 
authorization) and the second sentence (concrete authorization) of the second paragraph of 
article 48681. Reminding the second paragraph of article 48, it writes that “[sentence one] If 
in the German Reich the public security and order are significantly disturbed or 
endangered, the President can utilize the necessary measures to restore public security 
and order, if necessary with the aid of armed force. [sentence two] For this purpose, he 
may provisionally suspend, in whole or in part, the basic rights established in Articles 114, 
115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153”. 
 
Given that the second sentence entailed the suspension of certain enumerated articles in 
case of an emergency, Schmitt argued that these are the liberal elements of article 48 that 
are based on the assumption of a homogeneous state. However, if based on these liberal 
elements, the State is unable to answer effectively to the “sovereign” communist uprisings 
of the self-armed militias during the early Weimar period682.  
 
So, he developed a concept of commissary dictatorship that is based on the independent 
authorization of the first sentence and on the logic of self-defense in “concrete 
circumstances”. Schmitt concretized this concept of self-defense by arguing that “it is in 
the essence of the right to self-defense that its conditions will be determined through the 
deed itself; hence, it is not possible to create an institution that could prove legally whether 
the conditions of self-defense obtain or not.”683. Therein lies an “authorization for a 
commission of action unlimited by law” as soon as it is “concrete measure” (or, as he put it 
elsewhere “concrete exception”684). This means also that this authorization does not 
constitute unlimited legislative delegation because it could lead to the dissolution of the 
whole legal system and turn into a sovereign dictatorship685. 
 
Schmitt’s concept of article 48 should be associated with the fact that the starting point of 
his analysis about dictatorship is not the legal norm as such but (as seen in his theoretical 
problematization) the question regarding the “normal condition” that should be created for 
                                                
681Weimar Constitution ([1919], 2008) 409-440, 417 
682  Schmitt ([1921] 2014) 153, footnote 16 
683 Ibid. 154 
684 Ibid. 118 
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the legal norm to be realized. As he wrote the “dictator’s actions should create a condition 
in which the law can be realized, because every legal norm presupposes a normal 
condition as a homogeneous medium in which it is valid. Therefore, dictatorship is a 
problem of concrete reality without ceasing to be a legal problem”686.  
 
This leads him to his famous phrase that “the decision contained in a law is, from a 
normative perspective, borne out of nothing. It is by definition ‘dictated’ ”687. This phrase 
signifies the continuous gap between the legal norm and the norm of its implementation 
(Rechtsverwirklichung) that cannot be “covered” through the reference to a rationalist-
liberal approach. Hence, he adds to this that “the final consequences of this idea were only 
discovered by de Maistre, when rationalism was shattered”688. This is where we could see 
again that he needs the ‘‘help’’ from a powerful sovereign guided by the Catholic counter-
revolutionary thinking so as to impose the order.  
 
In this sense, Schmitt’s concept of “normality” as undergirding the legal order is from that 
time visible in his thinking and is associated with the concept of dictatorship through 
article 48. However, it is still not fully clear how he conceived article 48. That’s because it 
is not clear if it is used as “commissary” dictatorship, namely for the protection of 
democracy in times of extreme peril by being distinguished from totally unlimited 
authority.  
 
In favor of this interpretation (namely that it is deployed for the protection of democracy) 
is the fact that his theory included constraints. This can be seen in his argumentation that 
the emergency decrees are “measures” (Maßnahme) without statutory import and not 
“laws” (Gesetz)689 and, therefore, the President does not have a legislative role.  
 
However, against this interpretation of Schmitt’s theory, it is crucially the President that 
provides with normality on which the legal order can apply and Schmitt’s interpretation of 
article 48 is also expansive. Moreover, Schmitt wrote in a rather ambivalent way that 
article 48 of the Weimar Constitution is an outcome of both commissary and sovereign 
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dictatorship690. On top of this, there is also his requirement that normality presupposes only 
the State and the civil society of individuals (along with his general attack on the 
proletariat691), which shows a direction of a 19th century state-civil society relationship.  
 
So, we can conclude here that this work, both in its theoretical part and in its more 
“applied” part regarding Weimar, is ambivalent692. However, it indicates definitely a 
conservative stance that is in favour of a strong state. At the same time, it is mostly not 
anti-modern given his endorsement of the modern state. Its orientation seems to be mainly 
anti-democratic to the extent that democracy questions the liberal State-civil society 
configuration. It seems that Schmitt’s concept of normality is based on this configuration, 
which drives also his distinction between- what he calls- “law” and its realization. 
 
The neglecting of this distinction, according to Schmitt, can be seen in Kelsen’s theory. He 
argues ironically that “for Kelsen, dictatorship cannot be a problem of legislation any more 
than a a brain operation can be a problem of logic. True to his relativistic formalism, 
Kelsen does not realise that we are dealing here with something different: the authority of 
the state cannot be separated from its value”693. 
 
We can see, therefore, the context in which Schmitt concept of the President is developed. I 
will continue with his talk in Jena in order to have a better overview of his thought 
regarding the concept of dictatorship. 
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law and command, in “Political Theology” he shifts clearly more into counterrevolutionary thinking and in 
conceiving the exception as a permanent methodological trait that is inseparable from sovereignty. So, the 
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5.2.3. Schmitt in Jena: The economy in the “exception”? Theory and practice 
 
 
Schmitt developed his concept of dictatorship at a more concrete level in his speech in Jena 
in April 1924 during the second meeting of the Association of Teachers of State Law. This 
meeting was taking place at a time that the period of stability was gradually coming in 
Weimar. 
 
In this speech, Schmitt defined article 48 clearly as regulating only “commissary” 
dictatorship694- as opposed to his ambivalence in “On Dictatorship”. Moreover, he still 
argued that the second sentence of the second paragraph of article 48 (“for this 
purpose...153”) should be seen as regulating only the legal suspension of these certain 
provisions and not the necessary “measures” taken for the restoration of “order”, which are 
unlimited. So, his point is that the whole second paragraph of article 48 cannot be reduced 
to its second sentence because “the prevailing interpretation of Article 48 breaks down in 
front of any practical attempt to carry out the state of exception”695- a similar point with 
his 1921 argumentation.  
 
It should be noted here that the prevailing interpretation- against which Schmitt’s theory is 
counterposed- was supported by the majority of Teachers of State Law (Anschütz, Stier-
Somlo, Grau etc.) and was primarily expressed by Richard Grau two years earlier696. Grau 
had argued that the constitutional inclusion of the provision, which regulated that only 
certain articles could be suspended, and the inclusion of the limitation paragraph (5) after 
the constitutional debates in the National Assembly show that all articles of the 
Constitution except for articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 are “dictator-proof” 
(diktaturfest)697. He justified this by arguing that the point of having a constitution at all is 
the limitation “…on the government’s freedom to act, specifically on the executive 
                                                
694Schmitt ([1924] 2014) 180-226  
695 Ibid. 183 
696Grau, Richard (1922). Die Diktaturgewalt des Reichspräsidenten und der Landesregierungen auf Grund 
des Artikels 48 der Reichsverfassung. Berlin, Gunzel. 
See Stolleis (2004) 181 
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prerogative”. So, ‘‘enumeratio ergo limitatio’’698. Moreover, he wrote that there cannot be 
constitutional revisions but with the constitutional procedure that is regulated explicitly in 
article 76, namely there cannot be dictatorial revisions699.  
 
On the contrary, Schmitt’s interpretation both in his speech in Jena and later in 
“Constitutional Theory” (more explicitly) follows a clever strategy. Starting from Schmitt’s 
latter work, this is, on the one hand, to accept Grau’s “thoroughly correct idea that the 
Constitution even in regard to a wide-ranging commissarial dictatorship, must not be 
infringed”, but to question “what constitution means”700. So, he argues that when Grau 
identifies the Constitution with the inviolability of every single constitutional provision, he 
sacrifices in this way article 48 that has constitutionally the role of protecting the whole 
“public security and order”. So, according to Schmitt, Grau “perverts” article 48 into its 
opposite and, in this way, turns it into an “obstacle” regarding the defense of the 
Constitution.  
 
In the light of Schmitt’s analysis in “Constitutional Theory” we could see Schmitt’s 
argumentation in Jena, according to which “the prevailing interpretation of Article 48 
breaks down in front of any practical attempt to carry out the state of exception”701. In this 
direction, Schmitt cites also the governmental practice during the first period of the 
Republic, the decisions of the Courts and many governmental declarations.  
 
The governmental practice is the main focus of Schmitt’s argumentation702. That’s mainly 
because Ebert used article 48 extensively during his presidency (1919-1925). According to 
Rossiter, Ebert made use of this article for more than 130 times during the first years703. 
That was, firstly, for internal reasons of restoration of “order” against the far-right 
putsches, the communist uprisings (or the attempt of them) and after political 
                                                                                                                                              
697 In Kennedy, Ellen (2011). ‘Emergency Government Within the Bounds of the Constitution: An 
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assassinations704. This use of article 48 often suspended constitutional articles beyond the 
seven enumerated ones (e.g. the subordination of civil authorities in Saxony to a civil 
commissar of the Reich based on the presidential decree of 29 October 1923705). 
 
Carl Schmitt justified his latitudinous interpretation of article 48 by citing precisely these 
various governmental practices such as the emergency intervention in 1923 by the Reich 
government through the Reichswehr in the federal governments (Thuringia, Saxony) and 
the removal of local officials of those states, the taking over of their police forces, and the 
interference in private property through confiscations etc.706- even though these 
interventions were often made through a formal appeal to article 48 par. 2707. In this 
direction, it is also important to mention Schmitt’s reference to the decision of the 
Reichsgericht, which ruled the extraordinary courts permissible under article 48 and 
declared their compatibility with the third paragraph of article 105708. So, the authorization 
of martial courts and “drumhead trials” was deemed legal for the punishment of certain 
crimes, which was also practiced several times in order to suppress the communist 
outbreaks in 1920. These executive courts had broad powers to the extent that they could 
                                                
704Ibid. 40 
705According to this decree of 29 October 1923, the chancellor of the Reich ‘‘has the authority to dismiss 
ministers from the federal government of Saxony as well as federal and municipal authorities in that state 
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In Schmitt ([1924] 2014) 184 
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even punish rebel violence with death709.  
 
Even more important is, secondly, the application of article 48 for issues of economic 
policy, which became the leitmotiv of the 1930-33 period through Schmitt’s invocation of a 
‘‘financial emergency’’. This was already “practiced” extensively by Ebert during the 
“traumatic” hyperinflation period.  
 
Making here a short digression on the historical context, inflation had started in the 
aftermath of the Great War (also) due to the fact that the financing of the Great War was 
not based on taxation of the propertied classes (as in Britain and France) but on 
borrowing710. However, the situation got out of control after 1922 and particularly after the 
occupation of Ruhr by the French and the Belgian troops in January 1923 (that wanted to 
ensure their reparations through the iron and coal production)711. So, there was a point at 
the end of November 1923 that hyperinflation had reached a 1: 4.200.000.000.000 mark-
dollar exchange rate with phenomena that could lead to chaos- what Feldman called the 
“Great Disorder”712. At the same time, there was an imminent communist uprising in 
October 1923 and the Beerhall putsch in Munich in November 1923.  
 
Towards the resolution of this crisis, Ebert used a twofold governing method that 
substantively undermined the parliamentary debate. Firstly, there was a use of the 
Enabling Acts, which meant that the Reichstag authorized the government to issue 
legislative ordinances. These Acts (of limited time) were voted with a 2/3 majority since 
they were considered to be as constitutional revisions (article 76) and could be revoked 
upon the demand of the Reichstag. Secondly, he also used the governing by emergency 
decrees based on article 48.  
 
This double method aimed at achieving the stabilization of the currency. Crucially, both 
the Enabling acts during the period 1922-1924 and the governing by decrees for economic 
reasons was the first time to be practiced in the Weimar Republic and was not among the 
intentions of the framers of the Weimar Constitution. Moreover, it is also true that during 
                                                
709 See Rossiter (1948) 38  
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this time (especially during 1923) the economic elites and financial strategists were having 
direct access to power713. 
 
Going back to Schmitt after this short digression, the main reference that we can see from 
him in Jena about the subsumption of economy under the “restoration of order” concerns 
the Enabling Act of 13 October 1923. This Enabling Act entailed a very broad 
authorization since it empowered the cabinet to ‘‘adopt those measures which it considers 
to be absolutely necessary in the financial, economic and social realms’’714.  
 
Schmitt’s interest is particularly in the second sentence of the first paragraph of this 
Enabling Act, which writes that “fundamental rights guaranteed in the Weimar 
Constitution may be disregarded in this process”. This excerpt of this Enabling Act is cited 
by Schmitt in order to demostrate that a deviation of a constituted organ (the government) 
that is based on the first sentence of the second paragraph of article 48 is different from the 
suspension based on the second sentence of the second paragraph of article 48715. As he 
argued “this means something other than a suspension of the basic rights, because only the 
acting organ itself …and no other body…is allowed to deviate. When one violates a legal 
regulation, one does not cancel or suspend it”716.  
 
In other words, Schmitt used it so as to legitimize his concept of latitudinous presidential 
powers. However, what Schmitt also does not (want to) consider is that this Enabling Act 
was voted after Stresemann’s threat that he would dissolve the Reichstag and he would 
govern with article 48 until the new Reichstag convened after the elections (that’s 90 
days)717. The same method of “threat” to the deputies was followed by Ebert after 
Stresemann’s government had already fallen and he wanted to ensure the Enabling Act of 8 
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December 1923718. As Rossiter writes “the twin threat of dissolution and a concomitant 
resort to Article 48 was sufficient to secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the 
Reichstag”719. 
 
Crucially, these threats were based on an instrumental combination of articles 48, 25 (see 
chapter 3) and of this hybrid form of Enabling Act. This shows an anti-constitutional 
practice given that it was based on a different logic from the one endorsed by the 
Constituent Assembly. It was now closer to a Weberian concept of president (see chapter 
3). 
 
Regarding article 48 as a method of governing in the economy, Schmitt does not make any 
concrete reference in his Jena speech. His main reference concerns the Enabling Act as we 
have seen. In terms of the historical context, Article 48 was used mainly in the context of 
specifying the Enabling Acts. However, it was also used by itself concerning economic 
policies against hyperinflation such as the First Emergency Tax Decree (on December 7, 
1923)720. All in all, from October 1923 until February 1924, there were around 150 
legislative measures out of which 17 were based on article 48 and 110 on the two Enabling 
Acts721.  
 
So, going back to Schmitt, he starts from Jena to indicate that the exception extends as well 
to the economic organization. Through his analysis about the Enabling Act, he justified his 
interpretation of article 48. However, his concept of a “lawful” state of exception entails 
also limitations so as to avoid a sovereign dictatorship that would dissolve the constitution. 
Schmitt traces a three-fold limitation.  
                                                
718This Enabling Act reads as follows: “the government of the Reich is authorized to adopt those measures 
which it considers to be absolutely necessary in view of the distressing circumstances of the people and the 
Reich. Fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution may not be disregarded in the process. Before their 
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Firstly, Schmitt had asked in Jena for the implementation of the statute, which was based 
on paragraph 5 of article 48722. However, this statute never arrived from the legislature 
notwithstanding that the whole community of Teachers of Staatslehre (Schmitt included) 
was also asking for that723.  
 
Secondly, he argued for a limitation of the emergency measures both in terms of duration 
and mainly in terms of their content. He wrote clearly that a commissary dictatorship 
cannot change the “organizational minimum” of the regime (e.g. turn democracy into a 
monarchy) as the sovereign dictatorship of a constituent assembly can do. This 
“inalienable organizational minimum” comprises the President, the government and the 
Reichstag724. Hence, he argued that the measures taken against the Saxony government 
(based on article 48, par. 2) could not have been taken against the Reich government 
because it is part of the “organizational minimum”725. 
 
This is related with a second constraint that Schmitt recognizes, which is that the 
enforcement of article 48 needs (according to the Constitution) the ministerial 
countersignature (article 50) and the non-revocation by the Reichstag (article 48 paragraph 
3)726. The third related restriction is that the exceptional decrees are deemed to be 
“measures” (Maßnahme) and not “laws”, which meant that “this organizational minimum 
should not be eliminated or obstructed by way of taking actual measures”727. So, the point 
is that these emergency measures can breach constitutional provisions but not the 
‘‘organizational minimum’’. Moreover, they are not laws.  
 
As a final remark regarding this historical context of the hyperinflation period in which 
Schmitt’s speech in Jena takes place, it should be written that this period (that lasted from 
the end of 1922 until mid-1924) left its mark both at the level of constitutional theory and 
at a political level. Regarding the latter, the socio-political effect of this period can be seen 
in those middle classes that experienced an unjust re-distribution of wealth as a result of 
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Schmitt ([1924] 2014) 180-225, 180, 207-208, 225 
723 Stolleis (2004) 182 
724 Schmitt ([1924] 2014) 211 
725 Ibid. 
726 Ibid. 
727 Ibid. 
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the policies that were followed so as to counter the hyperinflation problem given that these 
policies benefited the wealthier728. As a consequence, “for much of the Mittlestand, the 
inflation permanently delegitimized the Republic while arousing hostility toward supposed 
speculators and representatives of international finance”729. This can be also revealed- 
without adopting a monocausal explanation- in that the biggest electoral move between 
1920 and 1932 was seen in the Mittlestand730. The various groups of the middle class “… 
(petit bourgeois, peasant, ‘white collar’) who were or had become homeless in the process 
of economic and political changes...” were mostly united ultimately by the NSDAP’s 
“authoritarian populism” by 1932 as Abraham writes731.  
 
Regarding industry, it “emerged from the inflation strengthened”, with more influence in 
the state and “even freed from financial dependence on the banks...”732. Moreover, a deeper 
monopolization process would be seen in the post-1924 rationalization period also due to 
the foreign loans that flowed into the German economy because of the Dawes Plan733. On 
the contrary, the unions were weakened (e.g. the eight-hour day was “non-existent”) and 
                                                
728Hyperinflation was ultimately resolved through various currency and tax reforms and with the introduction 
of the Rentenmark, whose market value was backed by the mortgaged assets of agriculture and business (3,2 
billion goldmarks). On November 20, the Federal Bank set a ratio of 1 trillion paper Marks to 1 Rentenmark 
based on the pre-war analogy between the mark and the dollar (1 dollar equals 4,2 Rentenmark). Moreover, it 
was also the Dawes plan that “helped” because it eased the reparations.  
 
The currency reforms and the introduction of a revalued currency ultimately favored, firstly, the big debtors 
and especially the bigger land owners (given that a lot of them were indebted) and, secondly, those who had 
large industrial properties. It destroyed significant parts of the middle class that had savings.  
 
So, as Winkler writes “…the distribution of wealth is significantly less equitable than before”.  
 
Winkler ([2000] 2006) 397-400 
 See also Feldman (1997) 
See also Kennedy (2011) 284-297, 285 
729 Abraham ([1981]1986) 118 
730 Ibid. 19 
731 Ibid.  
However, as Winkler writes, “the political mobility of the Mittelstand was limited to the Protestants. The vote 
for the Roman Catholic ‘Center party’ stayed fairly constant during the Weimar Republic”.  
Winkler (1976) 1-18, 8-10 
732 Abraham ([1981] 1986) 118 
733 Ibid. 119. Neumann ([1942, 1944] 2009).15 
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their treasuries were “quickly emptied”734. Their call for “economic democracy” was their 
response (see chapter 4.3). 
 
Regarding the field of constitutional theory, the marginalization of the Reichstag set a bad 
precedent. Firstly, this practice became itself an argument in Schmitt’s latitudinous 
interpretation of article 48. Secondly, there was shift of state law theory into natural law 
thinking and into the questioning of the legitimacy of constitutional democracy735.  That’s 
because one of the most debated issues was whether the revaluation that took place during 
1923-24 and expropriated a significant part of the middle classes without compensation 
was unjust736.  
 
This generated a discussion about article 109 (equality before the law) and article 153 
(expropriation), which brought into the fore two trends: firstly, a resurgence of natural law 
“general principles” and, secondly, a tirade against the “party state” and parliamentarism 
that inflicted on fundamental rights. Moreover, there was the “rise of the claim that there 
were institutional guarantees” ‘immune from parliament’ ” as Stolleis writes737. This claim 
was incorporated in Schmitt’s post-1928 theory (see chapter 5.5). 
 
As Stolleis writes “this was overwhelmingly the politics of bourgeois middle [class] 
afflicted by inflation and of the political right, which opposed the ‘party state’ in any 
case…”738. On the contrary, Kelsen argued at the meeting of “Staatslehre” Teachers in 
1926 (in Münster) that this trend in constitutional theory tended “to denigrate the value of 
the authority of the positive legislator”739. 
 
Concluding, we can see that this overall period of early Weimar- that ended with the 
overcoming of hyperinflation- left its traces in Schmitt’s theory, in Staatslehre and in the 
socio-political field. 
 
 
                                                
734Abraham ([1981] 1986)118 
735 in Stolleis (2004) 184 
736 See Caldwell (1997) 148-160, 80 
737 See Stolleis (2004), 183 
738 Ibid. 
739 In Ibid. 185 
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5.3. Schmitt’s ‘‘exceptionalism’’ and his concept of political representation 
  
Before developing how Schmitt introduced his conception of article 48 during the last 
period of the Weimar Republic, it is crucial to see Schmitt’s concept of political 
representation. This will reveal better his concept of normality, which goes hand in hand 
with the exception since “On Dictatorship”. 
 
In this section I delve into Schmitt’s writings between 1922 and 1928. In these writings, 
Schmitt’s main adversary is Hans Kelsen, the latter’s theory of legal formalism and 
democratic-philosophical relativism740. The adversary that Schmitt chooses is important in 
his theory in the sense that, as he argues, all his own concepts “are focused on a specific 
conflict and are bound to a concrete situation”741.  
 
Starting from “Political Theology”, this work is published at the time that Schmitt had 
moved to Bonn and is possibly the most “edgy” text of Schmitt, at least during the 1920s. 
It is startling that his analysis begins with the “exception” without mentioning at all the 
distinction between “commissary” and “sovereign dictatorship” (and the ‘‘institutional 
minimum’’). However, in continuity with “On Dictatorship”, its aim is also to deliver the 
“normal, everyday frame of life” to which the norm can apply742.  
 
In this work, Schmitt criticizes Kelsen for a rationalist-“immanent” conception of public 
law that represses totally both the exception and the sovereignty given Kelsen’s “..old 
liberal negation of the state vis-a-vis law and the disregard of the independent problem of 
realization of law”743. Kelsen’s concept of public law derives, according to Schmitt, from 
an idea of the modern constitutional state that “…triumphed together with deism, a 
theology and metaphysics that banished the miracle from the world”744. This is ultimately 
based, according to Schmitt, on a totally immanent-rationalist philosophy of history of the 
nineteenth century, where “everything is increasingly governed by conceptions of 
                                                
740Schmitt ([1922 1934] 1985) 42 
741Schmitt, Carl ([1932]1996). The Concept of the Political, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 30 
742Schmitt ([1922 1934] 1985) 13 
743 Ibid. 21 
744 Ibid. 36 
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immanence’’745 and can be traced back to Hegel’s philosophy of history. Here, Schmitt is 
critical of Hegel’s “immanentism” in contrast with his “Political Romanticism”.  
 
Based on this absolute immanence, Kelsen’s theory ultimately reduces the legal order to a 
causation that is “borrowed” from scientific-natural law concepts in the sense that his 
“pure” juristic unity is analogous to the “worldwide unity of the entire system”746 and is led 
to the identification of law with the state747. Crucially, the danger that Schmitt traces here 
through his critique of Kelsen’s “liberal negation” of the state is that Kelsen’s formulations 
could end into an immanence-pantheism that can accommodate anything748. From this 
perspective, Schmitt also criticizes Kelsen’s philosophical relativism749. 
 
On the contrary, Schmitt’s move so as to “save” both the legal order and the political from 
this “pantheism” -that he deemed responsible for Weimar’s fall in the 1958 afterword of 
“Legality and Legitimacy”750- is to rescue the “concrete” political moment inside the legal 
order but outside its immanent-rationalist conceptualization. As Mika Ojakangas 
commented “it is precisely the metaphysics of immanence- the metaphysics of natural 
sciences-that has paved the way for absolute rationalization and neutralization inasmuch 
as the concept of immanence entails, according to Schmitt, that everything is potentially 
under the control of human reason’’751. 
 
Against this immanence, this moment from the ‘‘outside’’ is the moment of “exception”, 
which Schmitt introduced as a “limit concept” here. The exception is identified with the 
fact that in every decision “transformation takes place every time…in every transformation 
there is present an auctoritatis interpositio…that constitutive, specific element of decision 
is, from the perspective of the content of the underlying norm, new and alien. Looked at 
normatively, the decision emanates from nothingness’’752.  
                                                
745 Ibid. 49 
746 Ibid. 20 
747 Ibid. 50 
748 Ibid. 
749 Ibid. 42 
750He used the term “value neutralization” in order to describe it. Schmitt ([1958] 2004) 96 
751Ojakangas, Mika (2005). ‘Philosophies of “Concrete” Life: From Carl Schmitt to Jean-Luc Nancy’, Telos: 
Critical Theory of the Contemporary , 132, 25-45, 28. 
752Schmitt ([1922 1934] 1985) 30-31 
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This is something that Schmitt had repeated already in “On Dictatorship” albeit it is 
welcomed more emphatically here as a “miracle” and acquires a more structural critique 
against- what he calls-  the “torpid of repetition” of a formalist legal order753. In other 
words, against the Weberian description of legality (see also chapter 3.2.). Moreover, it is 
evident here that the phrase “[out] of nothingness” should be read in conjunction with the 
phrase “looked at normatively” and not as endorsing a total step out of the legal order754. 
So, the crucial point is that the “exception” is viewed not as a step totally out of the 
juridical but as the pure political moment that is inscribed in its purity “as a miracle” from 
the outside in a totally self-closed legal order.  
 
Schmitt relates this purity to the philosophy of “concrete life” that “… must not withdraw 
from the exception and the extreme case, but must be interested in it to the highest 
degree”755. He does not develop more his theory of “concrete life” in this text but the 
meaning of this move can be seen in his concept of political representation, which grounds 
this “political” concept of law (that is tied to the exception).  
 
Analyzing this concept of representation, Schmitt’s critique is that enlightened rationalism 
erased both the decisionistic and the personalistic dimension of sovereignty after 
Rousseau’s volonté générale, which identified the will of the sovereign with the 
“quantitative” will of the people756. This erased the political in the sense that it surrendered 
it in the “economic-technical thinking” of the “American financiers, industrial technicians, 
Marxist socialists and anarchist-syndicalist revolutionaries”757. On this last point, Schmitt 
draws directly on Weber by arguing that the dominance of this logic shows that “the 
modern state seems to have actually become what Max Weber envisioned: a huge 
industrial plant”758. 
 
Against this thinking, Schmitt tries to save the personal dimension of the concept of 
political representation. This is precisely what he keeps from the Catholic 
                                                
753 Ibid. 15  
754 This is also visible in Schmitt’s phrase that ‘‘because the exception is different from anarchy and chaos, 
order in the juristic sense still prevails even if it is not of the ordinary kind…’’.   Ibid. 12-13 
755 Ibid. 15 
756 Ibid. 48 
757 Schmitt, Carl ([1922 1934] 1985) 65 
758 Ibid. 
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counterrevolutionary thinkers that he mentions in “Political Theology”759. That’s because 
he wants to stress that the sovereign decides precisely if/when the normal conditions are 
present for the “realization” of law, which is something that cannot be legally regulated but 
it is also not totally out of the juridical.  
 
Making the transition now to a more extensive analysis of Schmitt’s concept of political 
representation during the other works of this period, Schmitt identifies this concept with an 
access to the idea as a higher truth that evades rationalization. This is traced in Schmitt’s 
most Catholic book, which is “Roman Catholicism and Political Form” (1923)760. 
According to this book, the political representative ‘‘in contradistinction to the modern 
official…is not impersonal because his office is part of an unbroken chain linked with 
personal mandate and concrete person of Christ…The ground of decisionism is always a 
political idea, be it theological or juridical… To the political belongs the idea, because 
there is no politics without authority and no authority without an ethos of belief’’761.  
 
In this vein, Schmitt wrote that the political representative resembles the figure of the Pope 
who is “not the Prophet but the Vicar of Christ’’ in the sense that, on the one hand, this 
figure “precludes all the fanatical excesses of an unbridled fanaticism” but, on the other 
hand, it is a personified figure and “not the functionary and commissar of republican 
thinking’’762.  
 
Although Reinhard Mehring rightly argues that it is not clear whether Schmitt’s aim is to 
constitute the Church as the “guarantor of stability for the entire order…” or if he does 
“…unmask it as a worldly power”763, I think that his aim is mainly not to blur religion with 
politics and law. It is to distinguish between two concepts of political representation in a 
similar manner with “Political Theology”. 
 
                                                
759See in ibid. 52-66, especially 65-66 
760 According to G.L. Ulmen, these texts share an analytical resemblance. As he wrote, ‘‘Roman Catholicism 
and Political Form was written in conjunction with Political Theology, which has been described as a 
‘necessary complement to the Concept of the Political in explaining Schmitt’s understanding of state, 
sovereignty and politics.’ ’’. 
Ulmen, G.L (1996). ‘Introduction’ in Carl Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form. Westport CT: 
Greenwood, vii-xxxvi, xiv 
761 Schmitt, Carl ([1923] 1996). Roman Catholicism and Political Form, 17 
762 Ibid. 14 
763Mehring ([2009] 2014) 129 
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The first is a concept of representation that ‘‘suppresses sovereignty’’, which is the model 
that falls prey to –what Schmitt calls- “the “spread of economic thinking”764. The second 
form of representation is the “political form” of the Church that is tied to the “invocation of 
the idea”765- “the political is considered immaterial, because it must be concerned with 
other than economic values…Catholicism is eminently political”766 .  
 
As Kelly writes “…it has in fact been suggested that Schmitt’s essays can best be viewed as 
a ‘metacritical antitype’ to Weber’s own thought on the protestantic ethic, a ‘Catholic 
counterpart’ to these famous essays”767. In this sense, Schmitt’s distinction moves in an 
analogous way with Weber’s distinction between the charismatic politics and the ordinary-
bureaucratic ones (see below about their differences). This is evident in that the 
bureaucratic politics are identified, in Schmitt’s theory, with the parliamentary form of 
representation to the extent that the representatives are permeated by the economic 
thinking, namely if they don’t represent the idea “of the people as a whole” and they deal 
with the “material reality” of the “economic process”768. This is a critique of the Weimar 
Parteienstaat along with an effort of a conservative capturing of the Weimar Constitution, 
which is evident in Schmitt’s reference to article 21 of the Constitution according to which 
“deputies are representatives of the entire people” (given also that the Constitution did not 
include a constitutional regulation of political parties, as seen in chapter 3)769. 
 
It is in the light of this concept of political representation that we should analyze his 
“Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy” and ‘‘The Concept of the Political’’. In these texts, 
the German jurist develops more clearly his critique to rationalism by arguing that, if the 
rationalist-liberal approach is followed, the political is reduced to an ‘‘arithmetical’’ 
concept of equality that is ensured through the Rechtsstaat.  
 
However, as he writes, “the question of equality is precisely not of abstract, logical-
arithmetic games. It is about the substance of equality.… Finally one has to say that a 
democracy-because inequality always belongs to equality- can exclude one part of those 
                                                
764 Schmitt ([1923] 1996) 25 
765 In Mehring ([2009] 2014) 128 
766 Schmitt ([1923] 1996) 16 
767 Kelly (2003) 187 
768 Schmitt, Carl ([1923] 1996) 26-27 
769 Ibid. 
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governed without ceasing to be a democracy…”770.  
 
In line with his “substantive” logic of democracy, which claims now to be following 
Rousseau’s ‘‘general will’’771 but without its reduction in the quantitative will of the 
people, Schmitt justified one of the most virulent critiques of mass democratic 
parliamentarism. He argued that democracy is defined through the identification of the 
rulers with the ruled and ‘‘requires first homogeneity and second- if the need arises- 
elimination or eradication of heterogeneity’’772. 
 
So, the substantive logic of democracy is tied to exclusion. This is associated both with the 
logic of ethnicity773 but also with his idea of a purely political unity as opposed to a 
compromise of ‘‘liberal-arithmetic’’ aggregation of preferences. Analyzing this more 
thoroughly, Schmitt does not reject a priori parliamentarism but he ties parliamentarism to 
the 19th century parliament. As he writes, the fact that this parliament “...assumes the role 
of the legislative in the division of powers and is limited to that role makes the rationalism 
which is at the heart of the theory of balance of powers rather relative and…it 
distinguishes this system from the absolute rationalism of the Enlightenment”774. So, he 
argues for the theory of balance of powers, which reminds us his his reference on 
Montesquieu in “On Dictatorship”.  
 
In contrast with this 19th century parliamentarism, the problem that he traces in Weimar is 
that “small and exclusive committees of parties and party coalitions make their decisions 
behind closed doors, and what representatives of capitalist interests agree to in the 
smallest committees is more important for the fate of millions of people, perhaps than any 
political decision..If in the actual circumstances of parliamentary business, openness and 
discussion have become an empty and trivial formality, then parliament, as it developed in 
the nineteenth century, had also lost its previous foundation and its meaning”775. 
 
                                                
770Schmitt, Carl ([1926] 1988). Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (trans. Kennedy, E.) 2nd edition, 
Cambridge MA, London: MIT Press, 9 
771Ibid. 26-27 
772Ibid. 9  
773He gives as an example the expulsion of Greeks in the Asia Minor and the “reckless Turkish 
nationalization of the country”. Ibid. 
774 Ibid. 39 
775 Ibid. 50 
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So, we can see that his stance is related not to a general rejection of parliamentarism but of 
a 20th century parliamentarism. This stance of Schmitt is evidently influenced by the 
Weimar context, as is visible in the excerpt above. Taking this context into account, 
Schmitt argues that “...the crisis of parliamentary democracy in fact springs from the 
circumstances of modern mass democracy”776. So, his orientation is mainly against 
political parties in times of mass democracy by radicalizing, in this way, Weber’s insights 
in the sense that Weber’s theory was clearly elitist but not against parties as such (see 
chapter 3.2.). In this sense, Schmitt’s later critique of the “pluralistic party state” (in the 
early 1930s) was “…a concept already fully developed by the 1923 edition of his ‘Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy’ ” as Caldwell argues777. 
 
In his response to 20th century parliamentarism, Schmitt also finds a “strange” ally in 
Sorel’s concept of myth and his concept of unmediated real life. This move of Schmitt is 
again similar with his previous works, namely a move from rationalist immanence to the 
“irrationalist” immediacy of the idea/myth but in the name of rescuing the political from 
the technical logic778. 
 
Taking this analysis into account, we can make two final remarks regarding Schmitt’s 
concept of political representation that undergirds his concept of constitutionalism. The 
first remark is that Schmitt’s effort to protect the autonomy of the political shows an 
affiliation with the theological element, which was seen both in “Political Theology” and 
in “Roman Catholicism and Political Form”. It is through this lens that we can make sense 
of the fact that his concept of the political is ‘‘accompanied’’ with the ‘‘real possibility of 
physical killing’’779. So, he endorses a concept of a “sacrificial” substantive idea-truth, 
which is beyond any reflection and deliberation and is associated with the exception. In 
this sense, Schmitt’s thinking is permeated by a post-political effort to maintain the 
“purity” of the idea in a groundless modern society.  
 
                                                
776 Schmitt ([1926] 1988) 15 
777 Caldwell (1997) 113 
778 In this direction Schmitt cites also two examples of the use of myth. Firstly, the speech of Mussolini in 
Naples in October 1922. Schmitt tried to show that Italian fascism managed to make “…a stronger impact 
and has evoked more powerful emotions than the socialist image of the bourgeois” because it “depicted its 
communist enemy with a horrific face, the Mongolian face of Bolshevism...’’. The second one is the example 
of Trotsky, who ‘‘as … just reminded the democrat Kautsky, the awareness of relative truths never gives one 
the courage to use force and to spill blood’’. 
Ibid. 75-76, 64 
779 Schmitt, Carl ([1932]1996). The Concept of the Political, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 33 
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This is also related to the fact that Schmitt avoids using the word representation when 
referring to the Reichstag in “Constitutional Theory”. He uses instead the “bureaucratic 
[word] ‘Beauftragte’ [that] relates to Schmitt’s strong suggestion that parliamentary 
representation is not really representation since actual agreement is replaced by interest 
groups and lobbies”780. The political understanding of representation (Repräsentation) 
remains tied to the Church as opposed to the technical-economic rationality of the 
Reichstag781. 
 
This leads us to the second remark, which is that that the direction of Schmitt’s critique of 
20th century parliamentarism is related to his conceptualization of the social issues as 
embedded in the instrumental-economic logic. In this way, Schmitt de-politicizes the issue 
of social relationships. So, his concept of the political, whereas it does not collapse into the 
social due to the irreducibility of its basic distinction (friend-enemy) to any other 
categories (e.g. in the economy, aesthetics etc..)782, is based on a bourgeois assumption of 
the social that is beyond reflection and contestation. 
 
So, Schmitt’s critique of parliamentarism is related to his approach to the social question. 
Moreover, it is also important to see what Schmitt suggests (apart from his lament for the 
loss of 19th century parliamentarism). His suggestion is seen in ‘‘Constitutional Theory’’ 
and is the acclamation of the leader (President) instead of the ‘‘fractionary’’ interests of the 
parties (see below). Moreover, he criticized the secret voting by arguing that it 
individualizes the political procedure and fragments the political unity783. Hence, Schmitt  
gave to the people the power to say merely ‘‘yes or no’’.  
 
To conclude, Schmitt argues for a strong state that would have the “homogenizing” role to 
choose who is “the people” in terms of ethnicity while it would also exclude the social 
question from the political. Because of this, Schmitt’s state is also not compatible with a 
20th century parliamentary state that allows the staging of the social question. Hence, as 
Kelly writes (following Cristis’ analysis), the aim of Schmitt is “…to separate liberalism 
from democracy for the purposes of halting the democratic avalanche, not to criticize 
Parliament as such, although his criticisms were none the less sharp. His assessment of 
                                                
780 Caldwell (1997) 225, footnote 76 
781Kelly (2003) 189 
  
782 See Schmitt ([1932]1996). 
783Schmitt ([1928] 2008) 273 
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Parliament suggested that it was initially a genuinely representative institution, though one 
that was now tainted by the logic of the democratic principle”784. 
 
So, this is the concept of the political that undergirds Schmitt’s “purely” political moment 
inside the legal order that will restore the “everyday frame of life”, namely a conception 
that aims to bring back 19th century parliamentarism through a strong state. A deeper 
analysis about the association between his concept of the political and his concept of 
constitutionalism will be seen more clearly in the next section. 
 
 
 5.4. Schmitt’s “Constitutional Theory” 
 
 
Schmitt’s “Constitutional Theory” takes into account the aforementioned concept of 
political representation but in a more ‘‘tamed’’ manner in the sense that personalism and 
“hard decisionism” (especially of “Political Theology”) recede785. In this constitutional 
treatise, Schmitt seems to accept the Weimar Constitution albeit on his own terms.  
 
This is visible already in his theoretical approach, according to which “all democratic 
thinking centers on ideas of immanence…every departure from immanence would deny 
this identity…”786. This is in contrast, therefore, with “Political Theology” where he had 
argued against- what he called- an immanent approach. 
 
His own terms are evident since his argumentation that there is a ‘‘continuity of the 
German Reich’’787 notwithstanding that he recognized the constitutional change from the 
1871 Constitution. As he wrote ‘‘…one must respond affirmatively to the question of 
continuity. With the Weimar Constitution, the German people do not intend to deny its 
identity with the German people of the 1871 Constitution. As it states in the preamble of 
                                                
784 Kelly (2003) 192. Cristi (1998) 80 
785 Cristi (1998) 114, 116 
See also Thornhill, Chris & Seitzer, Jeffrey (2008). ‘Introduction’ in Carl Schmitt Constitutional Theory, 
Durham: Duke University Press, 1-50, p.34 
786 Schmitt ([1928] 2008) 266 
787 This was also based on Preuss’ statement (see chapter 3.0). 
Ibid. 141, 145 
 173 
the Weimar Constitution, the German people intend to renew the Reich of 1871, but not 
found a new Reich”788. 
 
This should be read also in the context that he recognizes as discontinuity mainly three 
historical examples, the 1789 and the 1793 French Constitutions and the 1917/1918 Soviet 
Constitution arguing that only in these cases there was a change of the constitution-making 
power789. This argument regarding continuity allowed him to declare that, despite the 
change from monarchy to democracy, the political unity remained the same. So, it allowed 
him to unfold his concept of the Weimar Constitution based on an “originalist”- 
substantive concept of identity. 
 
Analyzing gradually this concept, Schmitt argues that there is a central contradiction in the 
Weimar Constitution, which is associated both with the Weimar Constitution itself but with 
every constitution of the modern ‘‘bourgeois Rechtsstaat’’ (as he deems also the Weimar 
one790). This is the contradiction between its political component, which is the component 
of a substantive collective identity, and its Rechtsstaat one, which is the liberal component. 
Based on this approach, he distinguishes between the substantive “Constitution” and the 
formal “constitutional laws”.  
 
At a first glance, this distinction seems to concern merely the interpretation of article 76 of 
the Weimar Constitution, which defined the possibility to amend every single article of the 
Constitution by increased parliamentary majority (2/3). As an aside, every constitutional 
provision was amendable, according to the Weimar Constitution. 
 
However, this distinction, transcends a constitutional proposal and is a conceptual 
methodology of conceiving the Constitution that is informed by the concept of political 
representation that we analyzed earlier, namely it is opposed to a normative-technical 
concept of legality. This is evident in Schmitt’s argument that “for the Rechtsstaat 
understanding, law is a norm…alongside the Rechtsstaat concept of law, moreover, 
together with the juristic-technical aid of the so-called formal concept of law, there is still 
a political concept of law, which is not capable of eliminating the Rechtsstaat element”791. 
                                                
788Ibid. 145 
789 Ibid. 142 
790 Ibid. 87, 235 
791 Ibid. 187 
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So, the distinction between “Constitution” and “constitutional law” corresponds to the 
distinction between the founding “political decision” of the Constitution and the “formal” 
constitutional laws. This is the idea that there is an always-dual constitution, the political 
and the legal-normative. But it is crucial that both of them (as seen in the excerpt above) 
are inside the juristic. 
 
This means that the constituent power or- as he calls it- “the political element” of the 
constitution is always “present” as such in the constitutional order, as a “preestablished, 
unified will”792. As Schmitt wrote, “… This political will remains alongside and above the 
constitution. Every genuine constitutional conflict, which involves the foundations of the 
comprehensive political decision itself, can, consequently, only be decided through the will 
of the constitution-making power itself. Also, every gap in the constitution, in contrast to 
the lack of clarity in terms of constitutional law and opinions in details, is filled only 
through an act of the constitution-making power”793.   
 
But the question is how does this will appear in its purity in the constitutional order? This 
contradiction emerges in chapter 16 of his book in which Schmitt struggles between a 
concept of the Constitution that is based on an unmediated “identity between rulers and 
ruled” and representation. This contradiction appears when he faces the paradox of 
constitutionalism in the moment of the originary ‘‘constituent power’’.  
 
Regarding this paradox, whereas he had initially argued that there should be no 
representation ‘‘because the nation…need not and cannot be represented…’’794, he admits 
the problem of his analysis by arguing that ‘‘the weakness is that the people should decide 
on the basic questions of their political form and their organization without themselves 
being formed or organized’’795. Based on this, he seems to conclude that there is a need of 
some form of representation because there cannot be an ‘‘…absolute self-identity of the 
then present people as political unity”796. So, he writes that there should be some form of 
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representation along with some form of an identity797.  
 
It is important, nevertheless, to see how Schmitt concretized his definition of 
“representation” and the relationship between “identity” and “representation” in other parts 
of this book as well. Analyzing this, Schmitt allocated “identity” to democracy and 
parliamentary “representation” to ‘‘aristocracy’’798. Regarding further the concretization of 
representation, Schmitt argued that a logic of political representation should be seen “…in 
its public law and political peculiarity and be freed from any encumbrance from other 
concepts such as assignment, interest advocacy, business leadership, commission, 
trusteeship, etc. because otherwise ideas of a private law and economic-technical variety 
undermine its distinctiveness”799. On the contrary, for Schmitt political representation can 
occur only in the ‘‘public sphere’’800. 
 
What, we might ask, does this mean exactly? In this concretization of the concept of 
representation there is a paradoxical passage in the sense that representation is identified 
with the process of making an invisible subject visible. It sounds, in this way, as an “avant 
la lettre” Rancierian concept. Viewing this passage more closely, Schmitt explains the 
presence of the “people” alongside the constituted order and argues that “the people” 
cannot be defined as a mere state organ but as those that “are not honored or distinguished, 
everyone not privileged, everyone prominent not because of property, social position or 
education...In the French Revolution of 1789, the bourgeoisie as Third Estate could 
identify itself with the nation and the bourgeoisie was the people, because the bourgeoisie 
was the opposition to the aristocracy and the privileged. But as soon as the bourgeoisie 
itself appeared as a class that is marked by property and that dominates the state, this 
negation was extended. Now the proletariat became the people, because it becomes the 
bearer of this negativity”801.  
 
This is the passage (among others) on which Andreas Kalyvas is based by arguing that 
Schmitt’s theory could be conceived as enabling an “instituted constituent power” of the 
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extraordinary that could foster radical democratic politics802. However, Kalyvas’ 
interpretation seems to underplay the overall direction of Schmitt’s concept of political 
representation, which is in line with his previous works. 
 
 This is evident in the German word (Beauftragte) that Schmitt uses in “Constitutional 
Theory” (as seen in the previous section) to refer to the Reichstag as opposed to the 
representation based on the model of the Catholic Church. Moreover, this direction can be 
seen also in Schmitt’s argumentation that “parliament...has lost its representative 
character… a genuine identity (itself a mere part of the people) is naturally superior to 
representation that is not genuine”803. In this vein, Schmitt also argues that “the Weimar 
Constitution recognizes no parties”804- a remark that was also in line with his reference to 
article 21 of the Weimar Constitution in his previous works. 
 
This is even more clear in Schmitt’s alternative to Weimar parliamentarism, which is the 
concept of acclamation, namely the possibility of the unmediated people to say merely a 
“yes” or “no” to the proposals of the leader (e.g. through referendum)805. That’s because 
Schmitt conceived this concept of acclamation as a representation in “the public sphere”806, 
namely not as tied to liberal individualism and an economic-technical logic. 
 
Schmitt’s argumentation is, therefore, in continuity with his earlier writings. Moreover, 
Schmitt introduces for the first time in 1928 two terms that comprise his concept of 
President during his 1930s theory. There is, firstly, the concept of President as ‘‘pouvoir 
neutre’’ that he takes from Benjamin Constant notwithstanding that he is still torn between 
the concept of President as ‘‘pouvoir neutre’’ and the concept of President as political 
leader, namely as a political actor with partisan choices and “not merely the neutral 
third”807. 
 
The second is the concept of President as the “Guardian” of the Constitution. This is not in 
“Constitutional Theory” but in a paper that he completed in August 1928 after Kelsen’s 
lecture at the meeting of the Teachers of State Law in 1928 in Vienna. In this paper, 
                                                
802Kalyvas (2008) 79-186, especially see 174-186 
803Schmitt ([1928]2008) 276 
804 Ibid. 
805Ibid. 272 
806 Ibid. 272-273 
807 Ibid. 370-371 
 177 
Schmitt “attempts, for the first time, to make the case on behalf of the Reich President as 
guardian of the constitution by showing that the alternative, Kelsen’s doctrine of 
constitutional review, is unworkable”808. So, the central motif of the “Guardian of the 
Constitution”, which was developed and published in 1931, can be seen to an extent in this 
paper and is a response to Kelsen’s theory809 (see chapter 6 about this). However, as 
Paulson argues, “Schmitt’s program in support of what became the Weimar ‘reserve 
constitution’ or Präsidialsystem, was in place long before Kelsen’s 1928 lecture in 
Vienna”810. This has been also seen through the continuity that I have traced in the previous 
sections regarding Schmitt’s critique of Weimar parliamentarism. 
 
Carl Schmitt will develop more clearly his concept of president in 1931. At that time, he 
clearly conceived the President as the “Guardian of the Constitution” and as “… a neutral 
power… which is put to the side and not above the other constitutional powers, but which 
is endowed with peculiar competences and opportunities of influence”811.  
 
It is crucial to see the background of this logic. This is that Schmitt laments the fact that 
economy has become a political issue in the 20th century democratic state and that the old 
liberal state of the 19th century has been lost. As Schmitt wrote, “this [liberal] state, which 
was neutral in principle towards society and economy, in the liberal, non-interventionist 
sense, remained the presupposition of the constitution even where exceptions were made in 
the field of social and cultural politics. But it changed from the ground up, to the same 
extent that the dualistic construction of state and society, government and people, lost its 
tension and the legislative state came to completion. Now, the state becomes the ‘self-
organization of society’. The distinction between state and society, between government 
and the people, which had hitherto always been presupposed, disappears...”812. 
 
He argues, therefore, that civil society takes over the state and that “…it is no longer 
possible to distinguish between issues that are political, and as such concern the state, and 
issues that are social and thus non-political”813. His “solution” is to project a President 
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who unites the people in a homogeneous way without the “fractional” divisions and 
interests that characterize the mass parties. Hence, the President was called by Schmitt as 
‘‘pouvoir neutre’’. 
 
As Hans Kelsen comments, this concept of the non-political independence of the President 
prefigures “…a bourgeois ideology that is meant to veil the antagonism in which the 
proletariat, or at least a large part of the same, finds itself towards the contemporary 
legislative state, just like the bourgeoisie used to be in an antagonistic position, at the 
beginning of the 19th century, towards the ‘total’ police-state of absolute monarchy’’814.  
 
 In the light of Kelsen’s critique, we can see that Schmitt’s concept of political 
representation is based on a reification of the State-civil society relationship given that 
civil society is deemed unable for any political process and is presented as determined by 
sheer interests- namely by the “spread of economic thinking” as he had put it in his earlier 
texts (see above).  
 
Going back in “Constitutional Theory” in the light of this account, we can see that --in his 
effort to maintain the “purity” of the political that had been lost due to the “economic 
thinking” through parliamentarism- Schmitt ultimately identified representation as 
“something existential”815. This seems to be similar with his concept of representation that 
was endorsed in “Roman Catholicism and Political Form” (despite that the Church is not 
mentioned here).  
 
This concept of political representation backs his argument that “the concrete existence of 
the politically unified people is prior to every norm”816 and is always present inside the 
constituted order. So, this is the lens through which we can go back and understand the 
distinction between “Constitution” and “constitutional laws”, which is undergirded by this 
concept of political representation.   
 
Given this, Schmitt’s “political concept” of the Constitution is expressed by a President 
who represents the general will (based on Schmitt’s concept of political representation seen 
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above) as opposed to the Constitution’s reduction to a “sum of private opinions” (volonté 
de tous) that endangers the Constitution817. Through this depiction of a “prior existing” 
unity represented by the President inside the legal order, Schmitt reifies the socio-political 
order. As Hans Lindahl comments, “a state does not merely ‘have’ a constitution; it is a 
constitution (Verfassung)...Legal order as the unity of a manifold of legal norms is 
unintelligible unless it leads back to and is the expression of political unity – a concrete 
order”818. 
 
So, we have an effort of re-interpretation of the Weimar Constitution along conservative (if 
not authoritarian) liberal lines that seems in line with his concept of political representation 
as seen also in Schmitt’s previous works. That’s in the sense that Schmitt does not criticize 
the political-economic liberal distinction for the Constitution’s endangerment but mass 
democracy, which allows the politicization of the social-economic divide. In this direction, 
he also writes that “…there cannot be a bourgeois Rechtsstaat without private property, 
and the Weimar Constitution is intended as a constitution of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat”819. 
 
This overall direction can be also seen in Schmitt’s legal advice in 1926820 with regards to 
the (not successful) proposal by the SPD and the KPD to the Reichstag about the 
expropriation without compensation of the dynastic properties of the former royal 
families821. In this advice, Schmitt argued that the expropriation would violate the general 
and substantive concept of the legal norm and was deemed to be a measure822. Moreover, it 
would breach the equality of law (art. 109) since it was deemed to be a personal 
command823. As a consequence, it would also breach the right to property since the 
expropriation was allowed only “ ‘on the basis of a statute’”824; “that is according to a 
general rule” as Caldwell explains Schmitts’ position825. Finally, Schmitt argued that this 
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parliamentary absolutism turned the constitutional Republic into a ‘‘sovereign 
dictatorship’’, which had ended with the end of the Constituent Assembly in 1919826. On 
the contrary, according to Schmitt, this distinction between law and measure along with the 
equality before the law constituted the “proper foundation of the Rechtsstaat and the most 
effective warranty against all despotism”827.  
 
Caldwell argues that this case gave the occasion to Schmitt to develop his overall strategy, 
which was “to limit parliamentary power, in direct contrast to the theories of 
parliamentary sovereignty developed by the statutory positivists”828. Moreover, it indicates 
the embrace of the liberal Rechtsstaat principle in contrast with the parliamentary 
intervention in the economy, which erodes the generality of law according to Schmitt. 
 
 So, we can see that Schmitt’s substantive-political concept of law is identified with the 
liberal constitutionalism of 19th century as opposed to the “despotism” (reminding us also 
the distinction between despotism and dictatorship that had been traced “On 
Dictatorship”). Here we can see clearly how Schmitt’s concept of 19th century 
parliamentarism (seen also in the previous section) is tied to an effort to reach a 19th 
century constitutionalism. 
 
This interpretation of Schmitt can be seen also in the light of Habermas’ argumentation 
about 19th century parliamentarism that went along with 19th century constitutionalism. 
Habermas argued that this constitutionalism managed to combine legislation as “will” and 
as “rule of law” because it was based on the public opinion829 of the “critical public debate 
of private people...in the public competition of private arguments” (through basic rights 
guaranteeing the public and the private, always as citizens and property-owners 
simultaneously)830. In other words, constitutionalism as ratio “…was based on the fictitious 
identity of the two roles assumed by the privatized individuals who came together to form a 
public: the role of property owners and the role of human beings pure and simple”831. 
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They viewed the “market” as a private issue and the political as detached from the 
propertyless masses and the logic of “need”. 
 
However, the significant point is that when parliamentary democracy and universal 
suffrage came into picture during late 19th- early 20th century, the politicization of the 
social question “threatened” to unbalance the steadfast state-civil society distinction and 
the dominant 19th century constitutionalism. Long before Schmitt, this fear was expressed 
since mid 19th century by liberal theorists in various countries (e.g. J.S. Mill, Constant, 
Tocqueville, Dicey832 etc.), some of whom Schmitt explicitly invokes (Mill833, 
Constant)834.  
 
Going back to Constitutional Theory, Schmitt’s approach can be seen better by focusing on 
his new methodology that emerges in “Constitutional Theory”. Analyzing this, Schmitt has 
already understood that the “normality” and the “unity” on which the legal order can apply 
cannot be held only through a powerful decisionist President that “decides whether there is 
an extreme emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it”835. There is the danger 
(for Schmitt) that Strauss himself stresses: that the “friend” is not concretely defined and 
the “friend-enemy” distinction turns into an aestheticized concept836.  
 
So, Schmitt had started already shifting to a new methodology due to his search for further 
political stability: this is institutionalism, which signifies his deeper focus on the social 
domain and practices as tied to his concept of “substantive” constitution. To be clear about 
this, the shift was officially declared in his Preface to the Second Edition of “Political 
Theology” (November 1933)837. However, this shift can be already seen since his 
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“Constitutional Theory” to an extent838. These elements can be found in his passages that 
he discusses the “institutional guarantees”. The “institutional guarantees”, which are 
traced by Schmitt in the Weimar Constitution, are indicatively the marriage, family, 
localities, civil servant issues related to article 130 (avoiding party politics), freedom of 
science etc.839.  
 
He is not very clear about this concept in “Constitutional Theory” but he conceives the 
institutional guarantees not as rights in the sense that rights are linked to a logic of an 
unbounded freedom. Hence his hesitancy including property in this category at that time. 
Moreover, the “institutional guarantees” are internal to the State, which means part of the 
State as “total status”840. 
 
Although he does not define institutionalism further in “Constitutional Theory”, he would 
do so in the next texts during 1930s. However, it should be also clear that the element of 
decisionism, which works on the gap between “law” and its “realization”, plays still a 
significant role in Schmitt’s theory. This is evident in that Schmitt continues tying his 
“political” concept of constitution (represented by the President) to the exception- 
notwithstanding that the role of the exception is not so central as in “Political Theology”. 
As Schmitt writes “the Constitution in the actual sense, the fundamental political decisions 
over a people's form of existence, obviously cannot be set aside temporarily, but certainly 
the general constitutional norms established for their execution can be precisely when it is 
in the interest of the preservation of these political decisions”841. In this direction, Schmitt 
cites also his speech in Jena and his disagreement with Richard Grau (see 5.2.)842. 
 
So, we can see the beginning of a methodological shift by Schmitt in terms of legal theory. 
This shift was further developed during the early 1930s in the Weimar context of crisis. So, 
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it is necessary to see both this context and Schmitt’s writings in this context.  
 
5.5. Schmitt’s political engagement and theoretical shift: ‘‘Strong State-Free 
Economy’’, Institutionalism and article 48  
 
 
After Schmitt moved from Bonn to Berlin’s Handelshochschule (in Spring 1928) by 
accepting the position of the “Staatsrecht” professor843, his theoretical position goes hand 
in hand with his political engagement. So, it is crucial to analyze them in parallel. 
 
Regarding Schmitt’s political engagement, his move in Berlin and the fact that he was a 
“Staatsrecht” professor made it easier for him to be close to the corridors of power. His 
“new” friend and permanent state secretary in the Ministry of Economics (until 21 
December 1929) Johannes Popitz helped him in this direction by introducing him to the 
political and economic elites844.   
 
However, his closest and most substantive contacts were with the “circle” of General Kurt 
von Schleicher845- but not that much with Schleicher himself- and particularly with high 
officials in the Ministry of Defense (Ott, Erich M. Marcks)846. He was introduced to them 
by a historian that was a visitor in his seminars (Michael Horst)847. As Mehring writes, 
these two officials “remained Schmitt’s most important connections to the later chancellors 
of the Reich Franz von Papen and Schleicher”848. 
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 Schmitt’s serious political engagement came only after the Prussian coup (20 July 1932), 
which took place during the serious economic and political crisis of the Weimar 
Republic849. He learnt it only through the press850. After this coup, he became the main 
legal representative of the Reich in the Leipzig trial (that concerned the Prussian coup 
case) and he participated in various emergency plans until the period of Schleicher’s 
chancellorship. 
 
In this section, I will explore, firstly, the historical transition to the authoritarian state 
during the last phase of the Weimar Republic. Secondly, I will analyze the very last period 
of Weimar along with Schmitt’s political role. Thirdly, I will demonstrate Schmitt’s 
theoretical position during this period.  
 
I will start from the historical context because, as argued in the Introduction, the historical 
account of Schmitt and Kelsen and their theoretical positions are interrelated.  
 
 
5.5.1. The transition to the authoritarian state 
 
The narration about the transition from parliamentary democracy to the decree governance 
starts from the 1929 collapse of the American stock market and finance system. This was a 
severe blow to the German economy given that it was funded by American banks, which 
now wanted back the funds that they had placed in investments851. This turned into a major 
problem since “the Reich…found it increasingly difficult to obtain foreign credit”852, 
whereas at the same time it was still paying for reparations.  
 
The state borrowed ultimately from a consortium of internal banks headed by the Federal 
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850Ibid. 260. On the contrary, Ellen Kennedy writes that Popitz and Schmitt were advising Hindenburg’s 
counselors behind the scenes and “were involved in the decision to remove the government of Prussia that 
summer”.  
Kennedy, Ellen (2004). Constitutional Failure: Carl Schmitt in Weimar, Durham: Duke University Press, 13. 
851 Winkler ([2000] 2006) 431 
852 Ibid. 
 185 
Bank, which demanded the imposition of an austerity reform program853. After some 
measures passed in this direction - amidst a tug of war between the president of the Federal 
Bank and the Coalition government- this process led to the political controversy over the 
question of who would bear the “burden” of financing the unemployment insurance system 
(labour or industrial capital)854. Unemployment marked a further fiscal problem for the 
state given that, as it was rising, there was a growing demand by the organized labor for its 
coverage by the unemployment insurance system whereas at the same time the revenues 
were in freefall and representatives of industry were demanding the “release of the 
economy from such ‘political fetters’ ”855 (see also chapter 4).  
 
This turned into a political controversy, mostly between the SPD and the DVP, regarding 
the allocation of burden and led to the dissolution of the Grand Coalition due to the 
resignation of the chancellor Hermann Müller and of the other SPD members from the 
Cabinet (27 March of 1930)856. However, as Winkler wrote, the Grand Coalition “did not 
in any event have long to live”. The DVP was “busy trying to extricate itself from its 
government alliance with the Social Democrats” given also that since early 1930 “… large 
sections of industry, the Reichslandbund [RLB], the political leadership of the Reichswehr 
General von Schleicher and the camarilla around President Hindenburg had all been 
agreed that the crisis-ridden parliamentary system ought to be replaced by a kind of 
presidial democracy - a government dependent less on the support of the Reichstag than 
on the confidence of the President.”857. In these machinations, the name of the successor 
was also agreed: it was to be the chairman of the Zentrum party Heinrich Brüning. 
 
So, the dissolution of the Grand Coalition was welcomed by the parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary Right (and from the representatives of heavy industry and the RLB) because 
the issue was not that much the insignificant increase in the contributions to the insurance 
system but that they couldn’t find another way in order to overcome the crisis except for 
minimizing the welfare state. This could be done, nevertheless, only through a transition to 
a presidential regime governing by decrees given the power of labor.  
 
In terms of constitutional law, it is crucial to see that this period initiated by President 
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Hindenburg’s decision to use his presidential power and to impose the minority Brüning 
government without a prior discussion with the Reichstag parties (28 March 1930) and 
with the biggest parliamentary fraction (the SPD)858. However, the Reichstag legitimized 
indirectly the new government by rejecting the motion of no-confidence by the SPD and 
the KPD given that the DNVP- despite its disagreement with governmental policies- had 
decided not to cooperate with the anti-governmental powers859.  
 
This does not change the fact that there was a problematic interpretation of articles 53 and 
54 in the sense that these articles gave the power to the President to choose the chancellor 
but they also imposed the necessity of parliamentary confidence (see chapter 3.0). Here, 
the parliamentary confidence did not exist at the time of the government’s appointment by 
the President but followed merely in an indirect way through the rejection of the motion of 
no-confidence. However, it should be also written here that, according to the prevailing 
practice in Weimar, the government was not legally obliged to ask for a vote of confidence 
since it was deemed to have it a priori. Only 3 governments received a positive vote of 
confidence out of the 18 governments that were appointed since the adoption of the 
Weimar Constitution in August 1919860. It was only the visible loss of the confidence 
(through a vote of no confidence) that could be conceived as the loss of parliamentary 
confidence861. 
 
Continuing with the historical framework, the second significant step in this historical 
process can be seen in the Brüning decrees of July 1930. This marks the first stage of the 
transition to the openly presidential state. Analyzing gradually this context, Brüning tried 
to pass a budget bill, which comprised a series of draft laws. Only one of these laws was 
ultimately put into vote in the Reichstag and it was outvoted (16 July). It concerned a poll 
tax to the civil servants and an additional tax (5%) to the incomes above 8.000 marks862. 
 
 While the government withdrew the rest of this bill, it passed at the same day certain 
measures of this bill through article 48 with two emergency decrees863. However, after the 
SPD (and the KPD) declared a motion for the revocation of these decrees, the Reichstag 
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voted for their revocation (18 July). The Reichstag was, then, dissolved by Hindenburg and 
elections were declared.  
 
Similar measures with those rejected by the Reichstag passed in the interim (26 July) 
through a presidential “emergency measure to remedy financial, economic and social 
crises” based on article 48864. There is an evident unconstitutional dimension here. As 
Rudolf Breitscheid, the SPD floor leader, argued when speaking for the SPD immediately 
after the emergency decrees of 16 July, the purpose of article 48 was “to help the state and 
to protect the state when need arises, not to help a particular government out of its 
predicament when it cannot find the majority it is looking for”865. It was, nevertheless, 
precisely what was happening since July 1930. 
 
 Crucially, two days later (28 July 1930), Carl Schmitt drafted an advisory opinion in 
which he justified the emergency decrees through a recourse to the second paragraph of 
article 48. He argued that they were “regulations with statutory import” (gesetzvertretende 
Verordnungen), namely he deemed them as “laws” and not “measures” 866. In this way, he 
abandoned clearly his earlier theory (seen in “On Dictatorship” and in Jena speech), 
according to which decrees are not laws. More than this, he supported publicly with his 
writings during this period the governmental practice of the invocation of a “financial 
emergency” (due to the composition of the Reichstag)867 and he was conceived as an 
“apologist of the government” 868. 
 
It should be written here, as an aside, that the governing by decrees was deployed after a 
long period in the sense that between 29 January 1925 and 16 July 1930 article 48 was 
used only for the revocation of decrees that had been issued by Ebert869.  
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Going back to the historical framework, after the elections of 14 September 1930, there 
was a huge rise of the NSDAP and a smaller one of the KPD870. The SPD was in a great 
dilemma about its political stance and it was at that time that it ultimately chose the 
toleration policy. Although this line brought the party into a grave internal crisis, there 
were three main reasons for this “toleration’’ line.  
 
Firstly, the 107 Nazi deputies and the 77 Communist deputies (following the line of social-
fascism and avoiding cooperation with the SPD) made it difficult for the Reichstag to 
function and, due to this fact, any other option would lead to a more right-wing 
government that would depend on the power of the Nazis and would, therefore, endanger 
further the democratic regime871.  
 
This also leads us to the second main reason for this “toleration” line. This is that if the 
SPD opposed the Brüning government, this would endanger the SPD-led coalition 
government in Prussia (in which the party of Brüning, the Zentrum, participated) and the 
Prussian state was the most important institutional mechanism for the preservation of 
democracy872.  
 
The third reason was the substantive consent between the Brüning government and the 
Social Democrats, which was based on the agreement that the consequences of the post-
1924 “debt economy” could be faced with an efficient austerity policy. There were 
disagreements regarding the social groups that would be more “hit” from the austerity but 
these constant differentiations did not cancel the consensus for “reforms”873. 
 
I would also add a fourth reason at a more general level. This is the whole evolutionary-
reformist stance of the SPD during Weimar. Hence, the Social Democrats did not grasp 
that the attack on the welfare state was essentially related to an attack on parliamentary-
political democracy and that their toleration would make them part of the crisis of 
representation (see also chapter 4.3). 
                                                
870The results in these elections (14 September 1930) were the following: 
 SPD 24,8%, NSDAP 18,5%, KPD 13,3%, Zentrum 11,8%, DNVP 7,1%, DVP 5,2%, German State Party 
(former DDP) 3,5%,  Bavarian People’s Party (BVP) 3,3%, Others 12,5%. 
 
871 Winkler ([2000] 2006) 441. Winkler (1990) 205-227, 210. 
872 Winkler ([2000] 2006) 441 
873Ibid. 
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Because of the SPD’s “lesser evil” strategy a significant amount of austerity measures were 
introduced based on article 48 and concerned the entire range of policies (finances, taxes, 
customs, justice, commerce)874. Indicatively, the Reichstag sat only six times during this 
overall period of more than twenty months (until its dissolution in June 1932). Between 27 
March 1931 and 8 May 1932 the Reichstag sat only twice (three days each session), 
merely in order to provide confidence to the government875. This worked ultimately in 
favor of the anti-parliamentary powers. As Rudolf Hilferding remarked in July 1931: “The 
Reichstag is a parliament against parliamentary rule, its existence is a threat to 
democracy, to the working classes, to foreign policy...”876.  
 
The second stage in this openly presidential state (reminding that the first stage began in 
July 1930) is the transition from this more “moderate” presidential regime to an openly 
anti-parliamentarian stage of the presidential regime. We could see it arising since the 
appointment of von Papen’s government (1 June 1932)877. This government was composed 
of right-wing aristocrats that none of them was member of the Reichstag878. It is significant 
that this appointment by the President Hindenburg took place while the government did not 
have the parliamentary majority. On June 4, Hindenburg dissolved the Reichstag so that 
the new government would not be “hurt” by a vote of no-confidence. So, we can see here 
the instrumental combination of articles 48, 25, 53 and 54, which were interpreted much 
closer to the categories of constitutional monarchy879.  
 
What had preceded, nevertheless, von Papen’s appointment was a twofold electoral process 
that revealed the huge crisis of political representation that was going on in a country that 
had around 6 million unemployed people at that time. The two electoral processes, which 
                                                
874The proliferation of this methodology since 1930 is visible given that, as Kolb points out, “the Reichstag 
sat on 94 days in 1930 …42 in 1931 and only 13 in 1932. 98 laws were passed in 1930; 34 in 1931, only 5 in 
1932. On the other hand the number of emergency decrees rose from 5 in 1930 to 44 in 1931 and 66 in 
1932”. 
  In Dyzenhaus (1997) 24 
  See also Rossiter (1948) 50-60 
875 Rossiter (1948) 52 
876 Winkler ([2000]2006) 444 
877Ibid. 454 
878 Ibid. 455 
879 Kessopoulos (2016) 129 
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showed the weakening of the pro-republican forces and the huge rise of the NSDAP, were 
the presidential elections and the regional elections in five states. Regarding the former, 
Hitler acquired the 36,8% percent of the votes in the second round against Hindenburg 
(now supported by the SPD as well), which took place on April 10, 1932880. Regarding the 
latter (24 April 1932), the NSDAP was the first party in all the Landtags (in Prussia among 
others) except for Bavaria881.  
 
In the aftermath of these presidential elections (at least), the strategic orientation of 
Schleicher was an anti-parliamentary government that would not need even the toleration 
of the SPD but would aim at gaining the toleration of the Nazis (in the prospect of a more 
right-wing Cabinet)882. The first step of this strategy, at the political level, was the 
agreement of Schleicher with Hitler (at a meeting in May 1932) about the removal of 
Chancellor Brüning, the lifting of the ban on the Nazi paramilitary organizations and the 
call for new elections883. All these conditions were fulfilled since Schleicher convinced 
president Hindenburg to abandon Brüning and to appoint the Catholic aristocrat and Center 
party defector von Papen. 
 
A reason for Brüning’s dismissal was that he did not manage to win something in the 
Geneva (disarmament) conference but, mainly, that he tried to ease slightly austerity and to 
enforce a policy of distributing heavily indebted land to unemployed workers either by 
private contract or in a compulsory way884. However, the Junkers reacted against this 
“Bolshevism’’, while a lot of peasants had already voted for the NSDAP given also that the 
overall policies during the crisis benefited mainly the bigger landowners885. Moreover, by 
the end of 1931 the export-oriented industry, which had cooperated with labor during 
1925-1930 and that supported Brüning, was losing its power given the decline of 
international trade and the various bank crashes886. This meant a shift in the RDI towards 
the heavy industry fraction, which was more hostile against Brüning because he continued 
to be not so harsh against labor and he promoted more the interests of the export-oriented 
                                                
880 Winkler (1990) 212-213 
881Winkler ([2000] 2006) 449-450 
882 Ibid. 451 
883  Balakrishnan (2000) 154 
Winkler ([2000] 2006) 451-452 
884 Winkler ([2000] (2006) 452 
885 Abraham ([1981]1986) 94-97, 101, 282 
886 Ibid. 159 
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industry (according to them)887.  
 
So, Brüning was delegitimized both from “below” and from “above”, which was evident in 
the aforementioned electoral processes. The reasons can be also traced to his December 
1931 emergency decree. With this decree, he reduced further the wages to their 1927 levels 
(regardless of the existing collective agreements) and he reduced also cartel prices by 
10%888. This “infuriated” both the industrialists and the workers despite that the burden for 
the workers proved to be heavier given that “the price-to wage ratio began rising again in 
late 1931”889. Moreover, unemployment was rapidly rising due to the deflationary policies.  
 
On top of this, the crisis of market economy was dealt by the state through the socialization 
of costs via decrees. Such a case was Brüning’s decision in the summer of 1931 to “save” 
with the state revenues (by quasi-nationalizing) two private banks: the bankrupt 
Darmstädter und National Bank (Danat) and the almost bankrupt Dresdner Bank890. It 
ensured also the deposits in these banks. 
 
That was due to the fact that an inaction would cause a further loss of “confidence” in the 
German banking system and capital flight891. So, this state intervention through decrees 
had two sides. On the one hand, it showed evidently the socialization of private costs while 
there was a cut on the welfare state at the same time. On the other hand, it revealed the 
potential effects of the loss of confidence in the German market economy, on which the 
whole economy and the state ultimately depended. 
 
This clear public assumption of private risks was seen in various cases892 and it culminated 
with the decrees of von Papen’s government in September 1932 that included wage cuts, 
tax-coupon credits to the capital and state bounty of 400 RM for every new worker 
employed every year893. As Abraham writes, “besides the persistent efforts of the 
agrarians to ‘socialize’ agriculture’s losses, shipbuilders, railway-equipment, 
                                                
887 Ibid. 
888 Ibid. 267. See also Braunthal  (1978) 61 
889 Abraham ([1981]1986) 267 
890  Kessopoulos  (2016) 79. See also Winkler ([2000] 2006) 444 
891 Kessopoulos (2016) 78-79 
892For various examples see Abraham ([1981] 1986) 254 
893 Ibid. 167 
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manufacturers, and automobile companies, among others, all succeeded in obtaining 
Reich and local grants, loans, and guarantees in the period after 1925 and especially after 
1929”894. 
 
Overall, Brüning's policy was summarized well by Abraham: introducing through decrees 
higher worker contributions to the insurance funds, higher indirect consumption taxes, 
lowering the benefits both in terms of duration and the amount, lowering wages and taxes 
on capital, introducing a shorter work week and lower civil-service salaries, state spending, 
housing subsidies, and cartel prices, and acting in the direction of revising reparations by 
“encouraging German exports”895.  
 
Regarding von Papen’s government, he came in June 1932 as a blatant representative of 
heavy industry and of the big landowners in favor of an anti-parliamentary and anti-labor 
logic. This is evident by the aforementioned decree in September 1932 that actually funded 
the entrepreneurs for hiring workers and, more than this, “allowed for payment of wages at 
below contract rates for new employees and ‘in case of need’” (rescinded by Schleicher 
later)896. 
 
However, von Papen’s ultimate problem was, on the one hand, that he went contrary to the 
export-oriented industry interests and, more crucially, that he did not have a popular base 
to support his plans given also the weakening of the bourgeois parties897 (they held around 
10%) and their fragmentation. This is also the time that the NSDAP started acquiring the 
support of various fractions of capital in the prospect of its participation in the government 
(since early 1932). Until that point it had only few representatives of heavy industry that 
openly supported this prospect. This support augmented hugely in the autumn of 1932 
notwithstanding that the Nazis’ “demagogic populism” remained a concern for the 
industrialists in the second half of 1932898 (see below about the Langnamverein meeting). 
 
A crucial moment also in this second stage of the presidential system was the Prussian 
                                                
894 Ibid. 
895 Ibid. 266 
896Ibid. 268 
897 Ibid. 290 
898 Ibid. 311 
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coup, namely the takeover of the SPD-led coalition (care-taker) government in July 1932. 
Regarding the official way that this removal of the Prussian government took place, it was 
through a decree based on article 48 that was issued by President Hindenburg and declared 
that Chancellor von Papen would be the commissioner for Prussia due to the “…alleged 
inability and unwillingness of Prussian’s government…to deal with the state of political 
unrest and violence in Prussia’’899. So, the official justification was the restoration of 
public security and order. Moreover, there was also the argumentation that it was the SPD-
led government in Prussia that it could not ensure the order and that it was intending “to 
conspire with the communists to act against the Nazis”900. 
 
Regarding this official narrative, it is true that the “persistent” conflict901 during the 
stability period (1924-1929) - in a Republic that was marked by the militarization of 
political conflict from its birth given also that every party had its own “auxiliaries”902- had 
turned after the Depression and the rise of the NSDAP into a catastrophic conflict in the 
neighborhoods. The SA had an ever-growing power that “rivaled the power of the 
Reichswehr (100.000)” by the end of 1929, and the membership of the NSDAP had risen 
from 108.000 to almost 1,5 million between 1928-1932903. Moreover, it is also true that 
there was an atmosphere of civil-war in the summer of 1932 in Berlin. 
 
However, this significant explosion of political violence in Prussia at that time was also 
associated with the lifting of the ban on the Nazi paramilitary organizations on June 14, 
1932 (it remained on the communist ones) by the newly-appointed Minister of Defense 
Kurt von Schleicher. The lifting of this ban, the subsequent political handling of the 
escalation of violence through the coup and the attribution of responsibility in the SPD-led 
Prussian government904 should be conceived as steps of an overall strategy, which was 
already driven by Schleicher after the outcome of the second round of the 1932 
                                                
899  Dyzenhaus, David (March 1997). ‘Legal Theory in the Collapse of Weimar: Contemporary Lessons?’, 
The American Political Science Review , 91(1), 121-134, 121 
900 Ibid. 122, 123 
901Rosenhaft (1983) 3  
902Ibid. 1-4 
903 Bracher (1971) 167, 233 
904 The excuse that gave the chance to von Papen’s government to accuse the SPD and to impose the coup 
was the “bloody Sunday of Altona” (Altonaer Blutsonntag) that took place in this communist-dominated 
suburb of Hamburg (17 July 1932). See Winkler ([2000] 2006) 456-457 
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presidential elections (at least) and was also adopted by von Papen. This strategy was to 
get rid of parliamentary politics in general and of the SPD in particular (now in Prussia) in 
order to impose an authoritarian presidential regime that would gain the confidence of the 
Nazis905. As Bracher argues, it was the “last ditch attempt [by von Papen] to strengthen the 
political base of his hopelessly isolated regime by a display of authoritarian self-
confidence which he hoped would be greeted with admiration, applause or wholesome fear, 
and thus be instrumental in winning the respect and support of National Socialist 
circles”906. 
 
This coup was crucial for the future of the Weimar Republic because the Prussian 
government- despite that it was weakened after the regional elections and had a care-taker 
role907- was the ‘‘most important base of institutional resistance to Nazi march of power’’ 
in Dyzenhaus’ words908. That’s also because Prussia was comprising over 66 percent of the 
territory, 60 percent of the population and had a police force equivalent in size to the army 
of the Reich909.  
 
Regarding the reaction of the care-taker Prussian government and of the SPD against this 
coup, it consisted in a “hasty and peaceful capitulation” that “astonished even Papen 
himself” in Bracher’s words. A statement was just made against the “Cabinet of Barons” 
                                                
905As Dyzenhaus describes this strategy, “they would then be able to crush the communists and 
simultaneously tame Hitler by drawing him within the control of an increasingly authoritarian cabinet. The 
strategy would be complete once Hitler was neutralized and the cabinet, having eliminated all internal 
opposition and obstacles (including the Reichstag) ruled Germany by decree”. 
   Dyzenhaus (March 1997) 121-134, 123 
906 Bracher (1971) 175 
907The coalition in Prussia was comprised by the SPD, the Zentrum and the left-liberal Deutsche Staatspartei 
(the old DDP). However, in the Landtag elections of 24 April 1932 there was a rise of the Nazis, which 
controlled around 200 seats along with the German Nationalists, whereas the coalition between the SPD and 
the Centre party held 160 seats and the Communists 57.  
The existing governing coalition had, nevertheless, changed the electoral law twelve days before the 
elections because it was expecting the rise of the Nazis and introduced the requirement of absolute 
parliamentary majority in order to have a change of the government. So, given the inability of forming a new 
government after the elections of April 1932, the old coalition government continued to operate as a caretaker 
government.  
 Dyzenhaus (1997) 30-31  
 Dyzenhaus (March 1997) 121-134, 124 
908  Dyzenhaus (March 1997) 121-134, 122 
909 Thornhill & Seitzer  (2008) 1-50, 22 
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(writing that this Cabinet would be held accountable in the elections of 31 July 1932) and 
the constitutional validity of the decree was challenged before the Court 
(Staatsgerichtshof)910. 
 
The reason for the no-resistance decision was the commitment of the Social Democrats to 
the road of “legality”911 but mainly the estimation both of the SPD and of the ADGB that 
an active resistance in the form of a strike would be defeated in a civil war given their 
(already) weakened political powers and the great fragmentation of the working class due 
to the huge unemployment912. So, they feared that in a civil war, the Prussian police and 
the “democratic” paramilitary powers (Reichsbanner, Iron Front) would be weaker 
compared with the Reichswehr and the paramilitary far-right and Nazi organizations (SA, 
SS, Stalhelm), taking as well into consideration the lack of a united front between the 
communists and the Social Democrats913.  
 
So, on the one hand, there was a separatist stance by the KPD and, on the other hand, a 
“defeatist” strategy of Social Democracy and of the ADGB that aimed continuously to 
avoid the worst, namely the civil war, in an already weakened democracy. Regarding the 
latter, this can be seen also practically in the rejection of the KPD’s proposal for a general 
protest strike in the aftermath of the coup and in the declaration of the head of the ADGB 
(Legien) that what had to be done now was to ensure that “the Reichstag elections 
scheduled for 31 July take place in a calm atmosphere”914. As an aside, this stance of the 
ADGB (that is also related to its economistic-reformist logic, see chapter 4.3.) could be 
also seen later by the fact it never called for a strike after Hitler’s seizure of power despite 
the pressure both from the KPD and by militant union cadres915.  
 
This overall picture showed an enfeebled democracy. This was also revealed in the 
                                                
910 Bracher (1971) 176 
911 Dyzenhaus (March 1997) 121-134, 124 
912 Winkler ([2000] 2006) 456-458 
913Winkler ([2000] 2006) 457 
 Braunthal (1978) 67 
914In Fowkes (2014) 112-113.  
Winkler argues, nevertheless, that the KPD’s proposal was only a “rhetorical question”. Ibid. 457 
915Braunthal (1978) 75-82  
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elections of 31 July given that the result showed the further weakening of the pro-
republican forces916. Moreover, this picture can be also seen in the decision of the 
Staatsgerichtshof (25 October) regarding the Prussian coup. This decision was Solomonic 
and would not be able to ‘‘save’’ the Weimar Constitution and the Republic as Kelsen 
wrote917. Whereas it recognized Prussian’s constitutionally independent status, at the same 
time it gave to the Reich government the permission to intervene in the internal affairs of 
Prussia for the restoration of public order and security according to the discretion of the 
President918. 
 
We can agree, therefore, with Bracher’s conclusion that the no-resistance decision was 
ultimately “…a sign of the rapidly dwindling strength of the forces of democracy and of 
the imminence of their defeat at the hands of authoritarianism and subsequently of 
totalitarianism…however one feels about the effectiveness of political strikes, this first 
20th of July certainly encouraged the more ambitious plans of the National Socialists and 
the later policies of the Third Reich”919.  
 
This conclusion of Bracher seems congruent with the bigger picture of this historical 
context, which is that there was a series of “no-return” points for the Republic in this 
process of authoritarian restructuring of the state by the elites among which the Prussian 
coup constituted an important step in an already weakened democracy.  On the contrary, as 
we could see, what was never an option during this crisis was the parliamentary 
alternative920 (see also below about Schleicher’s effort). This fact played a role in this 
general crisis of representation. 
 
 
5.5.2. Between dictatorship and Nazi’s ascent to power: Schmitt the advisor 
 
                                                
916The results of the general election were the following: NSDAP 37,4%, SPD 21,6%, KPD 14,3%, Zentrum 
12,5%, DNVP 5,9%, Deutsche Staatspartei 1%, NVP 1,2%, Bayerische Volkspartei (BVP) 3,2 %. 
917Dyzenhaus (March 1997) 128 
918  Dyzenhaus (March 1997) 121-134, 124 
919 Bracher (1971) 176 
920 Ibid. 
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The historical account, which depicts the aforementioned “no-return” points, shows the 
ever-growing crisis of representation in this restructuring process and that the political and 
ideological environment circumscribed the available potential ways out of the crisis. This 
is revealed in Winkler’s argument that “the final alternative to a Hitler government would 
have been a more or less disguised military dictatorship…by 1932/1933 a return to 
parliamentary democracy was no longer an option: the majority of voters had decided 
against Weimar”921. Although Winkler slightly “smoothened” his argumentation in his 
book “The Long Road West”, the alternatives that were discussed during these times were 
very limited.  
 
These alternatives, from the perspective of governing elites, were discussed often with the 
active participation of Carl Schmitt as an advisor. After the Prussian coup, Schmitt was the 
“Crown Jurist” of the regime922. An anti-constitutional alternative, which was about to be 
enforced (at least) three times since late August 1932, was the declaration of a state of 
emergency along with the indefinite postponing of the elections923. This was actually what, 
according to Huber’s testimony (Schmitt’s student and colleague), was suggested by Carl 
Schmitt regarding the first time that this plan was about to be enforced in late August 
1932924. However, this plan was never enforced given that, prior to its declaration and the 
                                                
921 Winkler (1990) 205-227, 215 
922 Mehring ([2009] 2014) 263 
923 This plan was proposed for the first time during late August and was initially agreed at Hindenburg’s East 
Prussian estate (Neudeck) after von Papen and Wilhelm von Gayl (the Minister of Interior) convinced 
Hindenburg for its implementation. Hindenburg signed the dissolution of the Reichstag on August 30, 1932 
with a blanket authorization, namely without mentioning a concrete date of elections. However this plan was 
never enforced (see in the main text about the reasons). 
The second attempt took place after the November elections by Hindenburg himself after his talk with Hitler 
“convinced” him that there was no other option. However, he changed his mind after Schleicher (the Minister 
of Defence) warned the government that the Reichswehr would fight on two fronts at the same time in case 
of such an emergency plan: against the Nazi-affiliated paramilitary organization and against the communist 
ones. As a result, it would lose. 
The third one was suggested on January 16, 1933 by the last chancellor (Schleicher) and was rejected by 
Hindenburg. 
 Winkler ([2000] 2006) 464, 469-489 
924 As Mehring describes the details of this process, Schmitt “summoned Huber and sent him to Berlin” in 
order to meet in late August of 1932 three high-ranking officers (Ott, Böhme, Carlowitz) and “agree with 
them the legal-technical formulation of presidential emergency decrees and the wording of a justificatory 
appeal to the nation”- while Schmitt was in Plettenberg. 
Mehring ([2009] 2014) 261-262. 
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subsequent dissolution of the Reichstag, the Reichstag immediately proceeded to a vote on 
a motion of no confidence with a humiliating result for the government because the 
Reichstag wanted to avoid its dissolution925 (12 September 1932). So, the government 
changed its mind and elections were scheduled on November, 6, 1932. 
 
Although some months later Schmitt seemed to have considered this plan as already 
“hopeless” (6 November 1932)926, Schmitt and Huber had suggested in August 1932 that 
the elections could be postponed indefinitely since there was a “genuine state of 
emergency”927 due to the “necessity of pacifying radical paramilitary forces and the 
overall condition of the nation”928.  
 
This was justified on the grounds that both article 48 and the presidential oath to defend 
the Constitution trumped article 25 of the Constitution: “the substance of the constitution 
could only be defended if its electoral provision was sacrificed”929. Moreover, this plan 
also concerned the possible prohibition of political parties and the centralization of police 
powers930.  
 
Although Schmitt denies in the post-war period his involvement in any emergency 
scenario931, the President of the Zentrum Kaas publicly accused Schmitt as “lying” behind 
this plan at the theoretical level. This is brought to light in the open letter that Kaas sent to 
the Chancellor Schleicher on January 26, 1933 in which he argued against the possibility 
of the unconstitutional indefinite postponing of elections and warned him against the 
“basic tendency that Carl Schmitt and his followers have toward the relativization of the 
entire public law”932. 
 
However, Kaas probably refers here to the “milder” emergency scenario (compared with 
the August one) that was suggested by Schmitt and was added as an excursus at the crucial 
                                                                                                                                              
See also Kennedy (2004) 166 
925See Mehring ([2009] 2014) 262 
926 In Kennedy (2004) 167  
927 In Ibid. 166. See also Mehring ([2009] 2014), 261-262 
928 Kennedy (2004) 166 
929 In Ibid. 
930 Mehring [2009] (2014) 262 
931Schmitt ([1958] 2004) 100 
932In Ibid. 
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Cabinet meeting of 16 January 1933 under Schleicher’s chancellorship after the latter’s 
‘‘Querfront’’ plan had failed.  
 
Before presenting Schmitt’s advice, it is crucial to make a short digression to the 
presentation of the “Querfront” plan given that this was a plan through which Schleicher 
convinced Hindenburg to “give” him the chancellorship (on December 3, 1932) after the 
“negative majority” of the November elections933 and after he had convinced Hindenburg 
also about the dangerousness of the dictatorship. 
 
Schleicher’s Querfront plan aimed to win the “toleration” of the Reichstag based on a 
national “revolutionary” front (Querfront) extending from the left-wing of National 
Socialists under Strasser, to the Catholic parties, and to the Social Democrats and its 
unions behind an avant-la-lettre Keynesian program of public work projects. This plan 
would aim at reducing unemployment and would be also more “friendly” to labor (e.g. 
rescind of Papen emergency cuts of September 1932). However, this plan failed due to the 
lack of an independent social and political base. 
 
Firstly, at the political level, the plan for the split of the NSDAP was not successful934. 
Moreover, at the social level, Schleicher’s Querfront was opposed by the fractions of 
industry and agriculture. They “feared” that this would drive things back to 
parliamentarism, which they opposed by declaring that “organized labor and political 
democracy were the culprits”935. It was, crucially, this political fear of a return to 
parliamentarism and to the social-democratic reformism that also led to a more active 
endorsement of the NSDAP by industrialists in the autumn of 1932936. This is seen 
particularly in the Langnamverein convention of November 1932, which was the 
convention of heavy industry. It is indicative that this convention, whereas it was organized 
initially so as to show its support for von Papen and his program, it ended up by expressing 
“…overwhelming support for the appointment of Hitler”937. So, the NSDAP had already 
started to unify not only the various social strata that had abandoned the traditional 
                                                
933 The results in these elections of 6 November 1932 were the following: NSDAP 33,1%, SPD 20,4%, KPD 
16,9%, Zentrum 11,9%, DNVP 8,9%, BVP 3,1%, DVP 1,9%, Others 1%),  
   Winkler  ([2000] 2006) 468 
934 For details see Winkler ([2000] 2006) 476 
935Abraham ([1981]1986) 169 
936Ibid. 312 
937 Ibid. 
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bourgeois parties938 (see also above about the Mittlestand and small peasants) but also the 
dominant social classes.  
 
Secondly, despite that the President of the ADGB Theodor Leipart affirmed his agreement 
for a ‘‘ceasefire’’ in case Schleicher was appointed as a chancellor after the latter’s promise 
that he would revoke Papen’s September decree and that he would initiate an employment 
policy939, the SPD had now changed its mind from the toleration policy that kept during 
Brüning’s regime. This change of the SPD has to do with Schleicher’s overall 
machinations since the earlier times940.  
 
After this digression and going back to the alternative emergency proposal after 
Schleicher’s “Querfront” plan had failed in December 1932, it should be reminded that this 
alternative proposal aimed at preventing Schleicher’s plan for a formal declaration of a 
state of emergency (namely the indefinite postponing of the elections and the dissolution of 
the Reichstag). The origin of the alternative emergency proposal, which was presented at 
the Cabinet meeting of 16 January 1933, is not entirely clear. It seems to have been drafted 
either by Horst Michael under Schmitt’s direct influence during mid-1932941 or by Schmitt 
himself and sent indirectly through Michael and Bracht in Schmitt’s effort to gain direct 
influence during Schleicher’s chancellorship942. This paper tried to answer to the question: 
“how can an effective presidential government by protected from an incompetent and 
obstructionism Reichstag, with the goal of defending the Constitution”943? 
 
According to Mehring, Schmitt tried in this paper to advise Schleicher not to proceed to a 
formal declaration of emergency but in a “juridically less controversial way of proceeding- 
i.e. non-acceptance of a vote of no confidence and confirmation of his government by the 
                                                
938 Ibid. 314 
939 About the willing of the ADGB to cooperate during these times (some chiefs were even prepared to meet 
with Nazi officials in the context of Schleicher’s proposal) and the frictions with the SPD see Braunthal 
(1978) 71-74 
See also Winkler [2000] (2006) 474 
940According to Winkler, the stance of the SPD and of the Zentrum at the end of January 1933 was as if they 
conceived Schleicher as a bigger threat than Hitler. Winkler ([2000]2006) 484 
See also Braunthal (1978) 73-74 
941 Kennedy (2004) 168 
942Mehring ([2009] 2014) 270 
943 Kennedy (2004) 168 
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Reichspräsident”944. This would seem less a breach of the constitution than Schleicher’s 
state of emergency as Schmitt argued945.  
 
We can see also that this was not very far from Schmitt’s theoretical proposal in 
“Constitutional Theory”, according to which the interpretation of article 54 of the 
Constitution demanded that a government should resign only “if there is an express, so-
called ‘positive’ parliamentary vote of no-confidence” under this “partisan composition of 
the parliament”946. This should be seen in the light of his critique to Weimar 
parliamentarism (see 5.4). 
 
However, Schleicher ignored Schmitt’s suggestion and proposed the formal declaration of 
emergency, which failed to convince Hindenburg after the democratic parties “voiced their 
opposition” (e.g. the Zentrum)947. The other option, which was not discussed seriously 
even as an alternative option at the political level but could also be deduced at a theoretical 
level from Schmitt’s “Legality and Legitimacy” (see the next section), was an emergency 
ban on the “extremist parties” (NSDAP, KPD). Schmitt’s explicit wording in this work was 
that the President should deny handing the government to parties that would use legal 
means to close the “door of legality” and would, therefore, violate the principle of “equal 
chance”948. This was based on a “substantive” concept of legality (as opposed to a 
“functionalist” one)949. 
 
After the rejection of these options, the very old Hindenburg handed the chancellorship to 
Hitler on January, 30 1933. That was, among others, due to the fear of “civil strife”950 and 
of his indictment951 (in case a state of emergency was enforced) along with the pressure 
from various political952, powerful economic actors (see also above) and personal 
                                                
944 Mehring ([2009] 2014 270-271 
945 Ibid. 271 
946 Schmitt ([1928] 2008) 364-366 
947 Kennedy (2004) 168 
948Schmitt, Carl ([1932] 2004). Legally and Legitimacy, Durham: Duke University Press, 30-31. 
949Schmitt ([1958] 2004) 95-101, 100 
950 Winkler ([2000] 2006) 475 
951 Mehring ([2009] 2014) 271 
952In the open letter to the Chancellor Schleicher on January 26, 1933, the Prelate Kaas argued for a 
government resulting from “workable governmental combinations”, namely the appointment of Hitler.  
In Schmitt ([1958] 2004) 95-101, 100-101 
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reasons953. It was also the naïve thought that Hitler could be neutralized by the 
predominance of conservative ministers in the Cabinet954.  
 
This made as well a contrast with the context of August 1932, when Hindenburg had 
rejected rapidly Schleicher’s and von Papen’s proposal for a coalition government with 
Hitler as a chancellor955. Hence, Winkler argued that Hindenburg’s decision was neither an 
“inevitable result” nor an “accidental”956 option.  
 
Whereas the not “inevitable result” was seen in the previous paragraph, the “not 
accidental” option has to do with the (already presented) crisis of representation. This 
conclusion goes evidently against the conservative conclusion that “constitutional 
democracy was defenseless and gave itself up”957. As Caldwell critically adds, this 
“hypostatizes what was an unstable entity and not a coherent subject...that historiography 
obscures the way one conception of constitutional democracy, associated with Carl Schmitt 
and Chancellor von Papen, undermined other aspects of the Weimar Constitution, and thus 
laid the groundwork for the Nazi takeover”958. 
 
Writing along similar conservative lines in his post-war analysis about the fall of the 
Weimar Republic, Carl Schmitt put the blame for the Nazi seizure of power on the 
adherence to – what he called- a “functionalist” and “value neutralized” conception of the 
                                                
953 The personal reason was the revelation of the Osthilfeskandal (Eastern aid scandal), namely the scandal 
about the misappropriation of the financial support from public funds to heavily indebted estates in East 
Prussia, which was destined to the reprofiling of their debts.  
The scandal was that these funds had been wasted by the Junkers in luxury cars, horses and vacations in 
Riviera. These investigations, which were perpetrated by the budget committee, implicated some of 
Hindenburg’s close friends and fellow landowners. They also implicated Hindenburg himself because it was 
revealed that the Hindenburg estate in East Prussia at Neudeck had been bought and donated as a gift to him 
by German industrialists in 1927 and that it had been officially registered in his son's name in order to 
eschew death-duties. 
 Since these investigations were continued by the budget committee of the Reichstag, Hindenburg felt that 
Schleicher did not protect him and, more than that, Hindenburg’s friends were also pushing for the fall of 
Schleicher and the handing of chancellorship to Hitler. 
  Winkler ([2000] (2006) 485-489     
954 Ibid. 489 
955 Ibid. 461 
956Ibid. 489 
957 Caldwell (1997) 11 
958 Ibid. 11-12 
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Weimar Constitution959. To put it briefly, Schmitt argued that the political system remained 
within the formalist parliamentary legality and that’s why it gave the power to Hitler. On 
the contrary, according to Schmitt’s post-war argumentation, there were still inexhaustible 
“legal possibilities” of the Weimar Constitution, one of which was the dissolution of the 
Reichstag joined with a (third) call for elections960.  
 
Regardless of the fact that such a proposal cannot be traced during Schmitt’s Weimar 
writings, I think that- despite that the handing of power to Hitler was not inevitable961, the 
hyperbolic emphasis on the very last period and on the final decision loses the picture of 
the overall crisis of representation. That’s because it obscures the picture of the “origins” 
of this weakening of the Weimar Republic especially during the period between 1930-
1932, which was the time that the crisis of representation was created. This picture can be 
revealed only through the analysis of this whole period (the two “no-return” phases of the 
crisis etc.). However, this analysis is concealed by Schmitt.  
 
Secondly, among those “responsible”- from the perspective of constitutional theory- for 
Weimar’s fall Schmitt’s constitutional theory figures in a prevalent position given that he 
legitimized the authoritarian restructuring of the state through the invocation of a 
“financial state of exception” (see above) and his political practice. The role of the 
President in overstepping the Reichstag was crucial in the inability of “political 
democracy” to resist the power of capital, which wanted to overcome the crisis on its own 
terms. 
 
In this sense, although Schmitt’s post-war narrative is not entirely “accurate” regarding his 
stance, it seems to be mostly consistent with his political “practice” in Weimar. That’s 
because he conceived the origins of the crisis in “formal” constitutional democracy but 
without being pro the Nazis962.   
                                                
959 Schmitt ([1958] 2004) 93 
960 Ibid. 
961 Winkler discusses some possible alternatives (e.g. the maintenance of Schleicher and/or the option of a 
(third) call for elections and/or for a “Supra-Partes” chancellor) by showing that it was also Hindenburg’s 
political choice to hand the power to Hitler.  
 Winkler ([2000] 2006) 487-490 
962 Schmitt had argued that vote for the Nazis in the forthcoming elections was “courting disaster…Anyone 
who allows the National Socialists to obtain the majority on 31 July…gives this ideologically and politically 
immature movement the possibility of changing the Constitution, introducing a state church, dissolving the 
unions etc…”. 
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I will explore now in more depth how Schmitt’s theory during the crisis of the Weimar 
Republic is related to his political practice. 
 
5.5.3. Schmitt’s response to the Weimar crisis 
 
After I have analyzed Schmitt’s account of the “problems” of Weimar in his works during 
the 1920s and his “practical” suggestions during the last period of the crisis, I will analyze 
now Schmitt’s theory during this whole period of the Weimar crisis (1931-1933).  
 
Schmitt’s theory can be seen mainly from his works published during that era and mainly 
from his “Guardian of the Constitution” (1931), “Legality and Legitimacy” (excerpts of 
which were published on July 10, 1932), and from the speech that he delivered before the 
industrialist conference in November 1932. A second source is his defense of the federal 
government's actions before the Court regarding the Prussian coup given that he was the 
main attorney of the Reich. The only period, for which there is less evidence about 
Schmitt’s role and position was during Schleicher’s chancellorship963 apart from the 
emergency plan that he proposed (as already seen) and his despair about Schleicher’s 
resignation from chancellorship (27 January 1933) and the imminent handing of power to 
Hitler964.  
 
Unraveling Schmitt’s theoretical argumentation, albeit it entails contradictions and “grey 
zones”, it moves mainly in a two-fold direction: anti-NSDAP and, simultaneously, 
authoritarian965. Starting from the former direction, this is deduced, firstly, from his 
practical stance during Weimar (seen above). Secondly, this can be also based theoretically 
on his critique in “Legality and Legitimacy” against the “equal chance” of every party to 
acquire the parliamentary majority through a “numerical”-functionalist concept of the 
                                                                                                                                              
Carl Schmitt, “Der Missbrauch der Legalität”, Täglichen Rundschau, 19 July 1932 in Balakrishnan (2000) 
156 
963Mehring argues that, at the level of political practice, Schmitt was de-activated during Schleicher’s 
chancellorship since Schleicher had excluded him (whereas he was more active during von Papen’s regime).  
 Mehring ([2009]2014) 269-271 
964See Balakrishnan (2000) 174 
965 This is also the opinion of Mehring ([2009] 2014) 271 
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Constitution. That would be, as he wrote, to “use legal means to close the door to 
legality”, through which they themselves entered, and to treat partisan opponents like 
common criminals, who are then perhaps reduced to kicking their boots against the locked 
door…The majority is now suddenly no longer a party; it is the state itself”966. 
 
This argumentation, which legitimized theoretically an executive ban on the parties that 
professed their enmity towards the Constitution (like the National Socialists and the 
Communists)967, is related to Schmitt’s conception since “Constitutional Theory” that there 
is an unalterable “higher” substantive constitution that is based not on any individual 
provision but on the constitutional system as a whole. This concept of the constitution 
prevents from such a “National Socialist or Bolshevik, the godless or other”968 
transformation that could take place either through a simple parliamentary majority (51%) 
or through the augmented parliamentary majority (two thirds) based on a “neutral” reading 
of article 76 of the Weimar Constitution969. Such an interpretation of article 76 would fall 
again, according to Schmitt, into the logic of a quantitative-functionalist concept of the 
Constitution970 that gives an indiscriminate equal chance “for all contents, goals and 
drives”971 and it could lead to a “system suicide”972.  
 
Against this “suicide”, the “substantive” constitution embodies “fundamental principles”, 
which are identified by Schmitt at a conceptual level with the concept of “super-legality” 
that the French institutionalist Maurice Hauriou used973. Here the theory of Hauriou - who 
would be called in the “Three Types of Juristic Thought’’ his “elder brother”974- is not 
extensively developed but is a significant addition to Schmitt’s earlier distinction between 
the ‘‘political’’ constitution and the “formal” constitutional laws in ‘‘Constitutional 
                                                
966 Schmitt ([1932] 2004) 30-31 
967 McCormick, John (2004). ‘Introduction’ in Carl Schmitt Legality and Legitimacy, Durham: Duke 
University Press, xix 
968 Schmitt ([1932] 2004) 48 
969See article 76 in the Weimar Constitution ([1919] 2008) 409-440, 421  
970Schmitt ([1932] 2004) 40 
971 Ibid. 93 
972 Ibid. 48 
973 Ibid. 58 
974  See Croce & Salvatore (2013) 55, 103-104 
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Theory’’. 
 
With the use of this concept of super-legality, Schmitt appears at a first glance almost as a 
precursor of “militant democracy”975 as it was legislated in the eternity clause of the Basic 
Law in 1949976 (article 79, paragraph 3). Without delving further into the “militant 
democracy” principle here, this anti-NSDAP direction is only half of the picture regarding  
Schmitt’s constitutional theory.  
 
The other half of the truth is that, in line with his historical account, the German jurist 
conceives as a structural problem of constitutional democracy not only the “equal chance” 
that is provided to its enemies but also the pluralist Parteienstaat. This direction, which 
was a permanent Schmittian trait during the 1920s, can be seen in Schmitt’s defense of the 
federal government's actions before the Staatsgerichtshof (in October 1932).  
 
He argued that the intervention of the Reich government in Prussia through a presidential 
decree is justified because (among other reasons) only a President is independent from 
partisan politics and capable of dealing with the “enemies”. On the contrary, a government 
that enjoys a mandate from the regional parliament is problematic given that it is supported 
by political parties. This means, according to Schmitt, that it carries the danger of 
occupying the “state” and, therefore, of coming in conflict with the autonomy of the Land 
as well977.  
 
In this vein, he declared that the biggest danger both for the federal system and for the 
autonomy of the Land is that “tightly organized and centralized political parties that cross 
the boundaries of the several Länder may attempt to occupy a Land and to put its agents 
and servants into the government of a Land….and thus come to endanger the autonomy of 
the Land.... Now, if such a case occurs…and if the president of the Reich sees himself 
                                                
975This is a term coined by Karl Lowenstein. See Lowenstein, Karl (1937). ‘Militant Democracy and 
Fundamental Rights’ American Political Science Review, 31, 417-432. 
976Olivier Jouanjan argues- by citing Maunz's and Dürig’s commentary on article 79 of the Basic Law- that 
this provision was to an extent “une réception de la théorie de Carl Schmitt”.  
 
 Jouanjan, Olivier (1994). ‘Révision de la Constitution et Justice Constitutionnelle- République Fédérale 
d’Allemagne’, Annuaire International de Justice Constitutionnelle, X, 229-244, 232-233 
977 Schmitt, Carl ([1932] 2015). ‘Prussia contra Reich: Schmitt’s Closing Statement in Leipzig’ in Vinx, Lars 
(ed.) The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 222-227 
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forced to take action, then this is not at all in conflict with the autonomy of the Land…”978. 
 
This attack on political parties is even more visible in Schmitt’s purely theoretical writings, 
which declare the aim of protection of the Constitution from a “functionalist”-weakening 
conception. In line with his argumentation in the “Crisis of Parliamentarism”, he argues 
now that the danger to Weimar’s politics comes from the political parties, which are based 
on a solid organization, “influential bureaucracies, a standing army of paid functionaries, 
and a whole system of organizations of held and support, that bind together an 
intellectually, socially and economically captive clientele. The extension to all spheres of 
human existence, the abolition of the liberal separations and neutralizations of different 
spheres like religion, economy, and education, with one word: what we previously referred 
to as the turn to the ‘total’, has already been realized, to some extent, for a part of the 
citizenry by several organizational complexes in society”979.  
So, here we have an obvious association of two issues. The first is a radicalized Weberian 
picture of the political system. This picture of the Parteienstaat is, crucially, related to a 
second issue: the tracing of the 20th century “total state” that finds expression mainly in 
this pluralistic Parteienstaat and hollows Schmitt’s ideal conception of parliament.  
As he put it, “a pluralist Parteienstaat becomes ‘total’ out of weakness, not out of strength 
and power. The state intervenes in every area of life because it must fulfill the claims of all 
interested parties. It must especially become involved in the area of economy, which until 
now was free of state interference, even if it forgoes any leadership in and political 
influence in the economy”980.  
However, Schmitt argues that a backward move to the liberal-neutral state of the 19th 
century (in which there was a distinction between the state and civil society) is impossible 
mainly due to the change of the state-economy relationship981. As he argues, “what is 
                                                
978His “applied” example was the change of the electoral law in Prussia before the regional elections in April 
1932 (see above). According to Schmitt, this is an example of a case where the principle of “equal chance” is 
not valid any more. So, this is not an objective, independent and, therefore legitimate, authority but a 
government “occupied” by a party that dominates another party.  
  Moreover, he argued that the care-taker government was not aligned with the political line of the Reich 
since it was indirectly dependent on the toleration of the Communists in the Prussian Landtag (in order to 
remain as care-taker), who constituted a threat to the public order and security in contrast with the Nazis.  
Ibid. 225 
979Schmitt ([1931] 2015) 137  
980 Schmitt (1932 2004) 92 
981Schmitt ([1931] 2015) 133-135 
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decisive here for constitutional theory and the theory of the state is that the relation of the 
state to the economy is the real issue behind all contemporary problems in domestic 
politics, and that the accustomed formulas of the old state, which was based on the 
distinction between state and society serves only to conceal this fact…These can no longer 
be answered with the old liberal principle of unconditional non-interference, of absolute 
non-intervention”982. 
His solution in the contemporary condition of the “total state” is, therefore, clear: there is a 
need for a “stable authority in order to move ahead the necessary depoliticizations and to 
reestablish free spheres and living spaces from within itself”983.  
This is Schmitt’s “qualitative total state”, namely a meta-political state, but at the same 
time, as Schmitt argued, “… an especially strong state. It is total in the sense of quality and 
energy. The fascist state calls itself stato totalitario......It does not contemplate 
surrendering new powers of coercion to its own enemies and destroyers, thus burying its 
power under such formulae as liberalism, rule of law, etc. It can discern between friends 
and enemies. In this sense, as has been said, every true state is, and always has been, a 
total state”984. 
Schmitt proceeded also to an association of his substantive concept of the constitution with 
the institutionalist method in order to defend more clearly his concept of the strong total 
state (as opposed to the “functionalist” conception of the Constitution and to the weak 
state). Analyzing this, Schmitt’s institutionalism is, firstly, state-centered and it goes along 
with his decisionism as it also evident in his 1932 phrase that the sovereign is the one that 
“interprets, defines and applies the concepts”985.  
 
Secondly, it explicitly includes a concrete socio-economic organization through the 
discourse of “guarantees”. Based on this discourse (that was also seen to an extent in 
                                                
982Ibid 134 
983Schmitt ([1932] 2004) 90 
984Schmitt, Carl ([1932] 1998). ‘Appendix: Strong State, Sound [or healthy] Economy: An Address to 
Business Leaders’ in Cristi, R.(ed.) Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism, Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 212-232, 217 
985See Loughlin, Martin (2014). ‘Politonomy’ in Meierhenrich, J. & Simons, O. ( eds.) The Oxford Handbook 
of Carl Schmitt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 6, from Schmitt ([1932]1988). “Völkerrechtliche Formen 
des modernen Imperialismus.” In Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar—Genf—Versailles 1923–
1939, 2d ed., 162–180. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 
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“Constitutional Theory”) Schmitt counterposes the First Part of the Constitution986 (that he 
conceives as value “neutral”) with the “inner logical consistency” of the Second Part that 
embodies “fundamental values”. These values are identified with the “substantive 
capacities and characteristics of the German people”987. The focal point now is that this- 
with Schmitt’s words- “inner logical consistency” of the Second Part of the Constitution is 
mainly identified with three- as he calls them- “substantive constitutional guarantees”. It is 
property, family and religion988.  
 
Based on this analysis, Schmitt traces a- with his words- “structural contradiction” 
between the “value neutrality” of the First Part of the Constitution (namely the 
parliamentary legislative state) and the “substantive constitutional guarantees”989. Hence, 
here we have a clear shift to institutionalism against the organizational part of the 
constitution through a mostly liberal reading of the Second Part of the Weimar 
Constitution. 
 
 This legitimizes the Presidential regime in the sense that, on the one hand, a series of 
“guarantees” cannot be abrogated by parliamentary laws and, secondly, the President can 
govern through “measures”. The point regarding measures was evident through his 
ultimate argumentation that “in practice…the non-distinction of statute and measure will 
probably develop at the level of measure. The dictator better conforms to the essence of the 
administrative state, which manifests itself in the practice of measures, than a parliament 
that is separated from the executive and whose competence consists in making general, 
pre-established and enduring norms’’990.   
 
So, it is visible that Schmitt’s decisionism and institutionalism go hand in hand in order to 
respond to the parliamentary “total” state that intervenes in the economy. The tasks of 
Schmitt’s “qualitative total state” become clear in Schmitt’s lecture before the Rhineland 
industrialists (23 November 1932) with the indicative title “Strong State, Sound [or 
                                                
986 Schmitt ([1932] 2004) 46 
987 Ibid. 94 
988 Ibid. 46-47 
989 Ibid. 45 
990 Ibid. 82-83  
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healthy] economy”991. In this lecture, he argues that the important question is “how can one 
today render the distinction between state and economy effective?” and he answers that 
“only a strong state can depoliticize...depoliticization is a political act in an immense 
way”992.  
 
So, viewing this speech in combination with “Legality and Legitimacy”, we can see that, 
whereas during his 1920s writings his argument for “general” laws was going along with a 
“purely” political State and constitution- against the effort of the Left to intervene through 
the Reichstag in the economy- he substantively argues now for a state that will depoliticize 
through “measures” and “guarantees”.  
 
This leads us to a final remark before the conclusion, which is that in this speech Schmitt 
introduced also a new element in his analysis. He argues that “today one can no longer 
oppose the state with the private individual, the private entrepreneur.. In opposition to the 
collective image of the modern state it is necessary to insert an intermediate domain 
between the state and the singular individual…”993.  It is visible from this excerpt that the 
two-fold antithesis between the state and the individual should be replaced with a three-
fold one, where the third is the “autonomous economic administration”, which is non-state 
“but still public sphere”. This economic autonomous administration is further defined as 
“...completely different from the ‘economic democracy…that economic democracy 
explicitly espoused a mixture of economics and politics; By contrast when I refer here to 
economic autonomous administration…I mean something different, something that aims at 
a distinction and a separation…There is an economic sphere that belongs to the public 
interest and should be not seen as separate from it. Still this is non-state domain that can 
be organized and administered by the same business agents, as it happens in any genuine 
autonomous administration”994.  
 
So, it is clear that Schmitt here takes into account the Weimar state of organized capitalism 
and of associations995. Moreover, it is visible that Schmitt’s sphere of “autonomous 
                                                
991 According to Abraham, this had been the slogan of these industrialists already in 1928. Abraham ([1981] 
1986) 133  
992Schmitt ([1932] 1998) 212-232, 226-227 
993 Ibid. 224 
994 Ibid. 225-227 
995Indicatively, he refers to chambers, monopolies, mixed economic enterprises and the fact that the state 
appears as economic agent both in public law and in private law terms. 
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economic organization” is a countermove to the Weimar extension of political democracy 
into the workplace in the sense that suggests the extension of the economic logic into the 
political sphere but through the action of the State. This is the only way in which a “new 
order”996 can be born as he argued.   
 
However, this third sphere is not further defined. On the one hand, Cristi argues that this 
sphere “has affinities both to the professional order suggested by Pius XI in Quadragesimo 
Anno (1991) and to the fascist corporate order”997. If this interpretation is correct, this is 
where we can trace the first clear fascist elements of Schmitt’s thought as solutions to the 
problems seen in Weimar organized capitalism. This is Cristi’s interpretation. 
 
The alternative is that this authoritarian order corresponds to “the letter [of] the German 
ordoliberal programme”998. This is a big debate given, firstly, that Schmitt does not define 
further what he means with this term of “autonomous economic administration” and, 
secondly, it has also to do with what ordoliberalism means999. It suffices at this stage to be 
written that, whereas ordoliberalism was a theory that flourished in post-war Germany, the 
account of the founding ordoliberals is similar to Schmitt’s analysis regarding the problems 
of the Weimar state. As Bonefeld writes “they perceived Nazis, as the consequence of the 
democratic character of late Weimar Republic...the distinctive character of their founding 
texts in 1932 is that they define the economic crisis as a crisis of democratic disorder and 
call for the strong state to curtail democracy as a precondition of liberal economy”1000. 
More than this, some of them make explicit reference to Schmitt (Eucken more clearly and 
                                                                                                                                              
Ibid. 226 
996 Ibid. 
997 Cristi ((1998) 202 
998 Kelly (2003) 253 
999Joerges objects to Schmitt’s identification with ordoliberalism. Regarding Schmitt’s speech “Strong State-
Free Economy” he writes that “What Heller describes is an economic emergency. This is why he 
discusses…Schmitt’s infamous talks on the “strong state and the healthy economy”. There are affinities in 
this talk with an interventionism establishing market mechanisms. But Schmitt’s proclamation of a strong 
state with unfettered powers, on the one hand, and a depoliticized economy which is obedient to 
authoritarian commands, on the other, can hardly be understood as a promotion of the ordoliberal agenda. 
Schmitt’s plea for political decisions which depoliticize the economy, and his polemics against 
‘Wirtschaftsdemokratie’ (industrial democracy), form a tandem, although Schmitt’s ideas about the role of 
the strong state in the economy seem somewhat opaque”.  
Joerges, Christian (2016). ‘ What is Left of the European Economic Constitution II? From Pyrrhic Victory to 
Cannae Defeat’ in Kjær, Poul F. & Olsen, Niklas (eds.) Critical Theories of Crisis in Europe: From Weimar 
to the Euro, Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 146-147 
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Rüstow)1001.  
 
It should be clear that I am not identifying Schmitt’s theory with ordoliberals given the 
different variants of this theory during the post-war period. This analysis brings,  
nevertheless, into light how Schmitt’s legal theory is related to his analysis of the Weimar 
democratic state in the context of the capitalist economy. 
 
This leads us to the conclusion, which is that Schmitt’s theory throughout Weimar is 
permeated by a continuity. I have shown in this chapter, at the level of state theory, that 
Schmitt’s theory is driven by his analysis that the problems of the Weimar Republic are 
related to mass democratic parliamentarism as opposed to a 19th century parliament that 
was based on a liberal State-civil society divide. This leads to his lament for the loss of 19th 
century constitutionalism but in a mass democracy of 20th century. Hence, he developed 
throughout Weimar a theory that would be able to respond to these 20th century conditions 
and redraw the distinction between the political and the economic through an authoritarian 
state. 
 
This is in line with his overall continuity at the level of constitutional theory. Regarding 
this theory, he developed a concept of a reified social “normality” that enters the 
constitutional order, firstly, through a reference to a “purely” political constitution during 
his 1920s writings and, then, through the method of “substantive guarantees”. Through 
these methods he interpreted the Weimar Constitution through a combination between the 
political categories of “constitutional monarchy” with the “values” of economic liberalism 
but in the democratic Weimar state. As an consequence of this contradiction, he developed 
an authoritarian liberal theory in the sense that he suggested a very powerful elected 
President that, through a strong state, would be able to maintain the liberal political-
economic divide. I think that this is the best term to capture Schmitt’s project without 
reference to other historical currents that would cause further confusion.  
 
Schmitt’s constitutionalism is, therefore, an answer to the contradiction between the 
                                                                                                                                              
1000 Bonefeld, Werner (2017). The Strong state and the Free Economy, London: Rowman, 8-10, 47-48. 
1001As Eucken writes in 1932 with explicit reference to Schmitt’s “Guardian of the Constitution”, 
“democratisation grants political parties and the masses and the interest groups organized by them a 
massively increased influence on the government of the state and thus on economic policy as well... [As a 
result] the power of the state today no longer serves its own will but to a considerable degree the will of the 
interested parties”.  
In  Ibid. 47-48.  See also p. 10. See also Tribe, Keith (1995). Strategies of Economic Order: German 
Economic Discourse, 1750-1950, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 211-212 
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political state and the capitalist economy not by suggesting the closure of the chasm 
between the “two lives” (the civil and the political). On the contrary, his solution to the 
riddle that Marx theorized was the reification of this chasm and the ultimate dissociation of 
the constitution from the democratic promise when the liberal political-economic divide is 
endangered. 
 
This does not derive from a romantic anti-modernism but from his effort to protect what he 
conceives as modern, the liberal modality of the State-civil society relationship, against the 
danger “of a new feudal system …that was based on the proportional representation of 
individual or party estates”1002. Hence, his affinity with Weber’s insights. Moreover, his 
use of the “irrational” thinkers during the 1920s (e.g. Catholic counter-revolutionary 
thinkers) should be seen in the light that it helps in the maintenance of this modality 
against the 20th century parliamentary state. 
 
Finally, it was seen that through this authoritarian liberal theory he paved the way- from 
the perspective of constitutional theory- to the general crisis of representation and to the 
undermining of the Weimar State. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1002 Caldwell (1997) 113. From Schmitt, Carl, Huter der Verfassung, 1931, p.82-84 
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Chapter 6. Hans Kelsen’s Staatslehre: Back to the State?1003 
 
 
 
Hans Kelsen was the main enemy of Schmitt, as we have seen in the previous chapter. 
Starting from some biographical elements before proceeding with the analysis of his 
theory, Kelsen was born in Prague on October 11, 1881 and moved at the age of three to 
Vienna, which was at that time the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1911, he 
qualified as a university teacher to teach public law and philosophy in Vienna, and from 
1919 to 1930 he held the position of “ordentlicher Professor für Staats-und 
Verwaltungsrecht” (full professor of state and administrative law) at the University of 
Vienna1004. At the same time, he was invited by the (Austro-Marxist), Chancellor Karl 
Renner, to draft the constitution of the new Austrian Republic, which he tried to model on 
the Weimar Constitution, as we will see in section 1 of this chapter.  
 
Kelsen served also from 1921 until 1930 as a member of the Austrian Constitutional Court 
(Verfassungsgerichtshof). He had been elected unanimously by the political parties for this 
position in 19211005. However, he left Austria in 1930. The reason was a decision of the 
                                                
1003 The title is inspired by Kelsen’s injunction “back to Lassalle”. Kelsen, Hans ([1925] 1967). ‘Marx oder 
Lassalle’ (reprinted from: Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, 11. 1925) 
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 261-298, 298 
1004 Jabloner, Clemens (1998). ‘Kelsen and his Circle: The Viennese Years’, European Journal of 
International Law, 1(2), 368-385, 368. Urbinati, Nadia (2013). ‘Introduction’ in Hans Kelsen, The essence 
and value of Democracy, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 20 
1005Herrera, Carlos Miguel (1998). ‘La théorie  politique de Kelsen et le socialisme réformiste’, ARSP: 
Archiv fur Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie/ Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 84(2), 
195-231, 197 
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Constitutional Court on the issue of divorce (“Dispensehen-Kontroverse”)1006 for which he 
was severely attacked by the Catholic Church, the right-wing parties and the media1007.  
 
The most important issue, nevertheless, in this story is that there was also reform of the 
judicial system during the constitutional reform of 1929. According to this reform of the 
judicial system, all the existing judges were removed from the Constitutional Court 
(despite being elected for life) and the mode of appointment of judges changed “so as to 
ensure a future conservative majority that was expected to overturn the decision in favour 
of the validity of administrative dispensations”1008.  More concretely, the change was that 
the members of the Court would no longer be elected by the Nationalrat (Parliament) and 
the Bundesrat (Federal Council) but would be appointed by the administration1009 (see 
section 1 about the appointment of judges).  
Given this constitutional reform, Kelsen’s role ended on February 15, 1930. He rejected his 
re-appointment as a judge despite the proposal of Karl Seitz who was the mayor of “Red 
Vienna” and President of the SDAPDÖ1010. His acceptance would have legitimized this 
reform, which actually left only two places in the Court for the Social Democrats and 
twelve for the Christian Social Party1011. Another reason is that he also wanted to maintain 
his independence from political parties1012.  
However, from this issue we can trace the direct links between Kelsen and the Austrian 
Social Democrats (taking into account Seitz’s proposal to Kelsen) 1013. Leaving this last 
point aside for the time being, Kelsen left Austria and accepted a chair at the University of 
Cologne. He taught there until 1933 when he lost his position due to his Jewish origins, 
after the laws of the NSDAP regarding the “civil service” in 1933. It is also interesting 
                                                
1006See Vinx, Lars (2015). The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of 
Constitutional Law (ed. and trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 262 
1007Ibid. Baume, Sandrine ([2007] 2012).  Hans Kelsen and the Case for Democracy,  Colchester: ECPR 
Press, 3 
 
 
1008 Vinx (2015) 262 
1009 Kelsen, Hans (1942). ‘Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the 
American Constitution’, The Journal of Politics, 4(2), 183-200, 188 
1010 Herrera (1998) 197-198 
1011 Ibid. 198 
1012 Ibid. 
1013 Ibid. 
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that, whereas Kelsen had agreed with Schmitt’s appointment at the University of Cologne, 
by also welcoming him in a “warm” manner in late 19321014, Schmitt did not sign the 
declaration of solidarity initiated by Nipperdey1015. After he left Cologne, Kelsen moved to 
other countries and emigrated to the United States in 1940. 
The question that arises after the presentation of these biographical elements is why Kelsen 
is seen as one of the “most significant philosophers of the constitution during the years of 
the Weimar Republic” as Caldwell argues, given his arrival in Weimar in 19301016?  
 
Regarding this question, it is indubitable that Kelsen’s legal and political theory is 
influenced by the multiethnic context of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As he himself had 
written in an autobiographical sketch regarding the 'Austrian aspect' of the Pure Theory of 
Law, “considering the Austrian state which was made up of so many different racial, 
linguistic, religious and historical groups, theories that tried to found the unity of the state 
on some socio-psychological or socio-biological context of the persons legally belonging 
to a state clearly proved to be fictions. To the extent that this theory of state is an 
important part of the Pure Theory of Law, the Pure Theory of Law can be seen as a 
specifically Austrian theory”1017. 
 
 This can also be seen in that some of the directions of his “Pure Theory”, which have to do 
with the question of how to ground unity out of plurality, had been developed since 1911. 
At that time, he criticized the “organic” theories of the German-speaking “Staatslehre” that 
assumed a sociologically uniform will of the state based on –what he called - “real psychic 
facts”1018.  
 
                                                
1014See Mehring ([2009] 2014) 264-267 (regarding Kelsen’s “warm letters”), 294, 607, 613 
Dyzenhaus (1997) 4 
1015Dyzenhaus argues that Schmitt participated in the machinations that led to Kelsen’s dismissal. Dyzenhaus 
(1997) 4 
1016Caldwell (1997) 8 
Dyzenhaus also includes Kelsen in his account of the Weimar constitutional debate. See Dyzenhaus (1997) 
1017In Jabloner (1998) 373 (he takes all the biographical information from the biography of Rudolf Aladár 
Métall in 1969, “Hans Kelsen. Leben und Werk”). See also Paulson (2014) 3 
1018Kelsen, Hans ([1911] 2000). ‘On the borders between legal and sociological method’ in Jacobson, Arthur 
& Schlink, Bernhard (eds.) Weimar. A Jurisprudence of Crisis. Berkeley, London: University of California 
Press,  57- 63, 61 
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He argued that the empirical assumptions of these theories are wrong. As he wrote, “if one 
actually adheres to the real psychic facts, and especially to the congruence of wills, the 
people living within the borders of a state must disintegrate into a multiplicity of 
groups…”. The second example-reason that he gives is that “one not need to be a Marxist 
to consider a common will that psychically unites an entire people to be a phantom, given 
the deep class divisions that rend the people of a state who form a legal unity”.  
 
Based on these he concludes that “The content of the will of the state is the legal order- 
that is, law is the will of the state...there can be no doubt as to how this whole theory, 
which sees the will of the state as a real psychic fact, as a common will, can be designated 
methodologically: It is a classic example of a fiction- the claim of a reality, in conscious 
contradiction to reality!”1019. 
 
So, notwithstanding the variations of Kelsen’s legal thinking during his life1020, it is seen 
here that the concept of state unity as “fiction” and Kelsen’s identification of “law” with 
“state” can be traced from his 1911 publication. Moreover, it is from 1911 that an 
association of Kelsen’s legal and state theory can be traced through their common 
sociological presupposition of social plurality, as it is evident from the aforementioned 
examples. From those examples, it becomes evident that Kelsen’s assumptions are related 
to the context of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.  
 
However, I think that the Austrian origins of Kelsen’s theory should also be relativized in 
the sense that his 1920s theory also takes into account the German context. In order to see 
this, I need to make a longer detour to some biographical elements before introducing the 
theoretical analysis that I will follow in this chapter. 
 
Starting this detour, it is, at first, evident in the aforementioned excerpts of Kelsen’s 1911 
legal theory, that this theory is written in the context of the German-speaking community 
                                                
1019 Ibid. 62-63  
1020Paulson recognizes three stages in Kelsen’s legal thinking: 1) the early phase (up to 1920) during which a 
constructivist-“static” conception of legal order was developed 2) the middle period from about 1920 to 1960 
during which a more “dynamic” conception of legal order was adopted 3) the period after 1960 during which 
a more voluntarist (will-based) theory of law was developed. 
Paulson, Stanley (1996). ‘Hans Kelsen’s Earliest Legal Theory: Critical Constructivism’, Modern Law 
Review, 59(6), 797-812, 798 
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of Staatslehre. This becomes even more visible during the whole Weimar period, not only 
due to the fact that his theory was widely discussed by the Weimar theorists (primarily by 
Carl Schmitt), but also due to the fact that Kelsen was actively participating at the 
meetings of the Association of the German Teachers of State Law (1922-1932)1021, in 
which issues of the Weimar Constitution and Republic were discussed (e.g. see chapter 5 
about Kelsen’s thesis at the 1926 meeting). These meetings - one of which took place in 
Vienna in 19281022- were the main site of the “struggle over methods and aims” among the 
Weimar state law scholars (see section 4 about Kelsen’s position at the 1928 meeting).  
 
The overall point at this first level, is that there is a sense of community despite the origins 
also playing their role. This role of origins gets even more blurred when one views the 
general picture of the exchange of influences, such as Renner’s and Bauer’s influence on 
Neumann (as seen in chapter 4.3). Even outside the field of “pure” Staatserechtslehre, this 
sense of community was clear. In this direction, we can also see that Hilferding is 
conceived as one of the Austro-Marxists, but also as one of the most influential theorists 
and politicians of the Weimar Republic (see also chapter 4.3).  
 
At a more concrete level regarding Kelsen, he also conceived Germany as the homeland, 
which is also visible from the fact that he was opposed to the Treaty of Versailles and to the 
Treaty of St. Germain, that ultimately prohibited the unification of Austria with 
Germany1023. In this direction, Hans Kelsen – while commenting on Lassalle’s program of 
a “Großdeutschland minus the dynasties”- wrote that “during Lassalle’s period, the 
liberation from the dynasties appeared to many people as more difficult than the 
realization of Großdeutschland. Today we have that [namely liberation], but we are always 
still lacking this [namely the realization of Großdeutschland]”1024.  
 
Kelsen goes even further in “Marx oder Lassalle”, in which he comments on the invasion 
                                                
1021 The foundation of this Association was an initiative of Heinrich Triepel, which attracted all the political 
currents of the profession from Germany, Austria, Swiss-Germans and from the German University of 
Prague. It also aimed to prevent the politicization of the profession during these turbulent times and the split 
of the professors in various groups given that at the same time, “a republican association of state law 
teachers was imminent and with it the danger of a split” as Michael Stolleis writes. 
The membership during the Weimar period was in the range of 80-90 Teachers. Stolleis (2004) 178-180 
1022 Ibid. 188 
1023He had written this in 1920. Herrera (1998) 209 
1024Kelsen ([1925 ]1967) 294. The translation from German is mine. 
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of Ruhr by French troops in January 1923. He writes that “…Lassalle has perhaps felt 
more deeply than Marx and Engels that the national unification is a stage in the historical 
development of higher international forms, which we cannot skip, especially because today 
the disadvantages of the lack of national unity are clearly exemplified also for the working 
class, at a time that the German workers are at war with French imperialism for the whole 
German state and not only for their class interests, [but] in order to defend this State, their 
State, from the catastrophic effects of a military defeat that affects primarily these 
workers”1025. Kelsen concludes this paragraph by invoking the “German people”, with 
reference to Lassalle’s second essay on the essence of constitutions1026.  
 
This logic is also imprinted in Kelsen’s legal writings. As Herrera shows, Kelsen writes a 
juridical article on the specific issue of the integration of the Austrian state into the 
German state in 1927. In this article, Kelsen uses lyrical phrases about the prospect of the 
union1027. 
 
It should, nevertheless, be noted that Kelsen’s position is, firstly, not entirely unique 
because it is also shared by the leading Austro-Marxists (particularly Renner and Bauer), 
who had a similar position to Kelsen on the union with Germany. This is visible in the 
declaration of the German-Austrian provisional Assembly, which decided to form a union 
with Germany in 1918 (see section 1). Moreover, Bauer had renounced his position as 
Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs on July 26, 1919, as a reaction against the refusal of 
the Allies to accept the union with Germany and he had argued some days earlier that “our 
people are more than ever convinced that we cannot find a sustainable future but in the 
context of a great German Republic”1028.  
 
Secondly, this general strategy had also a political objective: the tying of the young 
Austrian Republic to the great German working class movement and to the powerful 
German Social Democracy1029. This is visible in Kelsen’s aforementioned excerpt 
regarding the Ruhr case in the Weimar Republic. This picture reveals, firstly, that the 
leading Austro-Marxists viewed themselves as part of (or at least familial with) German 
Social Democracy. Secondly, it shows the affinities between the leading Austro-Marxists 
                                                
1025 Ibid. 
1026 Ibid. 
1027 Herrera (1998) 210 
1028 Ibid. 210 
1029 Ibid. 
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(particularly of Renner and Bauer) with Kelsen.  
After this biographical detour and making now the transition to what will be my central 
argumentation regarding Kelsen’s theory in the chapter, I will show that Kelsen’s state-
political theory, during the 1920s, is influenced by the Austro-Marxists and particularly by 
their hegemonic “reformist” wing, namely by Renner’s and Bauer’s theories that are 
explicitly invoked by Kelsen during the 1920s. However, at an even deeper level, I will 
show that these state theories, and even more clearly Kelsen’s state theory, are based on the 
theoretical analyses of German Social Democracy and primarily those of Bernstein and 
Lassalle (and Hilferding). This connects Kelsen’s state theory with the Weimar context, if 
we also take into account that these analyses proved to be hegemonic in German Social 
Democracy during Weimar (as seen also in chapters 2.1 and 4.3). 
Apart from this, I will also show Kelsen’s explicit references during the 1920s both in the 
Austrian and in the Weimar historical contexts, which play the role of a practical anchorage 
of his reformist state theory and of his suggestion for an evolutionary strategy toward 
socialism. So, Kelsen’s “empirical” account of the Weimar Republic is related to his 
theory, even before his arrival in Weimar. Hence, at the level of his state theory, it will be 
seen in this chapter (in section 2) that, along with his Austrian multi-ethnic “influences”, 
Kelsen’s theory is, to an extent, also German before his arrival in Weimar.  
 
Regarding his legal theory, it will be seen that Kelsen can be considered as part of the 
Weimar context and constitutional debate, which is identifiable even by the fact that he 
takes into account the Weimar constitution when drafting the Austrian one (as it will be 
seen in section 1). Secondly and most importantly, Kelsen’s legal theory is strongly 
associated with his 1920s political-state theory and, therefore, with the latter’s 
assumptions. Thirdly, his theory is developed in the context of the German “struggle over 
methods” (see above and section 3 and 4 of this chapter). 
 
Making now the transition to the detailed structure of the chapter, it starts with a short 
section on Kelsen’s role in the drafting of the Austrian Constitution, which shows his 
general orientation, his inspiration from the Weimar Constitution, but also his own 
“innovations” (compared to the Weimar Constitution). 
 
It will then proceed by considering his political-state theory, which will be developed in 
the second section of the chapter. In line with the aforementioned analysis, I will trace the 
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origins of Kelsen’s political theory in his “Austrian”-inspired assumption of social 
pluralism and in his reformist logic, due to the fact that he was influenced by the leading 
Austro-Marxists and the German Social Democrats.  
 
This political theory is reflected in the “enemies” that Kelsen chooses: Marxism-as 
anarchism, liberalism and conservatism. According to Kelsen, these theories, which are not 
necessarily incompatible (e.g. conservatism with liberalism in Schmitt), have a 
commonality: the reification of the State from different perspectives. I will demonstrate 
that Kelsen argues against this reification of the modern state on three grounds. The first 
basis is his concept of freedom, which is inspired, among others, by Rousseau and is 
explicitly detached from liberalism1030. It signifies participation within the State, without 
presupposing, at the same time, any “substance” of the State. Secondly, this is based on a 
concept of a pluralistic society without foundations, that cannot become harmonious and, 
therefore, cannot get rid of the element of power. Hence, the necessity of the State, so as to 
pacify this conflict in a democratic way. Thirdly, it is based on his empirical argumentation 
that the modern democratic state, which was seen particularly in the Austrian and the 
Weimar Republic of the 1920s, is not a state that dominates over the proletariat, but a state 
of “equality of class strengths” through which social transformation can be peacefully 
achieved. 
 
The institution that embodies this concept of the state is, according to Kelsen, parliament. 
The overall analysis of Kelsen’s political theory will bring to light his relationalist 
approach of the social-political relationship through parliamentarism, which goes hand in 
hand with his assumption of an autonomous concept of the state. However, in line also 
with Kelsen’s explicit detachment of democracy from liberalism, it will be seen that 
Kelsen’s autonomous concept of the state is different from the Weberian-Schmittian 
position of autonomy. Kelsen’s concept of the state aspires to express the social, whereas 
Weber’s and Schmitt’s concept of an autonomous state is distinguished from civil society 
(that is usually conceived in liberal terms see chapters 3.2 and 5). I will argue that Kelsen 
leaves open the modality of the political-social relationship but without collapsing the one 
into the other. 
 
In the third section, I will make the transition to Kelsen’s legal theory. I will argue that this 
                                                
1030 Kelsen, Hans ([1929] 2013). The Essence and Value of Democracy in Urbinati, N.&Accetti, C.I. (eds.), 
(trans. Graf, B.) New York:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 32 
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theory is driven by Kelsen’s political theory and his enemies are, therefore, precisely the 
same as with his political theory: conservatism, liberalism and Marxism-as-anarchism. 
This is evident through Kelsen’s critique of the dominant dualisms in legal theory 
(subjective right-objective law, public-private law, state-law), which allows him to 
dismantle the reifications of the social and to suggest a concept of constitutionalism that 
keeps open the modality of the State-civil society relationship. Moreover, it will be seen 
that Kelsen’s state theory and legal theory are interrelated, in that Kelsen’s concept of 
legality plays the role of keeping open the space for Kelsen’s concept of the political to 
come - through the autonomy of these spheres instead of Schmitt’s confounding of the two.  
 
After the first three sections of the chapter, I will focus on two difficult issues that hang 
over Kelsen’s thinking. The first issue is Kelsen’s concept of constitutional review and it 
will be discussed in the fourth section. More specifically, I will try to identify in this 
section, firstly, whether Kelsen’s theory regarding the political role of the Constitutional 
Court, fits with the primacy of parliament in his political theory. Secondly, I will discuss 
whether his theory regarding the political dimension of judicial decision-making leads to a 
conflation of the political and the legal boundaries in the process of constitutional 
interpretation and whether it is compatible with Kelsen’s overall legal theory that aims to 
protect the autonomy of the legal. Thirdly, it will be asked whether Kelsen’s theory of 
adjudication can defend effectively the Weimar Constitution against Schmitt’s legal theory. 
 
In the fifth section of this chapter I will discuss the second issue, which revolves around the 
question of how we can conceive Kelsen’s overall theory, in view of the last Weimar 
period. Does Kelsen’s theory deal adequately with the effect of organized capitalism on 
mass democracy and on constitutional legality? To put it differently, was Kelsen’s solution 
to Marx’s riddle sufficiently political in order to oppose Schmitt’s theory and to defend the 
Weimar Republic from the perspective of constitutional theory? 
 
My overall analysis distances itself, firstly, from the approach that criticizes Kelsen as 
being a “little more than a distant cousin” to Schmitt’s theory1031. This perspective is also 
visible in Dyzenhaus’ critique that Kelsen and Schmitt share “the thought that ethics and 
politics are deeply irrational1032. This theory argues that the problem is in the “value 
freedom” of the Pure Theory that derives from Kelsen’s “relativism” that “seems…to be at 
                                                
1031 Scheuerman, William (1999). Carl Schmitt: The End of Law, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 82 
1032Dyzenhaus (1997) 105 
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the root of all the tensions and difficulties in the Pure Theory of law”1033 .  
 
However, this critique fails to recognize the overall normative aim that lies behind 
Kelsen’s political and legal theory. I think that this is because it does not focus on the 
aforementioned social democratic assumptions of Kelsen’s political-state theory1034, and 
does not give emphasis to the latter’s relation to Kelsen’s legal theory. Another reason for 
this approach of Kelsen’s theory - apart from its initial liberal/deliberative assumptions- is 
that it analyzes Kelsen’s theory mainly from the perspective of his comment in the 
Prussian case and less in the context of the whole state and legal theory that Kelsen 
develops during the 1920s. However, it will be seen that this approach to Kelsen’s theory 
captures well some of problems of his theory with regards to his concept of adjudication 
(see section 4). 
 
My approach to Kelsen’s theory distances itself, secondly, from the analysis that criticizes 
Kelsen for cutting “the ties between the validity of a norm and its legitimacy”. This is 
argued by Kalyvas, who also writes that “by radicalizing Weber’s notion of legality, Kelsen 
introduced a procedural argument that reduced the validity of a legal norm to a mere 
legality…he concluded with the near fusion of norm and fact, ought and is, validity and 
efficacy”1035.  
 
This approach is similar to the former critique of Kelsen (notwithstanding that it was 
opposed to its perspective regarding Schmitt’s theory) and they share the following 
commonality: they both underplay Kelsen’s critique of the liberal reification of the State-
civil society relationship, at the level of state theory and of legal theory. To put it 
differently, they both underplay how Kelsen’s political and legal theory responds, not only 
to the political, but also to the social question, by aiming at keeping open the possibility of 
an evolutionary socialist transformation. That’s why this approach concludes by adopting 
Schmitt’s critique to Kelsen, according to which Kelsen legitimizes “raw power” (see 
chapter 5)1036. However, it underplays that Kelsen’s critique of 19th century German 
                                                
1033 Ibid. 158-159. See also Dyzenhaus, David (2015). ‘Kelsen, Heller and Schmitt: Paradigms of 
Sovereignty Thought’ in Theoretical Inquires in Law, 16(2), 364 
 
 
1034Dyzenhaus parallelized Kelsen’s enterprise with Rawls and argued that the problems of Kelsen’s theory 
“arise out of an unwillingness to make political values an explicit foundation of his theory of law”.  
Dyzenhaus (1997) 158 
1035 Kalyvas (2008) 107-108 
1036 Ibid.  
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constitutionalism had precisely the opposite aim: to avoid the legitimization of power with 
law that was taking place through the law-state dualism (that Schmitt endorsed, see chapter 
5).  
 
My approach distances itself, thirdly, from the droit politique theory, which criticizes 
Kelsen’s theory for negating the (political) concept of sovereignty through the state-law 
identification thesis1037. This theory misses the point that Kelsen’s law-state identification 
is developed in the context of his critique of the “bourgeois” (as Kelsen calls them) 
dualisms, so as to open the way towards a de-reified concept of the legal order, which 
undergirds Kelsen’s relational concept of the state, namely a concept of the state through 
which the social finds direct expression. However, this escaped Loughlin’s notice possibly 
because the social democratic assumptions of Kelsen’s 1920s theory are not taken into 
consideration. 
 
Finally, I think that the term of “left-leaning liberal” that is attributed to Kelsen’s 
theory1038 is a quite confusing term. It suffices to note here that Kelsen’s 1920s and early 
1930s theory has little to share with economic liberalism and the liberal reification of the 
State-civil society relationship. This will be evident both in the social democratic origins of 
his state theory and in his critique of the “bourgeois” dualisms in his legal theory. 
Moreover, he apologized explicitly in 1929 for a 1911 passage, in which he had written 
that his theory in the “Main Problems in State Law” is liberalism1039.  
 
It should be, ultimately, noted that I will mainly analyze Kelsen’s writings during the 
1920s and early 1930s in this chapter.  
 
6.1. Hans Kelsen and the Austrian Constitution 
 
 
The 1920 Austrian Constitution (1 October 1920) was drafted by Hans Kelsen. It is 
                                                
1037 Loughlin (2003) 90-91 
1038 See Urbinati (2013) 2 
1039Kelsen, Hans ([1929] 2000). ‘Legal Formalism and the Pure Theory of Law’ in Jacobson, Arthur & 
Schlink, Bernhard (eds.) Weimar. A Jurisprudence of Crisis, Berkeley, London: University of California 
Press, 76-83, 80 
This 1911 passage is invoked by Urbinati as a proof that Kelsen’s theory is left-liberal.   
Urbinati (2013) 2 
 225 
important to see this drafting process because it is a good indication of the influence that 
the Weimar Constitution had upon his constitutional suggestions. 
 
Starting from the historical context, after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the 
members of the Imperial Diet (Reichsrat) that represented the German territories of the 
monarchy convened and formed a provisional National Assembly (21 October 1918)1040. 
This provisional assembly declared the state of German-Austria (Deutschösterreich) in the 
German-speaking regions (30 October 1918) and, then, the republican form of 
government, under the chancellorship of Karl Renner, on November 12, 1918. However, 
given that the Allied powers prohibited a union with Germany (a prohibition formalized by 
the Versailles Treaty and the St. Germain Treaty)1041, the new Republic’s name changed to 
Austria. It elected a new Constituent National Assembly (February 16, 1919) in which the 
SDAPDÖ was the first party and made a coalition with the Christian Social party.  
 
Kelsen was invited to draft the new constitution by Chancellor Renner, given that he had 
been serving, since November 1918, as a legal consultant for him. In this process, he 
received instructions from Karl Renner, in May 1919. As Kelsen himself wrote about this 
experience, “in May of 1919 I received instructions from the Chancellor to draft a federal 
constitution, following up on my earlier preparation of certain preliminary studies. During 
the summer of 1919, with the help of the constitutional department in the Chancellor’s 
offices, I completed the draft, supplementing it throughout the fall with several other drafts 
that were intended to present variations of the basic draft and to take into account the 
various political options. My guideline was to retain everything usable from the previous 
constitution, to preserve to the greatest possible extent the continuity of the constitutional 
institutions, to incorporate the principle of federalism into the existing tried and true, and 
thereby to lean on the Swiss but even more on the new German [Weimar] Constitution as 
far as I could, considering the differences in historico-political presuppositions”1042. 
 
During this first period, Kelsen made five preliminary drafts of the constitution, the latter 
being much closer to the Weimar constitution1043. A second period followed, in which there 
                                                
1040 Paulson (2014) 14 
1041Grote, Rainer (2013). The Republic of Austria: Introductory Note (ed. Max Planck Institute). Oxford 
University Press, 1-12, 1 
1042Kelsen, Hans (1922) “Die Verfassung Österreich”, Jarbruch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 11, 
236 and from Hans Kelsen (1923)“Österreiches Staatsrecht”. Tübingen, Mohr, 160-161 
In Paulson (2014) 15 
1043 As Paulson writes, “the initial sections on ‘the administration of the federal government’ and ‘basic 
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were negotiations with representatives of the Länder and a (failed) attempt by them to 
“take control of the proceedings”1044. During this period, which lasted until the spring of 
1920, Kelsen worked on another draft. The third period concerned consultations before the 
constitutional committee of the National Assembly, which started on July 11, 19201045.  
 
After several months and negotiations between the political parties - and several drafts by 
Kelsen that, at the end, tried to find a compromise between the Social Democrats and the 
Christian Social Party1046- the constitution was voted on by the National Assembly. It was 
voted by the coalition of the SDAPDÖ with the Christian Social Party (1 October 1920). 
This coalition ended after the parliamentary elections of October 1920. The Christian 
Social Party won these elections, whereas the Social Democrats continued to govern the 
city of Vienna until 1934. 
 
Regarding the content of the new federal Austrian Constitution, the crucial difference with 
the Weimar Constitution was that it established the parliamentarian direction more clearly, 
given also that the President’s position was designed to be much weaker. The Austrian 
parliament (Nationalrat) was elected by proportional representation (article 26) and it had 
legislative authority along with the Federal Council (Bundesrat, article 24). The President’s 
role was ceremonial and he was elected, not directly by the people, but by the Federal 
Assembly, which was a body that included parliament and the federal council (article 38). 
Moreover, he did not have any powers to proclaim a state of emergency1047.  
 
This “ceremonial role” of the Austrian President changed only after the far-reaching 
constitutional reform of 1929, which was led by the Christian Social Party and fascist 
parties. This reform gave many powers to the President, such as the right to dissolve the 
National Assembly, but only once for the same reason, which seems identical with article 
25 of the Weimar Constitution, and to appoint the federal government. Moreover, it 
                                                                                                                                              
rights and obligations’ reflect the Weimar Constitution’s sections on ‘the Reich administration’ (Arts. 78–
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1045 Grote (2013) 1 
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 227 
introduced provision for the direct election of the President by the people, every six years 
(Art. 60)1048. 
Another critical difference of the Austrian Constitution from the Weimar Constitution was 
that it established a Constitutional Court (articles 137-148). This centralized form of 
constitutional review was probably the first to be created at that time1049 . This Court was 
distinct from the ordinary judiciary and it had the competence to hear challenges to the 
legality of the ordinances of the regional or federal administration, on the application of a 
court of ordinary jurisdiction (article 139). Moreover, on the application from the federal or 
the regional governments, it had the competence to decide on the constitutionality of a 
Land or a federal statute (article 140). Finally, it was also empowered to decide on the 
Court’s own initiative “insofar as this is required in order to pass on the constitutionality 
of a statute in a case before the Court” (article 140)1050. Article 140 was thought by 
Kelsen, in 1922, to be “the high point of the [Court’s] function as the guarantor of the 
Constitution (Garant der Verfassung)”1051. 
The last issue that should be addressed here is the process of appointment of judges to the 
Constitutional Court, according to the Austrian Constitution (until the 1929 reform). The 
President, the Vice-President and half of the members of the Court were elected by the 
Nationalrat, and the other half by the Bundesrat1052 (article 147). This is also something 
that is, crucially, related to the “legislative” role of the Court. This association is stressed 
by Kelsen, in his debate with Carl Schmitt regarding the “Guardian of the Constitution” 
(see section 4). 
Concluding this section, we have seen that Kelsen tries to develop a democratic concept of 
constitution, which is in line with his theoretical emphasis on parliament as the locus of 
political power (see the next section). He tries, along with the Austro-Marxist Renner, to 
formulate this Constitution closely to the Weimar Constitution, with two main differences: 
without the latter’s concept of a president and with a Constitutional Court.  
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 We will move now to Kelsen’s political theory, which developed his constitutional 
suggestions at a deeper theoretical level. 
 
6.2. Kelsen’s political theory: the “class equilibrium” State theory  
 
Kelsen’s political theory is associated with democracy, as evident in the title of his most 
significant book on political theory, “The Essence and Value of Democracy”.  
His account of democracy starts from the heritage of the 1789 and 1848 revolutions and is 
related to parliamentarism. Kelsen argued that the whole development of the late 18th and 
early 19th century was “a battle for parliamentarism” that would “…put an end to the 
dictatorship of the absolute monarch and the privilege of the estates”1053. During the 19th 
and the 20th century, the emancipation of the bourgeoisie “against the privileges of the 
aristocracy” and, later, the political equality of the working class- that signified “the 
beginning of its moral and economic emancipation against the propertied classes”- was 
achieved through parliamentarism1054. 
The issue of universal suffrage was crucial here and played a role in the transformation of 
the State through parliamentarism. This state becomes “not only the state of the 
‘possessors’ but also of the propertyless” as he argued1055.  The social legislation of the 20th 
and late 19th century made this evident1056. In the direction of analyzing this concept of the 
state, Kelsen is also “helped” by a term that Otto Bauer- a centrist figure in the Austrian 
Social Democratic party- introduces. This is the conception of the state as “equilibrium of 
class strengths” (Das Gleichgewicht der Klassenkräfte). This term is used by Bauer in 
order to characterize the second period of his periodization of the new Austrian Republic 
(with references to Marx’s periodization of the 1848 French revolution and to Engels1057).  
More concretely, the Austrian Republic can be divided, according to Bauer, into three 
periods. The first period was between 1918 and 1919, in which there was the ascendancy 
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of the working class. The second one was between 1919-1922, in which neither the 
bourgeoisie nor the working class could govern on its own. During this equilibrium period, 
there was not a class state but a Volksstaat1058. The third period was after the fall of 1922 
(since the Geneva accord) in which there was the restoration of the bourgeoisie. However, 
even during this third period, the “restoration of the bourgeoisie did not last long. In fact, 
the proletariat are again in a position to reconstitute an equilibrium between the classes, 
as they fight for a ‘right of co-determination’, in order to realise an ‘organic democracy’, 
that is, the ending of the bourgeois class domination”1059. 
Kelsen traces a contradiction in Bauer’s argumentation. This is that the equilibrium period 
does not seem to be confined merely to Bauer’s second period. That’s because if this was 
the case, Kelsen argues, the proletariat would not be able to reconstitute the equilibrium (as 
Bauer suggests in the last excerpt) because the state would dominate the proletariat1060. 
This contradiction in Bauer’s argumentation is also evident, as Kelsen argues, in the fact 
that Bauer does not exclude the possibility of a new coalition, between the Social 
Democrats and the Christian Social party, during this third period1061.  
Kelsen takes this contradiction of Bauer and, making productive use of it in his direction, 
argues that the state, as class domination, has not been the case during the whole 1918-
1923 period1062. He also gives the example of the city of Vienna, that could still enforce 
social policies, despite the purely bourgeois central government of Austria after October 
1920. This shows, according to Kelsen, that the state has been transformed1063. 
He goes on by stating that this transformed state, this Volksstaat, has been the case already 
since the second half of the 19th century1064 (given the social systems of protection and 
general male suffrage) and that its difference with the post-1918 state is only 
quantitative1065.  Given this, the state of “equilibrium of class strengths” is, as he argues, 
“by no means a direct product of military collapse, but the result of a slow process long 
before the war that began with the proletariat's strengthening”1066.  
It is, therefore, evident that Kelsen’s appropriation of Bauer’s term allows his to argue for 
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an autonomous concept of the state, which is not a class state.  Moreover, Kelsen’s theory 
has also affinities with Karl Renner’s theory. Renner belonged to the right wing of the 
Austrian Social Democratic party, whose direction was based on Bernstein’s theory1067,  
and his theory is not that different from Bauer’s1068. He argued in 1917 that “1. the 
economy serves the capitalist class more and more exclusively; on the other hand, the state 
serves increasingly the proletariat. 2. The germ of socialism is to be found today in all the 
institutions of the capitalist state”1069.  
This analysis indicates that socialism is already an immanent tendency in the capitalist 
state, with the difference that the capitalist class is still dominant in the economy. Kelsen 
adopts this logic and Karl Renner’s injunction, which is “the state as the lever of 
socialism”1070. It is through the state, Kelsen argues, that the balance of forces can change.  
Given this analysis, we can clearly grasp, firstly, Kelsen’s commonality with the leading 
Austro-Marxists. This commonality is visible especially after the Great War and is also 
admitted by Kelsen. As he wrote later about this period, “From the very beginning, I was 
in complete agreement with the democratic program of the Austrian Party, which did stand 
fundamentally on the ground of Marxism, but which had practically nothing to do with the 
anarchistic state theory of Marx and Engels. As an individualist, I was originally opposed 
to its economic program of nationalizing the economy. Later, especially under the 
impression of the economic upheavals that the war had brought with it, I became more and 
more inclined to acknowledge that the system of economic liberalism, the way it was being 
realized under the given circumstances, provided no guarantee for the economic security of 
the mass of the have-nots. [. . .] I was and am fully aware of the difficulty combining the 
nationalization of production with the political freedom of the individual; but I believe I 
must be objective enough to acknowledge that economic security for the great mass is more 
important than anything else…”1071.  
This commonality is also revealed by the fact that Kelsen signed a call for people to vote 
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for the Austrian Social Democrats, in 19271072, that he was proposed as a member of the 
Constitutional Court and mainly by the fact that he was chosen by Renner to draft the 
Constitution of the new Austrian Republic (despite never having been a member of the 
SDAPDÖ because he wanted to maintain his independence from partisan politics)1073. 
The second issue to be revealed is that Kelsen delves into the debates of German Social 
Democracy during the 1920s, by siding with its reformist part, which is also theoretically 
close to the leading Austro-Marxists. In this direction, Kelsen cites Lassalle’s question 
“what is the state” and his answer that the state is “yours, [of] the big association of the 
poorer classes- that is the state” 1074.  
This is related also to the evolutionary perspective of Kelsen, which is evident in his 
phrase that “…from the insight that only existing tendencies need to be strengthened in the 
state legal order so as to approach the social ideal- perfect realization of which remains 
impossible-, there arises the justification of the evolutionary reform!”1075. Kelsen’s 
analysis, therefore, seems also close to Bernstein’s evolutionary analysis (see chapter 2). 
 The affinity between Kelsen and all the aforementioned theorists is in their resolution of 
the contradiction between democratic state and capitalist economy, through the former. 
However, contrary to all these figures that he invokes, Kelsen conceives Marxism as 
inherently problematic,1076 whereas all the aforementioned social democrat theorists argue 
from within the Marxist discourse, by trying to detach Marxism from Leninism” 1077.  
Marxism is, therefore, Kelsen’s first enemy in his political theory because it is hostile to the 
state. Kelsen argued that Marxism’s hostility to the state derived from its economic 
reductionism, based on which the State is depicted as an authoritarian machine for the 
benefit of the bourgeoisie1078. This is, according to Kelsen, mainly because Marxism is 
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based on a naturalistic-sociological method, which corresponded to the sociologies of the 
19th century (Comte), and views as “a causal result of a natural necessity” the prospect of 
a society that will be totally “stateless”, “solidarity-based”, and equipped with “free-
will”1079. Towards this prospect of a harmonious society that will dissolve the state 
“Marxist socialism is in complete agreement with the basic idea of anarchism”1080.  
Kelsen also draws here an association between the Marxist concept of the State as 
domination and Marxism’s anti-democratic outcomes, which appear in the distinction 
between “formal” democracy, that is “based on the principle of the majority”, and “social, 
proletarian” democracy, that is based on the “Bolshevist doctrine”1081. As Kelsen argued 
(with reference to Hilferding’s analysis) Marxism's anti-democratic tendency for a coup 
can be seen for two reasons: 1) due to the attitude of the (19th century) state, which 
excluded the proletariat from any participation in the political decisive formation of will, 
2) due to the theory of the ruling class, which identified the historically concrete form of 
the (19th century) state with the state in general1082.  
 
Kelsen argues that it is this concept of the state, which Marxism identified with the “state” 
in general. This is a consequence, according to Kelsen (following Hilferding), of the fact 
that “in Germany, socialist politics had developed into a semi-absolutist, undemocratic 
state”1083. However, this changed radically after the war with the experience of democracy 
that was practiced by the workers.  
 
Thus, Kelsen’s opposition to Marxism derives, firstly, from his concept of the state and his 
argumentation at an empirical level that there has been a transformation of the state during 
the 19th and 20th centuries, which means that the state has developed through an 
“immanent tendency” into a more autonomous role, even if it has been used initially by the 
bourgeoisie, as a means for its own ends1084. With this analysis, he means, therefore, that 
the current (Weimar and Austrian) states were states of “class equilibrium” and did not 
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exert any form of domination over the popular classes (an argumentation not that 
dissimilar from the one that we saw in pre-1933 Neumann’s and Heller’s account of the 
state in chapter 4.3.).  
 
Given this analysis of Kelsen, it is not surprising that he criticizes, explicitly, the German 
SPD for having a contradictory attitude in that it still held to Marxist rhetoric1085. On the 
contrary, he argues with Lassalle against the “night watchman” (Nachtwächteridee) 
concept of the state that is shared by liberalism and Marxism1086.  
 
However, there is also a second reason that Kelsen opposes Marxism (apart from his 
argument regarding the transformed state). This is the social harmony and the conflict-free 
society that Marxism suggests. That’s because, as he argues, even if economic exploitation 
is abolished, there are still other conflicts that do not derive out of economic origins such 
as the “…religious, artistic and above all erotic problems”1087. 
 
I think that this critique of Kelsen can be seen as an outcome of two elements in Kelsen’s 
thinking. Firstly, of his conception of the people. As Kelsen wrote, “…there is nothing 
more problematic than this unity, which goes by the name, the People. Sociologically, it is 
riddled with national, religious and economic differences and thus represents more a 
bundle of groups than a coherent, homogeneous mass”1088. There is, therefore, an intrinsic 
social plurality that leads to various sorts of conflicts. Here we can evidently see the 
‘Austrian influences’.  
Secondly, it is due to his “pessimistic anthropology”1089, which can be seen in his argument 
that “no social order is possible without the coercion (Zwang) of man over man”1090. 
Therefore, the state is always necessary. Regarding Kelsen’s point, it is interesting to look 
at Adler’s incisive critique of Kelsen. Adler, who belonged to the left-wing of the Austrian 
Social democrats, argued that “Marxists have never asserted that, with the dissolution of 
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the class-based state, development ceases, and that a condition of absolute harmony and a 
static equilibrium is achieved. Only the form of social development is changed1091.   
However, this remark is not taken into consideration by Kelsen who, firstly, considers 
Marxism in its most mechanical form and, secondly endorses a concept of an autonomous 
state by suggesting, as we have seen, that the Weimar and the Austrian state were not class 
states.  
 
Liberalism as Kelsen’s second ‘enemy’ and his defence of parliamentary 
representation 
 
It’s time now to make the transition to Kelsen’s second “enemy”, which is liberalism, given 
also that the origins of the political theory of Marxism can be traced, according to Kelsen, 
to the revolutionary liberalism of the 19th century1092.  
Liberalism was, according to Kelsen, the political theory of the German bourgeoisie, at the 
time that Germany was governed by absolute monarchs and by the aristocracy.  Hence, it 
was hostile to the state. However, despite this hostility, the state was tolerated because it 
secured a guarantee of private property to the bourgeoisie1093. The liberal idea of the state- 
and here Kelsen cites again Lassalle- confined it to a “night-watchman” role, namely to the 
protection of private property and individual rights1094.  
According to Kelsen this liberal approach of the state derives from a “natural” concept of 
freedom, which has a negative meaning. On the contrary, Kelsen endorses a different 
concept of freedom, which goes hand in hand with his conceptualization of the State from 
the perspective of democracy and with his “equilibrium” state analysis1095. This is a 
“denaturalized” freedom that “is transformed into social or political freedom. To be 
politically free means to be subject to a will, which is not however, a foreign, but rather 
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one’s own will…Anarchical freedom becomes democratic freedom”1096.  
In this direction, Kelsen brings in Rousseau, whom he deems as “possibly the most 
important theorist of democracy”1097. He takes into account Rousseau’s theory in order to 
justify this- as he calls it- “metamorphosis”1098 from the natural-individual concept of 
freedom to a positive-political concept of freedom. Based on this “perceptual shift”, he 
argues that “individual freedom is replaced by popular sovereignty, and a free state, or 
republic (Freisstaat), becomes the fundamental demand”1099.  
Kelsen concludes that “this transformation simultaneously requires that we detach 
democracy from liberalism”1100. In this direction, his concept of freedom is actually an 
inversion of Benjamin Constant’s distinction between the “liberties of ancients” and the 
“liberties of moderns” (that denotes an abstention from the state) to a logic of democracy 
that signifies a participation of the citizen in the state1101. That’s why Rousseau is “useful” 
to him. 
Having described this “perceptual shift”, Kelsen takes this further by arguing now against 
Rousseau’s “identification” thesis (between representatives and represented) and direct 
democracy. The main reason that does not allow for a “primitive”-as he calls it- form of 
direct democracy is the reality of the “complexity of social conditions that makes the 
advantages of labor division indispensable”1102. Given this, parliamentary democracy and 
the majority principle is a necessary compromise between the “primitive” idea of political 
freedom and the principle of the division of labor, as Kelsen argues1103.  
Moreover, he writes that, historically, it is through the “declaration of independence from 
the People” that parliament asserted its transformation from the old estate assembly 
“whose members were bound by and responsible to their mandates of their constituent 
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groups”1104. This excerpt denotes a second crucial difference from Rousseau: a distinction 
between the political and the social as an outcome of modern representation, in contrast 
with the early modern concept of representation (estate assembly).  
However, this distinction does not presuppose the bourgeois distinction between the 
political and the economic. As Kelsen, argues “such a clear separation of the political from 
the economic is impossible on most matters, as most economic matters have political, and 
most political matters economic, relevance…”1105. We can see, therefore, that Kelsen’s 
concept of parliamentary representation remains different from the concept of a liberal-
individualistic freedom that would be pre-political and hostile to the state.  
This concept of parliamentary representation is based not only on the division of labor but 
also on Kelsen’s concept of the “people” (see above). That’s because Kelsen justifies 
parliamentarism with reference to the lack of an “organic common will”1106. As he argued, 
due to social plurality, “one can speak of unity only in a normative sense”1107. So, 
according to Kelsen, the will of society can emerge only through the multi-party 
parliamentarism that represents the “fiction” of the people1108. As Kelsen wrote, “the 
fiction of representation is meant to legitimate parliamentarism from the standpoint of 
popular sovereignty”1109. 
On the contrary, the forms of representation that dissolve the political-social distinction are 
based on a logic of a homogeneous will and lead to autocratic outcomes. This is also how 
we can understand Kelsen’s critique of Rousseau for autocratic tendencies, when he writes 
that “[Rousseau] is not far from doing so, when he justifies the binding nature of majority 
decisions i.e the authority of the majority, on the basis that the minority has erred 
regarding the true content of the volonté générale”1110. He therefore understands 
Rousseau’s argument as being based on a common organic will. 
Kelsen argues that this autocratic logic, which suppresses social plurality, belongs to 
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philosophical absolutism, which signifies the resort of the political to the logic of “absolute 
truth”1111. This philosophical absolutism “transcends experience”, since it is inaccessible 
to human cognition and, therefore, to its critical disposition1112. That’s why it is linked to 
autocracy and not to democracy. 
 On the contrary, democracy, according to Kelsen, presupposes a relativistic viewpoint. 
The institution that embodies both this relativism and self-determination when a division 
of labor and social plurality exist, is parliament. However, the embodiment of this 
philosophical relativism, by parliament, should be seen under specific conditions.  
Firstly, parliament is expressing this relativism if it endorses proportional representation in 
the sense that “the true constellation of interests is reflected by this body in the first 
place… proportional representation actually amplifies the very tendency of freedom to 
prevent the will of majority from completely dominating the will of the minority”1113.  
There is also a second step, which is that the “entire parliamentary process, whose 
dialectical procedures based on speech, and counterspeech, argument and 
counterargumentation, aims for the achievement of compromise…”1114. From this excerpt 
arises the issue of “compromise”. The word does not denote a “higher absolute truth or an 
absolute value standing above group interests”1115 (given also his critique to Marxism 
precisely for this reason).  
I think that we should view this concept of “compromise” in two stages. Firstly, as a 
precondition for the formation of a parliamentary majority, so as to prevent the danger of 
extensive party fragmentation, which could be caused by proportional representation1116. 
The assumption here is the division of the people into political parties. As Kelsen argues “if 
the will of society is not to be the expression of the interests of one group along, that will 
must be the result of a compromise between opposing interests. The division of the People 
into political parties, in truth, establishes, the organizational preconditions for the 
achievement of such compromises and the possibility of steering the will of society in a 
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moderate direction”1117.  It is through party compromises that social peace is provisionally 
ensured (as visible in the excerpt above).  
 
The second stage concerns the compromise between the majority and the minority, which 
is evident in the following phrase: “if one disregards the fiction that the majority somehow 
represents the minority and that the will of the majority is the will of all, then the majority 
principle comes to be perceived as a principle of domination by the majority over the 
minority”1118.  
The consequence of this compromise logic is “practically” the protection of the minority, 
which means that “measures, which infringe upon the certain national, religious, economic 
or broadly intellectual spheres of interests, are possible only with the assent, and not 
against the will of a qualified minority; that is they require agreement between the majority 
and the minority”1119.  
This compromise logic should be seen as “inscribed in the social-democratic strategy”: it 
is the way in which a gradual and pacific transformation is preferred over a violent and 
revolutionary one1120. In this vein, it is not accidental that Kelsen makes an explicit 
reference to Bauer’s theory of “equilibrium of class strengths”1121 in the section, in which 
he discusses the issue of compromise. As an aside, it should also be noted that this 
thematic of compromise was introduced much earlier by Bernstein (in 1899) who had 
argued that democracy is the “high school of compromise”1122 in the sense that it “teaches 
social classes to cooperate with one another”1123.  
Thirdly (reminding that the first is proportional representation and the second is protection 
of minority), Kelsen’s concept of parliamentarism presupposes also the essential inclusion 
of “fundamental rights or human and civil rights” in “all modern parliamentary-
democratic constitutions”1124. Kelsen argued that these rights should be protected by the 
higher quorum of two-thirds or three quarters majority, which is enjoyed by the 
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constitutional laws1125. Moreover, he explicitly included them (“equality before the law, of 
individual liberty, of freedom of conscience and so on”) in his broader concept of the 
constitution that can be traced along with the narrower-“substantive” one in his “Pure 
Theory” 1126 (see section 3).  
Kelsen’s concept of rights should not be seen as detached from his overall state theory and 
social-democratic strategy. The identification of Kelsen’s theory as “left-liberal”- with 
reference also to an excerpt from Kelsen’s more liberal-leaning “American” period1127 that 
includes these rights in the category of “political liberalism”1128- misses the context in 
which Kelsen’s concept of rights was developed during the 1920s. That’s because Kelsen 
does not accept the liberal concept of the state1129 (as seen also above) and the liberal 
concept of freedom. To put it differently, Kelsen is as liberal as Bernstein is, who had 
argued that socialism is the legitimate heir of liberalism (as seen in chapter 2).   
 
Fourthly, Kelsen’s concept of philosophical relativism (centered around parliament) 
presupposes the elements of “publicity-criticism-accountability [and] the belief that the 
leader can be freely chosen”1130. These elements differentiate “democracy” from 
“autocracy”, in that the latter is based on a concept of leadership that “transcends society” 
and keeps “secret” the actions of the leader1131, which makes accountability impossible. 
So, Kelsen ties mass democracy to a logic of publicity and accountability, namely to a 
public sphere without associating this sphere to a 19th century model of parliamentarism 
(as Schmitt did, see chapter 5).  
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Kelsen’s third ‘enemy’: conservatism 
 
 
We have now a better picture of Kelsen’s concept of political representation. In this 
picture, parliamentary democracy plays a central role, which puts Kelsen on the antipode 
of the conservative critique during Weimar. This critique, which is Kelsen’s third ‘enemy’, 
argued that the people in a parliamentary democracy constitute a “soulless mass” and that 
democratic society is “mechanized”1132. 
 
Kelsen wrote that this critique derived from the logic of an organic “general will” and, 
therefore, of an organic society1133. This “organic society” is “this illusory idea of a 
solidarity of interests among all of society’s parts free from religious, ethnic, economic, 
and other differences which is then contrasted with the so-called multiparty state and with 
mechanical democracy”1134.  
Kelsen rejects this perspective because it presents the “state as the tool for the common 
interests of a unified community….it is simply an attempt to idealize, or rather justify, 
reality for political reasons”1135. Hence, he wrote that, due to the neglecting of social 
conflict, this logic of common interest was “above partisanship…metaphysical-or better, 
meta-political - illusion”1136. 
With the same argumentation Kelsen renounced as well corporative representation, by 
writing that the conflict between employers and employees is “exacerbated” when they are 
in the same “vocational group”1137. Thus, he also viewed the dangers of the dissolution 
between the social and the political (endorsed by the “associational” theory of Gierke).  
However, Kelsen’s defense of the parties is also not uncritical in the sense that he 
                                                
1132Here Kelsen refers to Triepel and he conceives him as a “typical representative of this dogma”. 
Ibid. 44-45 
1133 Ibid. 40 
1134 Ibid. 
1135 Ibid. 
1136 Ibid. 
1137 Ibid. 64 
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recognizes Weber’s insights (even without mentioning his name) into the bureaucratization 
of political parties. He argued that political parties take an “aristocratic-autocratic form... 
(even the parties “pursuing a radical democratic program”1138). Thus, he also makes a 
counter-move by suggesting the constitutional “anchoring” of political parties as public 
bodies (this was not the case in the Weimar Constitution)1139. This would help to make the 
parties more democratic internally. Moreover, he proposes also a series of reforms aimed at 
reinforcing parliament’s democratic accountability (such as the abolition of legislative 
immunity) and closer contact between the people and parliament (e.g. petition by citizens, 
referendums)1140.  
Kelsen’s overall methodology is in the direction of reinforcing parliamentarism. In this 
sense, he moves to the opposite side of Schmitt’s meta-political suggestions. Whereas 
Kelsen tried to reinforce parliamentarism so that social conflict can be better expressed, 
Schmitt’s suggestions tried to depoliticize the conflict, through appeal to the President as 
pouvoir neutre (see chapter 5).  
Concluding this second section of the chapter, we have seen that Kelsen’s political theory 
is centered on the modern State and has three explicit enemies: marxism conceived as 
“anarchism”, liberalism and conservatism. All these currents, according to Kelsen, share 
something crucial: they assume a given, sociologically-reified relationship between the 
State and society and, relatedly, a viewpoint of “philosophical absolutism” that is not a 
friend of democracy.  
On the contrary, according to Kelsen, democracy presupposes a relativistic approach 
around the distinction between State and society. This is based both on the logic of an 
inescapable and irreducible social plurality and conflict but also on Kelsen’s concrete 
analysis of the modern democratic state, which derives from his social democratic 
assumptions. So, the basic thread that permeated Kelsen’s political theory, is a logic of the 
state as an instrument through which (and mainly through parliament) the social is 
expressed (notwithstanding that it always remains conflictual). 
                                                
1138 Ibid. 41 
1139 Ibid. 
1140Influenced by the Soviet constitution, he is also thinking about some form of imperative mandate. 
However, in his version, this could take place through political parties and with the assumption that they will 
be very democratic (internally) and that almost all the people will be organized in them. 
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 As Kelsen had written in the framework of his analysis of James MacDonald’s theory- 
whose writings were well known in Germany because they had been translated in 1912 and 
the preface was written by Bernstein1141- the State is “not a class instrument but an organ 
of the society”1142. 
 
6.3. Kelsen’s legal theory: Law as a “social technique” and his critique of ideological 
dualisms 
 
It’s time now to see how Kelsen’s political-state theory is related to his legal theory.  
 
This connection is explicitly traced in Kelsen’s argument that “the idea of legality, though 
it places constraints on democracy must nonetheless be upheld if democracy is to be 
realized”1143. As Urbinati writes, Kelsen’s concept of legal order “does not need to be 
understood as an independent set of constraints, imposed ‘externally’ on the exercise of 
popular sovereignty but emerges instead as its background condition of possibility”1144. 
 
This association is also seen in that Kelsen’s legal theory is permeated by the same logic as 
his political theory. As noted earlier, Kelsen conceived the democratic state as an 
instrument that can be used in various directions by society. In an analogous fashion, 
Kelsen argued, in 1931, that the law “not seen through the lens of an ideology, is nothing 
but a social technique”1145. This overall direction is more evident given that Kelsen’s legal 
theory has the same ‘enemies’ as his political theory: liberalism, marxism, conservatism. 
His legal theory can be viewed closely through his critique of his “opponents”.  
 
 Kelsen’s critique starts from “traditional” 19th century legal theory, in which he includes 
both the liberal and the conservative conceptions of legal theory. Regarding the former, 
Kelsen distanced himself from the “liberal-individualist” theory that is “hidden in some of 
                                                
1141 Herrera (1997) 311 
1142 Kelsen ([1925] 1967) 297 
1143 Kelsen ([1929] 2013) 83 
1144  Urbinati (2013) 1-24, 17  
1145Kelsen ([1931] 1967) 92. The translation from German is mine. 
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the traditional thinking of the law of the state”1146. He argues that this legal theory adopts 
the “ideological” dualism between “subjective right” and “objective law”.  
 
This dualism denotes “the essence of legal personality [that] is declared to be precisely the 
negation of every bond, namely liberty in terms of self-determination or autonomy” as 
opposed to the objective law of the democratic legal order, which “is in fact coercion” 1147. 
This dualism is based on the “concept of legal subject or ‘person’ qua bearer of the 
subjective right, a concept essentially modelled on the property owner”1148. The 
ramification of this dualism is that a “system that does not recognize the human being as a 
free personality in this sense, a system that does not guarantee subjective rights, should 
not be considered a legal system at all”1149.  
 
The most important aspect in this dualism between “subjective right” and “objective law” 
is its ideological role. This is seen through the correspondence of this dualism to the 
distinction between “personal” and “material” legal relations “depending on whether the 
connection in question is, respectively, between legal subject and object- person and thing- 
or between subjects”1150. This latter distinction between “personal” and “material” legal 
relations, which is important in the “systematization of the civil law”, is modeled on 
property that is presented as a relation between person and thing. This distinction is 
“ideological” in that “…a definition of property as a relation between person and thing 
disguises the socio-economically decisive function of property, a function characterized in 
socialist theory (never mind whether correctly or incorrectly) as ‘exploitation’”1151. This 
process of disguise shows, therefore, precisely the ideological role of the dualism between 
“subjective right” and “objective law”.  
 
This dualism between “subjective right” and “objective law” is essentially related to the 
dualism between “private” and “public” law. This latter dualism “turns on a classification 
of legal relations, with private law representing a relation between coordinate subjects of 
equal standing legally, and public law representing a relation between a superordinate and 
                                                
1146 Kelsen, Hans ([1929] 2000). ‘Legal Formalism and the Pure Theory of Law’ in Jacobson, Arthur & 
Schlink, Bernhard (eds.) Weimar. A Jurisprudence of Crisis, Berkeley, London: University of California 
Press, 80 
1147 Kelsen ([1934] 1996) 40 
1148 Ibid. 39 
1149 Ibid. 41 
1150 Ibid. 
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a subordinate subject- between two subjects, then, one of which is of higher standing 
legally than the other”1152.  
 
As it is evident from this excerpt, this dualism juxtaposes the autocratic method of creation 
of norms by the state with the democratic method of creating law in the sphere of private 
autonomy1153. Moreover, this dualism, as Kelsen argues, “creates the illusion that the field 
of public law alone -above all the fields of constitutional and administrative law- is the 
domain of public power, which is totally excluded from the field of private law”1154.  
 
This distinction is, therefore, ideological given that it “obscure[s] the fact that the private 
law created in the contract is no less the arena of political power than the public law 
created in legislation and administration. What we call private law, seen from the 
standpoint of its function—qua part of the legal system—in the fabric of the law as a 
whole, is simply a particular form of law, the form corresponding to the capitalistic 
economic system of production and distribution; its function, then, is the eminently 
political function of exercising power”1155. 
 
Kelsen’s theory reveals, therefore, that these dualisms reify the legal order by concealing 
the political dimension of the socio-economic relationships. So, through this “ideological” 
role, they are tied to a concept of legality that reifies the State-civil society distinction, by 
detaching the socio-economic relationships from the democratic accountability of the 
“we”. It should be reminded here, as an aside, that this overall direction could also be seen 
in Schmitt’s presupposition of a general law and, then, in his theory of “institutional 
guarantees” as a method to avert parliamentary intervention in the economy (see chapter 
5).  
 
Against the reification caused by these dualisms, Kelsen suggests their dissolution and, 
while arguing that legislation is general1156, he did not insert any such restriction. So, as 
Brunkhorst writes, “Kelsen and Heller are arguing in concern in this respect. They have 
always argued for the input theory of the generality of parliamentary statutes. 
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Parliamentary statutes (laws, Gesetze) are practically (and not necessarily semantically) 
general because they are an expression of the general will that is realized through the 
procedural (equal, free and fair) regulated will of the majority…This legally enables the 
parliamentary transformation from capitalism to socialism and the socialization of the 
means of production”1157. 
 
Against liberal legal theory, Kelsen also counterposes his “dynamic” legal theory (in 
contrast with the earlier static version of his theory) during the post-Great War period1158. 
Making a short digression here into analyzing this theory, Kelsen indicates that “while the 
presupposition of the basic norm has the character of pure norm creation, and the coercive 
act has the character of pure application, everything between these limiting cases is both 
law creation and law application. One should note in particular that even the private law 
transaction is both, and it cannot be contrasted, qua act of law application, with 
legislation qua act of law creation—a mistake made in traditional theory. For legislation, 
too, like the private law transaction, is both law creation and law application”1159. Thus, 
the private law transaction entails also the element of law creation. 
 
This theory is related to the fact that the “…main emphasis of the constitution consists in 
governing the process whereby statutes are enacted, with little, if any, weight given to 
determining their content” (for the broader concept of the constitution see the second 
section and the footnote1160). Given this, “it is the task of legislation to determine in equal 
measure both the content and the creation of judicial and administrative acts”1161. The 
                                                
1157 Brunkhorst (2014). Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions: Evolutionary perspectives, New York, London: 
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general legal norms are further concretized by the Courts, the administration but also at the 
level of private law transactions1162.  
 
Thus, the law-creation process- “that is the dynamics of state decision-making (Staatliche 
Willensbildung)”- can be seen at the level of legislation, of administration, in the Court 
rulings and “it is continued in particular also in the acts of the legal-contractual law 
creation”1163. 
 
The effect of this theory, as he put in his 1931 argumentation, is that it “makes…impossible 
to oppose the subjective and private sphere of the contractual legal creation as being 
unpolitical or politically indifferent to the political-public-legal [sphere] of legislation and 
administration. From its absolutely universalist point of view [the pure theory] 
...recognizes the collective and thus the political function of a legal contract, which is 
precisely one of the specific legal forms, in which the capitalist legal system regulates 
economic production and especially the distribution of products”1164. 
 
To put it bluntly, this method shows that for Kelsen there is a political dimension in the 
legal contract through its law-creation dimension. In this vein, he argues that the “pure 
theory” has “demolished the ideological wall” of the traditional theory “between the 
allegedly only law-applying legal transaction and the allegedly only law-creating 
legislation and administration”1165. It is also crucial that in this direction he cites 
approvingly Karl Renner’s argumentation (an adherent of the “immanent” strategy as seen 
in chapters 4.3), according to which the capitalist's right is nothing but “delegated public 
power, blindly delegated to the benefit of those who have power (Gewalthabers)” and 
especially the employment relationship is "indirect power relationship" 
(Herrschaftsverhältnis)1166.  
 
It can be seen, therefore, that Kelsen ties the political dimension to law-creation, which 
does not take place exclusively in the parliament.  Leaving this last point aside for the time 
being (see the next section), another issue that is revealed through the private-public law 
dualism is that it paves the way for the state-law dualism. That’s due to the fact that public 
law is not conceived as stricto sensu law and private law is conceived as “the proper realm 
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of law”.  
 
Its effect is, as Kelsen wrote, that “…the relation between a general norm and the organ 
applying it would be different in the private and public law fields; in private law, the 
application of statutes to concrete cases would be constrained, bound by the statute, while 
in public law, realization of the state purpose would be unhampered, constrained merely 
by the framework of the statute…in the case of a so-called national state of emergency, the 
realization of the state purpose could even go against the statute”1167. 
 
It is visible, therefore, especially in this last excerpt, that Kelsen refers to a connection of 
the private-public law distinction with the third significant dualism of traditional theory, 
which is the state-law dualism (that captures also conservative legal theory)1168. This state-
law dualism “is the result when traditional theory attributes to the state an existence 
independent of the legal system, while at the same time regarding the state as a subject of 
legal obligations and rights, that is, as a [legal] person”1169.  
 
This dualism plays a significant ideological role in the sense that “from a naked fact of 
power, the state becomes the Rechtsstaat, which justifies itself by making law. To the extent 
that a metaphysico-religious legitimization of the state ceases to be effective, this theory of 
the Rechtsstaat inevitably becomes the sole possible justification of the state…But it 
emphasizes at the same time that the state cannot be comprehended legally because the 
state qua power is essentially different from the law”1170.  
 
 In other words, both the law and the State are legitimized through their distinction but by 
being, at the same time, inside the juridical order. In this way, law is still there but the State 
can act beyond it while being legitimized by it. This has as a consequence the state’s 
“independence from the statute, from the general norms created by the people’s 
representatives or with their substantial participation” 1171.  
  
On the contrary, Kelsen argues for the famous identity thesis between State and law in 
                                                
1167 Kelsen ([1934] 1996) 94 
1168Kelsen ([1929] 2000) 79 
1169Kelsen ([1934] 1996) 97 
1170Ibid. 98 
1171 Ibid. 95 
 248 
order to combat the “political ideology” of State-law dualism. If the identity thesis is 
adopted, “then it is impossible to justify the state by way of the law” as Kelsen writes1172. 
Moreover, it is significant that Kelsen does not ascribe the aforementioned dualism only to 
conservative legal theory, but argues that this dualism is part of the “bourgeois” state and 
legal theory (bürgerliche Staats-und Rechtstheorie) because it performs “an ideological 
function of extraordinary…importance”1173. This can be seen already through the 
association that he traced between the state-law dualism and the liberal private-public law 
distinction. 
 
In this way, Kelsen captures precisely, even without naming it, the two basic elements of 
Schmitt’s thought that are necessary in his theory of authoritarian liberalism. The first 
move, through the state-law dualism, is Schmitt’s hypostatization of a homogeneous unity 
represented by the State-“Constitution” (namely by the President) as opposed to the 
Weimar constitutional order but without stepping out of the juristic. The second move is 
the precondition of the semantic generality of “law” and, then, of the “institutional 
guarantees” in the direction of developing a bourgeois concept of legality that would 
obstruct parliament’s ability to enact legislation that would intervene in the economy.  
 
Kelsen, therefore, reveals that these three “bourgeois” dualisms are “ideological”- in that 
they try to legitimize a certain political conception of the State and of law- and that they 
are also interconnected. However, these dualisms, which are suggested positively by the 
“bourgeois” theory of law and state, are also accepted by Marxist legal theory (with the 
notable exception of Karl Renner1174) and, more particularly, by the legal theory of 
Pashukanis1175.  
 
Unravelling this gradually through the transition to Kelsen’s critique of Marxist legal 
theory, Kelsen argues that Pashukanis “is in perfect agreement with the prevailing doctrine 
within bourgeois legal ideology…”. His only difference is that, whereas “one usually 
speaks of ‘pulsating life’ or of social reality in general, he turns into the ‘relations of 
production’ as a Marxist”1176.  
According to Kelsen, this is due to the fact that Pashukanis’ theory is the “…consistent 
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application of the Marx -Engels doctrine of anarchism to the problem of law”1177. In this 
vein, Pashukanis accepted the “naïve utopianism” of a future society in which there would 
be “solidarity of interests” and only “technical” rules, given that in this society there would 
be a “unity of purpose” and not opposing private interests1178. This is “genuine ideology”, 
according to Kelsen, in the sense that it “conceals the coercion from man to man” that 
exists in every social order, precisely in the same way that this is concealed when the 
“bourgeois theoreticians” present the state “as an expression of the unity of an overall will 
(Gesamtwillens) or of a collective interest”1179 .  
 
Moreover, Kelsen associated the fact that Pashukanis does not understand the “ideological 
doubling” of the state-law distinction with the formulations of Marx and Engels, who kept 
this distinction. According to Kelsen, this derived from their base-superstructure 
distinction, which signifies that “...the totality of  these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises 
a legal and political superstructure”1180. The consequence of this base-superstructure 
distinction, Kelsen argues, is that the legal-political framework is conceived as distinct 
from society. Due to this fact, it corresponds to the state-law distinction1181.  
 
As we can see, Kelsen’s critique of Pashukanis is related to his critique of the Marxist 
theory of the State: by adopting the bourgeois methodological categories, Marxism falls 
into its trap. Against both the Marxist and the liberal theories, Kelsen’s dissolution of the 
dualisms is in line both with his concept of freedom, and with his relational conception of 
the State. In this way, whereas Pashukanis reduces the legal order to private law of 
commodity exchange, Kelsen’s move is the opposite. He argues explicitly that all law is 
“public law” in the sense that “there is not a legal relationship to which the state is not- 
directly or indirectly- a party”1182.  
 
Concluding this section, we have seen that Kelsen’s critique of the ideological dualisms at 
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the level of legal theory, is tied to a concept of law as a “social technique” (as he put it in 
his 1931 writing), which aims at keeping open the formulation of the State-civil society 
distinction, so that the social can be expressed in this legal order through Kelsen’s concept 
of the political. This undergirding from his state theory is also practically seen in his 
argument that “a constitution expresses the political forces (politischen Kräfte) of the 
people, it’s a document that attests the situation of relative equilibrium in which the 
struggling, for the power (Macht), groups remain until further notice”1183. Moreover, he 
had already defined the Constitution, when discussing the issue of constitutional review, as 
“a principle where the current balance of political forces is expressed”1184. As Herrera 
notes, this shows a certain “lassallism” in Kelsen’s legal theory1185. On the contrary, before 
1918, namely before his “dynamic theory” of law, Kelsen had attacked Ferdinand Lassalle 
for arguing that the real constitution is based on power, not on norms1186 (see chapter 2 
about Lassalle’s theory). 
 
However, at the same time, this association of Kelsen’s legal and state-political theory is 
done through the maintenance of an autonomy of the law. As Caldwell wrote, “Kelsen’s 
theory paradoxically tried to ground a purely normative science while at the same time 
denying the possibility of separating will and norms, society and state”1187. 
 
There are, nevertheless, two questions that arise out of this analysis of Kelsen’s theory. The 
first question is similar to a question posed in Kelsen’s state theory. Whereas Kelsen’s legal 
theory has a critical dimension because it unveils the ideological function of the above 
mentioned dualisms- that legitimized the Weimar presidential constitution (through the 
law-state dualism)- is it able to grasp the privatization process of the form of law that took 
place in Weimar?  
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Secondly, whereas Kelsen’s dynamic legal theory revealed that the whole spectrum of the 
State-civil society distinction is political (e.g. the legal contract), is the concept of the 
political that is seen in parliament the same as that seen in the Court decisions (or in the 
decisions of the administration)? Moreover, how can a judicial decision contain both a 
political and a legal component at the same time?  
 
6. 4. Kelsen’s constitutional review: the political in the legal 
 
In this section, I will answer the second question by focusing on Kelsen’s theory of 
constitutional review.  
Kelsen endorsed the establishment of a centralized constitutional review, as seen also in his 
suggestions regarding the Austrian Constitution (see section 1). He justified this by arguing 
for the necessity of an independent body that would uphold the constitutional order against 
the logic of the earlier statutory positivism, which did not distinguish between laws and the 
constitution. As he wrote “a constitution marked by the absence of a guarantee of the 
possibility to overturn unconstitutional legislation is not fully obligatory…a constitution in 
which institutional proceedings, and in particular unconstitutional laws, remain valid in 
such a manner…is virtually equal, from a truly legal perspective, to a wish lacking 
obligatory force”1188.  
Hence Kelsen argues that it is not only “individual administrative acts” that should be 
submitted to judicial review but also “general regulative norms and especially laws”- “the 
former with respect to their legality, the latter with respect to their constitutionality”1189. 
This is precisely the function of the Constitutional Court. 
The political logic that lies behind the necessity of this Court is the protection of 
parliamentary democracy and, especially, of the minority’s political existence “…the more 
the rules regarding quorum, a qualified constitutional majority, etc.… serve to protect the 
minority” (see also the second section)1190. As Kelsen argues, “…if the minority’s political 
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existence, which is so important for the very nature of democracy, is to be secure, that 
minority must have an opportunity to appeal, directly or indirectly, to the Constitutional 
Court. Otherwise, the minority would be subject to the arbitrary will of the majority and 
the constitution would be a lex imperfecta… Democracy without [such] controls is 
impossible in the long run; the abandonment of that very self-restraint, which the principle 
of legality represents, means the breakdown of democracy itself”1191.   
However, the picture becomes more puzzling once we trace the role that Kelsen ascribes to 
adjudication. Unfolding this gradually, Kelsen writes that the function of adjudication 
derives from the fact that “the general norm, attaching an abstractly determined 
consequence to an equally abstractly determined material fact, requires individualization if 
it is to have normative meaning at all. A material fact, determined in abstracto by the 
general norm, must be established as actually existing in concreto; and for this concrete 
case, the coercive act, prescribed likewise in abstracto by the general norm, must be made 
concrete, that is, first ordered and then realized. This multiple task is accomplished by the 
judicial decision… the judicial decision is itself an individual legal norm…; it is the 
continuation of the process of creating law—out of the general, the individual””1192. 
We can see from this excerpt that this is precisely where Kelsen’s dynamic theory is 
associated with adjudication given that, as Kelsen argues here, the judicial decision is a 
process of law-creation. The even more crucial point is that, according to Kelsen, this is a 
political judgement in the sense that “after all, every conflict of right is also a conflict of 
interest or power, every legal dispute therefore a political dispute”1193. The difference 
between legislation and adjudication turns into a matter of degree, into “quantitative” and 
not “qualitative” difference1194.  
This is more visible in the Constitutional Court, whose function is “political in character 
to a much higher degree than the function of other courts”1195 due to its power to 
invalidate statutes for all cases (whereas the ordinary courts only for a concrete case) and 
to control the acts of government (such as decrees and executive orders). In this direction, 
Kelsen argued that the Constitutional Court, given its political role, can be seen not 
through the scheme of separation but of “division” of powers (or, as he latter calls it, 
                                                
1191 Ibid. 
1192 Kelsen ([1934]1996) 67-68 
1193 Kelsen ([1931] 2015) 184 
1194 Ibid. See also Kelsen ([1934] 1996) 68. 
1195Kelsen ([1931] 2015) 185 
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“distribution of powers”1196) along with the legislature1197. In order words, not as purely 
judicial. 
This argumentation was developed during his Weimar debate with Carl Schmitt on the 
“Guardian of the Constitution”, in which Kelsen defended both the Constitutional Court as 
the “Guardian” of the Constitution and its political role- as opposed to Schmitt’s argument 
that political issues should not be driven by the Courts. This is a debate sparked after 
Kelsen’s defense of the Constitutional Court, at the meeting of the German Teachers of 
State Law, in Vienna, in 1928 and Schmitt’s response in 1929 (see also chapter 5)1198.  
However, there is a problem here, which is that, whereas Kelsen ascribes the role of the 
embodiment of the political to parliament, he simultaneously gives this role also to the 
Constitutional Court. Does the Court “comply” with the requirements for such a political 
role or is it incompatible with Kelsen’s theory of democracy and with the judicial role of 
the Court? This question concerns not only the Court but, to an extent, all the levels of law-
creation that were seen in the previous section, given that he ascribed to them a political 
role. However, the Court seems to be the most important in the sense that, for Kelsen, this 
is the “Guardian” of the Constitution. Hence, I will focus mainly on the Court in this 
section. 
Kelsen’s response to this question is to recognize explicitly that “the full import of law 
creation threatens to shift from the general to the individual level, that is from the legislator 
to the law-applying authority”1199. However, he tries to cope with this on a somewhat 
contradictory basis. On the one hand, he has various suggestions, such as the election of 
the judges by parliament (as in Austria), or even directly by the people. In this vein, he 
argues that “[Carl Schmitt’s] objection that ‘from a democratic point of view, it will hardly 
be possible to transfer such powers to an aristocracy of the robe’ can easily be answered by 
pointing out that a constitutional court elected by the people or even a constitutional court 
elected by parliament, for example after the fashion of the Austrian constitutional court 
                                                
1196Kelsen, Hans (1945). General Theory of Law and State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 272-273.  
1197 Kelsen, Hans ([1929] 2015). ‘On the nature and development of Constitutional Adjudication’ in Vinx, 
Lars (ed. and trans.) The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of 
Constitutional Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 46 
 
1198Kelsen’s talk in Vienna is in his paper “On the nature and development of constitutional adjudication”, 
([1929] 2015) 22-78. See also Paulson (2014) 18, 48.  
1199 Kelsen ([1934] 1996) 88.  
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according to the constitution of 1920, is anything but an ‘aristocracy of the robe’ ”1200.  
So, he suggests the Austrian process of appointment of judges (before the 1929 
constitutional reform) because it attributes democratic legitimacy to the Court so as to play 
its political role. In this direction, he adds also that the adversarial procedure of the Court 
helps the various interests to participate in the decisions of the Court “in much the same 
way they generally participate in the creation of law that concerns them”1201.   
However, on the other hand, Kelsen argues for the neutrality of the Constitutional Court 
and suggests a constrained role. In this vein, he advises that the legislator “has to make 
sure that the sphere of free discretion that the statutes leave to those who apply them is 
narrowed down as far as possible. The norms to be applied by a constitutional court, 
especially those which determine the content of future statutes, like the provisions 
concerning the basic rights, must not be formulated too broadly and must not operate with 
vague slogans like ‘freedom’, ‘equality’, ‘justice’, and so forth. Otherwise there is a 
danger of a politically highly inappropriate shift of power, not intended by the constitution, 
from the parliament to some other institution external to it ‘that may turn into the exponent 
of political forces completely different from those that express themselves in parliament’ 
”1202.  
In this direction, he also writes that the Court acts only as a “negative legislator”1203. 
Hence, it is contrasted with the “free creation” of parliament that “…is bound only in 
exceptional cases, and only by general principles, guidelines, and the like” (see above 
about the constitution qua means of allocation of legal powers)1204. However, he is 
ambiguous even on this, given his argument (in his Vienna talk) that the “annulment of a 
statute has the same general character as the enactment of a statute. The annulment, after 
all, is nothing but the inverse of enactment. The annulment of statutes is therefore itself a 
legislative function, and a court empowered to annul statutes is itself an organ of 
legislative power”1205. 
                                                
1200 Ibid. 174-221, 215 
1201 Ibid. 196 
1202 Ibid. 193-194 
1203 Ibid. 194 
1204 Kelsen ([1929] 2015) 48 
1205 Ibid. 46 
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Thus, there is an overall conundrum. We need to see firstly what lies behind Kelsen’s 
dynamic theory in order to approach it. As it is evident from the penultimate excerpt (“that 
may turn into...in parliament”) there is an implicit assumption in Kelsen’s thought that 
“change” inside the constitutional order should go hand in hand with the expression of the 
balance of political forces. This is also how we can connect this “dynamic” theory with the 
way in which it was used so as to criticize the liberal legal theory (as seen in the previous 
section), namely that it carves the space for his concept of the political to come.  
Such an interpretation seems to fit also with Brunkhorst’s take on Kelsen’s dynamic 
theory. He argued that Kelsen’s theory is revolutionary “…because it transforms the 
dualism of legislative will and executive performance, of political generation and 
professional application of legal norms, of general law and specific judgment into a 
continuum of concretization that (and here we need to correct Kelsen a bit) never ends, but 
goes and on in a hermeneutic-dialectical circle. Therefore, if at all levels of the continuum 
of concretization, legal norms are (politically) created, the principle of democracy (that is 
egalitarian deliberation and decision-making) is only fulfilled if those who are affected by 
these norms are included in a (socially and economically) fair and equal manners at all 
levels of their creation (albeit in what, in all probability, will be very different ways). 
Again, Kelsen himself (and again because of his empiricism) did not draw these radical 
consequences, but they are simply an implication of his construction of legal theory”1206.  
This sounds not far from Heller’s dialectical relationship between law and power, 
notwithstanding that Kelsen himself does not go that far and Heller criticizes Kelsen’s 
legal theory as “logicism of norms”1207 (despite also the fact that their state theories are 
quite close, see section 5).  
 However, I am more skeptical about Kelsen’s conflation of the “political” with the “legal” 
in all these processes of law-creation and, mainly, in the constitutional review that plays 
the most important role. I think that Kelsen’s problem is that he does not explain in a 
sufficiently clear way the meaning of his references to the “political” in his political and 
legal theory. Indicatively, I would categorize Kelsen’s references into four different 
meanings of the “political”: 
1)! the political as it is expressed in parliament. This is the main basis of Kelsen’s concept 
of the political (see section 2). 
                                                
1206Brunkhorst (2014) 256 
1207Heller ([1934] 1996) 1201. 
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2)! the concept of the political as expressed not merely through parliament e.g. trade 
unions. Kelsen refers to it briefly because social conflict can be carried directly into 
parliament through Kelsen’s concept of parliamentarism (e.g. proportional 
representation etc...)1208. 
3)! the political- “partisan” logic. This is related to the impartiality of the members of the 
Court. Kelsen refers to the necessity of independence of the Court as one of its main 
bases of justification1209. 
4) the political as it is expressed in the legal decision-making process, given that “every 
judicial sentence contains, to a higher or lesser degree, an element of decision, an element 
of an exercise of power”1210. Moreover, in this category, we can also add the “political” in 
every law-creation process as seen before (e.g. administration, private legal contracts). 
Kelsen does not seem to differentiate on these grounds except for a distinction based on 
degree. In this way, nevertheless, he runs the danger of conflating these levels, given also 
that the constitutions do often contain vague clauses. This danger is twofold.  
The first is the undermining of parliament, and along with that of the political. It is clear 
that a case in a court- even if this is a Constitutional Court with its greater publicity and 
justification- acquires necessarily an “always-already” legal discourse and 
institutionalization in contrast with the procedural institutionalization of parliament. As a 
result, the reflexivity of the political in a parliamentary procedure cannot be seen in a 
judicial procedure1211.  
Moreover, the accountability of judges is of a different kind from the logic of democratic 
accountability that is embodied in parliament. This turns also against Kelsen’s own 
assumptions of his political theory, since in this theory he argues fiercely against the logic 
of epistemic-technocratic decisions in a democracy, by calling them “a donkey in a lion’s 
skin”1212. I am not certain that this technocratic character can change with an election of 
judges by parliament, given that judges still have to be independent and to stick to the legal 
                                                
1208Kelsen (1929 [2013]) 55 
1209 Kelsen ([1931] 2015) 181 
1210Ibid 184 
1211See also Christodoulidis, Emilios (1998). Law and reflexive politics. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
1212See Kelsen, Hans ([1929] 2013). The Essence and Value of Democracy, in Urbinati, N.&Accetti, 
C.I.(Eds.), Graf, B.(transl.). New York:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 102.  
This is also argued by Urbinati (2013) 1-24, 6 
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framing of the issues. As a result, we can see that the “adversarial procedure” of the Court 
has little to do with the parliamentary procedure. 
The second danger is in the opposite direction: the danger of destabilizing the autonomy of 
the legal system. This is the danger at a methodological level (namely at the level of legal 
cognition) that there would be a legal “agnosticism” through the conflation between the 
political and the legal element. This leads, nevertheless, to the dissolution of the existing 
guarantees of legal certainty and of the formality of the legal system (that Kelsen’s concept 
of legality wanted to safeguard). Without adopting the language of natural-law morality 
that tries to identify law with a just legal order, it suffices to say that this formality is not 
always against the popular classes, but it can also ensure guarantees and procedures that 
protect the less powerful. It is not accidental that the authoritarian regimes act mostly in an 
anti-formalist manner1213, as we saw also in the case of late Weimar.  
The effects of Kelsen’s methodological conflation are visible “practically” in the 
divergence between his theoretical critique and his comment regarding the judicial 
decision in the Prussian coup case. Regarding the former, he was very critical of the 
concept of Constitution that Schmitt developed in the “Guardian of the Constitution”. He 
argued that Schmitt’s interpretation of the constitution “cannot stop itself from culminating 
in an apotheosis of article 48. It leads to the probably unintended but all the more 
paradoxical conclusion that the pluralistic system or, in plain German, parliament is that 
which ‘severely threatens or disturbs the public security and order in the German Reich’. 
The true function of parliament, given that it is an essentially pluralistic institution, seems 
to consist in the permanent fulfilment of the conditions that the Weimar Constitution 
requires for a use of article 48 paragraph 2”1214 (see also other parts of Kelsen’s critique 
of Schmitt’s “Guardian of the Constitution in chapter 5.4). 
This shows clearly that he opts for a restrictive interpretation of article 48. However, the 
picture gets more blurred in his comment regarding the judicial decision in the Prussian 
coup case (see chapter 5 about this Solomonic decision). Whereas in the first part of his 
comment Kelsen “tended towards invalidation” of the emergency decree in whole1215, he 
ultimately argued that it is not the Staatsgerichtshof that should be blamed for its decision 
                                                
1213See Neumann ([1942 1944] 2009)  
1214Kelsen ([1931] 2015) 219-220 
1215 Dyzenhaus (1997) 128 
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but the “technical insufficiency of the Weimar Constitution itself”1216. He justified this by 
writing that, firstly, the Constitution did not establish a Constitutional Court that would 
provide with “effective guarantees” for the preservation of the constitution. Secondly, he 
argued that, albeit the “intention of the authors of the Weimar constitution must surely have 
been directed at restricting the measures to be taken under article 48 paragraph 2”, the 
lack of the implementing statute of the fifth paragraph of article 48 made the authorization 
broad enough1217. Hence, he concluded that “the interpretation that comes to expression in 
the decree of 20 July is no less plausible, within the wide frame of article 48 paragraph 2, 
than the interpretation put forward by the Staatsgerichtshof”1218.  
I think that Dyzenhaus is right to argue that Kelsen’s conclusion is driven by his legal 
theory, which left him unable to show in a clear way the unconstitutionality of the decree 
(as the Prussian government argued for), in the sense that this would be another political 
argument and not a legal-scientific argument1219. In this vein, Dyzenhaus writes that “in the 
end Kelsen seems deprived by his own Pure Theory from making the very argument his 
polemic against Schmitt had promised, and so the Pure Theory fails to deliver on its 
apparent promise”1220.  
I think that this is related to Kelsen’s aforementioned indistinction between the concepts of 
the political that he adopted, which led him also to exaggerate the political component of 
the judicial decision-making procedure. Regarding this procedure, whereas Kelsen is right 
that the political component is not totally absent therein, I think that it can be conceived 
solely as knowledge regarding the political-historical context, which gave meaning to the 
Constitution as a political text (by revealing the reasons for its introduction and political 
function). This political element could function as an “objective cognitive presupposition 
of the correct interpretation”, in the context of a realistic-systematic approach of law (that 
does not legitimize political choices), as Dimoulis argues1221. Thus, this political 
knowledge is a cognitive precondition and not something that acts as a free-standing 
                                                
1216 Kelsen, Hans ([1932] 2015). ‘Kelsen on the judgment of the Staatsgerichtshof of the 25th of October 
1932’ in Vinx, Lars (ed. and trans.) The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the 
Limits of Constitutional Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 251 
1217 Ibid. 252 
1218 Ibid 253-254 
1219 Dyzenhaus (1997) 132 
1220 Ibid. 
1221On this see Dimoulis, Dimitris (2001). “The law of the political: An account of constitutional theory and 
constitutional interpretation”, (in Greek Το δίκαιο της πολιτικής. Μελέτες συνταγµατικής θεωρίας και 
ερµηνείας). Εκδόσεις Ελληνικά Γράµµατα, 83-86 
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political decision,1222 given also that the wording of the constitution is not like a novel that 
can be interpreted in various ways, but is a normative text that aims to guide political and 
social practices.  
An indicative example of this essential political-historical knowledge for a legal decision 
to be made, is that it would be impossible to make a legal analysis of the President’s role in 
Weimar, unless we knew the historical context of the 1919 Weimar Constitution (see 
chapter 3). It is only by resorting to this context that we can grasp the meaning of article 
48, in view of the whole Weimar constitutional order, namely we can see that the 
President’s role was not the same as in the 1871 constitution, but  was related to a counter-
weight concept of president and not to Schmitt’s concept of president (see chapter 3). It is 
this context that allows us to see how the meaning of article 48 changed throughout 
Weimar and, finally, led to the rise of the Presidential constitution through a series of 
unconstitutional emergency decrees (see chapter 5).  
 The insertion of this political dimension helps to avoid Kelsen’s agnosticism in the 
interpretation of the constitutional order. However, it is true that this does not always make 
things clear, in the sense that there will also be cases that are not clear cut. This is 
especially when the Constitution might also embody a “dilatory compromise”. The latter 
case, nevertheless, leaves discretion to the legislator to decide. 
On the contrary, Kelsen’s theory of adjudication runs the danger of ‘achieving’ what he 
criticizes, namely a legitimization of policies through legal interpretation. So, to conclude, 
Kelsen’s analysis on this issue seems problematic from the perspective of Kelsen’s 
political and legal theory and could not oppose efficiently Schmitt’s theory at this level. 
 
6.5. Kelsen’s theory, the late Weimar Republic and the “family” of social democratic 
approaches 
 
This section concerns the question regarding the feasibility of Kelsen’s theory in the 
Weimar political context and especially in the context of late Weimar.  
 
Before answering this question directly, it should be clarified that Weimar’s fall, from the 
                                                
1222 Ibid. 
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perspective of constitutional theory, came through the hegemony of Schmitt’s theory and 
the “apotheosis of article 48”. It came, therefore, through the defeat of Kelsen’s theory. 
Schmitt’s hegemony was apparent during the early 1930s, not only in the political terrain 
(as seen in chapter 5), but also among Teachers of State Law, even among those that had 
rejected Schmitt’s expansive interpretation of article 48, at the conference of Professors of 
State Law, in Jena, in 1924 (e.g. Gerhard Anschütz, Richard Thoma)1223. Indicatively, 
Gerhard Anschütz, Richard Thoma and Walter Jellinek, who were both positivists and 
advocates of parliamentary democracy (the former two were also members of the 
DDP1224), argued during the early 1930s for an expansive interpretation of article 48, 
regarding the fiscal and budgetary issues by invoking the negative majority of the Weimar 
Reichstag.  
 
Thoma wrote that “in times of emergency…such decrees are necessary for the existence of 
the state”1225 , in the sense that the collapse of the fiscal condition of the state and of the 
private economic sector would lead, sooner or later, to a serious disruption of public 
order1226. Anschütz and Jellinek subsumed also the economic emergency, under article 48, 
on the occasion of a legal brief that was written for the Brüning government1227. It is 
interesting that Anschütz justified the circumvention of the Reichstag by citing an excerpt 
from Schmitt’s “Guardian of the Constitution”, according to which “If a parliament that 
has become a stage for the pluralistic system is no longer able to do this [namely to be the 
decisive factor in the formation of the will of the state], then it does not have the right to 
demand that all other responsible authorities become equally incapable of action”1228. 
Thus, the argumentation of these scholars was similar to Schmitt’s argumentation, in Jena.  
 
                                                
1223About Jena see Kennedy (2004) 161. See also Mehring (2014) 576 (footnote 61) 
1224Caldwell (1997) 65 
1225Thoma, Richard, “Die Notstandsverordnung des Reichspräsidenten vom 26. Juli 1930’’ (1931), Zeitschrift 
für öffentlichen Rechts (11), 12-33, 17 in Kennedy (2011) 292 
1226 Kessopoulos (2016) 105 
1227The brief was “on whether Article 48 could be used instead of Article 87 to authorize credit”. Kennedy 
(2011). 291 
See Anschütz, Gerhard, and Walter Jellinek (1932). “Reichskredite und Diktatur: Zwei Rechtsgutachten’’. 
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To be clear, there were also other voices in the positivist camp that maintained their 
opposition to an expansive interpretation of article 48. Such a case1229 was the 
Staatsrechtslehrer, Fritz Stier-Somlo,1230 who argued that article 48 concerned only public 
security and order, not an emergency in general, given that the Weimar Constitution did 
not adopt the much broader term of article 55 of the Prussian constitution, which was 
“unusual emergency”1231. Moreover, he argued that “from a Staatsrecht standpoint” it is 
“absolutely inadmissible” (unbedingt unzulässig) what happened in July 1930, namely the 
fact that parliament’s decision to rescind the decrees was followed by a presidential decree 
of a similar content1232. That’s because when a political program is rejected by the 
Reichstag, it is the program that should change and not parliament’s legislative role1233.   
 
Going back to Kelsen, he was firstly opposed to this “apotheosis” of article 48 (as seen in 
6.4) and, more than that, he had also understood by 1932 that the ideal of democracy was 
waning and that dictatorship was becoming hegemonic, both at the political and at the 
theoretical level. As he wrote, “The ideal of democracy is waning, and at the dark horizon 
of our time a new star is rising, one to which the hopes of the masses are directed with 
increasingly fervent fait the bloodier its radiance shines above them: dictatorship…In the 
realm of social theory… the judgment on the value of democracy has changed with quite 
remarkable rapidity during the last decade. The number of theoreticians who find anything 
positive in this form of government is shrinking continually… Within the circles of state 
law teachers and sociologists, it almost goes without saying today that one speaks of 
democracy only in contemptuous words, it is considered modern to welcome dictatorship- 
directly or indirectly- as the dawn of a new era”1234. 
 
However, despite Kelsen’s defense of democracy, the question is what resources did 
Kelsen’s theory offer against this hegemonic tendency. On the one hand, I think that the 
emphasis of Kelsen’s political theory on parliament could have been very helpful in  
                                                
1229Hans Nawiasky was also in a similar direction and was influenced by Kelsen’s thinking. See Caldwell 
(1997) 172 
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 Stolleis (2004) 271 
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1234Kelsen, Hans ([1932] 1967). ‘Verteidigung der Demokratie’ in Demokratie und Sozialismus: Ausgewählte 
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efforts to maintain a space, so that another economic solution could be found, and to avoid 
the Presidential regime that contributed to this crisis of representation. In this direction, we 
can also see the “critical impact and the debunking force” of Kelsen’s legal theory, which 
made it impossible to “cover political demands with the cloak of law” as Neumann 
argued1235. This was evident in Kelsen’s critique of the bourgeois dualisms. As we have 
seen, the aim of Kelsen’s overall legal theory (besides his theory of interpretation) was to 
open a space for his concept of the political to come, and to achieve social transformation 
in a peaceful way, without reifying the State-civil society distinction. 
 
On the other hand, Kelsen’s state theory can also be deemed problematic in view of the 
late Weimar context. That’s because the inner assumption of this theory is the 
“equilibrium” logic that actually signifies a concept of the state as instrument. However, it 
escaped Kelsen’s notice that the capitalist state presupposes only a relative autonomy of 
the “political”-democratic state. In this sense, Kelsen focuses mostly on the stricto sensu 
political, as an expression of the social (through proportional representation), and loses the 
overview of the whole material condensation of relations of social forces that operate in a 
capitalist society. This can be seen in his underplaying of the public power of capital that 
was one of the crucial factors that led to the privatization of the Weimar state and to a 
subsequent crisis of representation.  
 
To be clear about this, it is not that Kelsen does not grasp the move of the bourgeoisie 
towards dictatorship. As he argued, with reference to Schmitt’s argumentation in the 
“Guardian of the Constitution”: “might such talk simply be an expression of the fact that 
the bourgeoisie will change its political ideal, and desert democracy for dictatorship, 
wherever parliament, as a result of the continuing struggle of the classes, has ceased to be 
a useful instrument of class-domination?”1236.  
 
However, he does not grasp the process through which the bourgeoisie’s desertion of 
democracy had the power to lead to the rise of the authoritarian state, which is what 
created this huge crisis of representation. To put it otherwise, he could not grasp at the 
level of State theory whence the privatization of the state comes from and what the origins 
of the subsequent crisis of representation in Weimar are.  
 
                                                
1235 Neumann ([1942 1944] 2009) 46 
1236Kelsen ([1931] 2015) 221 
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 This can be seen in his 1932 analysis regarding the “two fronts” that fight against 
democracy. The first front is, as he wrote, ‘‘From the far left, the ever-increasing 
Bolshevik movement, which continues to seize more and more circles of the working class; 
[the second front is ] from the far right…from National Socialism, whose party has grown 
more stormy [stürmischer] than ever a political organization in Germany; and that today 
already unifies the largest part of the bourgeoisie …This escape [Flucht] from democracy 
is just one proof that the political form of democracy is not suited to a class struggle that 
will end in the decisive victory of one party and the crushing defeat of the other party. For 
democracy is the political form of social peace, of the balance of opposites, of the mutual 
understanding on a middle line”. He continues by writing that the way to achieve this 
peace is the path of democracy, which follows the logic of “compromise”.1237 
 
However, what escapes Kelsen’s notice here is that the crisis of representation arose 
precisely from the compromise logic of the SPD, and from its inability to grasp the 
transformed state. The defects of Kelsen’s theory can also be seen in other social-
democratic theoretical accounts of this period, which have similar theoretical origins as 
Kelsen’s state theory (despite the divergences in their legal theories). Here I will refer to 
the so-called “Social Rechtsstaat” approaches (see also chapter 4.3.).  
 
Starting from Neumann’s pre-1933 analysis, albeit he foresaw the public power of capital 
(see chapter 4.3.), it is only with the emergency of von Papen’s regime, in June 1932, that 
he views more clearly the dangers of the Presidential regime1238. This can be seen, 
indicatively, in his 1931 argument that the limited parliamentary activity, since 14 
September 1930, was due to the existing class equilibrium (by citing also Bauer’s “class 
equilibrium” theory1239) and that “it is even questionable whether a highly active and 
effective parliament is desirable in a situation of class equilibrium. Should it adopt such a 
posture, then parliament could have in its hands the means to alter decisively the balance 
of power at a moment in which there is a decline in the workers’ political influence…”1240. 
He seems to have underestimated the dangers of the transition to the Presidential regime 
(as visible in the excerpt above).  
 
I think that this is not due to influence on Neumann of Schmitt’s “brand of antiliberalism” 
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and to his “classically Marxist assumptions”, as Scheuerman argues (by calling 
Neumann’s stance “authoritarian laborism”1241). I have already demonstrated that a 
substantive similarity between Schmitt and Neumann cannot be argued, given also 
Neumann’s rejection of corporatism, which does not leave much room for an interpretation 
of his pre-1933 work as “authoritarian laborism” (see chapter 4.3.). On the contrary, his 
aim was the expansion of democracy, beyond the stricto sensu political level through the 
economic constitution. 
 
Neumann’s Weimar stance can be seen better by taking into account the fact that he was 
influenced by the social democratic theories of the state (Bauer, Renner, see chapter 4.3.). I 
have already shown that his thinking was based on these theories, in order to develop his 
strategy of a State that could direct the economy, through a compromise with the various 
economic agencies (based on articles 159 and 165 of the “economic constitution”), while 
the final decision was “reserved by the state”1242(see chapter 4.3).   
 
This was captured by Kelly, who wrote that “Neumann’s integrationist vision was a 
common position within the SPD generally, and goes some way to explaining the policy of 
Tolerierungspolitik towards Weimar’s presidential regimes” 1243. Through the scheme of 
an autonomous concept of the state that would regulate the economy, Neumann could not 
see early enough the reasons for the state’s privatization and, therefore, the structural 
transformation of the state and of the constitutional order could not be grasped. It was only 
in his post-1933 theory that he recognized (implicitly) his problematic assumptions (see 
chapter 4.3.). 
 
 In Heller’s case, whereas his post-1928 theory1244 was clearly oriented towards the use of 
the parliamentary state1245 for social policies against the “anarchistic speed” of the 
capitalist production and the fascist “dictatorship”1246, he could not see that the state itself 
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the possibility of fair play…for one’s internal political opponent, in the relationship with whom one thinks 
one can exclude naked force and come to agreements”. Heller ([1928] 2000) 260 
For the affinities of Heller’s theory with Kelsen’s see also Herrera (1997) 319-322 
1246Heller ([1930] 1987)140-141 
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was dependent on the capitalist economy. That’s why he argued, in 1931, for the 
“authoritarian primacy of the state over society” as necessary, in order to ensure the 
primacy of the state over the private economic power1247. As Thornhill wrote in a critical 
vein, “his faith in the state as the expression of the community remained long after the 
German state had abandoned all interest in protecting the citizen from the economy…”1248.  
This is due to the social democratic assumptions of Heller’s theory, which can be seen also 
through the fact that he was influenced by Lassalle’s concept of the state and constitution. 
Heller, who had reedited Lassalle’s Arbeiterprogramm (1862)1249 wrote that “Lassalle, in 
his well-known lecture ‘Über Verfassungswesen’, said of the ‘real’ constitution which every 
state has at every time, that it is not the written constitution nor the piece of paper, but the 
‘established actual relationships of power in a country’…”1250. Moreover, it is interesting 
that the subtitle in this part of Heller’s work is “The Political Constitution as Social 
Reality”1251, which shows precisely that his theory presupposes that the social can be 
transposed directly into the state and into the ‘political’ constitutional order. This looks not 
too dissimilar to Kelsen’s theory as analyzed in this chapter. 
 Heller’s concept of the state had been criticized by Neumann’s post-1933 argumentation, 
when he argued that Heller neglected the class nature of the capitalist state1252. It is in 1933 
that Heller views that the danger for political democracy comes from the bourgeoisie’s 
power through the state. The authoritarian liberal state, as Heller called it, did not mean the 
“abstinence on the part of the state where subsidizing large banks, large industry and large 
agricultural enterprises is concerned. Rather it means the authoritarian dismantling of 
social policy”1253. 
The affinity between all these Weimar social democratic theorists (Kelsen included) is, 
therefore, that they could not see early enough the interrelationship between the social 
power of the bourgeoisie, which did not want to govern anymore with the SPD, in the late 
Weimar period, with its political power in this form of state. They conceived the state as 
an opposition to the economy, by underplaying its structural interrelationship with the 
capitalist economy. I think that it is this concept of the state that mostly explains Heller’s 
                                                
1247Heller, Herman (1931) “Ziele und Grenzen einer Deutschen Verfassungsreform’’, 576-580  
in Menendez (2015) 287.  
1248 Thornhill (2000) 112 
1249 Herrera (1998) 228 
1250 Heller ([1934] 1996) 1184 
1251 Ibid. 
1252 Neumann ([1935] 1987) 83 
1253 Heller ([1933] 2015) 300 
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and Neumann’s stance as being supporters of the SPD’s policy of toleration1254 (with the 
notable exception of Kirchheimer, who rejected the policy of toleration1255).  
 
Returning to Kelsen’s theory stricto sensu, these assumptions of his state theory have to do 
with the way in which Marx’s riddle was grasped. Kelsen actually conceived the “political 
state” in Marx’s riddle as “nonsense” or as “pleonasm”. That’s because, as Adler argued, 
“this profound critical argument of Marx concerning the double life lived by every citizen 
within the bourgeois state- of the public citizen and private person- leads to the necessary 
study of societal relations which Kelsen has left untouched…Kelsen completely loses the 
context in which the distinction between the political power on one side and private 
interest on the other are brought to bear in Marx’s argument”1256.  
 
Hence, Kelsen conceived the state as “nothing other than an organization of societal 
powers”1257. This made him underrate the fact that the capitalist distinction between the 
political and the economic traverses the “political” State by making it structurally 
dependent on capital. This concept of the state also made him unable to see the origins of 
the privatization of the form of law, given that law was conceived only as a “social 
technique” in the context of his state theory. That’s because, despite the fact that Kelsen 
did not focus on the social question through the economic constitution (as Neumann and 
Heller did), he answered Marx’s riddle through his assumption that the social can be 
directly expressed in the legal order through the state (via his concept of parliamentarism). 
 
Concluding, we can see after this analysis that Kelsen’s theory is both ambitious and 
humble. It is humble, in the sense that his concept of the legal order tries to maintain an 
open space for the political to come and to make, in this way, social transformation 
possible in a peaceful way. In this sense, he seems to have low expectations of the law, at a 
first glance, given that it is politics that can deliver social reform. However, Kelsen’s 
theory is also ambitious, in the sense that it shows a voluntarism, by underplaying the fact 
that a capitalist social formation traverses both the “political” State and the constitutional 
order. 
 In this sense, Kelsen’s constitutionalism is insufficiently political because it doesn’t grasp 
how the bourgeois constitutional orders are traversed by the power of capital in its 
                                                
1254 Thornhill (2000) 104. Kelly (2003) 280-281 
1255 Thornhill (2000) 121 
1256Adler (1922) 191-192 
1257Adler (1922) 190 
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entanglement with the mode of production, even if they are based on a post-traditional 
constitution (as the Weimar Constitution). Whereas he defends Weimar and the Weimar 
Constitution, Kelsen seems unable to offer a way out, firstly, due to his state theory that 
took into account the Weimar state through the lens of “class equilibrium” logic and, 
secondly, due to his related concept of law merely as a “social technique”. Hence, he could 
not effectively oppose Schmitt’s theory despite that his solution to Marx’s riddle is 
different from Schmitt’s.  
In this direction, Neumann’s post-1933 critique of Kelsen was incisive (albeit 
hyperbolically in his tone): “[Kelsen’s theory] by throwing out of account all relative 
problems of political and social power… paves the way for decisionism, for the acceptance 
of political decisions no matter where they originate or what their content, so long as 
sufficient power stands behind them”1258.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1258Neumann ([1942 1944] 2009) 47 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that the Weimar constitutional debate illuminated 
the contradiction between the democratic state and the capitalist economy and its effect on 
the constitutional question. It dealt substantively with Marx’s riddle by taking into account 
the question of the political organization of powers (the ‘political question’) and of the 
socio-economic structures of power (the ‘social question’). 
 
I have shown in this thesis that the solutions that were provided to this riddle cannot be 
traced without attention to the historical condition in which these theories were developed. 
That’s why I have explored them along with the historical process of the Weimar Republic 
and its tragic fall. Although this is not a dissertation about history, this historical context 
allowed me to recover the concept of political constitutionalism that was endorsed by 
Kelsen and Schmitt primarily (and by the other Staatslehre theorists secondarily), namely 
how they delved into the aforementioned questions in their theorization of the constitution. 
 
I divided this dissertation in two parts. With regards to this historical framework, I 
demonstrated in part A that the Weimar Constitution was a post-traditional constitution in 
the sense that it dealt both with the “political question” (by establishing parliamentary 
democracy for the first time in Germany) and with the social question mainly through its 
economic constitution. I argued that, regarding both questions, it incorporated a rupture 
with the 19th century constitutions. 
 
However, I showed that it included also some elements of continuity with regards to both 
questions due the fact that it was a compromise between various political powers and 
because of the ‘evolutionary logic’ favoured by the Social Democrats, which could be seen 
to an extent since the birth of the Weimar state.  
 
Regarding the political question, the logic of continuity was visible in the powers given to 
the President mostly through article 48. As far as the introduction of these powers is 
concerned, I have shown that it is justified at a theoretical level by Hugo Preuss and Max 
Weber, and for that reason, I have addressed their constitutional theories. 
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I have argued that it was Preuss’ more moderate concept of a President-counterweight to 
the Reichstag that was ultimately incorporated to the Constitution. It derived from his 
suspicion toward political parties (as an outcome of their weak role during the Kaiserreich) 
and from his concept of democracy as an organic unity of the people (as influenced by 
Gierke). Moreover, I have demonstrated that his greater emphasis on the parliament 
(compared to Weber) derived from his belief that parliament can be the place for the 
“cooperative structure of the state” and “the precondition for a rich and vigorous, though 
gradual, step-by-step unfolding of the social idea”1259.  
 
 On the contrary, Weber’s constitutional suggestions were more radical notwithstanding 
his ultimate compromise with the formulation of article 48. He suggested a concept of a 
charismatic President, which became the hegemonic interpretation of article 48 during the 
Weimar Republic both at the political level (during the first period of the Weimar Republic 
and mainly after 1929) and at the level of constitutional theory (after 1929). I showed that 
Weber’s constitutional suggestions derived from his theory, which dealt with the 
contradiction that Marx traced between the political state and the capitalist economy. 
Although his descriptive account had common starting points with Marx- given his 
emphasis on the instrumental rationality of capitalism- his solution was an idiosyncratic 
liberal one. That was mainly because he suggested the solution of a charismatic President 
that would be the one to resist the “bureaucratic” tendencies and maintain the typically 
bourgeois distinction between the political and the economic. Hence, I argued that he 
theorized an elitist concept of the political that went along with a defense of a liberal 
“pure” autonomy of the state. This was also seen in his defense of a liberal system of 
industrial relations so as to avert a “socialization” of law.  
 
Regarding the social question, I have demonstrated that the Weimar Constitution dealt with 
it mainly through its economic constitution.  I described how Sinzheimer introduced the 
economic constitution (and particularly article 165). He tried, in this way, to turn the 
“economic affairs into public affairs”1260 and to give a voice to labour about the way in 
which the national economy was run through the central role of councils (while the 
parliamentary legislator would maintain its supremacy over the economic constitution 
given that the economic constitution was based “upon the soil of the new political 
democracy”1261).  Sinzheimer’s thought presupposed a “satisfactory balance between the 
                                                
1259Preuss [1925] 2000). 120, 122 
1260 Sinzheimer(1920) 140 
1261 Ibid. 
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autonomous regulation of the economy by the economic actors themselves on the one 
hand, and state oversight or guardianship of the common interest on the other”1262.  
 
I demonstrated that his thought has affinities with the strategy that was adopted during the 
late 1920s by other social democratic Staatslehre theorists- the so-called “Social 
Rechtsstaat” approaches”- that gave emphasis to the way in which the economic 
constitution could oppose the effects of organized capitalism. Such an approach was the 
Weimar theory of Franz Neumann who was Sinzheimer’s Assistent from 1923 to 1927 and 
was “heavily influenced” by him1263.  
 
I have shown how, according to Neumann, the economic constitution could facilitate 
“democratic market control” through the cooperation between the social associations 
(employers, workers) and the state. I argued that his thought also has affinities with 
Heller’s thought. Heller, through his Social Rechtsstaat approach, argued for the legal 
regulation of the economy, which would enable the state to control the “anarchistic speed” 
of the capitalist production. 
 
However, I also demonstrated that these social democratic approaches (along with 
Sinzheimer’s) underplayed the incompatibility between this economic constitution and the 
capitalist mode of production. They underrated the extent to which the state and the 
constitution are structurally dependent on the success of the capitalist system and, 
therefore, on its power as long as it continues. To put it differently, they did not adequately 
recognize that the logic of accumulation traverses the State and the constitution by turning 
the state relatively autonomous in relation to the economic system. Hence, they could not 
grasp the origins of the ‘hijacking’ of the economic constitution during Weimar, which 
became evident during the 1930s in that the economic constitution turned into a tool for the 
suppression of the workers’ rights through the state. 
 
I also demonstrated that these origins could not be grasped also by a contemporary Weber-
inspired approach. According to this approach, the Weimar economic constitution was ab 
initio problematic because it blurred the boundaries between the political and the social by 
eroding the autonomy of the state, leading, in this way, to the privatization of the state, 
which ultimately benefited big capital. 
                                                
1262 Dukes (2014) 13 
1263 Tribe (1995) 172 
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I have disagreed in this dissertation with this approach because I have argued that, due to 
its liberal concept of the state as autonomous, it is unable to make sense of the origins of 
Weimar’s fall, which are to a great extent related with the always only relative autonomy 
of the state in capitalism (see below for the other two factors). In this direction, I found 
more convincing the post-1933 Marxist critique of Franz Neumann who changed totally 
his theoretical perspective after the Weimar period. He brought into light the power that 
capital has in a non-socialist state, which makes the state relatively autonomous. I showed 
that, from this perspective, he criticized both the earlier social democratic approaches, 
which underplayed the compatibility of the democratic organization of economy with the 
capitalist mode of production, and the similar assumptions that were shared by the German 
Social Democracy and its unions during the Weimar period. 
 
Through this analysis I confronted directly the question regarding the responsibility of the 
constitutional architecture for the way in which the economic constitution ended up. I have 
argued that, albeit the economic constitution was not responsible for its hijacking (and less 
for Weimar’s fall), its share of the burden was that, in not breaking the continuity between 
it and the capitalist mode of production, it left itself vulnerable to its subsumption under 
the logic of accumulation. 
 
Picking up the thread of this discussion, I presented extensively in part B the historical 
context and the reasons of Weimar’s fall (so as to answer also to the earlier question 
regarding the way in which the Weimar state was privatized). I have demonstrated that 
Weimar’s fall can be seen as an outcome of three main interrelated factors. Firstly, of the 
crisis of the capitalist mode of production, which capital wanted to overcome through the 
attack on the social state in order to maintain the margins of profitability. However, given 
that Weimar was a mass democratic welfare state in which the working class had ab initio a 
significant role, the only way that this could be done was through the attack on political 
democracy. This was “achieved” through the transformation of the Weimar state due to the 
fact that the Weimar welfare capitalist state was itself dependent on the success of the 
capitalist economy in order to avoid its economic collapse.  
 
This strategy was “successful”, secondly, due to the inability of political powers and of the 
unions to resist the “privatization” of the Weimar state and its alignment with the direct 
social interests of capital fractions. This inability was demonstrated mostly with regards to 
the toleration shown by the SPD and the ADGB to the presidential regime (during 1930-
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1932), which underrated the danger of this regime and shared practically the assumption 
that capitalism must be saved.  
 
Thirdly, Weimar’s fall was due to the structural transformation of the Weimar 
constitutional order, which overcame the contradiction between the democratic state and 
the capitalist economy in the direction of undermining the organizational-political part of 
the constitution (with regards to the political question) and of hijacking the Weimar 
economic constitution (with regards to the social question).  
 
I have showed that this whole process led to a huge crisis of political representation 
between 1930-32 and, ultimately, to Weimar’s fall.   
 
The main question that was asked in this dissertation is how did Schmitt and Kelsen 
theorize the effect of the contradiction between the Weimar democratic state and the 
Weimar capitalist economy on the constitutional question? In other words, was their 
answer to Marx’s riddle sufficiently political so as to grasp -from the perspective of 
constitutional theory- the privatization process of the Weimar state and of the Weimar 
constitution, which led to Weimar’s fall? 
 
I have found that Schmitt’s line of constitutional thinking is what accounts for the 
transformation of the Weimar constitutional order (from the perspective of constitutional 
theory). That’s because, according to Schmitt’s constitutional theory, the main problem of 
Weimar was 20th century parliamentarism, which allowed the Reichstag’s intervention in 
the economy. In this direction, I have demonstrated that his concept of the state tried to 
draw a 19th century State-civil society distinction in times of 20th century mass democracy 
and of organized capitalism. The understanding that this context is irreversible makes him 
develop an “authoritarian liberal” theory- as I called it- so as to restore the 19th century 
state-civil society relationship; in other words, he detached economic liberalism from 
democracy by prioritizing the former but with the “help” of a strong state.  
 
I have argued that, albeit this authoritarian liberalism, was made more explicit during his 
1930s account of the Weimar Republic (with his “Guardian of the Constitution” and his 
“Legality and Legitimacy”), this direction could be already traced at least from his “Crisis 
of parliamentary democracy” (1923). So, these assumptions drive Schmitt’s 1932 
suggestion for a “strong state and free economy”, namely a strong state that would 
depoliticize the social and would weaken the institutions of democratic representation 
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through his appeal to the popularly elected President as the only way to reset the 19th 
century distinction between the political and the economic. To put it in a nutshell, his 
attack was both on the Weimar economic constitution and on parliamentary democracy 
through a radicalization of Weber’s insights.  
 
Regarding his constitutional theory, I have demonstrated that it is inseparably connected to 
his state theory and to his account of the Weimar Republic. In this vein, I have divided 
Schmitt’s Weimar work into two periods: his pre-1928 and post-1928 period. His Weimar 
writings up to 1928 argue for a purely “political” constitution in contrast with the formal 
constitution, which enables the staging of the social question through the 20th century 
parliament. In this direction, he insists in 1926 on the semantic generality of law against 
law’s confounding with the parliamentary “measures”. So, I argued that both his 1920s 
critique to the legislature for confounding between “measures” (Maßnahme) and “statutes” 
(Gesetz) and his expansive interpretation of article 48 should be seen to a large extent as 
being against the parliament’s intervention in the economy. 
 
In his second phase after 1928, Schmitt adopted the method of “decisionist 
institutionalism”1264 by over-determining his prior distinction between the “political”-
substantive constitution and the “formal” one with the discourse of “institutional 
guarantees”. I have showed that this method helped him to interpret the Weimar 
Constitution in the direction of a clearer defense of economic liberalism against the 
parliamentary legislator. From this perspective, Schmitt legitimized the 1930s “financial 
state of emergency” by interpreting article 48 even more expansively than during the early 
1920s and by conceiving the President as the “Guardian” of the Constitution. That is 
because he traced the threat to the Constitution not in the power of capital but in the 
parliamentary mass democratic state that disturbs the 19th century political-economic 
distinction (on which he models the constitution). 
 
The overall argument has therefore been that Schmitt’s theory had, notwithstanding its 
variations, a main persistent orientation throughout his Weimar work: the critique against 
the Weimar breakthrough of the legislative supremacy that allowed the intervention of the 
parliamentary state in the economy. In this vein, both his political and his legal theory 
throughout his Weimar writings (and with bigger emphasis during the last period of the 
Weimar Republic) were attempts to detach the Weimar state and the Weimar Constitution 
                                                
1264This is a term borrowed from Croce & Salvatore (2013) 
 274 
from the meaning of the 1919 departure (with regards both to the social and to political 
question) and to tie it back to a 19th century concept of constitutionalism but with a 
popularly elected President and a strong state. In this sense, it was seen that Schmitt dealt 
both with the political and the social questions by ultimately suggesting a radicalization of 
Weber’s insights regarding them both. 
 
In the above sense it was demonstrated that Schmitt solved Marx’s riddle precisely in the 
opposite direction from the young Marx. Whereas the young Marx tied the constitution to 
the democratic promise in order to dissolve the split between civil and political life, 
Schmitt’s Weimar thinking untied the constitution from the democratic promise- 
notwithstanding his reference to a political constitutionalism- in order to defend this split 
(namely the political-economic distinction).  
 
Regarding Kelsen’s theory, I showed that his state theory throughout the interwar period 
made the opposite move from Schmitt’s. Whereas Schmitt located the problem in mass 
parliamentarism, Kelsen argued that there can be an evolutionary transformation to 
socialism and a peaceful handling of social conflict through parliamentarism. This is based 
mostly on his account of the Austrian and the Weimar Republic- drawn from the 1920s 
decade of these Republics- as states in which there is an “equilibrium of class strengths” (a 
term that he borrows from the Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer). His account of these two states 
is related to the social democratic assumptions of his theory and vice versa. 
 
 I have demonstrated that these assumptions have to do with the influence of the German 
Social Democracy and of the Austro-Marxists (that are to an extent part of the German 
Social Democracy) on his thinking. These social-democratic assumptions along with the 
influence of the multi-ethnic context of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on his theory played 
a crucial role in his relational concept of the state.  
 
I found in the thesis that this relational concept of the state de-reified the relationship 
between the State and (the modalities of) civil society. So, whereas Schmitt’s state theory 
reified the State-civil society relationship in a 19th century liberal direction, Kelsen argued 
that, through parliament, the social can be directly expressed in the state and, therefore, a 
socialist transformation through parliament is possible. Hence, I argued that Kelsen’s 
autonomous-relational concept of the State under these assumptions was different from 
Weber’s and Schmitt’s liberal concept of autonomous state in the sense that it did not 
presuppose the political-economic distinction. 
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These assumptions were also seen in Kelsen’s legal theory during the interwar period. I 
demonstrated that his legal theory was strongly related to his state theory and maintained 
the same ‘enemies’ (liberalism, conservatism, Marxism-as-anarchism). This becomes 
visible through the presentation of his critique to the dominant dualisms of traditional legal 
theory, namely of the State-law, subjective right-objective law and public-private law 
dualisms. I have shown that, through the critique to these dualisms, Kelsen brings the 
whole State-civil society under democratic accountability without succumbing to 
reification. In other words, I have argued that Kelsen’s concept of law as “social 
technique” functions as the way through which the social can be directly expressed in 
Kelsen’s relational concept of the state.  
 
Moreover, I demonstrated two problematic aspects of Kelsen’s theory. Firstly, I traced an 
internal contradiction in his theory. This is the political role that he ascribes to the 
Constitutional Court and to its decisions. Although he tried to square the circle in various 
ways with regards to this issue (e.g. judges elected by the people), I showed that his 
conflation between the legal and the political element had as a consequence both the 
undermining of his concept of parliamentarism and the granting of greater freedom to the 
courts to decide political issues under the veil of legal discourse. The effects of Kelsen’s 
thinking became evident in his 1932 comment regarding the decision of the 
Staatsgerichtshof about the Prussian coup, which dealt with the expansive use of article 48. 
Regarding this comment, I demonstrated that Kelsen was unable to defend efficiently the 
original use of article 48 (based on Preuss’ model) against its expansive interpretation due 
to his exaggeration of the political element in the judicial decision-making that led him to a 
legal agnosticism.  
 
Secondly, at a more general level regarding his constitutional theory, I have demonstrated 
that Kelsen, having as a model the Weimar and the Austrian states and their constitutions 
before 1930, ‘solved’ Marx’s riddle by endorsing a concept of the state and of constitution 
though which the social can be directly expressed (mostly through proportional 
representation). He did this, in effect, by tying the constitution to the democratic promise 
in the same way that the young Marx did. However, as seen in the introduction, young 
Marx’s solution presupposed the dissolution of the split between civil and political life 
through the democratic constitution, whereas Kelsen argued that the social is directly 
expressed through the ‘political’ democratic state and the democratic constitution 
regardless of the fact that the constitution incorporated this split. 
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Through this solution, Kelsen underrated the tension between the democratic promise and 
the logic of accumulation, which traverses the modern bourgeois constitutions even if they 
are post-traditional (as was the Weimar one). In this direction, I have shown that, although 
he had clearly foreseen that the bourgeoisie was deserting democracy for dictatorship, he 
did not grasp the structural element that gave power to the bourgeoisie and was leading to 
the privatization of the Weimar state and to the structural transformation of the Weimar 
constitutional order. That’s because of his autonomous concept of the state and of his 
concept of law as a “social technique”.  
 
I demonstrated this through Kelsen’s analyses during the early 1930s and through the 
stance of other social democratic Staatslehre theories (the “Social Rechtsstaat theories”) 
whose state theories had affinities with Kelsen (despite their divergent legal theories). I 
have shown that these theories were also based on a concept of an autonomous state (albeit 
different from the liberal one) through which the economy could be regulated and, 
therefore, they could not make sense of the origins of the state’s transformation, which was 
leading to a grave crisis of representation. This could be seen also in their support of the 
SPD’s toleration strategy.  
 
In all, I have demonstrated that Kelsen did not articulate an adequately political 
constitutionalism because he could not grasp the power of capital to affect the state and the 
constitution despite dealing both with the political and the social question in his theory. 
 
In conclusion, Marx’s riddle brought into light the framework in which one of the most 
significant methodological debates in the history of constitutional theory took place. This 
framework could not have been revealed unless this debate was historically contextualized, 
namely unless seen in the context of the Weimar Republic that embodied the contradiction 
between a modern democratic state and a capitalist economy. It is through this historical 
context that Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s answers to the political question and to the social 
question with regards to the constitution were revealed. Hence, I have called this debate a 
riddle of political constitutionalism, that is, a riddle regarding the role of the ‘political 
constitution” (in Marx’s sense) between the contradiction of the democratic state and 
capitalist economy that was played out in Weimar.  
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